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Lessons on Successful Reform Management
G á b o r  P é t e r i ,  V i o l e t t a  Z e n t a i
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, all countries in Central and Eastern Europe
encountered the challenge to deconstruct their previous
party state structures and rebuild new democratic ones.
This challenge emerged in a particular historical period
when a general discontent with the late modern welfare state
became apparent. Throughout the developed world it got
translated to ideals of a “lean and mean” governance creating
a better balance between efficiency and democracy,
bureaucracy and entrepreneurship.
In top of these changes, a wholesale restructuring of the
political systems in Central and Eastern Europe started to
take place when established democracies grapple new
problems of legitimation as states are to deliver services
in a globalizing economy, and an enhanced transnational
movement of people and ideas. The discontent with the
classical welfare state institutions and the challenges that
globalization processes triggered have altered the profes-
sional discourses on state, governance, and democracy
throughout the 1990s.
The changing discourses on state structures unfold in
principle on a consensus that despite the paramount local
specificities, welfare states in general have become many
times bureaucratic, input and structure oriented, authori-
tative in making claims on the public good. Therefore,
new ideals have started to emphasize the requirements of
flexible processes serving particular tasks rather than
preserving established structures. The potentials of steering
rather than controlling processes, using output indicators
instead of input ones for measuring performance, the
cooperative decision making versus an adversarial one,
enabling rather than directly managing, just to name a
few of these ideals.1
The need for a devolution of the power central authorities
hold emerged in many countries, and the sharing of service
delivery tasks with the market and civil society actors have
also become a preferred model. All these ideas seem to
move the current state arrangements into two parallel
directions: to enhance democratic processes as well as to
enable entrepreneurial performance. In other words, state
structures are assumed to be more transparent and more
capable, to pursue efficiency but inclusiveness as well, and
ultimately become more capable yet more self-reflexive
in practicing power.
Both powerful international institutions striving to in-
fluence the political reform process in Central and Eastern
Europe and the broader professional circles started to
promote the new discourses on state structures from the
late 1980s on. Societies in this region capture these new
discourses with a particular historical experience in mind.
In the early post socialist period, states in Central and
Eastern Europe were viewed primarily as a locus of super-
power and as such, prime target of cautious control and
containment. Thus, in the early 1990s, new democratic
ideals, although never homogeneously, pronounced the
deconstruction of old state structures, and the rebuilding
of new ones with strong democratic control.
Besides these broad principles, rarely was any political
consensus on a comprehensive model of state architecture,
let alone elaborate blueprints for its establishment.2 State
structures, however, have become targets of consciously
planned institutional and legislative reforms due to moral
and political pressures articulated by domestic actors, and
often also due to international aid and technical assistance
push. The reform measures, introduced in saliently different
political contexts and under varying professional support,
more often than not, reflected some major element of the
broader shifting discourses on state and governance. States
in the region faced the paradoxical job to reform them-
selves, to abolish the public distrust and suspicion, and
tame the impact of a globalizing economy with little nur-
turing impacts on post-socialist economies. To add up the
difficulties, reform ideals and measures, and in a number
of cases even the state apparatus itself, get captured by
fights for political and economic power, such as for example
the redistribution of property rights.
Redefinition of state structures has started by reform packages,
bodies, and with legislative measures. The depth, direction,
and space of these reforms of course greatly differ, and
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one could see major difference in a particular country
trajectory depending on the elections cycles, results, and
actual government’s commitments. Most commonly, state
reforms are conceived as public administration or/and
systems of governance reforms. The magic word of “de-
centralization” often occurs in the title and core content
of reform documents reflecting the major trends of con-
tem-porary professional and political discourses of state
and governance by a single summary term.
More than that, decentralization refers to a definite goal
of devolution of power from central to sub-national level,
which in this region entails the establishment of a genuine
system of local (and regional) governments. The devolu-
tion of power necessarily intervenes with service delivery
responsibilities, public finance arrangements, rebuilding
central state capacities and institutions, yet these elements
themselves often appear as distinctive reform packages
that may or may not move in accordance with the devolu-
tion of power.
ARTICULATION OF REFORM CONCEPTS
Decentralization and formulation of democratic local go-
vernment system are parts of broader reforms. Firstly, they
essentially modify the power systems, by shifting work-
place and job related dependency of citizens towards terri-
torial, residence based political structures. Together with
new political mechanisms of multi-party elections, control
over elected and government organizations local govern-
ments become critical elements of the new political system.
Secondly, establishment of local governments transforms
the structure and procedures of public administration, as
well. Countries gradually moved from traditional mecha-
nisms of ‘dual subordination,’ when local administration
had to report both to local councils and to sectoral minist-
ries. New relationship is established between central and
local governments by separating functions, developing audit
and control mechanisms, increasing the influence of elected
councils and mayors over local administration.
That is why decentralization and public administration
reforms are regarded as critical elements of broader, more
significant development programs. They are designed to-
gether with general ‘modernization’ strategies (e.g. in Slo-
vakia) or fit into long term strategies of the country (e.g.
‘Strategy for the 21st Century’ in Croatia). Decentraliza-
tion reforms are considered to be as important as privatiza-
tion or changes in the forms of control over state ownership.
Formulation of decentralization strategies and the imple-
mentation are always connected to other reforms. The
most visible one is the change in the territorial structure of
the administration. In almost each country new elected
municipal units were created following fragmented (Hun-
gary, Slovakia), or amalgamated models (Bulgaria, Poland).
Decentralization had more significant implications on
public administration, when the intermediate level of go-
vernment was created. The shift from government districts
towards elected regions in Slovakia, creating new regional
government units (poviat and voivodship) in Poland have
established new conditions for the public administration
and the entire public sector.
Devolution of competencies and powers can be imple-
mented only parallel to reforms of the central government.
Ministries and other government agencies have to go
through functional reviews by separating core administra-
tive and policy making functions from the daily manage-
ment of public service organizations. Traditional centra-
lized structures of controlled state owned companies, large
networks of service providers, extended social infrastruc-
ture for public employees have to be transferred to more
efficient forms of operation. The functional review was
—or sometimes still remained—the most significant com-
ponent of reform packages in the centralized countries,
like Bulgaria, Croatia, and Latvia.
Decentralization is usually followed by reforms of the civil
service. Under the new political and administrative con-
ditions the role and position of public employees have to
be changed, as well. Political impartiality, clearly regulated
rules of loyalty, transparency of their operation, stability,
professionalism and improved policy making capacity are
those new values, which drive the civil service reforms.
The legislative changes are only the first steps in this area,
because the transition of the old administration has to be
managed, new practices of recruitment and public em-
ployment has to be established, training and other forms
of professional carrier development has to be organized3.
Professionalization of public administration is typically
implemented in the second stage of reforms. The countries
studied in this book at first paid less attention to this task.
Sometimes even the legislation on civil service was delayed,
(Bulgaria: 1999, Slovakia: 2001), until the real decentrali-
zation reforms have been started. Those countries, which
had a quick start in public administration reform slowly,
recognized the importance of changes in administrative
behavior. For example the second wave of public administ-
ration reform in Hungary mostly focused on operational,
procedural conditions of effective civil service.
17
Decentralization is closely connected to transformation of
public services. Reassignment of service responsibilities is
the first step of public sector reforms. It is implemented
through transfer of assets, changes in organization and
management of service delivery, restructuring intergovern-
mental relations in financing, auditing and professional
control of public services. This component of decentrali-
zation has the most visible impact on the role of the central
government. Reform strategies are mostly based on sec-
toral approach in countries with a more centralized public
sector, like Croatia and Latvia. Here the legacy of ‘dual
subordination’ is the strongest, so perhaps the first step is
to modify these hierarchical, administrative linkages bet-
ween central and local governments.
Finally, the regional development structures are also con-
nected to decentralization reforms. As local governments
of Central and Eastern Europe have a wide range of res-
ponsibilities, they are involved also in local infrastructure
and economic development. The European Union acces-
sion process has also increased the local governments’ com-
petencies and tasks in regional development. So planning,
statistical, financing and coordination mechanisms of
regional development have a strong impact on decentrali-
zation. Debates over regional development structures
might strengthen local governments (Bulgaria, Slovakia)
or they may lead to centralized dependency (e.g. in Hun-
gary through the financing schemes).
As decentralization and public administration reforms are
deeply connected to other structural changes, the articula-
tion of reform concepts is faced with several problems. First
of all political goals of the actual governments are the most
critical conditions for these wide ranging reforms. As it is
discussed is the following section the domestic political
context can slow down or accelerate public administration
reforms. The most visible examples are Poland and Slovakia,
where political changes were clearly connected to shifts
in decentralization policies (in Poland the failure of poviat
reforms in 1993, but progress after 1998; in Slovakia
breakthrough following 1998 changes in government).
Decentralization of public services is usually a slow reform
process full of conflicts. Despite the close linkages between
‘territorial’ and ‘sectoral’ reforms, their implementation is
often separated in time and in reform programs. For
example the country reports on Slovakia described the
sectoral reform as a late one and not following the concept
of decentralization; in Bulgaria territorial reforms were
deliberately separated from other elements of public admi-
nistration reform; in Croatia implementation of sectoral
reform concepts (‘files of the Strategy for the 21st century’)
was delayed.
In the early stages of transition the basic question was the
sequence of steps in the wide ranging and complex public
sector reforms. From a merely professional point of view
the transformation of central government structure and
mechanisms should be in the focus of reforms. But as de-
centralization is a highly political process, transfer of power
to local elected governments will enforce later the changes
of national governments, as well. As the author of the
Polish report argues, ‘after decentralization ...the reform
of the center was not of such great importance and urgency
as it had seemed...” Perhaps this was the characteristics of
the early 1990s, during the first stages of transition it was
more important to start the reforms from below, focusing
on changes in political mechanisms.
The complexity of public administration reforms is reflected
also in the fact, that legislative and organizational changes
should be complemented in changes of the administrative
culture. Here the most evident example is Hungary, where
after the well-prepared and fast start of structural reforms
at the turn of the last decade, public administration reforms
later focused on capacity development and improvement
of management practices.
A similar shift was visible in some other countries as well
(e.g. Latvia, Poland), but the Hungarian case showed the
significance of institutional changes in an indirect way.
In this period, when due to political reasons it was im-
possible to implement major structural reforms (e.g. amal-
gamation of small municipalities), administrative mecha-
nisms could actually modify the basic rules of public ad-
ministration. Within this stable and decentralized struc-
ture, the new rules and procedures have created an envi-
ronment with rather centralized rules and procedures.
As decentralization reforms are complex and long pro-
cesses, country examples discussed in this book are also
characterized by different patterns and stages of transforma-
tion. (See Table 1.) There are three groups of countries,
which reflecting three types of decentralization reforms.
In Hungary and Poland political and institutional changes
were started at a relatively high speed: political, legislative
and structural reforms were implemented in two-three years.
This quick start was followed by almost a decade of long
process reforms.
Bulgaria and Latvia belongs to another group, where after
the initial revolutionary political changes (independence,
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Table 1.
Stages of Decentralization Reforms
1 .   Q U I C K  S TA R T,  LO N G  P R O C E S S
H u n g a r y
1989–1993: legislative, structural and institutional changes
1996– functional reforms: PAR, regional development structures
1999– fine-tuning: capacity development, improving management practices
Poland
1990: political changes, creating gmina-s
1993–1994: poviat reform prepared, but failed
1995-1997: stagnation: program on ‘effective, friendly and safe state’
1998: territorial reform: poviats, voivodships created and elected
1999– implementation of PAR
2.  SOME DELAY, FOLLOWED BY GRADUAL REFORMS
Bulgaria
1991: constitutional acts
1992–1994: lost period
1995–1997: preparations for reform
1998-1999: modernization strategy, development of basic structures
2001: political willingness to reform
Latvia
1991: independence
1993–1997: structural changes in public administration
1997– territorial reform: voluntary amalgamation until 2003
2001– PAR strategy (2001–2006)
3.  STARTING LATE, EFFORTS TO SPEED UP REFORMS
Croatia
1991: constitution, independence
1992–1999 war, autocracy, centralization
2000: reform steps and strategy design
Slovakia
1990–1992 establishing LG-s under administrative districts
1993 Establishing Slovak Republic
1993–1998: Meciar period, state administration reform steps
1998–2000: reform strategy design
2001: legislation and elections at county level
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new constitution) the actual public sector reforms were
delayed. After several years of stagnation, gradual struc-
tural changes, the territorial reforms and modernization
of local governments were started only in the late 1990s.
The third group of countries (Croatia, Slovakia) not only
started the basic structural changes with a significant delay,
but they were not able to launch comprehensive reforms
in the first decade of transition.
These models and waves of public sector reforms are only
partially explained by their internal logic and capacity to
manage and implement these complex processes. There
are more important political and economic factors, which
influence the reforms. The next chapters will summarize
the impact of these independent variables on decentrali-
zation and public administration reform.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT
The domestic political environment could significantly
facilitate or hinder administrative reform processes. One
of the major elements of this context is the stability and
persistence of the ruling political regime. In the post-socialist
political transformations, elected governments often prove
to show troubling frailty. As in most countries in the region
the party system is still shaping up, elected central govern-
ments are formed by coalition arrangements composed by
multiparty cooperation. These arrangements are often en-
dangered by major disagreements, ideological rifts, power
fights, and personal enmities.
Major legislative and institutional reform measures are
subjects to not only political deliberations but bargaining
processes in which the professional clarity and coherence
of proposals get frequently lost. Majority governments
theoretically could be more stable but they often tend to
rely on authoritarian power practices, which creates profes-
sional or political resistance. Resistance could openly or
subtly sabotage reform efforts regardless of the quality
and relevance of these efforts.
Leading political forces set the basic goals of decentralization
and public administration reforms. Depending on the
political and administrative structures the models of de-
centralization might be connected to different political
forces. For example in Bulgaria the author of the country
study reports, that leftist parties supported decentralization
to the lowest possible level, while the region, as the basis of
economic development was targeted mostly by the rightist
political party. Hungary is a different case, where regions
and intermediate levels of government are regarded as
transmission mechanisms of the state, so they were sup-
ported by political forces promoting centralization. (There
was an interesting shift in the political basis of this model,
because first the post-Communist party, later the more
rightist political forces voted for strong regions.)
Alterations in the reforms process were also influenced by
the shifts in political power. The speed and waves of decent-
ralization reforms, summarized in Table 1. were very much
connected to elections or other basic political changes.
Croatia, Poland, Slovakia are the best examples of this direct
linkage between politics and administrative reforms. In
Poland the model of the new territorial administration had
been prepared by 1993, but it was implemented only five
years later, when similar political forces got into power, again.
In Slovakia and Croatia the radical shift from the previous
political mechanisms in 1998 and 2000 has opened the pos-
sibility of designing and launching decentralization pro-
grams.
The political nature of decentralization and public admi-
nistration reforms exaggerates the characteristics of political
mechanisms and the process of public policy making. Good
linkages between politics and professional groups or the
administration are critical conditions of successful reforms.
As the policy making process gradually becomes more opened
to non-governmental organizations, giving new opportu-
nities for local government and professional lobby groups to
change the rules of the game and to gain higher political
influence.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Decentralization and public administration reforms are
influenced not only by political changes, but by economic
factors, as well. However, stages of reforms do not neces-
sarily coincide with the major periods of economic trans-
formation. The policy responses of governments on eco-
nomic crisis could be significantly different, as some country
examples show in our survey. So the relationship between
the shape of the economy and the scope of government
reforms is not simple and easily identifiable.
During the past decade annual growth of the studied eco-
nomies shows similar trends with declining fluctuation
(see Figure 1. below). In the early 1990s the economic
crisis hit mostly the ‘new countries’ of the region, like
Latvia, Croatia and Slovakia. It was an obvious reason
for the delayed start of decentralization and public admi-
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SOURCE: Transition report, 2000, EBRD.
nistration reforms. In the same period Hungary, Poland,
with lower level of economic decline (but still negative eco-
nomic growth or stagnation) already started the institutional
reforms.
The initial economic status of these countries was also
different. In 1991 the per capita GDP was the lowest in
Bulgaria, Latvia (around $1,000), while it was two-three
times higher in the other countries (Table 2.) The econo-
mic transition period was characterized by 4–6 years of
consecutive output decline and by 2000 the real GDP
has exceeded the 1990 value only in Hungary and Poland.4
The process of economic transformation was based on
similar actions for building a market economy. Privatiza-
tion of state owned enterprises, trade and price liberalization,
establishment of mechanisms supporting markets through
taxation, bank restructuring were in the center of economic
reforms. Despite the debates on the speed of reforms and
forms of privatization this early stage of economic transition
showed rather similar trends. The basic institutions of a
market economy had to be established.
As figures in Table 2. show, this process had been comp-
leted by the end of the decade: the share of private sector
in GDP is above 65%; general government expenditures,
as primary sources of state intervention have decreased in
countries with wide ranging reforms. (Exceptions are Croatia
and Latvia, where the weight of government spending
has increased.) The share of agriculture in the economy
is below 10% and declining (except in Bulgaria (16%),
where the economic reforms were delayed).
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Table 2.
Selected Economic Indicators (1991, 1999)
Countries 1991 1999
B U L G A R I A
GDP per capita [USD] 1,014 1,513
Private sector share in GDP [%] 20.0 70.
Share of agriculture in GDP [%] 11.6 15.9
Unemployment [%] 15.3 16.0
General government expenditures in [%] of GDP 43.6 40.7
C R O AT I A
GDP per capita [USD] 2,291 4,467
Private sector share in GDP [%] 20.0 60.0
Share of agriculture in GDP [%] 10.79 8.6
Unemployment [%] 13.2 13.6
General government expenditures8 in [%] of GDP 36.1 49.0
H U N G A R Y
GDP per capita [USD] 3,613 4,853
Private sector share in GDP [%] 30.0 80.0
Share of agriculture in GDP [%] 6.5 5.410
Unemployment [%] 9.3 7.0
General government expenditures in [%] of GDP 59.6 44.8
L AT V I A 11
GDP per capita [USD] 84812 2,582
Private sector share in GDP [%] 10.0 65.0
Share of agriculture in GDP [%] 16.5 3.6
Unemployment [%] 3.9 14.4
General government expenditures in [%] of GDP 40.513 46.8
P O L A N D
GDP per capita [USD] 2,197 3,987
Private sector share in GDP [%] 40.0 65.0
Share of agriculture in GDP [%] 6.7 5.2
Unemployment [%] 14.3 13.0
General government expenditures in [%] of GDP 50.0 44.7
SLOVA K  R E P U B L I C 14
GDP per capita [USD] 2,213 3,650
Private sector share in GDP [%] 15.015 75.0
Share of agriculture in GDP [%] 6.2 4.4
Unemployment [%] 10.4 19.2
General government expenditures in [%] of GDP 58.0 43.3
SOURCE: Transition report 2000, EBRD.
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The ‘costs’ of this transformation was rather high. The
drop in general government expenditures has decreased
not only the redistribution in the economy, but the public
resources available for basic public services, like social as-
sistance and pensions, health care and education. Unem-
ployment is high and increasing in all the countries, except
in Hungary and Poland, which had started the reforms
earlier, than the others had.5
The ‘minimum’ set of market based institutions did not result
automatically in better performance of these economies.
So by the end of the decade new components of the simp-
listic reform strategies have been built into policies of the
national governments and international organizations.
The ‘new consensus’ on reform policies in transition countries
emphasizes the importance of institution building, learning
new rules and changes in behavior under market conditions.6
Several components of decentralization and public admi-
nistration reforms became critical elements of the new
reform policies. Institutional reforms to provide market
discipline now include the transfer of responsibilities to
local governments, moving towards reformed social assis-
tance systems, where local and national governments have
new roles. Also the encouragement of further economic
growth should be based on new government practices in
securing property rights and developing transparent regu-
latory mechanisms.7
The success of these reforms are even less clearly measur-
able, than the formal changes in other market mechanisms,
like the scale of privatization, scope of price liberalization,
etc. Obviously in the first wave EU accession countries
these institutions were strictly scrutinized during the nego-
tiation process. Law harmonization and general requirements
on enforcement mechanisms encouraged this adaptation
process. In other countries (e.g. Bulgaria) the Council of
Europe reports played  similar roles. But the implementation
of these ‘soft,’ institutional reforms does not show that clear,
linear trend similar to the first stage of economic reforms.
That is why the impact of economic conditions on decent-
ralization and public administration reforms is not identi-
fiable. They are parts of the decade-long process, but the
actual steps or even trends cannot be clearly connected to
the stages of economic development. For example in Bul-
garia, the economic crisis of 1996/1997 has led to centra-
lization, or the 1995 bank crisis to postponement of public
administration reform in Latvia. Unlike Hungary, where
similar events did not change or even encouraged decent-
ralization, but later, after 1999 the economic growth co-
incided with centralization policies. Latvia, as a counter-
example was able to launch decentralization reforms after
the first signs of economic recovery in 1997.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE
New institutions and procedures of public administration
have to be professionally designed and prepared for ope-
ration. Similarly to economic reforms, general models and
legal frameworks of the public sector should be adjusted
to local conditions. This transfer of knowledge and deve-
lopment of implementation capability requires domestic
professional capacity and expertise. Standardized models,
internationally accepted practices will not work under
specific local conditions. The most important task during
the reform process is to develop and to use efficiently the
available professional expertise.
Development of professional capacity supporting decent-
ralization and public administration reforms requires dif-
ferent sets of activities. Firstly, the new models have to be
invented and introduced. Secondly, the modified legis-
lation, administrative and management techniques have
to be implemented and built into the daily practices of
the public sector. This latter task is long lasting and espe-
cially complicated at local level, which usually has lower
professional capacity. It is part of the civil service and public
sector management reform, which were not discussed in
detail by our project.
The first professional task, design and legislation of a de-
centralized and modern public sector were solved under
two different circumstances in the selected CEE countries.
In one group of countries the preparatory work had been
started well before the actual political changes. For example
in Poland and Hungary the academic and policy research
groups were in a position to discuss and assess the key
elements of theoretical models. This made it possible not
only to keep the reform ideas in the center of political
thinking, but also supported the learning process both
among policy makers and the public at large.
The other group of countries had a much shorter time to
prepare the new legislation. In Croatia or Slovakia only
the political shifts in the late 1990s have opened new win-
dows of opportunities for actual policy design. This does
not mean, that there were no previous studies or researches
on future reforms. But they were mostly dominated by
theoretical, legalistic approaches and no experiments or
gradual small reform steps were made possible.
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This had an impact on the reforms later, because the policy
makers did not speak the ‘language’ of reforms, as it was
stated in the Croatian report. They did not understand
the new requirements of modern, decentralized public
sector, operating in a privatized environment, but also in
a narrow sense they were not able to communicate with
their foreign counterparts.
Professional capacity for preparing reforms might be de-
veloped at various units of the policy arena. In the most
centralized structures units of national ministries or cont-
rolled semi-independent policy centers are the key actors.
For example in Bulgaria under the present Ministry of
Regional Development and Public Works the National
Center for Territorial Development has monopolized the
programming of the decentralization process. For several
decades only they provided technical advice to the govern-
ment. The Hungarian Institute of Public Administration,
under the government and later reporting to the Ministry
of Interior had a similar role.
Poland had to follow a different model, when independent
researchers and academics formulated an informal group,
which promoted reforms, whenever the political climate,
made it possible. In forms of research groups, clubs of
reform minded experts they are able to keep the reform
agenda alive and this way having indirect impact on local
and national government policies.
Later the work of these consultants become easier, when
the foreign technical assistance entered the transition count-
ries. There is no doubt, transfer of knowledge and expertise
had an enormous impact on the reforms. We cannot assess
the efficiency of the foreign technical assistance and donor
programs here, but it is sure, that they played an important
role in all stages of decentralization and public administ-
ration reforms. During the formulation of strategies,
design of models and policy options they made interna-
tional standards, various country practices widely known.
This information and advice was available in these countries
from the early stages of reforms.
International and bilateral donor programs sometimes
played critical roles in the reform process. They were espe-
cially important under two conditions: when the political
climate was not favorable for reforms or when the reform
capacity had to be developed in a relatively short period.
Bulgaria is an example, when in the mid-1990s foreign
expert studies or institutions set up by donors, contributed
to reforms significantly. In Slovakia, during the two years
of preparing large-scale reforms foreign technical assistance
helped not only the small group of policy makers, but
also other civil and non-governmental organizations, which
provided external support for the reforms.
However, cooperation with foreign donors raises several
problems. Sometimes, even when financial and professional
support comes at the right time (e.g. EU Phare funding
to the office of the reform plenipotentiary in Poland),
donors are not able to respond on the actual needs of a
country. When the political conditions allow only a few
months for the reform forces (e.g. in Poland), the foreign
technical assistance is usually late.
National governments also have to learn the cooperation
with donors. Understanding the decision making process
at the donor organizations is critical for the domestic reform
groups, because otherwise the foreign technical assistance
arrives with a delay or with a wrong focus. The task is
diverse: not only the professional content of programs have
to be influenced, but coordination and adaptation has to
be designed, as well.
Coordination of technical assistance is built into the proce-
dures of the major international programs (e.g. EU Phare),
but even in that case their implementation and bilateral
donor activities should be harmonized. Positive examples
are mentioned in the Slovak country report, where a govern-
ment center was set up for coordination of foreign pro-
gram in public administration or in Hungary, where in
the latest stage of reform, the unit under the prime minister’s
office tried to work with all the major international organi-
zations.
In other cases coordination was hardly feasible and perhaps
not really desirable, when the technical assistance programs
are directed toward local governments. These donor pro-
grams sometimes are looking for innovative mayors and
municipalities. Through these partnerships they can develop
good practices and models, which might be an example
for other municipalities or could have an indirect effect
on policy reforms.
Obviously the most difficult task is to adjust the foreign
advice and models to specific conditions in the target coun-
tries. Especially the models at the national government
level might be misused, because the organizational and
management practices could have different and unintended
political implications. (At local government level diversity
in goals and values leads to more balanced consequences
of technical assistance and advice in a country.)
L E S S O N S  O N  S U C C E S S F U L  R E F O R M  M A N A G E M E N T
24 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
M A S T E R I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  P U B L I C  A D M I N I S T R AT I O N  R E F O R M S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
One example is the influence of the British model of central
government on some CEE countries. The very efficient
model of centralized chancellery and system of special
advisors controlling the line ministries could have negative
impact in our region. Within coalition governments, where
centralized policy making mechanisms are still alive in
the central administration, the State Chancellery in Latvia
or the ‘ministerial prefects’ within the Prime Minister’s
office in Hungary, this British model is highly preferred.
But they serve different political and public administration
reform goals. They might strengthen the leading political
force of the coalition government and support centrali-
zation within the national government decision making.
Generally foreign technical assistance programs played
critical roles not only in design and introduction, but during
the implementation of reforms, as well. Making the policy
process opened to the general public developed new policy
making practices, for example. The use of the media was
learned by the reformers mostly through these programs
(e.g. systematic professional debates by major regions in
Slovakia, supported by a donor).
Marketing and use of media was important in other cases,
as well. In Poland the poviat reform was partly ‘sold’
through a survey, which was about drawing the actual
boundaries of these districts. The conditions, set up by
the reform groups (size, distance, access, etc.) have defined
rather strictly these boundaries and the geographic centers
of poviats, but the survey helped to internalize the new
structures by local leaders and gave additional arguments
to the experts. Other educational and promotional media
programs also helped to create the favorable social condi-
tions for change.
Finally, professional capacity should be developed within
public sector through training. There are different models
of public administration training, depending on the scale
and level of centralization. In most of the CEE countries
some centralized schools are established (e.g. in Latvia)
or developed, which are responsible for training of civil
servants. In the case of local public employees the orga-
nizational models might be less centralized, but still keeping
the control of the national government: for example through
an accreditation procedure and partial funding of training
programs in Hungary. Local government associations and
their special subsidiaries might have an important role, as
well.
The most critical factor of professional capacity and ex-
pertise in preparing reforms is the timing. As the political
conditions of decentralization and public administration
reforms are hardly controllable by the experts, they have
to be prepared for the change.  In Hungary and Poland,
where the expertise was available at the very beginning of
the reform, the changes were deeper, compared to other
countries, where the professional capacity was developed
parallel to the political shifts (Croatia, Slovakia).
Time is critical during the reform design as well. The
dilemma of the latest Polish regional reform was whether
to produce high quality, elaborated reform concepts or to
grab the political opportunity and to introduce the critical
elements of the reforms in a relatively short period. The
conclusion of the Polish author in this book is, that the
speed of changes is perhaps more important, even if
‘quality would suffer.’ Obviously this statement can be
evaluated only in the long run, when all the components
of the Polish regional reform are introduced. But it is
true, that the critical step, the creation of regions and basic
reassignment of the functions of sub-national governments
was implemented.
GOVERNMENT’S REFORM
MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES
Professional design and implementation of decentralization
reform strategies are responsibilities of national government
bureaucracies. They have to develop coherent reform pac-
kages, which not only meet the professional and political
requirements, but which can be legislated and later en-
forced, as well. The complex nature of these ‘institution
building plans’16 and the conflicts between shirt term, fire-
fighting and strategic tasks, claim efficient management
capacities of national governments.
Coordination both among the political interests and the
administrative structures is the most critical element of
reform management. Development of decentralization
policies should be supported the leading political forces
throughout the entire reform process. Political parties in
opposition sometimes are champions of decentralization,
until they get into power. In other cases new governments
are able to promote legislative reforms, but very soon they
lose control over enforcement and administrative imple-
mentation of the new legal framework.
This shift in government policies might be caused by the
administration itself. Bureaucrats may slow down reforms
for very simple reasons. Transfer of government functions
to private or non-governmental organizations might de-
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crease the power (influence, budget, etc.) of ministries.
Ministerial administration could be against decentraliza-
tion, because it might decrease public sector employment.
According to the Croatian report one of the difficulties of
reform implementation was that bureaucrats were afraid
of losing their jobs with the transfer of competencies. In
Hungary, where declining public sector employment was
the main indicator of reform progress, decrease in national
government staff was faster, than at local level.17
Harmonization of administrative strategies is also critical
for successful reform management. Decentralization of
government functions is often separated from the de-
concentration of state administrative institutions, which
does not lead to coherent structures. Strong regional or
local state organs might counterbalance and even destroy
the powers of elected sub-national governments. Regula-
tory, inspection and service roles of national governments
should be adjusted to the decentralized environment.
This requires horizontal administrative coordination among
the organs responsible for decentralization reforms and
the sectoral ministries or other government agencies. Sec-
toral fragmentation and conflicts between ministries (e.g.
with the Ministry of Finance) were reported in almost each
country, as the main obstacles to decentralization reforms.
At the early stages, the design and management of reforms
was typically assigned to one single ministry within the
government administration structure. Ministry of Interior
(Hungary, Slovakia), Ministry of Regional Development
(Bulgaria) or other specially established government units
(e.g. Ministry of State Reform in Latvia) is responsible
for reforms. They are members of the government, so their
competencies and influence are defined by the political
relations within the cabinet. (See Table 3.)
As the one single ministry is not sufficiently strong to launch
and to implement complex reforms the reform preparation
is often transferred to special entities, which have greater
power. Government plenipotentiary (Poland, Slovakia),
reform commissioner (Hungary) usually under the Prime
Minister or deputy Prime Minister, is more efficient form
of preparing administrative reforms. They might have not
only the power to balance sectoral interests, but they expli-
citly show the reform orientation of the government, as well.
After the first waves of comprehensive, structural changes
the focus of reforms is shifted towards quality improvement
of public administration, building mechanisms of conti-
nuous development, establishing adaptation mechanism
of innovations and learning. In this third stage of public
administration reforms responsibilities with the government
structure become more centralized and concentrated: special
units within prime minister’s office (Bulgaria, Hungary)
or coordination of reform activities by the deputy prime
minister show the new assignment of responsibilities.
Parallel to improved coordination of the government units,
also the rules of the political discourse have to be changed.
The dialogue between the politicians and the national
government organs is extremely important, especially in
coalition governments. This level of political coordination
is usually implemented in special councils, commissions,
which have political legitimacy.
Strong political leaders or advisory councils are not sub-
stitutes of these political fora. These councils might also
keep the reform alive in those periods, when it is not high
on the political agenda. Special reform councils could be
also good forms to incorporate other actors (local govern-
ments, non-governmental organizations, civic groups, etc.)
into decentralization reform processes.
Finally, the most important condition for building effec-
tive administrative capacity of reform management is timing.
The professional knowledge and administrative units,
managing the reform should be available at the time, when
reforms are politically feasible. The experience of the studied
countries show, that major changes in the public sector
can be implemented immediately after parliamentary elec-
tion, only in the early months of a new government. Now,
after the first decade of political transformation, the signifi-
cance of timing within a government’s period is even greater.
There are lower chances of ‘trial and error’ methods in
reform, than it was at the beginning of transition.
PUBLIC SUPPORT
If pursued in democratic conditions, reform efforts need
wide public support. Public support is composed by trust
by the populace expressed in different explicit and implicit
forms. Moreover, public support is shaped as well as medi-
ated by the dominant media discourses and representa-
tions. In the field of state and governance reforms, civil
society organizations, professional groups, and already
existing subnational governmental bodies may have a
relatively influential voice. Not that these forces would
be capable of implementing reform measures by them-
selves, but their cooperation or resistance could become a
major obstacle to or initiator in the reform process.
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Countries of Central and Eastern Europe have inherited
quite an extended public sector and ‘heavy handed’ state.
This common legacy of the post-Socialist countries put the
public administration and decentralization into the center
of reforms. It was supported by almost all-political forces
Table 3.
Changes in Administration Structures, Responsible for Decentralization Reform
B U L G A R I A
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works (decentralization)
Ministry of Public Administration (public administration reform)
Prime Minister (Regional Coordination Directorate) (1999)
C R O AT I A
Office for the Development Strategy of Croatia, under the Deputy Prime Minister
Ministry of Justice, Administration and Local Government
Sectoral ministries
H U N G A R Y
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance (1990)
Commissioner of Public Administration Reform (1996)
Special Unit for Public Administration and Regional Policy at the Prime Minister’s Office (1998)
L AT V I A
Ministry of State Reform (1995)
Department of State Reforms within the State Chancellery (1996)
State Minister of Labor at the Ministry of Welfare (1997)
Bureau of Public Administration Reform, under the Deputy Prime Minister (1997)
Minister of Special assignment on Public Administration and Local Government Reform
(with extended administrative support) (1999)
P O L A N D
Undersecretary of State and Plenipotentiary of self-government reform (1989)
Plenipotentiary for the Public Administration Reform (1993)
Plenipotentiary for the Public Administration Reform (1998) in cooperation with
Plenipotentiary for the Decentralization of Public Finances, and Under-secretary of State at the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Administration (responsible for administrative division and implementation of the reform)
S LOV A K I A
Ministry of Interior (1990)
Deputy Prime Minister (1992)
Government Plenipotentiary (1998)
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs, responsible for coordination (2000)
and the general public. Local governments as newly estab-
lished, democratic institutions together with demolition
of the centralized public administration were widely accepted
strategic goals.
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This was reflected by the citizens’ constantly high level of
trust in local governments. During the past decade in
countries of Central Europe public opinion surveys show,
that local governments seem to be more trustworthy
organizations, than other political institutions18. After the
first years of transition the surveys on trust in public ins-
titutions show, that local governments are put higher than
the parliament, or the president of a country.
The constant or slightly decreasing level of turnout at
local elections is typical in most of these countries (1998:
46%–58%). At parliamentary elections the initially high
turnout decreased significantly. Between 1990 and 1998
in the Czech Republic from 97% to 74%, Hungary 65%
to 57%, Poland 63% to 47%, Slovakia 95% to 84%.
The stability of local governments is also reflected in the
low rates of local mayors’ turnover: two thirds of them
are usually re-elected. This fact shows the acceptance of
local governments.19
There are interesting inquiries into the nature of public
trust in public institutions in post socialist political trans-
formations. Theoretically, public trust is something that
becomes a political force mostly at times of elections (or
dire crisis situations). But the fear, anticipation, and refe-
rence to public trust or distrust become an important device
for the political actors. Although public expectations re-
garding the state and its institutions are in flux in the current
transformations, one may identity some strong typical
public convictions.
Societies recently departing the almighty party states often
prefer weak state systems with strong service delivery capa-
cities. In contrast, what they often experience is a state
that is relatively weak in service delivery but strong in
controlling the civic liberties, means of production, and
not infrequently violating human and political rights.
Although directly influencing the quality of democracy,
public administration changes and issues of decentrali-
zation do not rank high in the public interest and this
gives a diverging impetus to reform initiatives: relatively
low public interest may paradoxically enhance the suc-
cesses of a reform process. The lack of pointed interest
may leave administration and governance reform in the
shadow of political clashes and ideological debates. But
in other contexts, heightened public sensitivity to state
structures could attract political opinion and inspire com-
mitted reform actions. A diversity of interactions between
the public and the political actors could be discerned in
the observed countries. There is no simple model of the
nature of interactions but the public is a crucial pretext and
context of forming and performing reform measures.
Similarity in political slogans does not necessarily mean,
that the functions of local governments and expectations
towards them are identical in the studied countries. The hopes
for establishing new political institutions were changing over
the decade, as well. There are countries where local govern-
ments are regarded as more democratic (responsive, account-
able, transparent) units, emphasizing the political aspects
of decentralization. In other cases the effectiveness and
efficiency of public service delivery are the most highly
ranked characteristics of the autonomous local governments.
These differences in general perception make the public
support essential for successful decentralization reforms.
Beyond the political consensus, properly designed professio-
nal concepts and effective administrative reform management
the techniques of communication with the public should
be developed, as well. Experiences of the studied countries
show that parallel to political bargains active consultation
with non-governmental, civil organizations and public de-
bates were necessary conditions of successful reforms.
In the field of state reform, professional associations of
public servants, local authorities, and service delivery NGOs
could become major proponents or exponents of reform
conceptions. Alliances or adversary relations with them
could profoundly help or hinder the elaboration and im-
plementation of reform packages, especially if decentra-
lization is targeted.
The most important NGO partners are obviously the local
government associations. There are two basic models of
representation in these countries. The concentrated, more
centralized local government associations (Bulgaria, Latvia,
and Slovakia) seem to be more efficient partners of reform
governments or political parties. They operate almost as
‘ministries’ of local governments, giving opinion on reform
proposals, having limited say in budgeting and fund allo-
cation. In other CEE countries the local government asso-
ciations were more divided by politics, type of local govern-
ments or regions. Hungary and Poland are examples of this
model, where also the administrative capacity of the several
local government associations were fragmented and con-
sequently more limited, than under the ‘concentrated’ model.
In some of the studied countries direct contacts with the
local partners and good relations with the media had high
importance during reform design and implementation.
Media is a key actor to express public opinion but it is also
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a means to communicate key political messages. By the
same token, the media has its own relatively autonomous
voice and modus operandi. Having a subtly crafted position
in the political arena, the media attention to state structures
and governance reforms could be a major hindrance in
achieving reform goals. Moreover, the media could be a
primary means to make the public sensitive to the relatively
uninteresting aspects of state reform and thus pushing
ruling governments or reluctant collation partners to act.
If some reform ideals are formed and actions are
envisioned (mostly by central governments and legislative
bodies), the attention of the media is again could be crucial
in generating public support, a willingness to stand the
“prices,” and capture the long term rewards of reform
packages. The capacities of reform implementing bodies
are different in the region as most of them are just learning
how to deal with a plural and mediatized public thinking.
In Poland the 1997–1998 regional reform used the media
promotional and educational programs for supporting the
wide ranging reforms. But it was already part of the ‘media
war’ in public television—typical in several CEE countries
in the late 1990s—, so they had to rely mostly on private
and local (cable) TV networks.
The first wave of Polish reforms in 1993 was supported
by a wide ranging survey of local leaders on their prefe-
rences of the boundaries of sub-regional entities; later the
pilot projects helped to launch limited reforms even in a
period which was not favorable for decentralization pro-
grams. The 24 regional public meetings in Slovakia on
the planned public administration reforms helped not only
to inform the general public, but also indirectly supported
the decentralization, by making the process irreversible.
CONCLUSIONS
Studies and country reports in this book mostly focus on
critical elements and techniques of decentralization and
public administration reforms. Ultimately the effectiveness
of these methods can be measured by the success of reform
efforts. However, questions like what has been achieved
in these countries or the performance of reformers cannot
be easily answered. There were some partial victories, the
reform processes had several waves, due to numerous external
and internal factors during these very complex reforms.
This brief summary on the most important achievement
of decentralization and public administration reforms gives
a very diverse picture. Even in countries where the reforms
had been started with a significant delay, by 2002 important
changes were legislated and partially implemented. In Croatia
the former sectoral monopolies are partially overturned
and de-concentration of public service responsibilities to
county local governments and large cities have been started.
It is still a long way to design and implement comprehen-
sive public administration reforms, but the first strategic
planning stage has been launched. In Slovakia, which
finally had four relatively stable years of modernization,
the critical step of shifting public functions from state
administration to elected middle-tier government has been
made. This irreversible action will hopefully create the
basis of future reforms in the public sector.
The two countries starting reforms earlier, progressing
only gradually were well on the road of decentralization.
In Bulgaria, the relatively large municipalities serve as
stabile bases of decentralization. The regional development
structures and policies will support future reforms. In
Lithuania the greatest reform achievement was the funda-
mental change in work style of public administration and
professionalization of government operation.
Hungary and Poland in many respects showed the examples
for reform forces in other countries. In Poland decent-
ralization at regional level was implemented even under
unfavorable political conditions and the newly created
elected regional governments are good experimental cases
for other EU accession countries. In Hungary, the slow-
down of structural changes coincided with a shift towards
operational and management issues of public administ-
ration. In this stage knowledge and expertise might be
accumulated, that will assist future reform waves.
The general conclusion of these wide ranging and diverse
reforms might be, that there is no one single solution or
model, that works even in this similar group of countries.
This is especially true in the case of reform management
techniques and methods. The core elements of an efficient
public administration system can be designed, as they are
summarized in Part I. of this volume. But professional
and administrative capacity of successful reform manage-
ment is very country specific.
As the public administration system and its public policy
making capacity is improving, the reform management
will be more successful. The tendency is to gradually move
from the legalistic approach of reforms towards introduc-
tion of other mechanisms and institutions of public sector
reforms. During this process the accumulation of ‘reform
wisdom’ will improve the capability of reforms minded
governments to learn from the previous mistakes.
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ABOUT THE PROJECT
For the purposes of this research we used the term decent-
ralization broadly, when all the components of public ad-
ministration and public sector reform are parts of the decent-
ralization process. The country studies of this book were
prepared for a work-shop in Croatia. As the country is in
the middle of designing its decentralization strategy, LGI’s
contribution was to help developing efficient methods for
managing reform policies. We provided professional support
to the Croatian Soros National Foundation and the Croatian
Law Center (CLC), who are involved in the implemen-
tation of the government’s decentralization program.
Beyond this immediate task, we were also interested in
formulating the policy lessons for the broader region and
to summarize the general conclusions on the management
of public administration reform and decentralization
policies in Central and Eastern European countries. That
was the reason for commissioning other comprehensive
reports.
This volume of LGI Studies series has two major parts.
After this introductory and summary chapter the first one
focuses on substance of decentralization and public admi-
nistration reforms. Here three authors give a general over-
view on various aspects of these reforms in Central and
Eastern Europe. Kenneth Davey identifies the elements of
decentralization reforms, the difficulties and resistance
during the implementation. Tony Verheijen discusses the
ways that the major structural problems of decentralization
can be solved within a properly managed public administ-
ration reform context. Civil service reform, as a critical
condition of systematic changes in public administration
is presented by Miroslav Beblavy´.
In the second part of this volume experts from selected
countries write about their own experiences. The authors
are not only specialists of public administration, but at some
stages of reform they were—or are still—involved in the
design and implementation of reforms. As our request to
the authors was primarily to write about the methods and
techniques of decentralization reforms, their primary focus
is on administrative and institutional conditions of changes
in public administration. But readers of the country case
studies might get some useful insights on various aspects
of decentralization in these selected six countries.
The authors of the country report were asked to respond
on questions, set by us, as project managers. The first task
was to give a brief description of typical reform trajectories,
explaining country specific rules and processes, by pro-
viding a brief history of the past decade of decentralization
and public administration reforms. The components and
sequence of legislative changes, conflicts of old and new
élite’s were analyzed by describing the major trends since
the public administration reform was put on the agenda
in the studied countries.
As management of the reform process was in the center
of this research, the authors had to analyze the behavior
of the major actors, the relationship between politics and
administration, external conditions for change, organiza-
tional and management techniques will be compared.
Some elements of these reforms have been identified for
the authors, in advance.
Adjustment to political changes, election cycles is critical
during decentralization reforms, which often cover more
than one period of a government. Our basic question was
how did the political system support or hinder the reform
process. We were also interested in how domestic and
international professional capacity contributed to reforms.
Beside political willingness and professional concepts
administrative capacity is needed for public administration
reform. The role, organizational setting and relationship
between government entities during reform design and
implementation were asked to be discussed.
The authors of the country reports provided very good
and concise description of these wide ranging reforms.
We are very grateful for their contribution and also ac-
knowledge the high quality work of the authors, discussing
the substantive issues in the first part of this volume.  The
CLC team, Marko Kovacic and Mladen Ivanovic also
helped the project by organizing the workshop in Croatia.
LGI’s goal is to promote information exchange and trans-
fer of knowledge between countries of Central Europe,
South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As
decentralization and public administration reforms are
on the agenda in most of these countries, we hope that
this publication will help this transfer process. Our ob-
jective is to support systematic reforms by discussing the
findings summarized in this volume in countries com-
mitted to reforms. Examples and findings, summarized
in this book, together with professional support of our
experts might help better design and more efficient ma-
nagement of reforms in other countries.
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NOTES
1 See a succinct discussion of these trends in Pierre, Jon and B. Guy Peters (2000): Governance, Politics, and the State.
London: Macmillan Press.
2 Discussed in depth by Verheijen in this volume.
3 Beblavy’s paper in this book.
4 Real GDP in 2000 (1990=100): Bulgaria: 81; Croatia: 87; Hungary: 107; Latvia: 61; Poland: 112; Slovak Republic:
82. Source: Transition, the First Ten Years. The World Bank, Washington DC, 2002.
5 The recent crisis may modify this favorable picture in Poland.
6 Kolodko, G.G.: A posztszocialista átalakulás tíz éve—a gazdaságpolitikai reformokkal kapcsolatos tanulságok (Ten
years of post-socialist transition—lessons of economic policy reforms). Közgadasági Szemle, XLVII, évf., 2000.
március.
7 They are important elements of the reform agenda, identified by The World Bank. (Annex 1. in Transition, the First
Ten Years. The World Bank, Washington DC, 2002).
8 Consolidated central government, including net lending.
9 in 1995.
10 in 1998.
11 First data are from 1992.
12 in 1993.
13 in 1994.
14 First data are from 1992.
15 in 1991.
16 T. Verheijen’s study in this volume.
17 In the period of 1992–1997 decline in employment at central government budgetary institutions was 13%, while at
local level only 10%. Cs. László: Twist and Turn: The History of the Hungarian Public Finance Reform. in. Bokros,
L.–Dethier, J-J: Public Finance Reform during the Transition. The World Bank, Washington DC, 1998.
18 P. Swianiewicz (Editor): Public Perception of Local Governments, LGI Books, OSI/LGI, Budapest, 2001.
19 Despite the general problems of the public sector (low level of public services, corruption at local level, etc). Source
of turnout and turnover data is P. Swianiewicz (Editor): Public Perception of Local Governments, LGI Books, OSI/
LGI, Budapest, 2001.
Most recently there are signs of changing attitudes, especially when fundamental changes are implemented, with
unclear consequences for the ordinary citizens: the turnout at the newly created regional governments was extremely
low (Slovakia: 26%) J. Nemec: Decentralization—the Main Tool of the Public Administration Reform in Slovakia?
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Decentralization in CEE Countries:
Obstacles and Opportunities
K e n n e t h  D a v e y
INTRODUCTION
Decentralization is a protracted and difficult process. So
much is clear from the experiences related in this book.
Vested interests and intractable problems subject reform
to long delay and prevarication. Even when a compre-
hensive package is enacted, as in Hungary in 1990/91,
operational problems arise which defy solution. A change
of government can bring the process to a halt, as in Poland
in 1993, or move it in a false direction, as in Slovakia the
following year.
The polish experience also shows that persistence pays. If
reformers have a clear program and sustained determina-
tion, the opportunity to move ahead occurs sooner or later.
Political momentum can be short-lived, however, and the
reforms have to be ready for launching while the favorable
tide lasts.
This chapter attempts to summarize a number of the issues
which arise from the country experiences and to address
four key questions:
• What are the key components of a decentralization
program?
• What are the major difficulties associated with each
of these components?
• What are the main sources of resistance to reform?
• What circumstances provide a favorable opportunity
for promoting decentralization?
ELEMENTS AND STAGES OF REFORM
The introduction of pluralist democratic government at
national level has led in almost all CEE countries to an
immediate demand for a parallel reform in local administ-
ration. One of the first acts of newly elected parliaments
in countries such as Hungary was to provide for the election
of representative municipal councils with an executive
mayor selected either by the voters at large or by the council.
What varied greatly, however, was the speed with which
these elected bodies were vested with the powers and
resources that determined their real weight in local affairs.
Four sets of issues typically pose challenges:
• Territorial structure
• Assignment of competencies
• Financing
• Transfer of state property
Territorial Structure: the Municipal Tier
Problem issues concerning territorial structure have typically
arisen at both primary and upper tiers of local government.
In the majority of post-Communist states, local government
legislation often reinforced by constitutional provisions
has allowed human settlements of any size to claim the
status of an autonomous municipality. This has been
exploited by thousands of small villages, often reacting
against forced amalgamations and deprivation of services
and development under Communist regional planning
policies. The result is that the basic level of local government
has a highly fragmented territorial structure as illustrated
in Table 1.
This situation is not universal; in Bulgaria and Poland,
for example, the basic levels of local government have
average population sizes well over 5,000 which have been
the target minimum in western European reorganizations
and are viewed empirically as adequate for most municipal
services. (Council of Europe, Colloquy on the size of
municipalities, efficiency and citizen participation,
Budapest, 1994).
However, most CEE countries have thousands of com-
munities with municipal status with populations below
1,000 (and a substantial proportion of these fewer than
200). Reform programs are challenged by the inability of
such communities to provide administrative and financial
capacity and the scale economies and catchment areas
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institutions at regional level that can provide a focus for
planning and partnership in economic and social develop-
ment. Moreover, most post-Communist countries have a
legacy of powerful state administration at a regional/
county level that do not fit comfortably in a democratic
system of government; they lack direct accountability
either to a local electorate or to national ministries, and
are often vested with considerable authority to intervene
in municipal affairs.
While most reform programs have contained a commitment
to establish an upper tier of self-government, doing so has
often proved a tortuous and protracted process.  Numbers
and boundaries pose endless possibilities of argument,
historical identities conflicting with ethnic loyalties,
administrative rationality and the European Union’s ob-
session with minimum population sizes for its regional
development funding. Cities fight to become or remain
regional capitals because of the facilities to which this status
apparently entitles them.
There are also strong arguments about the responsibilities
of upper tier self- governments. While the specialized service
institutions may be obvious candidates for devolution to
them, it is arguable whether they should take over many
of the tasks of regional bureaucracy which are regulatory
or very specialized (meteorology or cadastral registration,
for example,) by nature, or aimed at overseeing the opera-
tions of municipalities.
These contentious issues often take many years to resolve
because forces at both national and municipal level lack
sufficient positive enthusiasm for the creation of potentially
powerful political rivals.
Table 1
Average Size of (Municipal) Local Governments in Selected Countries
Country % of Municipalities Average Population Average Area
Below 1,000 Citizens [sq. km]
Bulgaria 0 35,000 432
Poland 0 16,000 130
Hungary 54 3,300 32
Slovakia 68 1,900 17
Czech Republic 80 1,700 13
SOURCE: P. Swianiewicz: Size of Local Government, Local Democracy and Efficiency in Local Services’ Delivery in
Central and Eastern Europe. Draft paper prepared for LGI, 2001.
necessary for such essential services as primary education
or waste disposal and for the employment of staff qualified
in law, engineering, physical planning etc.
There are, a range of solutions to territorial fragmentation
including amalgamation of smaller units, performance of
tasks through inter-municipal bodies, and assignment of
selected tasks to either central town municipalities or to
higher tiers of self- government. For varying reasons, reform
programs find it extremely difficult to make a strategic
choice between these options. Architects of reform are so
obsessed by the economic costs and irrationality of frag-
mentation that they refuse to accept the political (and often
constitutional) impossibility of amalgamation. Local
government associations resist the compulsory frameworks
that usually accompany inter-municipal cooperation on
any significant scale. Assigning tasks to central towns is
unpopular with villages, and assigning them to higher
tiers is unpopular with the larger towns.  Failure to drive
a solution forward often leaves in the hands of local state
administration functions that should be managed by
locally accountable bodies.
Territorial Structure: Higher Levels
Most CEE states have faced the challenge to establish a
higher tier of self-government. The municipal tier, whether
highly fragmented or not, does not provide adequate
catchment areas for the more specialized services such as
secondary education, hospitals, or residential care institu-
tions. There has been increasing pressure, particularly
from the European Union, to establish representative
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Assignment of Competencies
Most local government legislation assigns responsibility
to the basic municipal level for what are often described
as “communal services.” These are elements of physical
infrastructure including local roads and lighting, heating,
water supply, sanitation, waste management, parks, and
cemeteries. Management of housing is also included
though the extent and nature of these tasks-changes with
privatization of the public housing stock. These are often
recognized as “own” or “original” functions of municipali-
ties; difficulties attach more to finance and property rights
than to the location of responsibility.
The most contentious item in devolution of physical
infrastructure is water supply. Although the construction
of individual pipelines, treatment plants etc may have been
financed by local budgets, water supplies have customarily
been operated in the Communist era as integrated units
covering a range of urban and rural settlements. Decentra-
lization has not been too difficult where local governments
have agreed to the conversion of these regional entities into
joint stock companies with constituent municipalities
sharing the equity. Where, however, they have insisted on
the transfer of assets to the municipality where they are
located, grave operational difficulties and disputes have
inevitably arisen.
Greater difficulties in the reform process surround the
responsibility for the human services (education, health,
social welfare and culture) and the local regulatory tasks
(for example, physical planning and construction control,
civil registration, trade and occupational licensing and
child protection). Uncertainty and argument focus on two
issues. The first harks back to territorial structure—the
mismatch between catchment areas for schools, hospitals,
social care institutions etc and the size of local governments,
together with the inability of smaller municipalities to
employ qualified professional staff. These difficulties do
not in themselves challenge the principle of decentralization,
but pose practical difficulties that, as discussed before,
often exceed the political support for decentralization or
the willingness of interest groups to compromise.
The second issue concerns the proper division of responsi-
bility between national and local government; it is intrin-
sically more difficult to resolve because it involves principle
as well as practice. Both the human services and regulatory
tasks are often defined as tasks of “state administration”
rather than “local self government” which can at most be
delegated rather than devolved.  In terms of the human
services, this definition implies that there are universal
rights to minimum standards of provision that the State
must guarantee.  In respect of the regulatory tasks, the
definition implies that the task involves an impartial app-
lication of national laws to the circumstances of individual
citizens, in which there is no room for local variation or
discretion; these are seen as roles for qualified bureaucrats,
not elected politicians.
There are, of course, strong countervailing arguments for
decentralization of both human service and regulatory
competencies. The services are of strong concern to citizens,
putting pressure on local governments to devote resources
to their development.  Local councilors and parents are
just as worried as the Minister of Education if a school is
failing its pupils. To retain such services under State mana-
gement is to exclude the contributions of local resources
and local accountability which local government is under
strong pressure to provide.
There is ample evidence from Western Europe that national
minimum standards of human services can be guaranteed
within a decentralized framework of administration. The
problem is, however, that such guarantee depends on a
combination of arrangements that are relatively sophisti-
cated and unfamiliar to a post-Communist state. The first
is a normative system of financial equalization that ensures
that national standards can realistically be achieved despite
differences in local revenue bases. The second is national
systems of inspection which can provide positive guidance
as well as negative criticism, and which can be divorced
from administrative management and political bias. The
third is overcoming the difficulties of inappropriate ter-
ritorial structures that have been discussed in the previous
section.  Time and determination are required to develop
such framework for devolution.
Until a satisfactory framework for devolving the human
services is developed, various interim solutions apply. In
some cases service management is retained by State agencies
which suffer from the lack of local accountability and may
well be under-resourced. In a second scenario responsibi-
lities are shared as where local governments manage schools
but teachers are paid by the State, health service facilities
are provided by local government, but funded principally
by health insurance agencies, or the State provides social
benefits but local government provides welfare services.
In a third case competencies are fully transferred to local
government, but subject to severe incidence of ‘non-funded
mandates,’ i.e. decisions made unilaterally by sectoral
ministries like teachers’ salaries increases or extra social
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benefits which are not accompanied by changes in local
revenues.
Similarly, the argument that regulatory tasks should be
excluded from local self- government jurisdiction because
of their judicial nature is oversimplified. Many regulatory
decisions do involve elements of subjective judgment, e.g.
the capacity of a family to bring up its children, the archi-
tectural consistency of a proposed new construction, the
balance between economic benefits and environmental
costs of a new industrial estate or retail park. Moreover,
decisions made within the apparently neutral framework
of state bureaucracy may be no more protected from
political influence than in local government, simply less
exposed to public scrutiny. Moreover, local governments
may well be more concerned to see that such administrative
processes are discharged in a “client friendly” manner.
Decentralization of regulatory tasks may well be the most
satisfactory solution in the long term, but again it depends
on the sustained development of a supportive environ-
ment. A key element is professional staffing requirements
and the combination of training, qualification and
professional association that can alone ensure adequate
protection and weight within local government.
Finance
The dependence of effective decentralization on an adequate
and equitable financial base needs no explanation. Most
post-Communist countries inherited inter-governmental
finance systems, in which the cost of local public services
fell initially on local budgets. These were funded partially,
if not completely, by local collections of a wide basket of
taxes, fees and charges including taxes on both personal
and enterprise incomes as well as land. There was a system
of redistribution, both vertical and horizontal, but lacking
a normative base, subject to arbitrary variation in annual
budgets and much political bias in its application at both
national and regional levels. Liabilities for taxes and charges
and their rates were determined nationally. There were
strong disincentives for revenue mobilization or cost
discipline. Much local budget expenditure subsidized low
charges for utility services.
This framework was clearly incompatible with the func-
tioning of a legally and politically autonomous system of
local government system. Moreover its inherent inefficiency
is increasingly intolerable given the massive shifts from
public to private consumption and the consequent fiscal
stress experienced by post-Communist governments. In
financial terms decentralization has demanded a range of
fundamental reforms.
Firstly, it has been necessary to distinguish clearly between
the responsibilities of different levels of government,
national, regional and local, for meeting the costs of specific
services. This has to be in line with the assignment of
competencies, and the process is, therefore, subject to the
uncertainties and arguments outlined in the previous
section.
Secondly, decisions are required on which revenue sources
should accrue exclusively to local governments, which
should be subjected to some intergovernmental sharing (and
in what proportions), and which should be retained exclu-
sively by the State Budget. This poses several difficulties.
Until the assignment of responsibilities have been resolved
it is impossible to quantify the relative resource needs of
individual tiers of government. The structure of taxation
may be concurrently subject to reform to adjust it to the
requirements of a market economy. Taxes on enterprises
that have previously accrued, at least in part, to local budgets
may no longer be suitable for such assignment once prob-
lems of origin or disparity can no longer be solved by ar-
bitrary redistribution.
Thirdly, there are strong arguments of accountability and
efficiency (together with the provisions of the European
Charter of Local Self-Government) for giving local govern-
ments some power to determine liabilities for local taxes,
fees and charges. Ministries of finance have been in no
hurry, however, to surrender their exclusive powers in these
respects, often supported by macroeconomic arguments
concerning the control of inflation and the encouragement
of private investment. Nor have they been under pressure
from local government lobbies, eager to obtain larger tax
shares rather than taxing powers. The demands of local
government leaders have been generally short sighted in
this respect, ignoring the fact that a taxing power is less
hostile to political fortune than a tax share.
Fourthly, a system of redistribution may still be needed,
particularly if extensive responsibilities for the human
services have to be financed by local governments, requiring
rough equality in per capita expenditure. This demands
the creation of equalization transfers, either vertical or
horizontal based on normative assessments of the differences
between local needs and resources. Calculating such for-
mulae poses technical challenges of measurement and data
collection, but also political judgment over the balance
between equality and incentive.
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Fifthly, the demands of both efficiency and equity and
the increasing intervention of private sector ownership or
management have led to progressive decline in general
subsidization of public utility services. This involves the
challenge to apportion responsibility between the State
and local government for making such decisions, for
imposing the consequent rises in consumer tariffs, for
funding and managing the individually targeted compen-
sation for poorer consumers of essential services, and for
meeting the increasingly urgent demand for investment
in repair and upgrading.
Finally, the greater the degree of fiscal decentralization
the greater the need for improved systems of account-
ability. EU accession processes, for example, highlight the
need to develop systems of external audit of local
government and to restrict indebtedness, measures that
are both unpopular and technically demanding.
To list this agenda (which excludes the practical issues of
revenue assessment, budget management etc in a compe-
titive mixed economy) is to indicate its complexity and
the demands it makes both on technical capability and
political courage.
Property Rights
It has been an obvious and generally accepted principle
of decentralization that transfer of ownership of State
property should accompany assignment of functional
responsibilities to any legally autonomous tier of govern-
ment associated with their performance. In practice, this
has often proved a contentious and protracted process.
Communist states obeyed the principle of the unity of
state property. However, administration of property was
often delegated to regional or local executive bodies, usually
according to location or catchment area.  Regional admi-
nistration felt that an electricity supply belonged to them,
so that they appointed the directors, controlled the budgets,
disposed of surplus land etc, as though they were legal
owners. The same applied to the attitude of city officials
to a local hospital. This was often reinforced by the fact
that capital investment in a utility plant or a service insti-
tution was often funded by regional or local budgets.
The restitution of property to pre-Communist owners
has added complexity to the process. In many cases, service
institutions like schools, residential homes and hospitals
were originally built and managed by voluntary bodies,
usually religious. The principle of restitution has also
encouraged municipal governments to demand return of
assets they constructed in pre-Communist times, whether
or not they now accord with their functional responsibility.
Both of these earlier patterns of ownership or management
have complicated the process of transferring property
rights in line with the assignment of competencies.  City
governments claim ownership of hospitals or secondary
schools that serve a much wider area with consequent
difficulties for the allocation of running costs and control
over access. Municipalities, on the other hand, are made
responsible for the provision of utility services that are
the monopoly of regionally owned and managed networks.
Technical solutions are possible, such as joint ownership
of utility companies, but application is obstructed by
arguments over the apportionment of shares and the
opposition of current management who have succeeded
in some countries in thwarting the process by buying out
the assets or the contractual rights to manage them.
Property transfer is also subject to systemic difficulty, such
as the lack of inventories and cadastral records and over-
load of the State apparatus by the processes of restitution
and privatization. Again technical difficulty combines with
political conflict and ambivalence to impede and delay
an essential component of the decentralization program.
VESTED INTEREST
What the previous sections have tried to convey is that
beyond the simple creation of legally autonomous, elected
bodies at municipal level, decentralization is a complex
and contentious process. It involves choices which are
either politically or technically difficult (or both), such as
the territorial structure of regional administration. It
requires the reconciliation of conflicting interests, for
example between national responsibilities and local
discretion in the management of a service like education.
It demands tenacious spadework, for example to devise
an appropriate equalization formula or a workable
framework for inter-municipal cost sharing.
To drive the process through, demand, determination and
positive enthusiasm. These two qualities are often
insufficient to overcome vested interest and inertia. Some
interest groups are bound to oppose decentralization. The
bureaucracies of sectoral ministries and local state
administrations are likely centers of opposition, having
much power to lose or being faced with unfamiliar roles.
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Ministries of finance will be nervous, their anxiety over
fiscal decentralization reinforced by IMF demands for
strict control over levels of taxing and spending. Others
may well be ambivalent. Mayors of smaller municipalities
are often reluctant to see human service and regulatory
responsibilities transferred to local governments, because
a narrow range of competence preserves their freedom
from cooperation with neighbors and from state oversight.
The larger towns may well see the introduction of a higher
tier as a threat. Local government associations may well
be ambivalent or in conflict over particular stages of reform.
A further hurdle is coalition politics. Most CEE countries
have proportional election systems that rarely produce
overall majorities for a single party. Governments usually
comprise coalitions of parties that may not share a uniform
view of decentralization. However much priority may
nominally attached to such policy, it is difficult to persuade
sectoral ministries to tow the line in terms of functional
devolution or ministries of finance to share taxes if there
is insufficient cabinet discipline and prime ministers are
constantly afraid of parties walking out.
OPPORTUNITY
Nevertheless, opportunities for pushing through a
decentralization program do arise, often unexpected. The
overthrow of an autocratic regime may be one such
occasion, leading to a determination to remove a regional
apparatus that may have supported the regime in power.
The 1998 election provided this opportunity in Slovakia
although it has only been partially exploited.
The threat or occurrence of civil war may demand radical
decentralization to give ethnic groups a sufficient degree
of local autonomy to buy off attempts at secession. The
current legislative program in Macedonia is a clear
example.
Recent developments in Ukraine illustrate another path
to reform. The severity of the State’s budget crisis en-
couraged Government to side with Parliament in adopting
a major program of fiscal decentralization involving a clear
separation of functional responsibilities between State,
province and city budgets, accompanied by an equally
explicit division of revenues and a formula system of
equalization. Although enacted through financial legis-
lation, this reform has greatly enhanced local autonomy
by severing the chain of vertical dependence.
Finally, negotiations over accession to the European Union
have put pressure on candidate countries to complete
structural reforms including the formation of regional tiers
of self-government.
PREPAREDNESS
These are examples of circumstances that give decentrali-
zation programs a favorable wind behind their sails. But
the wind can lose force or change direction. The important
thing for reformers is to be able to take advantage of the
wind while it is still behind them and blowing strongly
enough to overcome opposition and inertia.
This means preparation. Two examples bear this out. The
Hungarian reforms in 1990/91 were far more comprehen-
sive than in other CEE countries because the Hungarian
Institute of Public Administration took advantage of a
more liberal political climate to prepare them during the
late 1980s.  The incoming Polish administration in 1997
was able to push through the creation of two higher tiers
of self-government with remarkable speed, again because
so much preparatory work had been done during the
previous frustrating electoral period.
By contrast, the Slovak coalition which came to power in
1998 quickly adopted a strong decentralization platform,
but has taken early four years to implement it and then
only in a diluted form. Argument over regional boundaries
has highlighted the conflicts that have delayed reform,
but equally debilitating has been a failure to formulate a
clear model of how to devolve state competencies on a
very fragmented municipal structure. The absence of a
coherent model of inter-municipal relations has allowed
sectoral ministries to procrastinate over the devolution of
competencies, which in turn has delayed the elimination
of the local state administration and the introduction of a
permanent structure of intergovernmental finance; the
Ministry of Finance has been able to argue, with some
justice, that it did not know the scale of the finances which
would have to be transferred to local government and to
which tier. Lack of technically coherent solutions has been
just as responsible for the delays as the ambivalence of
coalition partners and xenophobia.
Earlier sections have highlighted the technically prob-
lematic areas for which blueprints have to be prepared.
Particularly important are the questions of inter-municipal
cooperation in the territorially fragmented states, (and its
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implications for the roles of upper tiers of self govern-
ment), the precise divisions of responsibility between the
State and local government in respect of education, health
care and social welfare, and the basic elements of inter-
governmental finance, namely the division of tax revenues
and the system of equalization.
Reformers can never quite know when their day will come.
When it arrives, they will still have many vested interests
to surmount. Their success will depend heavily, not only
on political support, but also on averting excuses for delay.
A politically and technically coherent set of proposals will
enable reformers both to catch a favorable tide and, more
importantly, to keep up momentum.
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INTRODUCTION
Decentralization policies in Post-Communist states are
hampered by a lack of comprehensive approaches to the
definition of the architecture of the state. Whereas much
attention has been devoted in the literature on decentrali-
zation to the optimal size of local authorities, the definition
of the number of levels of government, models of financial
and fiscal relations between levels of government and the
legal basis for local government, there are few examples
as yet of comprehensive processes of reform. Such compre-
hensive processes would include the review of the allocation
of functions across levels of government, the design of a
clear architecture of the state administration across levels
of government. These are design issues to be undertaken
as a basis for and over and above the development and
implementation of the necessary ‘technical’ elements that
make the system function and deliver services effectively,
such as the system of fiscal intergovernmental relations.
The lack of attention for systemic aspects of public admi-
nistration development is due in part to the lack of reflection
on the role of the state in Post-Communist states, with
reforms and re-allocation guided by a mixture of ad hoc
decisions and, in some cases, perceived requirements of
EU accession. It is also due to the lack of a comprehensive
approach2  to central government reform, which only in
the last 3–4 years has started to emerge as an important
issue on the political agenda of the states of Central and
Eastern Europe. However, the increased attention for this
area of reform does create an opportunity to re-visit some
of the more fundamental questions that continue to hamper
the creating of effective and efficient systems of public
administration.3
This paper addresses the link between overall government
reform and successful decentralization and reflects on how
decentralization policies can be better ‘embedded’ in overall
administrative development strategies. This paper draws
on the conclusions of two recently published UNDP
publications, ‘Rebuilding State Structures, Methods and
Approaches’ (2001) and ‘Recreating Effective government,
Local Level Initiatives in Transition’ (2002), which both
address these questions more in depth, as well as on earlier
work by the author.
LINKING THE WORLDS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
AND DECENTRALIZATION
Administrative reform and decentralization are often treated
as rather separate elements of institutional reform processes,
even if the are clearly and indisputable linked. In central
Europe, for instance, much of ‘administrative reform’ in
the early 1990s was in fact decentralization and local govern-
ment development, as politicians and citizens alike turned
their back on discredited central state structures. When
reforms in the area of decentraliztion stalled in many states
of the region in the mid-1990s (with the exception of
Poland), attention shifted to central government reform.
This was due to some degree to the issue of ‘administrative
capacity’ arriving on the EU enlargement agenda after 1995,
but also due to the increasing realization that strengthen-
ing the system of central government is a key condition
for the development of effective and efficient local
government [see UNDP, 2002, chapter 4]. As a cross-
cutting issue, sectoral institution building requirements
for EU membership have in recent years driven a more
sectoral approach to administrative development, thus
reducing to a certain degree the attention both for horizontal
administrative reform issues and for general issues related
to decentralization policies. ‘Institution building’ in the
sectoral sense has become a category of administrative
reform of its own in many candidate states, often managed
again by a different institution to those responsible for
general administrative development and decentralization,
and thus further reducing the chances for a successful
overall reform of administrative systems.
Therefore, even if all three elements of administrative
development, local, central and sectoral, have at times
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featured as important issues on the political agenda of
Post-Communist states, they have rarely been addressed
together and holistically, except maybe in institution
building plans.4 Institution building plans became an
additional requirement for candidate states in 1998-1999.
They are now a mandatory element of the documents
candidate states have to submit to the EU on a regular
basis, much in the same way as the National Programs
for the Adoption of the Acquis. However, in most EU
candidate states these have remained relatively low-key
planning tools,5  and for other associated states they are
not yet an integral part of the association process. In many
cases, responsibilities for central government reform, de-
centralization policy and the management of institution
building plans are even institutionally separated. In par-
ticular in states where EU accession is a key priority, how-
ever, the three areas should be clearly and explicitly linked,
as the EU will assess the quality of the administrative
system as a whole, and in particular the strength of the
linkages between levels of government. Two important
illustrations of the above are the system of checks and
balances, in particular in the area of financial control and
oversight, and systems for cooperation in decision-making.
The latter is important both in terms of the way regional
development resources are planned and, ultimately, in
the extent to which local governments are effectively
involved in EU decision-making.6  However, attempts to
sensitize governments to the importance of integrating
central government reform, decentralization policies and
sectoral institution building strategies in a holistic
approach to institutional development [see for instance
OECD, SIGMA papers 23 and 26, 1998 and 1999] have
generally not led to changes in the way these issues are
being handled.
Apart from questions related to the architecture of govern-
ment, there are additional questions of importance that
link central and local government development. As an
example, the degree to which the central policy on civil
service employment conditions is mirrored and local level
and the extent to which civil service systems are integrated
across levels of government have fundamental repercussions
on the ability of local governments to attract and retain
qualified staff [see UNDP, 2002, chapter 3]. This issue
will be discussed less comprehensively as a general review
of civil systems in the region is included in a different
section of this publication [see Beblavy in this volume].
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
DECENTRALIZATION POLICIES
Systems of public administration in Central and Eastern
continue to show various structural problems, which are
found with a surprising level of consistency among states
in the region. Many of these problems are due to the fact
that many of the structural flaws that characterized systems
of public administration under the previous regime have
not been adequately addressed during the last decade. A
recent UNDP publication ‘Rebuilding State Structures,
Methods and Approaches’ [UNDP, 2001] provides an
analysis of these structural problems. Many of these issues
also constitute a serious impediment to the successful im-
plementation of decentralization policies, which therefore
are unlikely to succeed unless these underlying problems
are addressed. The five main structural problems as
discussed in the UNDP advocacy paper7  are the following,
• A clear conception of the role of the state is missing;
• Leftover elements of the previous system limit the
possibility to re-orient budgetary allocations;
• Low vertical coherence creates scope for ad-hocracy
and reduces reliability and predictability of government
actions;
• Weak inter-sectoral co-ordination limits government
abilities to adopt strategic reforms;
• Mechanical and technical approaches to public
administration continue to prevail.
A Lack of Progress
in Rethinking the Role of the State
The lack of a clearly defined concept of the role of the
state is a first and key issue that hinders both the develop-
ment and implementation of public administration reform
overall and has strong repercussions for the success or
failure of decentralization policies. There is no longer a
strong over-arching ideological ‘drive’ to reduce the role
of the states, as the strong neo-liberal influences that
dominated the political agenda in Central Europe and
parts of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s have
gradually waned. However, there has not been as yet a
clarification of thinking on the role of the state, in particular
in social and economic policy areas. The UNDP publication
‘The Shrinking State’ (1997) possibly captures best the
general trend of ‘unorganized state withdrawal’ from key
social policy areas, driven mainly by concerns over
dwindling resources. If there is no clarity over what the
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state will provide and under what conditions, how then
can one think in terms of effective decentralization? One
of the reasons why local governments, and in particular
self-governments, have been left with ‘minimal packages’
of tasks is that where there is no consensus on the role of
the states, it is impossible to define what level of government
should undertake what task. One way governments have
found there way around this ‘dilemma’ is to transfer func-
tions to lower levels of government, in particular self-
governments, without increasing significantly transferred
resources, so-called non-funded mandates, which ultimately
may lead to the delivery of many services, but in a highly
inadequate way. Another approach that has been widely
practiced is mandatory across the board reductions in staff,
applicable of course mostly to local state administration
structures. By and large this has had a similar effect to
creating non-funded mandates: key-underlying imbalances
(mandated services versus resource base) are exacerbated
rather than mitigated.
In most states of Central and Southeastern Europe EU
membership obligations provide some degree of counter-
balance to the general lack of strategic thinking about the
role of the state. National systems have to then be built
around these EU obligations. However, even in these states
numerous choices remain, for instance about health, edu-
cation and social welfare systems, where EU competencies
are relatively weak.
‘Leftover’ Elements of the
Previous System Reduce the Scope for
the Re-allocation of Scarce Resources
The continued presence of leftover structures from the
previous system of governance is a second serious impedi-
ment to reforming current systems of public administration
and freeing up resources to fund functions transferred to
local levels of government. The involvement of Public
administration in economic management under the pre-
vious regime created the need to develop a number of ad-
ministrative structures to support that role. These include
economic branch ministries that controlled state enterprises
as well as units in finance ministries that worked on budget
calculations for such ministries. One may have expected
that such structures would have disappeared ten years after
the start of the transition to a market economy. Other
structures, such as printing and publishing facilities,
research institutions attached directly to ministries, and
credit and loan management institutions, could also have
been either privatized or abolished. However, the functional
review conducted in Slovakia in 2000, for instance, found
that many of these types of institutions were in fact still
in place [UNDP, 2001, chapter 1]. Recent budgetary
problems in Poland, where the new incoming government
found a deep hole in public finances upon taking office,
have been widely blamed on the lack of systematic restruc-
turing of state structures and the continued operation and
budget funding for a large array of agency structures. The
widespread existence of such institutions can pose a serious
hindrance to economic development uses much needed
budgetary resources. This is in stark contrast to the apparent
inability of the state to properly fund mandates transferred
to local government structures.
Functional reviews conducted in various states have been
useful in identifying redundant structures and make argu-
ments for their closure. However, unfortunately the same
functional reviews generally have not gone beyond the
central level of government. A review of local state admi-
nistration structures could have identified further scope
for rationalization of the central state administration and
for re-considering the allocation of functions between
levels of government. Bulgaria is one of the first states to
take this type of approach to administrative reform and is
planning a review of the division of functions across levels
of government, but this remains an exception in the
region, with Kazakhstan as the only further example of a
state engaged in this kind of process.
Lack of Vertical Coherence
in Policy Sectors Reduces Reliability
and Predictability
A further common feature of systems of public administra-
tion in Central and Eastern Europe is the lack of a clear
system of inter-institutional relations inside policy sectors.
Modern systems of public administration are generally
built on a clear distinction between types of institutions
in any given policy sector, with related systems of account-
ability. Generally the following types of institutions are
distinguished:
• Policy-making institutions;
• Regulatory and licensing bodies;
• Supervisory bodies;
• Inspections;
• Service delivery institutions;
• Institutions under tutelage.8
Institutions should preferable perform only a single type
of function and a clear and well-defined system of reporting
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and accountability has to be in place. The development
of a rational system of division of functions across insti-
tutions is also a key condition for the creation of a working
system of local-central government relations. For instance,
the development of clear lines of responsibility and account-
ability between school inspections (as part of the state
administration) and locally managed schools is key to a
well-run education system. If, therefore, there is no clearly
defined role and position for supervisory, regulatory and
other types of administrative bodies, and of their relations
to local self-governing authorities, this leaves local govern-
ments open to ad hoc and unpredictable decision-making
by such authorities. This risk is even greater if the indepen-
dence of inspections and regulatory bodies is in doubt.
Informal pressure and ‘instructions’ by central authorities
are often quoted as some of the main reasons why local
self-governments are not able to fulfill the role legislation
provides for them [see for instance Verheijen and Coombes
on Bulgaria, 1998], and much of this could be avoided
with a rationalization of the system of central state
administration. This risk is particularly strong in systems
where local self-governing authorities carry out a large
array of functions on behalf of the state.
Weakness of Inter-sectoral
Coordination Makes the Adoption
of Strategic Approaches More Difficult
In addition to the lack of a clear organization and transpa-
rency in the organization of policy sectors, there is the added
complication of weak horizontal management systems in
state administrations. Formerly horizontal management
was largely performed by Communist Party structures,
where sectoral inputs were integrated into state policy.
The disappearance of the Party from the system left public
administrations virtually without any horizontal manage-
ment systems. Little has been done to replace these systems.
One could argue that weak inter-sectoral coordination
could in fact be an advantage to local self-governing autho-
rities, as it may improve the ability of local governments
to ‘play’ state institutions against each other, and thus
possibly increase freedom of action. However, in reality
weak systems of inter-sectoral coordination are bad for
local governments. Strategic decisions on decentralization,
which are always difficult to make, require consensus to
be taken and have generally to be enforced by the line
ministries. This gives central authorities two ‘windows’
to delay and obstruct strategic decisions on decentralization.
In first instance, the need to build agreement across the
government in systems that still operate in a highly top-
down fashion is extremely difficult. In addition to the
problems of low capacities in administrative coordination,
brought out by virtually any analysis of systems of public
administration in the region, the fact that most EU
candidates states have political systems that rely on
coalition governments makes the adoption of strategic
decisions extremely difficult.
The process of decision-making over decentralization in
Slovakia (2000–2001) is a painful example of how admi-
nistrative obstruction and unwillingness to forge political
compromise can delay, and almost destroy an ambitious
policy of decentralization. Even if the process of preparing
the decentralization strategy was taken out of the administ-
ration to avoid administrative obstruction,9  in itself an
indictment of the Slovak policy-making system, the sub-
sequent phase of (political) decision-making dragged out
the process. Finally, the whole project almost failed to be
adopted in time for it to be completed during the current
government’s mandate.10  Political priorities clearly over-
rode economic rationale,11  with only the threat of a govern-
ment collapse finally saving the decentralization process.
Problems of enforcement of decisions can further hinder
effective decentralization. Decision-making systems in
Central and Eastern Europe are notorious for their imple-
mentation problems. In many states this is largely due to
a lack of a well-functioning system of monitoring imple-
mentation, which is an additional element of weak coordi-
nation capacities. This is a point repeatedly stressed by
the EU in its annual assessment of administrative capacities.
Therefore, even if strategic decisions are taken, the im-
plementation process provides many opportunities to those
that feel their objectives have not been met to delay the
implementation of government decisions. This problem
affects decentralization in particular, as government officials
are rarely enthusiastic to lose their control over policy areas.
Therefore, even if weak systems of inter-ministerial coordi-
nation might at first glance constitute a possible opportunity
for local governments, in reality they are likely to hinder
the implementation of the very strategies and legislation
that should empower local self-government.
Limited Strategic Capacity Leads
to Over-reliance on Outsiders
Reviews and reports on public administration in the region
all point out the problem of policy-making capacity. Public
administrations in Communist states used to be mainly
implementation machines, with little or no role in policy
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formulation. The role of public administration in the new
systems of governance in the region should be fundamen-
tally different to that under the previous system, but in
reality there appears to be little change. The lack of policy-
making capacity is reflected in virtually all assessments of
administrative capacity in the region, and was, for instance,
included as a key issue to be addressed in the revised ac-
cession partnership between the EU and Bulgaria.
In terms of the scope for the development and implemen-
tation of decentralization strategies this can again pose
serious problems. Politicians in many states have tended
to take sensitive and difficult policy-making issues out of
the administration and have entrusted them instead to either
local consultancy firms,12  or entrusted them to specially
created units or capacities under direct supervision of a
minister. This type of practice can make sense to overcome
bureaucratic resistance. However, as the well-known
example of public administration reform in the UK shows
[see, for instance, Metcalfe and Richards, 1988] it is
important to at least to some degree co-opt officials in
order to ensure the implementation of complex reforms.
The development of legislation to put into practice strategic
objectives will inevitably be the responsibility of officials,
except for very exceptional cases. Strategies that are seen
by officials as externally imposed have a much greater chance
of being ‘sabotaged’ in the implementation process. The
lack of strategic capacities in the administration, often
cited by politicians as a key reason for placing the develop-
ment of strategic policy documents outside the administra-
tion, therefore in the end greatly increases the chances of
strategies remaining just that.
Conclusions: The Problematic Nature of
Structural Reform and its Implications
for Decentralization Policies
The above set of complex and interrelated problems has
not been fully addressed by any state in the region. Yet, as
the above analysis has shown, these problems need to be
dealt with if the decentralization processes in the region
are to be more successful. Several factors reduce the scope
for the adoption and implementation of structural reforms
in the region.
First, there is the multi-faceted nature of structural reform.
Structural reform involves the re-definition of the role
and position of ministries, they’re subordinated organiza-
tion, the core executive unit(s), and local self-governing
authorities.13  This is of particular importance in Central
and East European states as there are a number of funda-
mental ‘system values’ that need to be changed. For instance,
core executive units of the administration used to ‘shadow’
line ministries under the previous regime and play a domi-
nant role in the process of policy co-ordination. Policy
processes were therefore ‘top heavy’, based on co-ordination
at the top, and ultimately controlled by the Communist
Party. Core executive units also tended to manage large
numbers of subordinated institutions. Ministries in turn
had direct responsibility for the management of a plethora
of subordinated bodies, including often state enterprises
and other institutions that in a market economic either
belong in the private sector or, at the very least, in the
‘third sector.’ Local self-governing authorities did not exist
at all, and the development of a workable system of relations
between central governments and local self-governing
authorities possibly requires the greatest change in admi-
nistrative culture in the whole restructuring process.
A second element of complexity is the need for radical
change in accountability systems, which has both insti-
tutional and cultural implications. In the past, account-
ability lines were directed towards the leading political
party. Changing a system based on a single hierarchy with
single accountability lines to a complex accountability
system with various ‘centers to which institutions report
is a highly difficult task. In particular, the development
of a system where the activities of local self-governing
authorities are subject to ex-post legality control only, away
from a tradition of ex-ante controls or ‘veto-rights’ for
appointed higher level officials, goes beyond merely
adopting legislation, mentality changes are much more
difficult to come by than changes in legislation.
During the last few years initiatives have been taken in
several states to come to a more comprehensive approach
to structural reform. One method applied has been the
use of framework laws to regulate the role and function
of the different institutions in the administration and to
rationalize their operation. For instance, in Bulgaria a Law
on Public Administration was adopted in 1998, defining
the type of institutions that can exist in the state administ-
ration, and their relations of accountability. Other states
have also taken initiatives of this kind in recent years,
such as Latvia and Lithuania. Slovakia has defined a package
of laws and regulations, which is in the process of being
adopted. The clarification of the role and function of the
different parts of the state administration is relevant for
local self-governing authorities. It provides them at least
with an understanding in principle of their own rights
and obligations towards the various state structures, and,
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in an ideal situation, with enforceable rights. The develop-
ment of legislation to regulate accountability systems could
in this way help to overcome at least the problems of
vertical fragmentation.
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
Whereas the implementation of structural reform in the
central state administration could provide much better
conditions for the successful implementation of decentrali-
zation policies, there is also an important linkage between
civil service reform and decentralization. As will be argued
in this section, building local government capacities goes
beyond putting in place training systems for local govern-
ments. Whereas I would not in the least dispute the im-
portance of high quality and tailor made training programs
to build up local government capacity, this alone is not a
sufficient condition for creating strong local self-governing
institutions. The development of suitable employment
conditions (in terms of remuneration and career possibi-
lities) is a second necessary condition for building strong
local self-governing institutions, and thus ensuring effective
decentralization.
In fact, the link between civil service reform and  decentra-
lization is not often explored. Civil service reform is most
often seen as a matter for the central government administ-
ration, and as not directly relevant to decentralization
policies. However, the development of civil service systems
can provide both incentives to the development of pro-
fessional capacities at local level as well as impede the
creation of a professional cadre of local government officials.
The link between civil service development and local
capacity building lies largely in the question how the central
civil service law is linked to local government employment
conditions. Three possible scenarios can be considered in
this respect.
The first scenario is a full de-linkage of local and central
government employment conditions. This provides the
best guarantee for autonomy to local authorities in terms
of setting employment conditions for their own staff, thus
safeguarding the independence of local self-government.
In this case, the adoption of a central level civil service
law will have no implications for local self-government
staff. However, if no over-arching regulation of local
government employment conditions is put in place, this
will make it impossible for poorer municipalities to attract
adequate staff. This can also lead to a departure of talented
officials from self-governing authorities to local state
government authorities on the same territory.
The other extreme, a fully integrated civil service system,14
in which employment conditions for civil servants at
central and local level, including local self-government,
are regulated through one set of rules, provides potentially
better employment conditions for local self-government
officials.15  However, this is achieved at the cost of a loss
of budgetary autonomy for local governments. In addition,
the problem of a ‘brain drain’ from local to central level
is difficult to prevent in this kind of system. Unless there
is an obligation for civil servants to spend at least part of
their career at local level (a two-way mobility), civil servants
at local level will merely hope to use the integrated system
of employment conditions as a launching pad for a central
government career. The potential advantage of this kind
of system remains that local self-governing institutions
can at least temporarily attract qualified staff, but a high
level of turnover is inevitable in this case.
A third possible option is the parallel development of
legislation regulating the employment conditions of
central and local government officials. The success of this
kind of model depends on the extent to which fiscal
relations between levels of government are adequate to
ensure that the law on local government employment
conditions can be implemented regardless of the size and
location of the local government.
There are few examples of states that have tried to relate
civil service reform at central government level to em-
ployment conditions at the level of local self-governments.
The trend in the region has rather been the inverse. Civil
service laws have increasingly focused on defining a core
civil service, incorporating mainly managerial and policy
staff at central government level and senior management
staff at the level of subordinated bodies [see for instance,
Reinholde and Jansone in Verheijen, 2001]. Whereas
earlier versions of civil service laws in the region tended
to be more inclusive in nature,16  at least as far as officials
in the central government and subordinated bodies were
concerned, the more recent laws have focused on
improving employment conditions for smaller categories
of staff, leaving most public officials outside the remit of
the Civil Service system. Staff of local self-governing
authorities generally do not enter the picture at all. Among
the EU candidate states, Lithuania is the only state that
has adopted an integrated civil service system, including
local self-governing authorities, but even in this case
amendments to the Civil Service law will in all likelihood
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reduce the impact of the law on local self-governing officials.
The Lithuanian case, however, did provide an interesting
example of how a balance could be struck between local
autonomy and the principle of integrated civil service,
providing for a central definition of employment conditions
with local autonomy in the hiring process, of course within
the limits set by the law [see Lazareviciute, Tirviene and
Poniskaitis in Verheijen, 2001]. Kazakhstan is the only
other state as yet to experiment with an integrated civil
service system. However, since the role of local self-
governing authorities is still limited in Kazakhstan,17  this
example is for now less relevant. The one important lesson
that can be drawn from the Kazakh case, however, is the
difficulty of implementing a system based on unified salary
scales in a state where economic disparities are wide. Inter-
estingly, this could actually put cities and larger towns,
where life is more expensive, at a disadvantage in attracting
qualified officials.
It is urgent that those designing decentralization strategies
do reflect on the issue of local employment conditions.
The argument that this should be a matter of local auto-
nomy does hold much value in states where disparities
are wide and local government revenues unstable. The
development of capacities at the level of local self-governing
institutions should be a matter of interest of central govern-
ment, and employment conditions are a central issue for
discussion in this context. However, looking at the pro-
fessional and academic literature on this subject, little
attention has been devoted to this problem. Capacity
development through training appears to have been the
main and almost exclusive focus of thinking on this issue.
As discussed above, the development of integrated Civil
Service Systems may not be a miracle cure for the low
level of competitiveness of local authorities, especially in
the current context, where Central and East European
states are moving towards the creation of ever more narrowly
defined Civil Service Systems. However, other means are
available to address this problem. The creation of a law
on employment conditions of local self-government staff,
mentioned as an option above, could create a more compe-
titive system of local self-government. Many EU member
states have such arrangements in place. Such legislation
should obviously prepared in close consultation with asso-
ciations of local governments. It is important to cost of
the implementation of such laws, and to make provisions
to address regional disparities, as these tend to be significant
in the region. Furthermore, for legislation on local self-
government employment conditions to work, it is essential
that the cost of employing staff is properly integrated in
the system of intergovernmental transfers. This would
ensure that even small municipalities could afford minimum
staffing levels, while encouraging them, through fiscal
incentives, to set up joint administrations.
Innovative solutions are required to address the problem
of staff capacities at the level of local self-governments.
This requires urgent reflection on the problem of creating
employment conditions that can attract qualified staff. If
decentralization policies are to have better results, the
factor of staff quality needs to be given more attention.
THINKING ABOUT LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM PROCESSES:
CREATING BETTER CONDITIONS FOR
SUCCESSFUL DECENTRALIZATION
This paper has looked at the issue of integrated public
administration development. Central government reform,
decentralization   and sectoral institution building for EU
membership continue to be ‘separate worlds’ in many
ways, even if all three would benefit from a more integrated
approach. decentralization will not fully succeed unless
central government reform issues are addressed in parallel,
while success in sectoral institution building is dependent
on progress in both central government reform and local
government development. Reforms at central level, es-
pecially when concerned with the transfer of functions,
will be blocked if local government capacities are insuffi-
cient to take on those tasks that central government needs
to transfer.
The above argument has been illustrated by reviews of
two key areas of public administration reform and their
relevance for the successful implementation of decentrali-
zation policies. Some of the key structural problems in
central government reform have serious implications on
the chances for effective  decentralization. Issues such as
horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the state admi-
nistration, the lack of consensus on the role of the state
and the related irrationalities in budgetary allocations to
redundant institutions all combine to make effective de-
centralization much more difficult.
The development of a more comprehensive approach to
Civil Service Reform, taking into account employment
conditions at the level of local self-government, also could
do a lot for effective decentralization. In particular the
development of special legislation on local government
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employment conditions, designed in parallel to national
civil service laws, is an under utilized tool to strengthen
local self-governing authorities. This should be an issue
for advocacy by local government associations and external
supporters of decentralization policies alike.
In general, a better synchronization between central govern-
ment reform and decentralization policies is essential if
both are to be more successful than they have been thus
far. It requires to integrate rather than separate respons-
ibilities for these areas of reform and to develop a holistic
view of state reform. Thus far the fragmentation that has
characterized public administration systems in Central and
Eastern Europe in general appears to have been equally
present in reform efforts. This is one among the many
issues that policy-makers in the region should address
urgently.
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NOTES
1 Chief Technical Adviser on Governance, UNDP Regional Support Center. The views and opinions expressed in
this paper are the personal views of the author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDP.
2 In some cases, any approach at all.
3 There are some examples where this type of approach has been tried at least partially, such as in Slovakia (even if in
an imperfect manner), and a reflection on ways of rationalizing the allocation of functions between levels of government
has started recently in Bulgaria.
4 Institution building plans are an obligatory element of national plans for EU accession and have been used since 1999.
5 There are exceptions to this, especially Lithuania has devoted a lot of time and energy to developing institution
building plans as real planning tools, to a lesser degree this is also true for Latvia. See for instance, Verheijen, T.,
Developing a methodology for the development of a Lithuanian Strategic Institution Building Plan for EU accession,
Produced for the European Committee under the Government of Lithuania and the EU PHARE SEIL project.
Linkages to the institution building plan are provided in the chapters of the NPAA 2001–2004, covering both
vertical and horizontal aspects.
6 This relates both to formal decision-making, where it is relevant mainly to states with strong devolved systems of
authority (Germany, Spain, Belgium etc.), and to consultation practices, e.g. to ensure that local governments have
been consulted and are able to apply EU public procurement rules. Obviously the former issue is of less relevance to
the current candidate states, as all are strongly unitary.
7 The following section draws broadly on the argumentation in the UNDP paper Rebuilding State Structures, chapter
1, but sets out the relevance of the issues discussed there for the decentralization process.
8 The concept of ‘tutelle’ (in French) is best translated as ‘guardianship’ and in this context refers to institutions that
are subject to administrative control on the financial regularity of the use of allocated budget resources, but otherwise
have a high degree of autonomy in the way they are managed. This modality could apply in particular to cultural
institutions, higher education institutions etc.
9 Instead the process was managed by a plenipotentiary, how drew on limited staff resources for inputs.
10 The final decisions on the decentralization process were taken only in late Spring 2001, which was the last possible
moment possible as regional elections had to be held by the end of 2001, in order to avoid having two major
elections in 2002. Two of the main political forces clearly used delaying tactics to gain maximum political benefits
for their constituents.
11 In addition one of the main political forces tried extensively to use economic arguments to back a clearly political strategy.
12 The development of the administrative reform strategy in Bulgaria by STRATEGMA is one key example.
13 For instance, Chancelleries, Prime Minister’s Offices, Cabinet Offices or Council of Ministers.
14 experimented with in Lithuania and Kazakhstan.
15 and makes local self-governing institutions more competitive at local level.
16 For instance, the Latvian Civil Service law adopted in 1995, the Polish Civil Service Law adopted in 1996.
17 Local self-governing authorities in the European definition exist only at village level thus far, even if experiments
with elections at city and Raion level have started during the last year.
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Management of Civil Service Reform
in Central Europe
M i r o s l a v  B e b l a v y´
INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with experiences from management of
civil service reforms in countries of Central Europe
(primarily Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, but also
Slovenia).1  Therefore, it is not primarily focused on the
substance of the civil service reform in these countries,
but on how the challenge was managed. To understand
the management of a reform, however, one frequently
needs to allude to the substance as well.
To analyze issues in civil service reform management, several
questions need to be asked: what is reform? What is a civil
service reform? What does management of such reform
include? Introduction provides brief and rather stylized
answers to these questions for the purposes of the paper.
What is reform? To put it very simply, reform is a conscious
implementation of changes. [Kolarska–Bobinska (2000),
p. 7] A more sophisticated version can define reforms as a
specific set of public policy measures aimed at significant
and swift change of public policy in a certain area with an
objective to obtain a qualitatively new state.
What is civil service? There is no single, overarching defi-
nition, which would be universally accepted except that
it means a subset of public sector, which excludes certain
groups of employees. In most countries, employees of
organizations with corporate status are excluded. In 20
out of 34 countries surveyed by OECD, health pro-
fessionals are not included and in 18 out of 34 countries,
teachers are not included. [See Synnerstrom et al. (2001)]
These views are reflected in the paper, which does not
focus on teachers and health professionals or employees
of public corporations. It does however include both
central and local public administration employees. This
is due to focus of the book as well as OECD findings that
in the sample of 34 countries, 18 countries include sub-
national civil servants in the general scheme, while 11
others have a separate civil service scheme for them.
What is civil service reform in transition?
As analyzed more closely in the next section [see also Beb-
lavy´ (2002), Hojnacki (1996), and Vanagunas (2002)],
transition countries inherited a public administration,
which was problematic in several aspects:
• its employees were responsive to political pressure and
vulnerable as individuals;
• the bureaucracy as a whole had very little political
accountability toward the people or the party/ies;
• public administration as a whole lacked skills and
information needed to participate in policy-making
in a new world of market democracy;
• due to state control of all organizations, there was a
lack of public service ethos as the distinction between
“civil service” and other government employees (in-
cluding enterprises) was blurred.
To gradually remedy this situation, all civil service reforms
in Central Europe, in some way, pursue some of the fol-
lowing essential components:
• to replace some of the public administration emplo-
yees with new employees with a different set of skills
and preferences;
• to give the remaining and incoming public administ-
ration employees incentives to mould their behavior
in a desirable manner;
• to equip public administration employees with skills
that enable them to respond to incentives in a desir-
able manner.
Management of civil service reform, in this context, means
inter alia:
• primary and secondary legislation concerning civil
service—preparation, interpretation, monitoring of
implementation and amendments thereof;
• Management of transition of the existing public ad-
ministration employees into the new system (exams,
oaths, lay-offs etc.);
• organization of training for existing and new civil
servants;
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• setting up institutional solutions for recruitment,
dismissal, evaluation and remuneration systems of
civil servants (which usually require complex
institutional underpinnings).
In all these aspects, reform management involves issues
such as how much change? How fast? What sequencing
of individual steps? How to combine top-down and bottom-
up approaches?
In all of these countries, because of their legalistic culture
and other factors, a new civil service law became a focal
point of civil service reform and its management, around
which all these issues gathered. However, as the enumera-
tion above shows, it would be a mistake to confuse passage
of legislation with a reform. Nonetheless, because of its
focal nature, the civil service legislation and management
of its preparation and implementation is going to play a
prominent role.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner:
first of all, some key factors impinging on civil service
reform and its management are introduced. Then, choice
of institution responsible for civil service reform is analyzed
both from the positive and normative point of view. Look
at various stakeholders and their role follows. The paper
concludes with a discussion of timing issues in the reform.
KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AND ITS
MANAGEMENT
This section introduces and details some of the key in-
fluences on civil service reform and its management.
Starting generally with how heritage of communism
influenced civil service reform, it then goes on to look
specifically on governance and public administration
reform as well as labor code reforms.
Heritage of Communism
Since communism meant a totalitarian system based on
collective ownership of all means of production and
repressive and intrusive political system, both outsiders
and insiders often tend to see it as an environment with
very low level of autonomy for individual actors in any
area. Such a view tends to perception of the whole
communist society as a centralized, vertically and horizont-
ally integrated hierarchy, where the center (e.g. central
committee of a communist party and its government
apparatus) directed resources and activities of sectors,
organizations and individuals. It ignores, however, several
important factors
The officially tightly knit hierarchy contained thousands
of organizations with legal autonomy. While the system
could rely to some extent on its ability for arbitrary use of
power to resolve conflicts between interests in this hierarchy,
arbitrary use of power in itself was an insufficient answer
to daily routines of administration in a complex society.
The communist system lasted from 40 to 70 years in
countries of Central and Eastern Europe as an industrialized
economy where citizens were provided with a welfare-to-
cradle superstate (issues in quality, responsiveness and ability
to generate wealth notwithstanding). No economic, political
and social system would be able to last so long in these
complex conditions unless it developed a relatively pre-
dictable system for conflict resolution between both indi-
vidual and organizational interests. [See Beblavy´ (2002)]
As several authors, including Mlcoch (2000), argue, the
hierarchy was largely an illusion: “In a closed system of
hierarchical management, the planning was a widespread
social game based on a all-encompassing dichotomy
between the real rules and the official ones. In reality,
local “controlling” groups tried to maximize their share
of a social pie in the inverted pyramid. Planning was an
instrument and an ideological smokescreen to utilize a
monopoly power over allocation of scarce resources, infor-
mation and decision-making processes within the social
reproduction process:” [pp. 30–31]2
By 1970s and 1980s, the public administration was penet-
rated individually (by compulsory party membership on
many levels), but it was nearly invulnerable collectively
[see Sootla (2002)]. As Hojnacki (1996) writes: “There
can be little doubt that during the last several years of the
communist rule, the major force in both policy-making
and policy implementation... was the communist-led
bureaucracy that was almost immune to political pressure
from any source.” [Hojnacki (1996), p. 147]
Since the hierarchy involved not only public sector as
understood in the OECD countries, but also the whole
corporate sector (enterprises), the well-known problems
of information flows and information asymmetries were
even more acute than in public sectors of OECD countries
due to span-of-control problems and lack of accountability
systems. Managers of organizations were the real masters
of the system because of their unique position in the
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information flows and decision-making. In other words,
the real rulers of communist countries were, to quote
Burnham (1972): “the men who are running the factories
and mines and railroads, the directing members of the
commissariats and sub-commissariats of heavy and light
industry and transportation and communications, the
heads of the large collective farms, the expert manipulators
of the propaganda mediums... the managers in short.”
[Burnham (1972), pp. 221–22]
Since the “public” and “corporate” sectors were treated
equally under the communist system—both were controlled
by sectoral ministries and were subject to similar regulatory
environment—this blurring not only led to enterprises
behaving like “civil service,” but also to “civil servants”
behaving like corporate managers. In other words, the
two groups were part of a unified system and a continuum,
where there was neither a sharp distinction between the
two in the eyes of actors themselves nor much difference
in systems and incentives regulating their behavior.
Governmental organizations during the communist period
generally had no accountability systems. On the other
hand, they had a number of legal relationships with other
elements of the government. Since the “public sector”
organizations themselves and their ministries saw them
on par with “corporations” (as it was unclear anyway what
belongs where) and as the regulatory framework was similar,
this led to high level of both de iure and de facto autonomy.
All of this led to a situation where the real heritage of
communism is not a hierarchical, disciplined public sector
with a distinctive culture and ethos, but a chaotic free-
for-all, where organizations often had legally defined
autonomy, rights and responsibilities, their staff and parti-
cularly managers remained responsive to political pressure
individually, but acquired very little accountability, felt
certain informal ownership rights and the distinction
between public- and private-sector mentality remained
blurred or non-existent in eyes of most actors. Public
administration employees also on the whole lacked skills
and information needed to participate in policy-making
in a New World of market democracy.
Governance and
Public Administration Reform
A key influence on civil service reform has been the overall
governance reforms in transition countries. Not only did
the level of government involvement in the economy and
in the society decrease by any fiscal or financial measure,
the role of state was redefined “down,” sometimes repeatedly.
Partially as a consequence of this redefinition, but also
due to economic challenges of transition, the public sector
in transition countries has experienced a long-lasting and
profound decline in funding, prestige and stability. It was
clear in early transition everywhere and it is still true for
most transition countries that the extent of government
involvement in society both in fiscal and other terms and
the size of the public sector were incompatible with a
market democracy and the actual wealth of these countries.
To remedy this, public sector employment and government
involvement in the civil society have been repeatedly and
relentlessly cut during the transition, but these cuts were
smaller than the actual decrease in financial resources
available to governments. As a consequence, not only is
the public sector doing much less in transition countries
than it used to do, it is doing with smaller funding and
resources than would be proportional to its reduced size.
This, together with a very high level of uncertainty and de-
creasing prestige of the public sector due to new employment
alternatives for the best staff, led to the already mentioned
long-lasting decline in funding, prestige and stability.
On the other hand, within more narrow confines of public
administration, there has often been simultaneously a
growth in number of employees due to pressures of
devolution and de-concentration as well as additions of
new functions not to mention establishment of new
countries (e.g. Slovakia and Slovenia).
The overall role of public sector in service delivery has
consequently been diminishing, while regulatory and
policy-making responsibilities of public administration
mushroomed, putting a particular strain on ministries and
other policy-making bodies. These reforms, however, were
rarely if ever pursued within a systemic conceptual and
legal framework, which would set out in advance the goals,
the instruments, their relationships and the timetable across
the board. Due to low quality and capacity overload in
public administration as well as among the political classes,
these changes usually occurred as a quick sectoral fix.
Another key influence is the decentralization momentum
and its influence on civil service reforms. All countries in
Central Europe gradually loosened the hierarchic structure
of their public administration and granted substantial
autonomy to local governments, usually moving up from
municipalities to regional structures. This has had, of course,
a profound influence on the civil service reform. The
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interplay, especially, concerning the issue of timing, is
analyzed in more detail in part E.
Labor Code Reforms
Nearly all transition countries emerged from the communist
period with a general labor code applicable to all em-
ployees.3  The code has been subject to several reform steps,
ranging from initial adjustment to new realities of a market
democracy and existence of a private sector to pre-accession
adjustments to EU requirements, with many possible
changes occurring in between aimed particularly at labor
market flexibility or increased protection of employees.
Public sector employees have gradually been partially or
completely separated from this general framework by a
passage of separate legislation. A complete separation
occurs rarely because it is more practical to use relevant
provisions of labor codes for general issues such as occu-
pational safety etc.4
Labor code reforms therefore are interdependent, to some
degree, with civil service reforms. In some instances, they
can be used as proxies for more complex civil service
reforms (e.g. provisions included into the Labor Code in
the Czech and Slovak republics in the early 1990s aimed
specifically at regulation of public sector employee
behavior). In other cases, a civil service reform can be
understood as a part of a complete overhaul of a labor
legislation (Slovakia in 2000 and 2001) and thus directly
tied to labor code reforms.
Most frequently though the interdependence is only limited
to a relationship of a tree and an imputed bough. Civil
service laws and regulations then build on general provisions
of a labor code, amending and complementing the general
set of rules as necessary. Labor market reform and civil
service reform is thus decoupled both politically and
temporally. Such was the case particularly in Hungary in
1992 and in Poland in 1998.
INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MANAGEMENT
AND EFFECTS OF THE CHOICE
This section analyses potential choices of institutions
responsible for the management of civil service reform.
The management task, as indicated in the introduction,
involves primarily administration of components of the
reform and/or their co-ordination (see introduction for
the list of components).
There are several likely players in the area of civil service
reform, based on their responsibilities either inherited
from the ancien regime or assigned by a new, democratic
one. In this section, they are going to be introduced and
the role of three key institutions is going to be analyzed
in more detail. The key determinant of institutional res-
ponsibility for civil service reform management is, un-
surprisingly, whether the country has an integrated civil
service with a single legal, institutional and financial
frame-work or a fragmented civil service.  In addition to
sectoral civil service systems, non-core public employees
often have a different status than the core public administ-
ration.
One institution, which always plays an important role, is
a ministry of interior in a given country. Ministries of
interior are usually responsible for a combination of local
“state” administration (i.e. de-concentrated administrative
bodies), law enforcement and general issues in public
administration, with the mix varying in each country. In
Hungary and Slovenia, this has been the ministry generally
responsible for the civil service reform. Therefore, they
will be one of key drivers analyzed more closely in this
section. The ministry can also have a sectoral role if there
is separate civil service legislation for policemen and if it
is responsible for the law enforcement, which is the case
in most transition countries.
Ministries of labor are usually closely involved in the civil
service reform due to their responsibility for working issues
and labor market.  These ministries have been responsible
both for general labor legislation and specifically civil
service regulations. They have played a key role in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia by preparing (repeatedly,
as it turned out) a legal framework and remaining, in the
Czech case, to be responsible for it.
In several countries, a separate agency5  is responsible for
some or all components of a civil service reform. It is
usually created as a consequence of a new legal framework
for the civil service to implement and oversee the reform
and functioning of the civil service. In Poland and Slovakia,
such an agency is officially a separate quasi-ministry with
an independent director. In the Czech Republic, a separate
bureau, which is part of the Government Office, is en-
visaged, with its director being a political appointee. Once
created, such an agency usually becomes a focal point for
further civil service reform.
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From the point of view of civil service management,
ministries of finance in Central Europe are in a peculiar
position. Even though they hold enormous influence over
the reform via purse strings, they are rarely a key driver or
a key actor in the process. This is in stark contrast to
situations in some other small European countries (e.g.
Finland), where the Ministry of Finance is the key actor
on civil service legislation, financing and reform. Ministries
of finance generally seem to prefer a more arms-length
approach, which allows them to veto or downsize financing
requirements for the reform should that prove necessary.
The only exception exists if there is separate civil service
legislation for customs or tax officials, who usually are
part of the superstructure of the ministry of finance.
Countries with a cabinet system of government generally
have an institution at the center of government responsible
for co-ordination as well support for the cabinet as a whole.
Again, various names are attached to it in various countries,
but Government/ Cabinet/Prime Ministers Office is the
most frequent ones. Even though its central location
would make it suitable for co-ordination of such a multi-
sectoral exercise as a civil service reform, this has not really
happened to any significant degree. Even in countries such
as Slovakia, where Government Office and a Deputy
Prime Minister were responsible for the overall public
administration reform, the civil service reform remained
in the hands of individual ministries or specific agencies.
Ministries of defense, justice (and finance in the already
mentioned case of tax and customs officials) act as sectoral
ministries for their own mini-systems of civil service should
those exist. In such cases, those ministries like to wrestle
as much control over all aspects of their employee status
and career as possible.
Three key institutions—interior ministries, labor ministries
and single-purpose agencies—are now going to be analyzed
in more detail due to their importance.
Interior Ministries
Ministries of interior are one of default choices for an
institution responsible for a civil service reform. Its strongest
points are usually administrative continuity, an extensive
pool of employees with wide administrative experience
and close relationship with local governments.
In most countries, the necessity of smooth functioning as
well as their existence under the previous regime precluded
major and abrupt changes in their staff after the fall of
communism.6  This personal and institutional continuity
also means however that ministries of interior tend to be
conservative in their approach and usually focus on in-
cremental change or stability. On the other hand, their
direct relationship with local governments and various
branches of administration means that the “ivory tower”
problem should not arise and ministry should have a
holistic view of general public administration rather than
create the reform based on a narrow range of central
government experiences. This integrated approach also
makes it easier to carry out pilot projects on various levels.
However, this vertical advantage is not always accompanied
by a broad horizontal knowledge, especially in cases of a
fragmented public sector, where large parts might formally
not be a part of the executive branch of government.
Ministries of interior also usually offer administrative
advantages in organization of training as they usually
inherited institutions relevant to this area and also again
based on their ties too much of public administration.
Hungary and Slovenia chose this approach, among others.
In Hungary, this was accompanied by a decentralized civil
service system, so the role of the interior ministry focused
primarily on legislation and regulation. In Slovenia, the
role of the interior ministry is again limited primarily to
legislation and regulation, with more specific tasks now
handed over to personnel service and personnel com-
mission. This points to self-acknowledged limitations of
the pivotal role an interior ministry can play in the reforms.
Labor Ministries
Labor ministries are not a frequent choice for co-ordination
of civil service reform, but the Czech Republic and
Slovakia chose this route. In Slovakia, this approach is
based on identifying civil service reform with civil service
legislation and identifying civil service legislation with
labor law reforms. As already noted, this approach was
taken to its extreme in Slovakia, where the two laws
covering public sector workers (State Service Act and
Public Service Act) were passed together with a new Labor
Code in 2001, with an emphasis placed on interdependency
of these laws.
Based on the Czech and Slovak experiences, it is easy to
understand why the choice is rare. Both ministries placed
an almost exclusive emphasis on labor and social aspects
of a civil service reform, particularly on employee protection,
at the expense of the rest of the civil service reform. Apart
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from the advantage gained by the fact that the legislation
was drafted by individuals well versed in the overall frame-
work for the labor market, this offers mainly problems.
Labor ministry also has much less contact with the lower
tiers of the public administration than an interior ministry.
On the other hand, by its involvement in labor issues
everywhere, it is better placed to co-ordinate civil service
reform for non-core parts of the public sector if the civil
service reform is pursued as a “government-as-whole”
reform.
Single-purpose Agencies
In Poland and Slovakia, single-purpose agencies7  were
created as a part of a civil service reform to take over
functions related to civil service reform management. In
the Czech case, a separate bureau within the Government
Office is envisaged in the law under debate. Such single-
purpose agencies offer several crucial advantages, but also
run several major risks.
First of all, the issue is whether a civil service agency should
or should not be an executive agency? Executive agencies
are not responsible for policies, but for an implementation
of policy determined by ministries.
If the agency is supposed to execute policies decided else-
where, several problems emerge. Agencies generally have
more information and expertise than ministries on policy
issues related to their work. The cause is often the policy
weakness of ministries rather than particular strength of
agencies. Larger agencies also have more resources for
public relations, work with media and stakeholders. As a
result, the presumed split of policy/execution tasks between
ministries and agencies does not de facto apply as agencies
are very often informally responsible for preparation of
policy and legal changes in their area that are officially
submitted by the ministry in question. Agencies can also
usually block changes they dislike using their relationships
with stakeholders as well as the media.
Problems go beyond the issue of who is really going to
determine policy. Executive agencies create fragmentation
of responsibility for a civil service reform, thus adding to
an already existing fragmented system of civil service
reform management. If it is not on par with other
ministries in its position, it will also have a very hard time
co-ordination their work on civil service reform, as its
authority will probably be insufficient.
On the other hand, if the agency is granted a quasi-minis-
terial status (defined primarily by responsibility for all
relevant policy and legal affairs in a given area), political
and accountability problems emerge.
In countries with a strong tradition of an overly politicized
civil service, there is a natural tendency to reinforce inde-
pendent and apolitical nature of the head of the civil service
agency transcending government terms of office (e.g.
Poland, Slovakia, to some extent the Czech Republic).
However, such a status raises significant political account-
ability issues, if it is fused with an overall responsibility
for civil service policy. The government then has only a
limited ability to influence civil service policy while being
responsible for it as well as for its outcomes.
Looking beyond the policy/execution split, single-purpose
agencies have several attractive features. They can easily
provide a good focal point for civil service reform, which
can otherwise be lacking, as civil service reform is not a
key issue for either of the ministries named above or the
ministry of finance. They can thus become a driver for
further reform, active in public advocacy for the civil service
reform. Such an agency is also ideally suited to understand
and weigh interests of various elements of the civil service
and understand complexity of the civil service reform.
On the other hand, major risks apply as well. Especially
if it is not granted a quasi-ministerial status, the agency
can be too weak. In addition to loss of power over policy
and legislation, it is subject to budgetary problems. It is
easy for a part of the public sector to get lost in the enormous
fiscal pressures transition countries have been facing. If
an agency does not have a quasi-ministerial status or other
source of power in budget negotiations, the likelihood
that it will be ignored or that the reconciliation of pressures
will be done at its expense is significant. This is particularly
relevant because new public institutions always face a
financing squeeze in the budgeting process.
Another issue is that if precautions are not taken, the agency
can be easily captured by the relevant interest group—
civil servants. This is true for ministries as well, but in a
single-purpose agency, the risks are higher for two reasons.
One is that due to its isolation from the political process,
there is less accountability and consequently more
tendency to become an agency for the benefit of civil
servants. The other is that the agency is subject to more
intense lobbying by civil servants as it centralizes many of
the sensitive and important issues. On the other hand, if
there is sufficient political will at the outset to prevent
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these issues (e.g. by appointing a reform-minded manage-
ment, which does not come directly from the civil service
or has a wide experience outside of the civil service), the
opposite can happen—see, for example, the Polish ex-
perience.
OTHER ACTORS
—INCENTIVES AND ROLES
This section focuses on other actors interested in civil
service reform and their influence on its outcomes. Such
a view is important for management of the reform because
it can offer suggestions of potential pitfalls as well as ways
of avoiding them or minimizing them. The section deals
primarily with civil servants, the European Union, the
media and the public as well as political parties and trade
unions.
Civil Servants
Civil service reform is one of the few reforms where civil
servants as a group have direct pecuniary and non-
pecuniary interests. To distinguish them conceptually from
civil service trade unions, one needs to focus on civil
servants as individuals present at policy-making, their
influence and interest.
In our stylized approach, civil servants present at policy-
making defend interests of current senior civil servants as
they see them. The reason is that influential civil servants
tend to be senior current civil servants themselves. Let us
return to three aims of the civil service reform as defined
above:
• to replace some of the public administration emplo-
yees with new employees with a different set of skills
and preferences;
• to give the remaining and incoming public administ-
ration employees incentives to mould their behavior
in a desirable manner;
• to equip public administration employees with skills
that enable them to respond to incentives in a desir-
able manner.
The influential civil servants rarely have any interest in
the first aim, slightly more in the second and most in the
third. They have an additional interest in maximizing
utilities for individuals like themselves. This tends to skew
their aims for the civil service reform towards training,
tenure and privileges that are attractive for insiders, but
not for outsiders and would not induce reduction in the
number of civil servants. [Beblavy´ and Sicáková (2001)]
For example, in considering pay raises and other measures
that increase attractiveness of the civil service for outsiders,
civil servants have to weigh these increased benefits for
themselves with risks of increased competition. An in-
genious compromise is related to preference for seniority-
based pay increases. In general, a more civil-servant-driven
reform, one can see these effects (they are least dominant
in Poland, most in the Czech Republic and in the original
draft of civil service law in Slovakia).
Civil servants have their greatest influence during pre-
paratory stages of civil service reform within the executive
and then, of course, in its implementation. In between,
their power is very limited.
Foreign Partners—EU and Others
Foreign partners in civil service reforms include both indi-
vidual states and multilateral organizations. Foreign
assistance and involvement in the issue of civil service reform
in Central Europe has been dominated by the European
Union to such a degree though this section will deal almost
exclusively with its role.
In his paper on institutional change in advanced transition
countries, Jackoby (2001) speaks about “tutors” and
“pupils”—invoking not only the learning process, but also
certain powers a tutor has over students. In his analysis,
he recognizes “thresholds”—a qualitative and individual
view of what minimum standards the new formal structure
must fulfil to allow a membership in a certain organization
[p. 181], in this case the EU. Since reform of the civil service
certainly was an element of the EU threshold, the EU
involvement in such reforms concerning both their design
and evaluation is understandable. However, to understand
the EU incentives, a more detailed analysis is needed.
Civil service legislation as such is not part of the acquis
communitaure that each member country must formally
incorporate into its legal framework to allow EU mem-
bership. However, a functioning administrative system
including the civil service is a necessary precondition for
full membership in the Union. Awareness of this has been
growing gradually and, consequently, the EU bodies have
paid increasing attention to the topic, particularly by the
European Commission. [See Verheijen (1999) for a
discussion.]
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The European Union was a pivotal player in two specific
developments relevant to a civil service reform and its
management—the civil service law and the decentralization.
The legalistic nature of the acquis has focused the accession
process on changes in the legal framework in transition
countries and this has spilled over into the civil service
reform as well. Therefore, from the EU perspective, the
civil service reform was often reduced to a passage of an
appropriate civil service legislation that would contain
mechanisms aimed at achieving a professional civil service.
Consequently, in countries where sufficient civil service
legislation had not been passed prior to relevant accession
negotiations (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia),
the act usually became a focal point of negotiations with
regard to public administration.
Existence of regions with self-governments compatible
roughly in size and functions with regional policies of the
EU is a precondition for successful membership in these
schemes. Therefore, again, in countries where a minimum
extent of decentralization had not been implemented prior
to the start of relevant accession negotiations, need to do
so became the second focal point of negotiations with
regard to public administration.
Governments often use foreign partners, including inter-
national investor and financial markets as a ‘sacrificial lamb,’
to push through otherwise unpopular reforms. [Beblavy´
and Sicáková (2001)] In case of civil service reforms, a
better expression would be a “battering ram,” because in
the case of the Czech and Slovak republics, civil service
legislation was subject to a domestic political deadlock
within the government or between the government and
key stakeholders. Without the EU pressure, it is unclear
whether any relevant reform would be passed in either of
the two countries. The ‘battering ram’ function allowed
to create credible exogenous pressure on individual poli-
ticians, political parties, government employees and stake-
holders and break through a very complex web of interests,
which would otherwise almost certainly veto the change.
Concerning tools of intervention by the EU, the dominant
one has been PHARE. PHARE started operating in 1990,
but initially only limited attention was devoted to public
administration development. This has gradually developed
towards becoming one of the key PHARE areas. There are
two essential components [Verheijen (2002), pp. 252–3]:
• national projects, where the dominant horizontal
projects followed relatively similar formats, focusing
on support for the development of the new legislative
framework for the operation of the administration,
improvement of decision making structures, general
capacity building through training and the develop-
ment of training institutions and the provision of
equipment;
• Multi-country programs, where PHARE recipient
states have facilities available, of which SIGMA and
TAIEX deserve a mention.
With regard to civil service reform and its management,
PHARE has tended to bring financial support, but also
to complicate the management issues because of lack of
coordination in project design, lack of coordination with
bilateral and other donors and slow and inefficient
programming and contracting procedures. Experts often
‘tried to export their national systems without taking into
account the conditions they were exporting them to...
because of the multi-national composition of the con-
sortia, recipient countries were often given contradictory
advise within one project.’ [ibid. p. 254]. Since 1997,
twinning has been the dominant form of assistance in
public administration reform in PHARE. The efficiency
and effectiveness of these projects varies.
On the multi-country front, SIGMA played an important
role in developing civil service legislation in latecomers
(particularly in Slovakia).  It was pivotal in knowledge
diffusion and network building both within the region
and between region and EU countries. It also contained
an expert body for the European Commission itself during
the accession negotiation concerning public administra-
tion reform.
Generally, it needs to be noted that while the EU was very
successful in pushing through major formal institutional
instruments it focused on (creation of regions, civil service
act), it was much less successful in influencing the actual
content of the change. Civil service reform is too close
and too important for both politicians and civil servants
to allow themselves to be dominated by EU experts.
Therefore, even in countries where EU pressure and
assistance has been pivotal in the overall reform (the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and to some extent in Poland), its
role in implementation is much weaker and less focused.
[See Beblavy´ and Sicáková (2001), Verheijen (2002)].
The Media and the Public
Even though the quality of the civil service and the public
administration in general has gradually been recognized
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in transition countries as a key factor in achieving major
policy objectives, it is not an issue about which the electorate
cares very much per se. It is also an issue where the relation-
ships between reform steps taken and outcomes experienced
by citizens are tenuous at best and where reforms take a
long time to feed through into the quality of the civil service.
Therefore, it is not surprising that public and media interest
in the issue is rather volatile and difficult to mobilize. It
usually tends to be seen as a technocratic “technical” issue
(technical in the sense that, if successful, it contributes to
politically relevant successes in other policy areas).
As a consequence, the media and the public play a more
significant role in the civil service reform process if there
is a visible disagreement/conflict within the government
or between key stakeholders (e.g. in Slovakia and the
Czech Republic). Only in that case can the battle for public
opinion have significant consequences for the reform itself.
In such cases, the conflict tends to be phrased in ways
that fit the political divisions in other areas (e.g. communists
vs. reformers, more money for bureaucrats, politicization
of public life).
The public and the media, unsurprisingly, tend to react
favorably to reforms, which market themselves as:
• decreasing the size of the civil service;
• removing politicization of the civil service;
• decreasing corruption in the civil service;
• modernizing the civil service.
One of the other key elements used is also the need to
approve the legislation within the process of EU accession
(see above).
Political Parties
In their approach to the civil service reform, political
parties are subject to two contradictory incentives.
On one hand, in competitive democracies, parties in power
feel a need to deliver on their election promises to increase
the likelihood of re-election. A need to deliver pushes
parties to favor civil service reform. Parties in the post-
communist countries generally lack the capacity for policy
design and rely on civil servants for assistance even more
than in most industrialized democracies. Quality of civil
servants in ministries is, therefore, even more important
in these countries than elsewhere. As Sootla (2002) writes
about the situation in Estonia: ‘Political leaders... soon
became aware that popular, but very volatile support at
the elections alone is not a sufficient tool for efficient
policy-making. Also, the organizational capacity of their
parties was weak.’  [Sootla (2002), p. 34] On another
level, quality of the civil service influences implementation
of policies, particularly of service delivery, pushing for a
wider civil service reform. Both of these observations were
confirmed in Hungary, for instance [see Gyorgy (1999)].
Parties also generally tend to be responsive to public desire
for a civil service reform, but strength of this pressure is
rather low (see above).
On the other hand, potential for patronage and need for
direct control create strong pressure on parties to resist civil
service reform. Ability to influence appointment is attractive
both in cases of top appointments, but also in cases of lower-
level appointments if local unemployment is high and/or
civil service wages are attractive. Even more importantly,
since civil service reform usually means removal of political
influence over most appointments and dismissals, it signi-
ficantly weakens direct control of politicians and parties
over civil servants and their actions. In environments
where parties are under pressure to deliver on their pledges,
which can often be at odds with desires and aims of civil
servants, their ability to personally penetrate the civil
service is important for their ability to deliver. Again, the
Estonian case can be used to illustrate: “The need for direct
control over the administration and ad hoc interventions
became more and more necessary to ensure that ambitious
reform policies would be carried out without any
impediments.” [Sootla (2002), p. 37]
That does not mean that the conflict is absolutely inherent.
A key issue is how to win the trust of parties in both neut-
rality of the reformed civil service, and its responsiveness
to their concerns. One of the practical solutions is the
advisory council to the Head of the Civil Service in Poland,
where parliamentarians from all parties are involved in
addition to experts. Many other versions of this approach
can be used, but the rule is: if parties cannot be persuaded
that civil service protected from politicians will not ‘stab
them in the back’ when they are in power, the likelihood
of reform failure is very high.
Trade Unions and
Other Interest Groups
Trade unions are, understandably, an important actor in
the civil service reform and its management. They tend
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to be conservative and risk-averse, reflecting both a general
political economy of unions as well as tumultuous nature
of transition. In civil service reform, they tend to place
emphasis on job/tenure guarantees, prevention of lay-off,
minimization of individual and political influences over
the civil service and additional enticements for civil
servants (additional salaries, longer vacation, shorter
working time etc.)
Their role in the civil service reform and its management
itself is manifold. They usually play a role in preparation
and approval of key policy and legal documents relating
to the reform. (In most Central European countries, they
are formally entitled to this position based on some sort
of tripartite arrangement, where the government, employers
and trade unions negotiate concerning their key interests).
They often have the very rare expertise in labor and legal
issues and extreme interest in the civil service reform. The
reform can therefore be easily captured by trade unions,
especially if there is weak or uncertain political leadership
on the issue. Trade unions are also in a unique position to
mobilize support among civil servants for their proposals,
as public administration employees tend to trust them on
social issues.
On the other hand, it is interesting to contrast the Czech
and the Slovak experience, where the Slovak trade unions
as a whole defended the position of civil service trade
unions, on all issues, whereas in the Czech Republic the
trade unions split on the issue, with Czech union leaders
protesting what they saw as unfair privileges for a small
part of the overall employed.
The other social partners - employers - are usually quite
indifferent to the reform though in some countries they
tended to resist what they as precedents for other groups
of employees (vacations, additional salaries etc.)
TIMING IN REFORM MANAGEMENT
Timing of Civil Service Reform
—When to Start Reform
Timing and sequencing of a major civil service reform
are primarily determined by the fact that a government
needs to work every day. Policy documents and laws must
be prepared and public services delivered. Therefore, in a
way, no time is ‘right’ for a civil service reform because
many other pressing ‘real’ issues always present themselves.
As one can see from Table 1, countries in Central Europe
are extremely varied in timing of civil service reform.
Table 1
Passage of Civil Service Legislation
in Countries of Central Europe
Country Passage of Civil Service Legislation
Slovenia 1990
but continuing major changes
Hungary 1992
Poland 1996, 1998
(a completely new law)
Bulgaria 1999
Slovakia 2001
Czech Republic 2002 (expected to pass)
SOURCE: OECD SIGMA, laws of respective countries,
country report on Bulgaria in this volume.
However, several factors influence, to some extent, the
optimal timing of civil service reforms.
Civil service reform is usually ranked among the so-called
‘second generation’ reforms in transition. The first generation
usually involves [see e.g. Zemanovicová (2000), Beblavy´
and Sicáková (2001)] implementation of “simple” speedy
systemic changes (privatization, liberalization of prices and
trade, macroeconomic stabilization). The second generation,
on the other hand, involves ‘messy’ and ‘wicked’ complex
issues such as education, health care, social security and public
administration.  These involve sectors, where there are no
clear-cut best practices, no universally accepted model, and
a high number of individual stakeholders with difficult
monitoring of their efforts and a complex political economy.
Such a reform is both more meaningful and more urgent
when the early transition measures have already been taken
and there is at least a fragile consensus on the size and
function of the state.  At least a rough consensus is also
needed within the society and the political elites that civil
service should be at least partially set aside from political
struggle and that reform will serve interests of all. There-
fore, even in two countries where the civil service reform
was already started in early transition (Hungary, Slovenia),
either major changes were later implemented as transition
progressed or the civil service reform was of a much ‘looser’
nature.
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Sequencing of Components
of Civil Service Rreform
As already emphasized, the decentralization process8  it
the other key pillar of public administration reform in
Central Europe. Their mutual sequencing presents the
challenge in timing of civil service reform.
If decentralization takes place before civil service reform
(as it did in Hungary), the number of relevant stakeholders
will increase so significantly that any agreement on com-
prehensive civil service reform will become extremely
difficult. One option is to separate civil service legislation
for central and local government. Another issue is that,
with their very limited administrative capacity, local autho-
rities might not be interested and/or equipped for the
implementation of civil service reform, particularly train-
ing and internal regulations.
Simultaneous decentralization and civil service reform strain
the capacity of public administration to its utmost (Slovakia
being the most relevant example). The strain shows not
only in terms of policy capacity for reform preparation or
in overload issues during implementation, but also in un-
expected consequences of mutual interplay of the two
reforms. Both decentralization and civil service reforms
are, by their very nature, iterative processes requiring frequent
adjustments, particularly early on. If started simultaneously,
both original designs and subsequent adjustments are
likely to have unexpected effects on the other reform, even
if conscious efforts were taken to think the issues through.
Decentralization after civil service reform probably presents
the least problems unless it creates problems for restructur-
ing of public administration because of tenure and other
considerations. Such sequencing is difficult to find though
primarily because most transition countries can sooner
find a political will to decentralize than to comprehensively
reform their civil service.
The second key issue in sequencing of the civil service
reform understands the political economy of reform in
balancing contemporaneous benefits and costs. Even
though it might sometimes be awkward for other reasons,
it is essential that costs and benefits for actors in the process
(politicians and parties, civil servants, media and public)
are part of the same package and, if possible, their imple-
mentation is simultaneous. The tumultuous nature of
transition required frequent changes and turnaround both
in terms of policy and public finance, thus reducing cre-
dibility of future commitments.
Another factor to take into account in sequencing com-
ponents of the civil service reform, is the fact that a new
legal framework for civil service is usually both a focal
point and a necessary precondition for further action.
Much of the action therefore has to be structured around
it (see also part A. for discussion).
This section has so far dealt mainly with various components
of a comprehensive civil service reform. However, civil
service reform can also be structured as a series of sectoral
civil service reforms, which happened, to some extent, in
nearly all the countries mentioned, usually with special
laws and systems of civil service for policemen or tax and
customs officials. Another option is to create a core civil
service with different rules and regulations and then gra-
dually expands it.
While the latter can be recommended under certain circum-
stances, the former should be avoided. It is not a good way
to pilot civil service reform, because such sectoral reforms
usually mirror sectoral interests and political power in
winning special privileges. Resulting patchwork of civil
service systems is then impossible to change or integrate
into a single framework, inducing permanent tensions
between sectors as well as privilege-creep and hampering
mobility within the civil service as a whole. On the other
hand, a core civil service at all levels and organizations
make it possible to ‘allow a space for the gradual dissemi-
nation of principles for a modernized civil service.’ [Sootla
(2002). p. 40]
A key issue in the implementation of civil service reforms
is transition mechanisms for existing public administration
employees. From the management point of view, two
lessons should be noted. First of all, reformers should insist
on more-than-automatic transition mechanism, even if
the new system does not guarantee tenure. Such transition
is a politically and managerially and opportune time for
weeding out the weakest links in the civil service. It should
not be confused though with a possibility to radically
improve the quality of the civil service. Unless recruitment,
evaluation and salary systems change radically at the same
time, transition is an opportunity for marginal, not whole-
sale improvement. Another lesson is that transition should
be accomplished within one electoral cycle if possible.
Otherwise, political considerations and intrigue enter the
picture, greatly complicating any transition mechanism.
A specific issue in management of the reform is the organiza-
tion of training. The principal choices are between creation/
preservation of special institutions directly reporting to a
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ministry or the government or involvement in building/
enhancing capacity in universities. This is not an issue of
sequencing as such, but there is an element of timing
involved. Institutions directly subordinated to a ministry
can be usually set up faster and, when existing, can be made
responsive to governmental needs more easily by command-
and-control systems. However, as time goes on, they very
often raise issues of quality and mobility. On the other
investment into creation, extension or improvement of
capacity in a regular university system takes longer and
usually requires more sophisticated managerial systems
(in terms of getting universities to do what customers want
through effective use of financial resources), but the integ-
ration in the regular system brings benefits over time.
Nearly the same choices are faced in terms of centralization
and decentralization of training.
Recommendation can involve use/creation of centralized/
ministry-controlled institutions in the beginning and
gradual introduction of competition, decentralization and
integration into the university system (e.g. by fusing the
ministerial institution with a university) as the system
evolves. However, if there is a well-developed university
or even private capacity responsive to governmental needs,
then the situation is quite different. Also, since in most
countries civil service reform occurs quite late in transition,
there is a likelihood that universities or the private sector
will be developed enough to accommodate governmental
needs (see particularly the Slovenia and the Czech ex-
periences, but also the Hungarian and the Slovak one).
The last issue worth mentioning in terms of civil service
reform management is whether there should be a conscious
“big bang” moment in the reform. A “big bang” moment
can be defined as a focal point for civil servants, politicians
and the public, which should mean a moment of signi-
ficant change in the behavior of the civil service. This
concerns, of course, mainly management of expectations.
On one hand, civil service reform is, by its very nature, a
long-term incremental affair and if one raises expectations
of sudden improvement, the inevitable disappointment
can create a dangerous backlash and cynicism. On the
other hand, the performance of civil service is, to a large
extent, based on expectations of civil servants and the
environment that surrounds them. It can be said that the
civil service exists in the state of “multiple equilibrium”,
where the same set of formal rules is compatible with several
actual outcomes due to informal norms, which govern
human behaviors. As such, an awareness of a real change
of the ‘rules of the game’ can substantially strengthen
effectiveness of any civil service reform.  Therefore, such
instruments should be used even with the risk of backlash,
but on a well-thought, limited and persuasive basis (e.g.
a new civil service act together with a new civil service
authority chairman can be used as a powerful signal for
change in recruitment and evaluation procedures, but a
new law should not be used as a promissory note to the
public for a swift improvement in quality every-day local
administration).
Is There an End to Civil Service Reform?
The obvious answer is that there is no end to civil service
reform. As amply demonstrated in all OECD countries,
the push for reform in public administration in general
and in civil service in particular, is never-ending.
Nonetheless, in the case of transition countries, one can
make a conceptual distinction between two phases of civil
service reform.
The first one involves the creation of a new system of a
civil service in all the aspects mentioned above. It can
take anywhere from four to eight years if one includes
preparation of legislation, but excludes political discussion
before the start of serious work on reform. As already
stressed, this is always an iterative process. The phase can
be said to be over when the new system is up and running
in the following sense:
• all crucial legal components are in place, including
secondary legislation and internal regulations;
• all employees passed through the system of transition;
• all new institutional underpinnings for the career pro-
gress of civil servants are in place and functioning;
• training institutions and systems are functioning.
When all of this is fulfilled, the second phase of consolida-
tion can begin. Even if there was an underlying philosophy
for the whole reform, it can never be entirely translated
into real life. It is likely that at least some components of
the reform were put in place by different institutions with
insufficient communication or shared vision. Numerous
pressures from interest groups and budget realities also
intervene. Therefore, the final architecture of the system
is probably not only far from the original vision, it can
also have serious internal inconsistencies or omissions.
While the former is not a problem per se, the latter deserves
much more attention. It can therefore be recommended,
when all the components are in place, to undertake a
review of the civil service system to uncover these incon-
sistencies and remedy at least the most important ones.
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On the other hand, one could argue that the whole linear
view could be misleading. [John (2000)] Public policy in
any given area does not progress through such neat stages
and civil service reform can be seen as a continuous stream
of changes, which add or subtract to the overall architecture,
and where a one-time review is nothing more than a singular
and ultimately ineffective tool. While the continuity argu-
ment is undoubtedly true, there is still reason to believe
that such an analytical framework as well as tools such as
the review can serve a useful practical purpose. However,
it needs to take into account the ecology of the civil service
and work with it rather than against it.
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NOTES
1 This paper is based on the actual situation in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, including the Slovak Acts on
Civil Service and Public Service, which are fully operational only since April 1, 2002. In the Czech Republic, it also
takes into account the civil service act currently being debated by the Lower House of the Parliament, assuming that
it is going to be approved based roughly on the same principles as the Government draft submitted to the Parliament.
In Slovenia, a new law on public servants is being debated, but there is an existing legislation from 1990 that was
amended several times.
2 This analysis is based on the situation in the Czech Republic, but is generally applicable to nearly all transition
countries. The only difference is that some countries such as Hungary abandoned these games faster or allowed
parts of their society to opt out of it already during 1980s.
3 In the Polish case supplemented by a rare exception—1982 law on state servants.
4 A complete separation was attempted in Slovakia in 2000 and 2001 by drafting a civil service act that was completely
autonomous from a labor code drafted simultaneously. This approach was abandoned only at the insistence of
Sigma experts.
5 with names such as office of civil/state service or a directorate-general for civil service.
6 This concerns primarily the “civilian” part of interior ministries. The law enforcement element, where it exists, was
usually subject to radical changes.
7 Agency, as used here, means an institution whose sole responsibility is the management of civil service and its
reform. Such an agency can range from a bureau defined in law, but existing within a larger ministry (Czech
Republic), to an independent organization with quasiministerial position, i.e. not only policy execution, but also
policy responsibility (Slovak Republic). The key point is its legally defined focus on civil service.
8 the term decentralization is not used in this context with regard to creation of self-governing municipalities, which
were created in Central European countries shortly after 1989, but with regard to creation of self-governing regions
and transfer of substantial powers to the regions.
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The Polish Experience
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TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND
AFTER 1989
Since 1989 reforms in Poland have moved in three main
directions. Fist of all they included political changes to
create the foundations of a democratic system including
individual rights, civil liberties and political liberties.
Secondly, they included reforms of the economic system
aimed at restoring market economy based on private
ownership. Thirdly, they included reforms of the system
of government, especially decentralization.
Since 1989 Poland has had a circle of people who were
for decentralization (they began working on a new system
of government in 1980). They understand very well the
interplay of complex factors and relations between the
administrative system and the general rules of functioning
of the economic and political systems. If the economic
and political systems change, also the administrative system
should follow the changes.
The communist system in Poland was modeled on the
Soviet system. As such it was coherent, but it was based
on assumptions, which were strange not only to Polish
tradition and mentality but also to the basic rules of a de-
mocratic state. The preamble of Poland’s Constitution
of 1952 r. (amended in 1976) contained a statement that
the main role of the state was the implementation of ‘the
great socialist ideas.’ What was also decreed in the Consti-
tution was the friendship with the Soviet Union. Formally,
the supreme power in Poland was in the hands of ‘the
working people of towns and villages’ through parliament
and people’s councils (rada narodowa). The leading force,
which would set directions, was to be the working class
and its political party. But in reality Communist party
committees and party leaders governed outside the country
from the state authorities. The slogan: ‘the Party leads,
the Government governs’ reflected very precisely the exist-
ing relations at the time. The real government was the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish
United Workers’ Party (the communist party) whereas
the Council of Ministers was an executive body, which
was in fact an ‘administrative board’ of the country. Thus,
the communist party made decisions whereas the state
apparatus was an executive body. Society was to head in
the direction set by the official ideology. The will of the
people was not important as those who ruled Poland un-
officially assumed (and they were right) that the nation
was and would remain against the existing political system.
What resulted from the official ideology were the rules,
which defined the scope of the activity of the state, its
institutional structure and the way it functioned. This
resulted in the need to create a centralized state, which
controlled all the social and economic life of the country,
and interfered with private life of its citizens. Of great
importance were the adoption of the rule of ‘democratic
centralism’ and the rule of the unitary state power as the
foundations of the political system [Regulski p. 19].
According to the rule of democratic centralism all govern-
ing bodies, both political (the party) and the state were
elective (whatever it meant that time), but at the same time
those lower in the hierarchy were answerable to those higher
in the hierarchy. It meant in practice that the central bodies
decided about everything and any form of civic control
over their activities was only formal. Under such circums-
tances any election was a farce. At the same time the autho-
rities rejected the rule of the separation of powers proposed
by Montesquieu and replaced it with the rule of the unitary
character of state power. Any form of decentralization,
which provided for expressing independent views, not to
mention their implementation, was seen as a threat to the
state authority. That is why the whole state apparatus focussed
on passing orders and checking if they were carried out.
The main idea of the system was to make people dependent,
particularly on their place of work in order to make them
fully depend on the system and eliminate the possibility
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of any independent behavior. That is why—paradoxically
—the ‘workers’ councils’ played an important role in state
owned enterprises and became the forerunners of democ-
ratization in management as early as in the 1970s. On the
other hand, there were no real forms in which people would
be organized in the areas where they lived. The ruling party
was afraid of spontaneous and uncontrolled local initiatives.
The managing of public issues was based on centralist rules
whereas the organizational structure of the existing admi-
nistration was based on the domination of ministerial and
departmental structures (vertical) over the territorial ones.
Both forms according to which society was organized i.e.
according to place of work or the place of living are anta-
gonistic (competitive) to a big extent. If one of them is
strengthened the other is weakened. Totalitarian systems
prefer the former whereas democracies the latter [Regulski
p. 20]. The transformation, which has been going on in
Poland for the last 11 years, involved first of all a change
of the rules according to which social life was organized.
However, the changes encounter many difficulties and
require time necessary to raise social awareness. It was
also necessary to overcome the forces, which would lose
as a result of the change, and they include the central ad-
ministration. ‘Territorialisation of power’ is a condition for
creating the civic state through strengthening the territorial
systems (on various levels) and through weakening the
direct role of central administration with its structures
and ministerial bodies in direct managing public issues.
The public administration has always been an important
force of development and it influenced the direction and
the pace of change. But it can be either a creative and
constructive force or a destructive one, hampering deve-
lopment and obstructing any transformation. This is not
only a theoretical thesis. Its practical side can be observed
in Poland were the development of civic society and de-
mocratic behavior, and the increase in the economic ac-
tivity of individuals would have been impossible without
the far-reaching administrative reform. Without the reform
it also would have been impossible to improve public safety,
introduce changes in the system of education and in public
health care etc. The dependence between the shape of
public administration and the effectiveness of all units
and sections of public services is obvious.
That is why the issue of restructuring the system of govern-
ment including the reform of public administration en-
compassing far-reaching decentralization constituted one
of the most important challenges for Poland’s political
elite after 1989.
DECENTRALIZATION AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
AS A REINVENTING FACTOR FOR
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN POLAND
As I have said before, the main structure and rules of
functioning of public administration in Poland were
formed between 1944 and 1989 when it existed under
totally different political principles and circumstances. It
served then a different political system, a different philo-
sophy of law, a different ownership structure, and a dif-
ferent system of managing the economy and different goals
of internal and foreign policy.
The administrative system in People’s Poland, as in other
countries of the Eastern Block, was centralized and based
on the domination of ministerial and departmental struc-
tures. This made it impossible to pursue a rational social
and economic policy on national, regional and local levels.
It also made it impossible to prioritize, choose and achieve
public goals.
What the new system also inherited from the old one was
a very damaging mixture of politics with purely administ-
rative functions, which blurred the division between poli-
tical responsibility and administrative competencies. As
it was mentioned before, the country was governed by
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the com-
munist party together with the whole party apparatus,
whereas the Council of Ministers became a purely execu-
tive body as the highest segment of state administration.
Also, the government and administration were not separated
institutionally from the management of state property.
As a result, pathological phenomena appeared where the
two areas met but also because of the lack of managerial
skills, and bureaucratic and ineffective forms of managing
public property and the economy. In 1975 Poviats and
Voivodships (medium and higher tiers of administrative
division of the country) were liquidated, replaced by new,
small Voivodships, which led to the strengthening of cent-
ralist management of the party, administration and the
economy. The old vision of the state is difficult to eradicate
as it is deeply rooted in many politicians but it is not
limited only to the former communists. As a result, even
today the government and its ministers are ready ‘to fix
things’ rather than prepare a national strategy and policy
and make sure that it is implemented in a coherent manner
both on the national and international levels.
It must be said here that the first timid attempts to increase
independence of people’s councils in Poland were made
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in the 1980s. However, it brought more anarchy into the
existing system, which was still centralized and managed
by ministries or departments. To sum up this short diag-
nosis it must be said that Polish administration of the late
1980s was largely ineffective and was only one step from
being uncontrollable as a whole, facing chaos and inertia.
This brought about serious and real threats to Poland and
that was why administrative reforms became a necessity
immediately after Poland got its independence in 1989.
In order to restore local identity after 1989 (Gmina and
Poviat) and to create mechanisms for regional develop-
ment (Voivodship) it was necessary to reverse the old system,
which meant that the new system had to be based on the
rule of subsidiary, decentralization and a democratic man-
date of any authority. The first rift in the system of minis-
terial (sector) management became the Gmina in 1990
but the Gminas had only 15 percent of the public budget
at its disposal. Another step was made in 1998 when the
mechanism of local self-government was supplemented
with the restitution of the Poviat and foundations were
created to manage regional development on the newly
created Voivodship level. Local self-governments (Gmina
and Poviat) as well as regional self-governments (Voivod-
ship) based their activities on democratic elections and
that is why they constitute a counterweight to state centra-
lization. They have become a school and practice for new
political elite, who after ten years is present in all political
parties, parliament and the central government.
The territorial reform and decentralization of public ma-
nagement were also important from the point of view of
how central government works. The decentralization (the
transfer of responsibility and of much entitlement to local
and regional self-governments) has freed the center of exe-
cutive power from responsibilities and managing many
other issues. It also made it possible to remodel the
mechanisms according to which the central government
and its administration (central and field) work.
I think that I am entitled to say that in 1989 Polish experts
were well prepared for any work on the reform of the
government in Poland. We chose a route, which was dif-
ferent from that of other post communist countries. We
decided that apart from the necessary reform of the central
government the key to a far-reaching reform of the political
system was the decentralization of public issues. It meant
the decentralization started at the lowest segment of public
administration and the radical strengthening of the
position and role of Gmina.
We did not consider as correct the proposals put forward
to Poland by many western experts (including i.a. those
from OECD) that the transformation should begin with
the reform of the central government and its administ-
ration. It was obvious that due to the collapse of the single-
party system the restructuring of the center of government
was necessary. But under such conditions the restructuring
could not be radical and would only mean superficial
adaptation to new conditions.
The main problem Poland faced (as indeed all post-com-
munist countries did) was first of all hyper-centralization
of the government and not only the inertia of the central
administration. Any reform of the center in a highly
centralized system would not bring any qualitative change;
it could only... strengthen centralization making it more
efficient with all its consequences. In such a centralized
system of managing public affairs every single wrong de-
cision is being carried out all over the country. A decentra-
lized system defends itself from such dangers, serves
democracy and proper management, and it is safer.
That was why we had to ‘discover’ our own way of chang-
ing the system through decentralization. The methodology
of change proved to be right. Paradoxically, it turned out
that after decentralization of public management, the
reform of the center was not of such great importance
and urgency as it had seemed as the scope of responsibility
of the central government was reasonably diminished. At
present the central government governs and not adminis-
ters. Even though the proper functioning of the central
government and its administration still constitute a big
challenge (especially when it comes to efficient governing
on the macro scale), but it is no longer a matter which
directly influences public life in Poland and every day
activities of public services and institutions. Now most of
public services and administrations are linked to local and
regional governments.
COURSE OF THE REFORMS
[Before 1989 ] The state works on decentralization have
been going on since 1989 with different intensity. The
subsequent governments have pursued a policy, which
was not always characterized by continuity in all fields.
The willingness to restructure the state and to make it
rational, orderly and civic, and to make its administration
effective could be seen between 1989 and 1993. However,
the final decisions were taken only in 1998, which became
a breakthrough in the system of government.
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Experts began their work on the restructuring of the admi-
nistrative system of Poland and so did political debates
on the subject in the late 1970s. The debates were held as
part of a seminar entitled Experience and Future (Prof. Jerzy
Regulski and Prof. Andrzej Piekara), that was attended
by researchers contesting the existing political situation.
The work carried out since 1980 by research teams led by
Jerzy Regulski and Michal Kulesza (Warsaw University)
resulted in the creation in 1989 of a lengthy list of points
that both sides of the talks of the Round Table2  disagreed
with. The so-called Party-and-Government side did not
agree to any changes in the way territorial authorities would
be organized as proposed by the Opposition–‘Solidarity’
side. That proposals included consent to set up local self-
governments and to guarantee in the constitution that
local communities have the right to set up local self-govern-
ments. In order to be able to do it, local communities
must become empowered with competence to govern as a
public government and be allowed to enter into civil law
transactions on their own behalf.
The basic postulate was the creation of independent units
of territorial self-government. The units would have they
own tasks and their own bodies. They would also have
the right to hold property, enjoy financial independence
and their legislature would be elected in a democratic
process. State supervision would be limited only to the
question of the legality of their actions, which would
guarantee their independence.
At the Round Table nothing was decided but it was at
that moment that the expert knowledge was turned into
a political postulate.
[The restoration of territorial self-government at the Gmina3
(municipal) level—1990 ] After the elections of June 1989,
at the initiative of the Senate of the Republic of Poland
undertaken in July 1989, only several months into the
Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government, the territorial self-
government was restored at the Gmina level.
Jerzy Regulski became a member of the Senate and chair-
man of the State Administration and Territorial self-
government Commission in the Senate. It was Regulski
who initiated the above-mentioned resolution of the Senate
to restore self-government. He became the Under-secre-
tary of State and a Plenipotentiary of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s
government for territorial self-government reform. In this
position he managed the preparation of the reform and
then supervised the implementation of the reform. After
Regulski had become a government member, the Com-
mission, under the special auspices of the Senate speaker
Andrzej Stelmachowski, was chaired by Jerzy Stepien´ who
is now a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Sejm
commission was chaired by Prof. Walerian Pan´ko, who
later became the President of the Supreme Chamber of
Control. I had the honor to work on the territorial self-
government draft bill. The draft was prepared in the
autumn of 1989, under the auspices of the Honorary
Legislative Council of the Solidarity Trade Union. Then
the Commission prepared it and on January 19th, 1990
became the first bill submitted by the Senate of the
Republic of Poland to the Sejm.
Within a few months the necessary drafts were prepared
and voted into laws: first was the amendment of the Cons-
titution, followed by the law of March 8th, 1990—the
Territorial Self-government Act, the Election Law, and
finally all other laws (at that time more than one hundred
laws relating to different fields were amended). On May
27th, 1990 the first free municipal elections in Central
and Eastern Europe were held. It was a reform of a fun-
damental importance and became the first successful step
towards creating civic society.
The main political dilemma at the time was as follows: to
hold free elections to the former people’s councils, which
could be little adapted to the new needs and then work
out new solutions; or to carry out a far-reaching reform
of local self-governments and then hold elections to new
institutions. It should be noted here that the mechanism
of taking political decisions was very simple during the
first few months. That was the political leadership of the
Citizens’ Parliamentary Club who chose the latter variant
with a reservation that the election must be held as soon
as possible settled the dilemma. The pace of work both in
the government and in the Sejm was so high that the
opponents of the reform (and there were many of them
both among politicians and members of state administ-
ration) did not have enough time to co-ordinate their
efforts to effectively oppose it.
Another problem referred to the scope of the reform: how
many levels of territorial government should become self-
government. At the Round Table debate the communists
proposed that the people’s councils of both levels should
simply be ‘re-named’ as self-government and the problem
would be solved. Not only was such a superficial reform
rejected, for the reasons described above, but also the
reform was limited to the Gmina level and other levels of
self-government were left for later to be dealt with.
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Firstly, because the administrative division of Poland on
the Gmina level had and still has proper size: an average
village Gmina in Poland has around seven thousand inha-
bitants which is very beneficial if the Gmina is to perform
a big variety of important public tasks. Therefore, it was
not necessary to introduce territorial changes at this level.
Secondly, after the reforms of the mid-1970s the admi-
nistrative division of Poland became adapted to the needs
of a centralized state (49 small Voivodships) and that was
why a far-reaching territorial and organizational reform
was required and in 1990 there was no time for that.
Thirdly, as it was assumed that Gmina was to become the
basic territorial unit for public management in Poland it
was unwise to introduce higher levels of self-government
as they might have dominated the whole system. The main
aim of the reform was to strengthen the Gmina, let it be
accustomed with independence and the burden of respon-
sibility, and to stimulate and integrate local communities.
The key role in implementing the Gmina reform was
played by the field Delegates of the Government Pleni-
potentiary who were appointed for all 49 Voivodships as
it was impossible to contact 2.5 thousand Gminas, give
them advice, information or consultation from Warsaw.
That was why it was necessary to create new channels for
managing the Gmina reform, which would be separate
from the existing territorial administration, which since
1990 remained in the hands of the old apparatus. Offices
of Delegates became the first element of non-communist
territorial administration in Poland. The representatives
were chosen from among candidates presented by the local
Citizens’ Committees. The selection criteria were clear
and simple. The reform needed people with some know-
ledge of administrative matters who were involved in the
reform process but who were not involved in local groups
of interests, which might be dangerous and limit the free-
dom of their actions. The people who were chosen for
the positions were independent, responsible, had negotia-
tion skills and were able to convince others. Also people
from the old administration became Delegates but they
were in minority. Most of those chosen were members of
the former opposition [Regulski p. 96].
The main task of the Delegates was to prepare the Gmina
to set up self-government, and to choose its authorities,
take over state property etc. They were also to instruct
the new Gmina during the first phase of its independent
operation and to stimulate the self-government movement.
The small team performed a huge task. At that time there
were neither Gmina statutes nor any regulations for the
conduct of proceedings. The formers were to be discarded
and the new had to be written from scratch. The scale of
the challenges was enormous. It was necessary to carry
out stocktaking of public property taken over by the Gmina,
re-organize Gmina offices as well as public services and
administrative institutions, sort out financial matters, and
create new institutions. At the same time, Gminas at their
own initiative began the process of freeing the economy
by privatizing many enterprises, which they owned at this
point, as well as selling, transferring or leasing land,
buildings and office space. In this way the self-government
reform began important changes in the economy and
became one of the main driving forces of economic
transformation in Poland.
As it can be seen above, the Office of the Government
Plenipotentiary for the Territorial Self-government Reform
played the key role in the preparation and introduction
of the Gmina reform. The same system was used later on
many times in Poland and it was not limited only to the
administrative reform issues. It seems to be the best solution
to manage deep systemic changes. On one hand those
who act enjoy strong political support (they are subordinate
directly to the Prime Minister) and on the other they focus
their efforts on one particular task. Only two dozen people
worked in the office but it co-operated on a long- or short
time basis with a numerous teams and individual experts.
When Gminas became operational, the disagreement
between the supporters of the reform and those against it
(especially the government administration) began to grow.
The core of the conflict was first and foremost the imple-
mentation of the Act defining new competencies and tasks
of the Gmina. Many competencies, which earlier were in
the hands of Gminas as part of the state administration,
were kept in the hands of the state administration (Voivods
and their district administration) after the reform. It was
possible, however, to hand over those competencies to
Gmina self-governments but the administrative lobby
wanted to limit or even stall the whole process.
As a direct result of this conflict self-government activists
made efforts to strengthen the position of the Gmina in
the conflict with the administrative lobby, to effectively
protect the interests of self-governments and provide mutual
help to those who had to cope with similar difficulties. In
July 1990 the chairmen of Voivodship Assemblies4  held
a national convention and set up the National Assembly
of the Territorial self-government as a representation of
self-governments on the national level. In January 1991
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the Association of Polish Cities was set up and it was mo-
deled on a pre-war organization, which was the basic self-
government organization. Following the move, smaller
towns set up in April 1991 the Union of Polish Townships.
In March 1992 the Union of Polish Metropolitan Towns
was founded which became the club of Poland’s biggest
cities and in May 1993 the Association of Village Gmina
of the Republic of Poland was set up. The above organiza-
tions began close co-operation and quickly became an
important force on the side of self-governments to influence
decisions taken by the central government and parliament.
In 1993 the Joint Commission of the Government and
Territorial self-government was set up and it will be men-
tioned later on.
It is worth stressing that the Polish self-government reform
aroused great interest abroad. Many governments and
non-government organizations were ready to help. It would
be difficult to mention here all parties involved in helping
the reformers but some institutions and organizations
must be mentioned. They included USAID and USIA
and US non-government organizations, the British Know
How Fund, the French Foundation France–Pologne, the
German Adenauer Foundation. What is worth mentioning
was the action Polish Wings (Polskie Skrzydla) which
made it possible for five hundred local activists to visit
French Gminas before the municipal elections held in
1990. Without those initiatives the development of local
democracy in Poland would have been much slower.
The Polish self-government reform of 1990 as well as the
economic reforms of that period was much more appre-
ciated in the democratic countries of Western Europe than
in Poland. And it is not surprising as the countries appre-
ciated the importance of self-government where local self-
governments have become a stable element of public life
and where the tradition of self-government is centuries old.
[The first attempt to the Poviat (county) second local self–
government level—1993]
The output of the subsequent government of the Republic
of Poland, led by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, (1991) includes
numerous studies, expert opinions and projects prepared
among others by two teams of experts. The first team
worked on the concept of changes in the territorial struc-
ture of the state (led by J. Sulimierski). At that stage of
the political debate in Poland one of the main issues put
forward was political regionalisation, supported by Prime
Minister Bielecki. The other team for the reform of state
administration, led by Senator Jerzy Stepien´, worked out
the preliminary premises for the restructuring of central
government and for introducing changes within territorial
administration. It also prepared a civil service project and
a project regarding the representation of the State Treasury.
Under Prime Minister Jan Olszewski (1992) the work
was continued by the Team for the Reorganization of Public
Administration, also led by J. Stepien´. The report prepared
by the team entitled the preliminary premises for the
restructuring of public administration [Wstepne zaloz·enia
przebudowy administracji publicznej] that was approved
by the government in May 1992. It was the first govern-
ment, which referred to the administrative reform as a
single entity. The report stressed that in order to restruc-
ture the state administration in a thorough and detailed
way a special government agency (body) must be set up
to co-ordinate work undertaken by different state organs.
The subsequent government, led by Hanna Suchocka
(1992–93) declared from the very start its political will
to carry out reforms in the following areas:
1) The functioning of the central government, central
administration and local government administration;
2) The territorial system—which was related to the ex-
pected new territorial division of Poland (Gmina,
Poviat, big Voivodship) as well as to the continuation
of the process of administrative and financial decent-
ralization through the creation of Poviat self-govern-
ments;
3) The state civil service;
4) Streamlining the flow of information and the process
of decision-making,
5) Effective use of public resources.
Hanna Suchocka’s government nominated a Plenipoten-
tiary for the Public Administration Reform and I had the
privilege to hold the position. The Office of the Plenipo-
tentiary employed around 20 people.
The main tasks of the Plenipotentiary were first of all to
build a team, to prepare a budget for the office, to create
a strategy of the reform and to draw action plans. The
main document prepared at the time was entitled The
premises and directions of the reform of public administration
of the Republic of Poland [Zaloz·enia i kierunki reformy
administracji publicznej RP]. The document became a
foundation for all works in that area carried out by the
state in the subsequent periods.
Experts from outside the office, self-government workers
and others carried out all work to design and draft particular
legislative solutions. There were among others following
work groups preparing the reform: two teams designing
the new administrative division of Poland (upper tiers—
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Poviat and Voivodship); the team for organizational chan-
ges; the team which analyzed the cost of the reform; four-
teen teams which drafted the legislative projects from
various fields of public management, and others. As a
result of the work performed by the teams of experts, all
projects of the territorial reform were created including
bills (amendments of 150 Acts) as well as organizational
projects, and a map of the new administrative division of
Poland agreed with the majority of Gminas.
With the reference to the last issue, I asked all Gminas
(2500) to declare what Poviat they wanted to belong to.
The conditions were as follows: at least five Gminas in
one Poviat; at least ten thousand inhabitants of a city that
was the seat of Poviat authorities; and at least 50 thousand
inhabitants of the Poviat. Such conditions matched social
expectations as Poland had around three hundred local
centers, which aspired to become a Poviat. The Poviat
reform was to restore local ties as a basis of self-government
on this level. The preparation and consultations regarding
the map of Poviats aroused interest in the reform of all
Gmina authorities and local political elite.
A very important element of work on the Poviat reform
was the preparation and implementation of the Municipal
Pilot Program of the Public Administration Reform (PAR).
The program was prepared for Poland’s forty-four biggest
cities (excluding Warsaw), that were to become independent
cities excluded from Poviats as a result of the future Poviat
reform. On the basis of an agreement with the government,
the cities were given a proposal to take over the majority
of tasks, which were to be carried out by the Poviat. Such
decentralization implemented ac-cording to agreed rules
contributed to the identification of many aspects of func-
tioning of local authorities. As a result, a special team was
set up for monitoring the preparation and implementation
of the Pilot Program [S. Najniger]. Apart from that, on a
political level, the Convent of Presidents of Big Cities was
founded from among those taking parts in the Program.
The Plenipotentiary began his co-operation with many
government bodies and government administration, self-
government organizations and universities, and the press,
which provided extensive coverage of the work and bills
which were being prepared with the help of international
organizations and others.
In the Office of the Plenipotentiary there was a separate
unit, which was responsible for managing resources
coming from European Union (PHARE). Also another
numerous organizations supported our works, amongst
which USAID, Association of German Counties and Know
How Fund have to be especially mentioned. All these
supporting organizations and initiatives were very effective
for medium and long-term projects. Majority of them
was concluded with state administrations, variety of local
governments and their organizations, delivering know-
how, experts, technical support and exchange of views
and people. However their practical influence on prepa-
ration of the reform was rather small, as they were unable
to react on our questions immediately, within the time
given, perhaps with grateful exclusion of OECD and Royal
Institute of Public Administration (RIPA). Especially a
solid financial support of European Union (PHARE) was
delivered always to late for a public administration reform
needs, as their planing procedures require months of
preparation, acceptation and implementation. The means
concluded and urgently needed in 1993 came 1994–95
when another coalition was in power. Exactly the same
situation occurred in 1998 when the aid came two years
later and also was misused. I do not have enough know-
ledge to find out, where was the fault: in Brussels or perhaps
in Warsaw.
Apart from the territorial reform managed by the Plenipo-
tentiary, we prepared other bills regarding the center of
government, under the leadership of Jan Maria Rokita,
the Head of the Office of the Council of Ministers. Also
numerous other drafts of the administrative reform were
prepared, among others the law on public procurement
[M. Lemke].
The person responsible for approving work on the reform
on the political level (i.e. in government and parliament)
was Minister J.M. Rokita who was the Head of the Office
of the Council of Ministers.  It was not an easy task as a
part of the coalition government (and some parties, which
formed the coalition) was not in favor of the reform.
Suchocka’s government stepped down in the autumn of
1993 leaving behind many documents and drafts, which
became a foundation of further reforms. What remained
was the Municipal Pilot Program, which in 1995 was turned
into a Large Cities Act.
One of the permanent results was the setting up of the
Joint Commission of the Government and Territorial Self-
government in 1993. The members of the Commission
on the self-government side were the representatives of
five national self-government organizations. From the very
beginning it was intended that the Commission would
become a body, which not only issued opinions on govern-
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ment’s decisions, but also made statements about the
direction of the self-government policy pursued by the
state. The setting up of the Commission by the Prime
Minister and the supervision of its work guaranteed that
any arrangements made by commission would be binding.
However, the most important achievement of that period
was the strengthening of public support for the reforms
within the political parties, but first of all within the orga-
nizations of territorial self-government. At that time, in
co-operation with the organizations of territorial govern-
ment, a very strong movement was created to support the
implementation of the Poviat and Voivodship reform.
After the parliamentary victory of the leftist Alliance of
the Democratic Left [Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej5 ]
and the Polish Peasant Party [Polskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe] in September 1993 the leader of the Polish Peasant
Party, Waldemar Pawlak was to form a new government.
It was a party opposing radical reforms and it aimed at
defending the existing status quo, especially the interests
of peasants and farmers. The party apparatus wanted to
maintain the influence of the party without introducing
any structural, democratic changes in the state. The strong
leadership of the party negated the need to create Poviats.
It was obvious that this approach was on a collision course
with the program of decentralization initiated by the pre-
vious government. As a result, Pawlak’s government refused
to introduce any reforms and even made an unsuccessful
attempts to block the Municipal Pilot Program. At that
moment the media offered great consideration and
expressed their support for the reform. The reformers
managed to pass the Public Procurement Law prepared
in 1993. Also they undertook attempts to reform the
system of City government of Warsaw, which unfortu-
nately was deformed during discussions in the Sejm.
The anti-reform stance of the government became clear
during the election campaign preceding the second self-
government election of 1994. The climax of the period
of reforms was my resignation from the position of the
Government Plenipotentiary for the Public Administra-
tion Reform in May 1994, which echoed throughout
political circles.
Under Prime Minister Józef Oleksy (1995) the above Large
Cities Act was passed. The bill included also future Poviat
pilot program in the framework of the so-called Public
Services City Zone, which particularly enjoyed the support
of members of parliament and self-government activists
from the Sadecczyzna region. The bill was prepared outside
parliament; it was however passed as during the presiden-
tial campaign, which was under way at the time, the leftist
Alliance of the Democratic Left wanted to prove that they
supported the idea of self-government. In the course of
Polish self-government reforms the Large Cities Act was
of great importance as it transferred to the authorities of
big cities powers to perform numerous public tasks of
local character (among others running hospitals, secondary
schools, cultural institutions, public roads in cities and
many others). It referred only to 40 cities but they were
home to 25 per cent of the total population of Poland and
to more than 30 per cent of public services institutions.
In this way some important public services and institutions
were at the disposal both of the self-governments and
central government administrations. However, in the long
run the situation of such dualism in management would
not last. The pilot scheme became an important step to
continue the reform in unfavorable circumstances. It made
it possible to survive unfavorable times and gather
experience on how those institutions functioned under
the rule of self-governments. The tactics the reformers
embarked on proved to be successful as in 1998 all those
and other responsibilities as well as public institutions
were handed over to Poviats all over Poland.
In 1996 work began on the reform of co-called ‘Economic
center of the Government’. The Government Plenipoten-
tiary, Secretary of State Marek Pol, managed it. As a result
of the work, under Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz’s govern-
ment (1996–97) the Civil Service Act was passed but it
was in a much shorter version in comparison to the bills
prepared between 1992 and 1993. Apart from that a
package of laws reforming the government was also app-
roved. They included the law on the organization and
functioning of the Council of Ministers and the scope of
activity of ministers, and amendments to the Law on field
organs of the general government administration (1996).
Both laws were based on the bills prepared in 1993. More-
over, in 1997 a law was approved on the sectors of central
government administration. Even though the law was of
great importance it did not become effective until 1999.
As far as the territorial system and reform was concerned,
the only result of the four years of work of the leftist govern-
ment (apart from maintaining the Pilot Program) was the
publication in 1996 of a report by the Office of the Council
of Ministers entitled The Effective, Friendly and Safe State.
It should be mentioned here that the self-government
reform enjoyed strong support of the new Constitution
of the Republic of Poland adopted in 1997. The suppor-
ters of self-government were well prepared and professio-
199
nally represented during the work of the National Assembly.
There are following basic rules in Constitution, important
for the general organization of the state: the Principle of
Subsidiary creating one of main philosophical foundations
of the 3rd Republic of Poland (Preamble); the Rule of
Decentralization as the foundation of the system of govern-
ment of Poland (Art. 15); and the Public Corporations
Clause (Art. 16) as the form in which public life on every
territorial level within society is organized. The chapter
of the Constitution on self-government is detailed and
quite precise, and fully meets the requirements of the
European Charter of Local Government. The Constitution
clearly indicates that the basic unit of the territorial self-
government is Gmina and that in Poland apart from local
self-governments there are also regional self-governments
(Voivodship). The PSL did not agree to mention Poviat
in the Constitution, as members of that party wanted to
retain the small Voivodship where the party apparatus and
activists were strong and played a vital role. Thus the
dilemma the lawmakers were left with, was the number
of levels of local self-government in Poland, as this has
not been decided in the Constitution. Such compromise
was needed for the Constitution to be adopted by the
National Assembly with a majority of votes.
The above dilemma was settled soon, with the laws of
1998 adopted by a new coalition formed after the autumn
elections of 1997 by the Solidarity Election Action (AWS6 )
and the Freedom Union (UW).
Before it happened the fight for the administrative reform
and its shape had been going on for four years in the
media, in the circles of opinion formers, and during the
election campaign of 1997. What the circle of reformers
(made up from experts, self-government activists, and
members of centrist and rightist parties) managed to
achieve was that decentralization reform became one of
the main issues of the election campaign of 1997. As a
result, each sizeable political party had to take a stand
regarding decentralization and declare if they were for or
against it [Sochacka Kras´ko].
[The Poviat7  and Voivodship8  (region) reform; Poland’s new
territorial structure and decentralization—1998 ]
In the period between 1989 and 1997 many laws relating
to the administrative system, public tasks and mechanisms
of operation of the administration were passed. However,
despite breakthrough changes in the political system as
well as in the economy, the public administration and
the way if functioned did not undergo major changes
during that period with the exception of the Gmina reform
of 1990. As the Polish administrative system was still
dominated by centralism (thought in its bureaucratic not
political form) the achievements of the self-government
reform of 1990 were thwarted. As a result, the stalling of
the reform process between 1994 and 1997 brought about
the re-emergence of centralist factors in the bureaucratic
and anarchistic form. Again officials began to put into
practice the local variant of the ‘share the loot’ approach
understood as the right to take over positions, which
became deeply rooted in the government administration.
This also legitimized profits from political contacts, which
led to the re-emergence of close relations between self-
governments and government bureaucrats.
The main rules of the new administrative system of
Poland, provided for in the Constitution of the Republic
of Poland of 1997 and which finally became laws in 1998,
had been negotiated by experts, politicians and self-
government since 1989. It is impossible to mention here
all people involved and the work carried out so far. That
is why it is important to stress that the circle of people
keen to restructure the administrative system of Poland
for good has been widening since 1989 and enjoyed ever-
growing understanding from different political groups.
When in the autumn of 1997 the coalition of post-Soli-
darity parties took over power in Poland, under Prime
Minister Jerzy Buzek, they embarked on a mission to
‘improve the state’ and complete the process of transfor-
mation of the system of government.
The preparation and implementation of the reform was
co-ordinated by three government centers. The work on
the main concepts and the preparation of basic legislative
measures were co-ordinated by Prof. Michal Kulesza who,
in December 1997, became the Plenipotentiary of the
Government for the Reform of the State System. Prof.
Kulesza who held the same position in 1993 was the
Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.
The work on financial issues was co-ordinated by Jerzy
Miller, the Plenipotentiary of the Government for the
Decentralization of Public Finances. Initially Mr. Miller
was the Under-secretary of State but in May 1998 he
became the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance.
The work on the administrative division of the country
was carried out by Jerzy Stepien´ the Under-secretary of
State at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration.
Also the work to prepare the implementation of the reform
was co-ordinated at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Administration, initially by Under-secretary Jerzy Stepien´
and later on by the Under-secretary of State Dr Józef Plos-
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konka. In May 1998 Dr Ploskonka was nominated secre-
tary of the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Implementation
of the Reform of Public Administration.
The organizational work aimed at preparing the practical
introduction of new institutions was de-concentrated and
was carried out on the Voivodship level. Sixteen Voivodship
level teams for the Reform of the Voivodship System of
Government were set up. The work was co-ordinated on
the national level personally by Minister Ploskonka and
through two-day meetings of the secretaries of Voivodship
teams in which Minister Ploskonka took part and cont-
rolled. His work was supported and organized by the
Department of Implementation and Monitoring of the
Reform of Public Administration at the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Administration.
The work on the reform was continued later on after the
new system had become operational. It was necessary to
introduce new mechanisms. Of special importance were
the government instruments of supporting regional
development [G. Gesicka, later Wl. Tomaszewski]. The
Sejm passed a law regarding the issue in May 2000.
It is worth mentioning that the Prime Mister set up the
Advisory Council for the Reform of the System of Govern-
ment (with Jerzy Regulski as its president). The Council
was to issue opinions on the administrative reform and
other social reforms, which were being introduced by Jerzy
Buzek’s government. The pace of work on the administ-
rative reform was so fast that the Council was not able to
issue their opinions on time, which caused some problems.
Members of the council also voiced their opinions and
reservations regarding some aspects of social reforms
(especially the reform of the health care system).
The implementation of decentralization reform in 1998
took place according to the political will of the ruling coali-
tion of AWS and UW who wanted to restructure the admi-
nistrative system of Poland. It was not a goal in itself but
a prerequisite for increasing the effectiveness of public
management and for constructing democratic mechanisms.
It was also a step on the road to improve the condition of
various sections of public life including the health care sys-
tem and the system of education, but also to rationalize
some areas which were partly or totally controlled by self-
governments (e.g. managing public roads, order or safety).
This complicated process of transforming the system of
government in Poland has been a big challenge. The
transformation was begun, as putting off the implementa-
tion of changes for later would bring about concrete
civilization, economic and financial losses. As a result,
instead of implementing the reform in reasonable stages
(and the reform was not implemented between 1993 and
1997 by the previous government coalition), the whole
reform as one packet had to be introduced at a time in
1998. With one move the reformers had to change the
administrative division of the country, introduce self-
government in Poviats and Voivodships, restructure central
government administration, consolidate it and modify rules
of responsibility as well as implement major social reforms.
With such a scale of change, problems and tensions were
inevitable both on the political level and with public com-
munication. This might have halted the reform, bring
about the fall of the government and earlier parliamentary
elections. A lot of tension was caused by the conflict re-
garding the number of Voivodships, which ended in the
defeat of the government side. After a lot of consideration
the government made public its version of the administ-
rative division of Poland, which provided for the creation
of 12 Voivodships. If a government accepts a certain ver-
sion of something and on the next day the leader of the
main party of the coalition undermines that version, it is
a disaster both from the point of view of public relations
and political marketing. And this is what happened.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the opposition and the
President of the Republic (also leftist) took advantage of
the situation and a result the number of Voivodships was
increased to sixteen [Emilewicz,Wolek pp. 108–109]. It
is still considered a success on the part of the ruling coali-
tion as the number might as well has risen to twenty-five.
Any work on reforms of the system of government should
focus on three areas, which are not always taken into consi-
deration, namely: the subject matter level, the political
level and the executive level [Emilewicz,Wolek p. 76]. The
same division applied to the Voivodship issue. As far as
the subject matter was concerned, it was clear from the
very start that the best solution would be 12 Voivodships.
My office was on the executive side and I was to implement
the change. But at the same time I was not any of the
leaders of AWS so I could not summon the political leader-
ship of the party to take final decisions. My duty was to
produce proper legislative instruments of the policy of
the ruling AWS-UW coalition and not the other way
round. However, it turned out that the weakest link of
our work was the political decision making process. It
affected the administrative reform but also other areas of
activity of the government and the coalition. From
December 1997 until June 1998 I took part in many
meetings of the leadership of the coalition. Such meetings
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should be preceded by work carried out by cabinet staff
and political advisors within the government and parties
to prepare the leadership to take political decisions. That
was not the case. The work on the subject matter was
smooth and so was the executive side but the political
level was often a compromise between different interests
and ‘fixing small things’ rather than an area in which
concrete decisions based on political choices were made.
The biggest political controversy regarding the reform was
the final number of Voivodships but the biggest battle
was fought over the competencies (responsibilities) of new
self-government units. The battle was decisive as far as
the degree of decentralization of public power in Poland
was concerned and also decided how much power would
be given to the Poviat and Voivodship. The battle consisted
of many skirmishes fought within the teams, ministries,
in the government and in parliament.
The initial stage of the work on the Law defining new
com-petencies consisted in preparing a list of necessary
changes within particular sections of substantive law with
the help of experts, self-government officials and
representatives of parti-cular ministries [Emilewicz, Wolek
pp. 162–164 ]. I set up 14 teams of experts similarly to
what was done in 1993. It should be stressed here that
the participation of the self-govern-ment side in the work
was exceptionally important. The self-government side
did not have any inhibitions and took into consideration
postulates of all kinds whereas the representatives of the
government administration were not as willing to consider
all options. On the contrary, they attempted to defend
their interests (i.e. scope of activity, competencies, personal
responsibilities and institutions).
After the above list had been drawn up, the bills were
drafted to amend the existing laws as an indispensable
part of the reform of the state system. In all, almost two
hundred laws were to be amended. As the Legislative
Department of the Prime Minister’s Chancellery had too
much work to take over the task, all the bills were drafted
by the above-mentioned teams of experts. Their work was
co-ordinated by the Office of the Plenipotentiary (Wlod-
zimierz Tomaszewski). Afterwards the Legislative Depart-
ment issued opinions on our work before it was to be
discussed by members of the cabinet.
Each amendment of the existing law was consulted many
times with lawyers and experts on the subject matter in
the ministries and in the self-government. When the
amendment was ready a description of what was to be
achieved was added to it as well as the justification and a
figure to visualize the shift in competencies. All the
documents were placed in a red folder, including materials
from a particular field referring to each change. Such red
folders, and there were two hundred of them, were sent
subsequently to ministries for consultation.
The timing of inter-ministerial consultations was also tight
as the ministries were given from 7 to 10 days to give their
opinion. Once the ministries issued their opinions a new
version was prepared. Then the drafts were put together
as one legislative entity, which included changes in many
laws. In this way subsequent parts of the Law defining
new competencies were created. They could have been
treated as separate legislative products. In all, five such
separate parts were prepared, which were subsequently
approved by the Council of Ministers and sent to
parliament. In parliament they were combined together
to become a law.
However, before the bill was finally discussed at the
Council of Ministers meeting, it was once again sent over
to ministries and it was here that the whole process became
very dramatic as the final remarks were sent back in the
last moment. It was often so late that it was difficult to
analyze them. It often happened that our opinions on the
proposals put forward by ministries were written down
in the dead of night just before the meeting of the Council
of Ministers.
As time was running out, preventive, blocking proposals
put forward by ministries were often accepted by the
Council of Ministers and therefore many of the approved
measures were not going far enough. A good example is
the issue of job centers, which were to be taken over by
the self-government administration. However, the Ministry
of Labor and Social Issues and the trades unions lobbying
against the reform did not want to agree to that. The re-
sistance was difficult to understand. I think it was generated
by the Ministry of Labor as on one hand it claimed it was
in favor of the reform but on the other it was used to
operating within the existing system were huge sums of
money remained in their hands and beyond citizens’ con-
trol. On the level of government the battle was lost, as what
remained was the old model. However, a favorable change
was achieved in the Sejm where members of parliament
form the Special Commission, who were in favor of self-
government reform, immediately identified the problem
and the draft was changed. The self-government authorities
took over job centers with a one-year delay and that law
came into force in January 2000.
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All drafts were also sent to self-government organizations,
which supported the work. They were to express their
opinion on the documents. The self-government repre-
sentatives also lobbied members of parliament and senators
to chose particular solutions. It became a counterbalance
to the bureaucratic and trades union lobby.
The above-mentioned examples show clearly that the final
measures were a compromise and often a damaging one.
As a matter of fact the ministries viewed the reform through
their own eyes. The fight was bitter and was led on many
fronts at a time.
In particular a bitter cake was a financial aspect of the
reform. Big problem from the very beginning was a lack
of reliable statistics concerning new territorial entities.
Because of that, transfer of financial means from the state
administration to the new units (Poviats and Voivodships)
was based—in general—on real expenditure reports (of
1997 and 1998) of every administration, institution, service
etc. which were the subject of decentralization. Such a
proceeding was very troublesome but it was only way to
drew out new financial scheme form every Poviat and
Voivodship—and to be sure that each unit will get enough
money to continue activity of all administrations, insti-
tutions and services taken over to local (regional) respons-
ibility. Of course new, temporary Law on self-government
financial resources (for years 1999–2000) related and
reversed those dispersed financial data to constitutional
sources of self-government incomes: taxes, block grants
(general subventions) and special transfers. However from
the beginning of our work it was sure that decentralization
reform ought to bring savings to the Ministry of Finance
rather than any surplus to the newly created units. As a
matter of fact, financial resources of Poviats and Voivod-
ships are very weak and limited, in contradiction to their
decentralized legal and political status and broad scope of
responsibilities transferred to them. Many commentators’
say, describing the reform: Decentralization of troubles.
Also, one must notice that such a restricted financial posi-
tion of newly created local and regional authorities has
also very positive impact upon general budgetary situation,
fully expected by the reformers. Exactly the same situation
had place in 1990, when new Gmina was created. The
centralized state had not got any measures to rationalize
effectively organization, personnel, management forms
and quality of services offered to the public. Decentraliza-
tion reforms transferred all those institutions and services
to the local (regional) political and quality control,
allowing to prove effectiveness and usefulness of them. It
created conditions to evaluate their necessity and real role
played, level of public acceptance, cost-effectiveness relation
etc. in regard to local (or regional) needs. The expectation,
that decentralization reform would bring rationalization
of expenditures in many areas of public services and
improvement of their quality have been fully justified,
both after 1990 and after 1998.
In Poland there was no serious discussion in 1998 about
forthcoming recession and crisis of public finance.
However, Polish Ministry of Finance is one of the most
conservative apparatus, I have ever seen. It regards both
civil servants and politicians serving at the position of a
Minister of Finance and his deputies. From the very
beginning (i.e. from 1990) all the decentralization reforms
were made in Poland despite of opposition of leading
circles of the Ministry and against them. They contested
also 1998 reforms. The new Public Finance Act (1998)
drafted in the Ministry of Finance brings only minimal,
indispensable steps toward decentralization.
It was obvious that decentralization would not be done
without relevant money transfer. Financial means trans-
ferred to the Poviats and Voivodships are (almost) enough
for their current expenditures. But on the other hand there
was a broad expectation that ‘relevant’ would mean a
strong financial position, especially for Voivodship autho-
rities responsible for regional development and policy. It
did not happened yet. It is a matter of fact that financial
reserves of local and regional authorities and their possible
capital expenditures are practically very limited, in that
respect Poviats and Voivodships are still very dependent
upon central government.
Thus, a real decentralization reform of public finance in
Poland has not been made yet. As a result it has created the
main discrepancy of the system: management of the public
finance system is still strongly centralized, au contrary to
the decentralized organization of local and regional autho-
rities, constitutional and statutory position of respective
entities and broad scope of their responsibilities. As a
current consequence, the Polish decentralization pushes
fiscal stress to lower level of government. It is much more
visible nowadays (at the end of 2001) when the economic
recession and fiscal crisis are present in Poland, than three
years ago when we hoped and supposed to implement
next steps of financial decentralization soon.
The above issues and critical observations cannot conceal
the conclusion that the administrative reform implemented
in 1998–1999 has become a legal, political and social
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fact in Poland. It was large and successful political project
prepared and completed by post-Solidarity milieu and
parliamentary coalition. Second stage of decentralization
revitalized many local communities and activated new
energy of numerous circles of citizens. Apart from approving
many new laws almost two hundred existing laws were
amended—some of them to a big extent. They referred
to different areas of public administration. It was possible
thanks to many people strongly engaged in the issue—
experts, politicians, civil servants, self-government elite
and others. Also—thanks to the expertise and materials
gathered before (among others the draft of the Poviat and
Voivodship map from 1993). The work on the territorial
reform was taking place under the watchful (and unfriendly)
eye of public TV cameras and the strong political opposi-
tion in the Sejm. However, all efforts both with preparing
the legislation itself and the organizational ones were
successful. In October 1998 elections were held to all levels
of self-governments. New local and regional elite of various
political options got their incredible and unique chance
to take over government and to influence local and regional
developments. On January 1st, 1999 a new administ-rative
division of Poland came into force, the territorial administ-
ration was consolidated, and the self-government authori-
ties of all levels and the reformed central government
administration began their work.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (1998–2000)
The creation of a new system of government required
radical changes within the structure of Poland’s central
and local administration. The preparation of the changes
required legislative, human, and organizational work, and
also included ownership issues. All preparations must have
been terminated by the end of 1998 in such a way to enable
the existing administrations and services to continue work
as normal on December 31st, 1998, but at the same time
to allow new administrations and services become opera-
tional on January 1st, 1999. As new units of territorial
self-government were created, in charge of the implemen-
tation of reform was the state administration. As the organs
of the Poviat and Voivodship self-governments came into
being after the election of September 1998, they could
co-operate with only to a limited extent.
First, it was necessary to create new institutions including
new offices of general administration (consolidated) be-
longing both to self-government (Poviat office and
Marshal’s (Regional) office) as well as to the field offices
of central government (new Voivod offices).
Second, the new institutions were to be given the existing
resources, both material and human, of the former field
administration. What made the whole process complicated
was the fact that new institutions were created in different
territorial and administrative units and sometimes in different
cities. This often required dividing or merging the existing
units or resources. This also applied to special administra-
tions also on the Poviat or Voivodship level, whose old struc-
tures did not match the new Poviat and Voivodship division.
Third, it was necessary to prepare a list of institutions of
the state sector (education, health care, social help, culture,
roads, police, fire administration etc.) which should be
handed over to the territorial self-governments to allow
them to perform their statutory tasks. It was also necessary
to work out a special rule how the institutions would be
taken over. A special database featuring all institutions to
be handed over was created [Ploskonka pp. 14–15].
Another issue was the preparation of draft budgets for new
units according to a timetable prepared by the government
administration.
The implementation of the reform of public administra-
tion included:
• Legislative work—preparation of bills, which regulate
the rules and procedures of implementing the reform,
i.e. transition from the old to the new system and
issuing secondary legislation. Regulation of the issues
relating to the liquidation of some institutions and
to the continuation of pending cases;
• Operational work—setting up structures responsible
for implementing the reform, stock taking, and re-
designating of the resources of the territorial administ-
ration and distributing information about the new
structure of administration (training courses etc);
• Monitoring of preparations and the implementation
process as well as undertaking action when necessary;
• Evaluating the effects of the reform and making cor-
rections of a legislative nature;
Informing the public about the reform.
The legislation also dealt with the functioning of the
territorial administration during the period of transition.
In May 1998 the Prime Minister set up the Inter-Minis-
terial Team for Implementing the Public Administration
Reform. The main task of the team was to co-ordinate all
activities aimed at implementing the reform performed
by the government administration. The activities were
both of a legislative nature (draft of the introductory regu-
lations Act and executive acts for laws reforming the public
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administration), as well as of an operational nature (co-
ordinating activities within the central government and
on the Voivodship level).
The Team was made up from representatives of particular
ministries holding the positions of secretaries or under-
secretaries of state. Janusz Tomaszewski the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs and Administra-
tion headed the team. Its secretary became the Under-
secretary of State at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Administration Józef Ploskonka, who was in charge of
implementing the reform. To support the activities of the
Team, the special Department for Implementing and
Monitoring the Public Administration Reform was set
up in the Ministry on July 15th, 1998.
The scope of organizational changes made it necessary to
manage them in a deconcentrated way on the Voivodship
level. In August 1998 in 16 future seats of Voivodships
the Voivodship Teams for Implementing the Public Admi-
nistration Reform were formed. In the beginning of
November 1998 the President of the Council of Ministers
nominated sixteen Government Delegates for the State
System Reform in Voivodships. They were positioned as
Under-secretaries of State at the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Administration and having power of authority
they were in charge of implementing the reform in
particular Voivodship [Ploskonka p. 17].
The Delegates acted until new State Voivodship governors
(Voivods) were nominated. The Voivods nominated after
January 1st, 1999 performed the function of Delegates
until December 31st, 2000.
FACTORS OF THE SUCCESS
In order to implement a sizeable reform in a democratic
country at least three basic elements are required, namely:
political will, knowledge (expertise) and support of elite
and media. Then qualified staff is needed, able to make
use of new conditions. Apart from that any reformer needs
some luck.
In case of the reforms of 1990 and of 1998 this recipe for
success proved to be right. In both cases there was political
will but the basic role was played by expertise and know-
ledge of experts as well as their involvement in the reforms,
which went beyond the role of advisors. It can be said
that in both cases the political will was a direct result of
their active involvement.
The studies, which made it possible to prepare the first
reform (1990), were begun in 1981 during the period of
the Solidarity trades union. The work was continued
during martial law [Regulski, Kulesza]. It constituted a
basis for the participation of the Solidarity side in the
talks of the Round Table and then a foundation of
subsequent state works carried out in 1989 and 1990. In
1998 the reformers made use of the expertise from the
operation of Gmina reform (1990) and from work on
Poviats (which began in 1991 under the auspices of self-
government organizations and was continued in 1992–
1993 under Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka when bills
and other drafts were drawn up). The work on the concept
of the self-governing Voivodship began in 1991 and it
was continued by the government in 1993 (three options)
and later in the Institute of Public Affairs—non-govern-
mental organization.
It is perhaps only Polish experience, but I am sure, that
official structures of government are never enough pre-
pared, keen and ready to work out such massive and com-
prehensive materials as needed for public administration
reform. The more, I have an opinion that such a reform
can be introduced successfully only at the beginning of
the term of office of the government. Because of that, all
the concept and materials have to be prepared and broadly
discussed earlier, as a political and/or substantive project,
before such a reformatory political grouping takes over
the power as a result of the election. After election, even
successful, there is never enough time to prepare all the
concepts, discuss them, accept or rebuild and then draft
all needed bills, organizational projects etc.
Question of time is crucial. If the reformers are not ready
to present their concept and its particulars exactly when
it is needed and possible (from the viewpoint of the poli-
tical situation), then a proper time is probably over. In
my opinion young democracies do not like big structural
reforms, which hit economic and political interests of many
parties and groupings by destroying their positions and
mechanisms present in the functioning of the state, eco-
nomy and politics. It is why all the public debates have to
be done during electoral campaign and earlier. Afterwards
comes the time for decisions and implementation, only.
In Poland the reformers were gathering more and more
knowledge and the circle of those in favor of the reform
was growing bigger and bigger. That was why when poli-
tical will appeared, the reformers knew exactly what to do.
Such a sizeable venture as the reform of the system of
government required decisive actions in the ‘emperor style’
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and not endless democratic debates. In 1998 the reformers
had only six months (180 days) to implement the reform.
The AWS, the main coalition partner, did not have enough
political will and determination to continue the game
longer than few months after taking over the power. It
was clear from the very start that either the reformers would
manage to prepare and pass all bills by the summer of
1998 or the reform would fail, as tension and media war
were too much of a problem. The main factor to guarantee
the success was to maintain the high pace of work.
As Poland did not have an emperor, the radical changes
had to be implemented in a democratic way and that is
why an emperor’s power had to be replaced with high
pace of work as only speed could save us. That was why,
my aim was to implement the reform even when quality
would suffer. Thus all critics and remarks to what was
not done in the right way or what could be done better
are justified but with limited time on our hands it was
impossible to oversee every aspect of the reform as we had
only the above six months to implement it. The whole
team of my Office of the Government Plenipotentiary
for the Systemic Reform of the State was made up from
14 (to 20) officials including two directors and three
secretaries. This was all I received from the Office of the
Prime Minister in November 1997. But it would be even
impossible to manage effectively a bigger team. One must
consider that around us there were also numerous members
of government and administration, many involved parlia-
mentarians of the coalition and next hundreds of experts,
politicians, civil servants etc., co-operating with the team
in various ways. I think that when we take into considera-
tion what was needed and what was feasible at the time
given, the result of our work is quite satisfactory. In my
opinion we managed to achieve even 80 per cent of the
target, which is a lot. As for the rest, it must be done by
self-governments in their constant struggle with state
centralism, still vivid in Poland.
Despite many flaws for which Jerzy Buzek’s government
is responsible and which adversely influenced the reform,
it must be said that the coalition government of AWS and
UW was the first political leadership of the country since
1989–1990 to take a conscious political decision and to
implement a wide-ranging reform of the structures of the
state and the public sector. Until that moment no govern-
ment had attempted to do it.
The reform was implemented not because of a miracle
but because an opportunity to do it appeared and the poli-
ticians and reformers seized it.
Indeed the reformers were lucky. For a brief moment the
curtain went up and the reformers found themselves in
the right place at the right moment to play the reform on
stage. Shortly afterwards the political curtain went down
and today no reform of the system of government on such
a scale would be possible.
It is also unlikely that conditions for carrying out such
reform will exist in the future. It is because the period when
state structures are relatively flexible to accept changes is
short. In my opinion, the best moment to implement radical
changes of such type lasts from two to three years after a
political breakthrough. The second phases when radical
changes are still possible but their cost from the political
point of view is high are the next few years. This period
would have ended in Poland well before 1998 if it had
not been for the work of many people and groups after
1993 due to which centralized state structures were prone
to change. Without such actions the reform would not
have been feasible, as new party and state bureaucracy would
have gathered strength and as the old structures would have
supported them.
If it had been a military operation and not a political
reform it would have been planned in one of the rooms
of the military headquarters. Every detail would have been
marked on the map and the whole military game would
have been practiced well before sending real soldiers to
war. To some extend it was possible to simulate the reform
1998 as well but no one did it. My mission and my
position in the government were related to the subject
matter and not to politics. Someone ‘higher’ should have
taken care of the political aspect of the reform but in fact
there was no one to do it. As a result everything that we
attempted to do (and had to do) we did on the higher level
of national politics and this resembled something of the
cottage industry.
It must be stressed however, the credit for convincing
decision-makers to implement a radical administrative
reform should not go only to the experts. Both in AWS
and UW there were strong and deeply involved groups of
politicians who thought that the reform was of funda-
mental importance for Poland. And that was why the reform
became an element of the manifestos of both parties. I
also mentioned the fact that we enjoyed the support of
large self-government circles. It must be said here that local
elite of different political shades, though rather inactive,
was looking forward to the reform which was seen as an
opportunity to act on a bigger scale than just Gmina.
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The position of the Government Plenipotentiary that I
held at that time is a proper one from the operational and
subject matter point of view to carry out operations on
such a scale but it is weak from the political (structural)
point of view. A lot depends on the involvement of the
state leadership. Such a reform process cannot be managed
half way i.e. the person in charge must be a minister with
all ministerial powers (or a plenipotentiary of the government)
and all people involved must know that the person enjoys
full backing of the Prime Minster. It cannot be a weak
administrative position. As such, it sends signals that it
enjoys little support of the leadership. If the position is
weak all the activities related to the reform are becoming
chaotic and this is what happened in November and
December of 1998. My real political role ended approxi-
mately six months after my nomination as the Plenipoten-
tiary—in summer 1998. This gave me enough time to
prepare bills but the practical implementation of the
reform had to take place through different channels (see
Chapter 4 above). In the course of time, the forces oppos-
ing decentralization were becoming stronger and stronger,
especially the circles of civil servants in ministries and
central administrations, but they were a bit late. It seems
that at present the whole system is in a state of equilibrium,
as there are no forces in Poland now that would question
the new territorial system and the existing possibilities to
play politics newly created by the reform in Poviats and
Voivodships.
All reforms implemented in a democratic state must win
the hearts of society at large. That is why reforms must be
accompanied by educational and promotional activities,
which will make it possible to win the trust of society and
adapt the reform to the needs of the citizens. In case of
the reform of the system of government, public support
for decentralization seems to be a natural phenomenon
as it answers the needs of the Poles and their country.
That is why, the reform did not require any particular
lobbying on the intellectual level. Moreover, the product
we showed to the public in 1997–1998 did not have any
competition from the subject matter sense as there was
no other similar program and there was no criticism ac-
companied by sensible arguments. However there were
numerous political vetoes, as the public administration
reform is always a political issue.
It does not mean that the reform did not require political
lobbying and support of various other groups. At the same
time the reform also required a public relations and
educational campaigns for broad circles of public.
However, in 1998 this task (broad education) proved to
be unfeasible due to a media war, which broke out when
the reform was being implemented. Public television in
Poland is in the hands of the leftist circles (SLD-PSL).
Public television, which is the main medium for social
education, became involved in the war with the coalition
government of the center right.  It is a key to understand
the area of public relation and communication during the
crucial period for the reform, which lasted from January
until March 1998. Obviously the reformers carried out
educational and promotional programs, which were quite
effective (e.g. more than one million leaflets as well as
programs in cable and private TV stations), but the proper
social climate for any events in Poland is created by public
television. As the public television refused to take part in
the educational campaign and was involved in criticizing
the reform (and the central government), any further
questions regarding the choice of tools to promote the
reform are pointless. Apart from TV commercials that
the government could not afford, the government and
reformers did not have any comparable means to present
the reform to the general public.
FINAL REMARKS
This text was not presented to describe all aspects of the
Polish reform in detail. Its main aim was to show different
aspects of the process of implementing important and far-
reaching reforms, as in the case of decentralization in
Poland.
Reform of that scale leads to transformation of general
system of the state. That was the case with Polish reforms
after Communism. Apart from such large transformation
reforms, governments often implement other reforms and
changes. In particular there are reforms of the managerial
character, which deal with the implementation of new
and more effective methods of public management, and
not with the transformation of the general system of the
state. Moreover, the organizational side and functioning
of public administration are constantly modernized. Such
constant modernization of administration is every day duty
and business of any government. Each of the types of
reform needs relevant means of operation.
Sometimes those three levels of public administration
reforms are confused. It leads to many misunderstandings
and to the possible failure of great state reforms or to the
reforms being implemented only superficially.
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Decentralization in Poland is an example of a successful
effort of the state. It was a common effort made by the
political elite and experts. In my opinion the reform will
facilitate the functioning of Polish democracy and
economy, and will support European integration processes.
The effect of the reform would be a civic state, which acts
on various levels of public management, which is open to
change, to co-operation and competition.
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ANNEX
Resolution No. 101/97 of the Council of Ministers Concerning the Principles for the
Preparation and Implementation of the Public Administration Reform [Preamble]:
“In order to efficiently implement systemic reforms of
the State,
Considering that this task, of major significance for a
propitious future of Poland and common good, should
become a field of concerted co-operation of all political
forces that cherish those values,
Basing, in accordance with the Constitution, the draft of
the new organization of authorities of the Republic of
Poland on the principle of subsidiary, according to which
Gmina and Poviat communities, that is local self-govern-
ments should be directly responsible for matters of local
interest and common needs of inhabitants,
Whereas the strong Government and its representatives
in Voivodships—voivods should be responsible for matters
of national interest, which include primarily sovereignty
and integrity of the State, collective security—internal and
external, concern for the observance of the law, as well as
ensuring conditions for civilization and economic develop-
ment,
Recognizing, that Voivodship self-governments should be
involved in State work concerning favorable economic
development,
And the number of Voivodships, as well as their individual
economic, intellectual, cultural and organizational potential
should make them capable of undertaking public tasks
on the regional scale,
Also recognizing that the optimum time for carrying out
elections to the decision-making bodies of Poviat and
Voivodship self-government is the year 1998
The Council of Ministers resolves as follows:
[...]
SUBSTANTIATION of the Resolution No. 101/97 of
the Council of Ministers concerning the Principles for
the preparation and implementation of the Public
Administration Reform:
The action program of the Government, defined in Prime
Minister’s expose, provides for an expeditious implemen-
tation of systemic reforms. It is a broad notion, involving
—most generally—the need to build new foundations of
public life, in a large scope. It should take into account
not only reorganization of the administrative system of
the state, but also reconstruction of the value of state work
in civil service, as well as simple consolidation and ratio-
nality in managing public funds. The latter requires a
transparent system of responsibility for public affair, with
amendments of the regulations relating to public procure-
ment. Transparency of public affairs embraces not only
the issue of the distribution of competencies and reorga-
nization of administration, but also matters of putting
public property in order, as well as an appropriate new
arrangement of the system of public finance.
Those are necessary pre-conditions without the meeting
of which it will not be possible to speed up economic
development or carry out major social reforms. Amongst
them there are the health insurance reform, the social secu-
rity reform, the educational system reform, the reconstruc-
tion of the sense of collective and individual security of
citizens, etc.
The administrative-territorial reform has two major objec-
tives of a direct nature.
First, it is aimed at strengthening the government, by im-
plementing the principle of separation of the political func-
tions (governing) from the executive functions in the field
of public administration. Thanks to administrative decon-
centration and decentralization of public tasks the govern-
ment will become an authority adopting principal decisions
relating to the strategy of the development of the state, its
security and public order instead of managing singular affairs.
The above function of the government will be realized
not only at the central level, but also at the regional level,
through the institution of the strong, government-ap-
pointed Voivod. As an administrative authority of general
responsibility Voivod will have at his disposal instruments
for securing the interest of state and observance of law in
Voivodships in the form of consolidated government ad-
ministration. Consolidation of government administration
at the Voivodship level will bring about tangible financial
economies. In turn, decentralization of the government
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function with respect to social and economic policies will
provide conditions for better planning the strategy of the
economic development of the regions.
Another direct objective of the reform is to reinforce social
integration through reconstruction of local communities
and giving them competencies within the area of satisfying
community needs at the local level. Therefore, one of the
priorities of the Poviat reform is to strengthen identification
with the local community, and through this also with the
national community, as well as to intensify citizens’ parti-
cipation in public life at the local level (“feel at home”).
Implementation of public tasks of a local character (so far
performed by government administration at the Voivod-
ship and district level) by self-governing Poviats and orga-
nizational consolidation of administration also on that
territorial scale will also contribute to better management
of public funds under direct control of representatives of
local communities.
Such a sequence of implementing the reforms is also
prompted by the following factors:
• The need to eliminate the competence and organi-
zational disorder in the State by clear distribution of
responsibilities between local, regional and central
segments of public authorities. This end will also be
served by a radical reduction of the number of special
administrations (their organizational consolidation,
though with necessary competence autonomy);
• The need to make a distinct separation between politics
and administration, and both areas from the economy;
• Making the system of public finance efficient and
transparent by subjecting it to civil control in all
segments of public authority within the framework
of decentralized functions of the State;
• Creating organizational premises for reducing corrup-
tion and nepotism in the administration and for re-
constructing the ethics of the civil service, improving
operating efficiency of the administration and turning
it into an institution serving the citizens;
• Creating professional and politically neutral staff
ensuring efficient performance of public tasks by the
administration. In this respect it is necessary to build
up new legal grounds for the civil service;
• Ensuring collective and individual security for the
citizens, and creating appropriate conditions for crisis
management.
The reforms have to be carried out in such a way so as to
avoid disorder caused by reorganization and destabilization
of public functions.
Therefore, it is assumed that the reforms have to be carried
out all at once and as soon as possible so that the state
system in the new form starts functions as of the beginning
of 1999. The combined implementation of the Poviat
and Voivodship reforms (and in consequence also holding
Voivodship elections in 1998) is justified by the fact that
about 100 proposed Poviats infract upon the borders of
present Voivodships. The earlier (in 1998) implementa-
tion of the Poviat reform while postponing the Voivodship
reform to a later date would anyway force out some in
1999 corrections of boundaries of all 49 present Voivod-
ships. Whereas the disorder relating to reorganization and
the competence confusion would last adequately longer
since the setting up of large Voivodships at a different date
and the separate introduction of Voivodship self-govern-
ments would require—every time anew—extensive amend-
ments of about 100 organizational and competence statutes.
This resolution, defining the scope of tasks that need to
be executed in the forthcoming future by the members of
the government and the administrative offices they are in
charge of, at the same time sets the deadlines for their
execution.
In order to keep those deadlines it is also necessary to
resolve that the first Poviat budgets will be set by Regional
clearinghouses and then if necessary corrected by Poviat
councils following their constitution.
It is also necessary to accelerate work within the govern-
ment, which is to ensure simplification of the procedure
of considering proposals by the Council of Ministers—
after they are properly prepared by the Government
Plenipotentiary for the Systemic Reform of the State and
upon Prime Minister’s approval.
In the period of preparing and implementing the reform
it is necessary to stabilize the existing administrative
divisions: both at the basic Gmina level, as well as special
divisions.
The reforms of administration (and also that of courts
system) are also necessary within a broader context of
Poland’s accession to the European Union. Administrative
reform is one of the principal roads to ensuring for Poland
a partner’s share in the operation of European structures
and in relations with other member countries.
The proposed resolution provides for the preparation of
the implementation of the reforms as soon as possible,
which meets halfway the expectations of the citizens and
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political elite, including the parties that form the
government, without destabilizing the performance of
public functions by the self-government and government
bodies. It is to be hoped that the political forces that are
now in the opposition also share the same expectations.
The reforms in the proposed form do not require any
amendments to be made in the Constitution.”
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NOTES
1 Michal Kulesza is a professor at Warsaw University, Faculty of Law and Administration—Head of the Public
Administration Dpt. Author of some 150 scientific publications in the area of public administration and administrative
law. Took part in the 1989 Round Table debates as member of the local government workgroup (on behalf of
‘Solidarity’). One of the main authors of the 1990 Polish Gmina reform and legislation. In 1992–1993, as the
Government Plenipotentiary for the Public Administration Reform and Under-secretary of State in the Hanna
Suchocka government prepared the poviat (county) reform, that time not introduced because of political reasons.
From November 1997 to March 1999 was Secretary of State in the Jerzy Buzek government and as the Government
Plenipotentiary for the Systemic Reform of the State was in charge of preparing the 1998 administrative reform
(Powiat & Wojewódzrwo), in particular its legislative groundwork.
2 Round Table (Okragly Stól)—talks held by the representatives of the Opposition, most of whom were linked to the
‘Solidarity’ Trade Union, outlawed after the introduction of martial law in Poland, and by the representatives of the
State and Party authorities (the Polish United Workers’ Party). The talks were held in Warsaw from February 6th
until April 5th, 1989. The negotiators were to work out rules for the democratisation of the social system in Poland
and for introducing economic reforms that would be acceptable for both sides. According to the Round Table
agreements, it was decided that the reform of the political and economic systems would be carried out in steps and
it would be based among others on political pluralism, freedom of speech, independence of judiciary, strong territorial
self-government, democratic elections to all elective bodies of state, freedom of ownership and development of
market economy and competition. The agreements provided for pluralism of trade unions i.e. freedom to establish
and be a member of trade unions and it was also decided to allow to legalise the ‘Solidarity’ Trade Union.
As far as the supreme state authority was concerned it was decided to set up the Senate as a second chamber of
parliament and the office of the President of Poland. It was also decided that the Senate election would be free
whereas the Sejm election would be based on a political contract among parties, i.e. Party-and-Government side
would get 65 per cent of the seats whereas the Opposition-‘Solidarity’ side would get 35 per cent of the seats. The
Round Table agreements formed a foundation for implementing significant political changes in Poland.
The first election held according to the above agreement took place on June 4th, 1989. As a result of the vote the
Solidarity side won all 35 per cent of seats in the Sejm and 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate. This made it possible
to create a strong Opposition grouping in the Sejm known as the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club and then, after
forming an unexpected coalition with two parties (former political supporters of Communists—SD and ZSL), to
create Eastern Europe’s first non-communist government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
Then a number of important decisions were taken regarding Poland’s economy, including freedom of ownership,
introduction of a free market economy and competition, liquidation of central planning and a unified fiscal policy
regarding companies.
3 Gmina—the basic level of public administration introduced in 1990. The most important collective needs of a local
community are met here. There are ca 2,500 Gminas in Poland, amongst them rural and urban (towns) of various
size. Voits (wójt), urban Gminas and Gminas head rural Gminas with townships—by mayors (burmistrz), and
larger towns—by presidents (prezydent). The average rural Gmina is of ca 7 thousand inhabitants (there are only 28
Gminas with population lower than 2,500 each).
4 Voivodship Assemblies (1990–1998) were made up from all Gminas located within one Voivodship and represented
the interests of Gminas toward state administration.
5 The Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), a leftist political coalition and an election committee created in 1991.
Since 1999 it has been recreated as a political party. SLD has their roots in the former communist system. It is made
up from dozens of political parties, trades unions and social organisations including first of all the Social Democrats
of the Republic of Poland (SdRP). SdRP is the successor of the communist Polish United Worker’s Party). In the
1993 parliamentary elections SLD won 20 per cent of the seats. Between 1993 and 1997 SLD formed a government
coalition with PSL. Also since the autumn of 2001, with 40 per cent of the seats in Parliament SLD has been a
member of the ruling coalition with PSL.
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6 The Solidarity Election Action (AWS), a centre-right political alliance formed in 1996. It was composed from the
Solidarity trades union and more than 40 political parties and organisations. It represented three ideological options:
liberals, Christian-democrats and nationalists. During the elections in 1997 AWS won 33.8 per cent of the seats and
with UW (13.4 per cent) and formed a centrist right government whose Prime Minister was Jerzy Buzek (AWS) and
Deputy Prime Minister was L. Balcerowicz (UW).
7 Poviat (Powiat)—the county level of public administration designed to maintain efficiently many of the everyday
local services and institutions of public life. Unlike the Gmina, which is responsible for local tasks defined by law
but also for all matters that have not been explicitly assigned to other levels of government (General Clause), the
poviat will implement only those tasks that have been clearly defined for it in the law. There are 315 poviats headed
by self-government officials (starosta) appointed by democratically elected poviat councils. There are approximately
85 thousand inhabitants and 8 Gminas in average (statistical) Poviat. Also 65 largest urban Gminas (towns) have
been endowed with poviat status.
8 Voivodship (Województwo)—the largest administrative unit in the sub-national organization of the state. There are
sixteen Voivodships (regions) in Poland. Voivodship can be also understood as the regional self-government (where
Sejmik is the governing body and Marshal [Marszalek] is the Chief executive) and as the area of activity of the
central government appointee—Voivod [Wojewoda ].
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Structural and Organizational Reform:
The Experience of Latvia
S v e t l a n a  P r o s k u r o v s k a
INTRODUCTION
This paper emphasizes establishment of the civil service
and the structural and organizational reform of public
administration in Latvia during 1993–2001. The content
of the paper is based on a six-year personal experience of
the author in designing, managing and implementing
reforms in Latvia. The views and opinions expressed in
this paper reflect the views of the author, occasionally
supported by the opinions of international experts familiar
with the process of public administration reforms in
Latvia.
During 1995-2001, due to the Government course on
integration into the European Union, Latvian administ-
ration has been increasingly subjected to the influence of
the Western European countries and particularly EU
member states and the European Commission.  This inf-
luence stems from the obligation of Latvia as an EU candi-
date state to implement internal reforms and ensure com-
patibility of Latvia with the Copenhagen (1993) political,
economic and administrative accession criteria. Implemen-
tation of the administrative criteria requires that Latvia
develop a sustainable and reliable administration capable
of implementing the European Treaties, EU policies and
the acquis communautaire in Latvia to the same standards
as in any EU Member State.
Administrative capacity, both sectoral and horizontal, has
become an enormous challenge for Latvia. Therefore, im-
plementation of the internal administrative reforms takes
place in close cooperation with and assistance from the
European Commission, Member States, and SIGMA/
OECD. Moreover, the reform process is closely scrutinized
and evaluated by the Commission in the annual Regular
Reports on the progress achieved in preparation for acces-
sion. Such Regular Reports serve as a guiding document
regarding the priorities of internal reforms and areas,
which are considerably lagging behind the expectations
of the EU Commission and EU member states. The Regular
Reports act as monitoring tool to measure the progress
and identify problems as well as set a benchmarking
mechanism for comparison among the candidate states.
Although there is no acquis in the area of public administ-
ration and National Government retains its sovereignty
in establishing the structures of public administration and
regulating the civil service as well as deciding on the model
of decentralization of the state, there is a convergence in
the systems of public administration in Europe caused by
the obligation to ensure effective implementation of the
acquis, integration of EU members within the four freedoms
of movement,1 rulings of the European Court of Justice
supplementing the European law. All this provides for a
more close integration of national public administrations
based on recognized common administrative principles.
Since 1997 Rotterdam conference on Governance and
European Integration, experts of public administration
have started to refer to the European Administrative Space,
which characterizes an administrative system capable of
the implementation of the EU legislation and meeting
such criteria as democracy, predictability, reliability,
adherence to the rule of law, proportionality, transparency,
effectiveness and efficiency.
Reform of public administration in Latvia is driven by
the internal challenges: need to improve coherence of
policy making and policy implementation, need to ensure
effective management of public finance, need to improve
responsiveness and quality of public services, need to im-
prove ethical standards and combat corruption, need to
facilitate economic growth and welfare of society. At the
same time, public administration reform is driven by the
integration process, which requires strengthening of poli-
tically neutral civil service system, implementation of rules
on administrative procedures, improvement of policy
coordination, ensuring sound management of public
finances within a medium term framework, developing
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internal and external financial control, implementing
transparent public procurement rules. While implementing
public administration reform, Latvia uses EU-stated re-
quirements for the administrative capacity as a benchmark
and ensures that the reforms are in compliance with the
European administrative principles.
It is important to note though that the application of the
good governance principles is not an easy task in a country,
which is in the process of building of administrative culture
based on democratic values. Reforms require a consider-
able degree of learning on the part of administration and
legislature. The EU legal acts usually state the desired
outcome but do not offer the countries any specific guid-
ance on how the effective implementation of the letter
and spirit of law can be achieved. It is presumed that the
national administrations should establish the implement-
ing structures that fit the tradition, political and administ-
rative culture and effectiveness and efficiency criteria in
their own countries, thus showing respect to the fact of
sovereignty of the national administration. Designing the
structures to implement the acquis is often linked to the
establishment of specific procedures, embedded in western
administrative culture. Therefore, the transfer of know
how from the EU member states serves as a key element
of success of public administration reform.
In this paper the author attempts to review the structural
and organizational reform, which enabled to transform
Latvian public sector from a single producer of goods and
services for the citizens, the sector which implemented
the policies decided outside Latvia (in Moscow), into the
public sector, which promotes development of the private
initiative and the sector which implements nationally
adopted policies in the interests of the Latvian society.
The author also pays attention to the success and failure
in designing and implementing of the reforms, which may
serve as a good lessons to those who follow the same route
of transformation from a centralized authoritarian society
to a market based democracy.
The paper describes the experiences of Latvia in reforming
administration and also suggests (in Chapter 5) the
common approach to designing and managing the reforms
of administration, which may be useful for the countries
at earlier stages in the reform process.
STRUCTURAL AND CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM IN LATVIA IN 1993–1997
First Program of Reform
of Public Administration in Latvia
Preparation of reform of public administration started in
1993, when Latvia took a decision to de-politicize the
state administration and establish professional civil service.
The Program of Latvian Public Administration Reform
(adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on 28 March 1995)
[1] stated that Latvian State and public administration
were in transition from totalitarian regime to a democratic
state based on the rule of law. The Program envisaged
establishment of an administration that is derived from
the structure of the state stipulated in the Constitution
(SATVERSME) and which should perform entrusted
public functions with integrity, effectiveness and justice
towards the citizens.
The Program proclaimed the following strategic directions
of the reform:
• reform in relations between the society and the state;
• reform of public administration functions,
• reform of the structure of public administration,
• reform in basic operational principles of public ad-
ministration;
• reform of main instruments of public administration:
— public finance management;
— personnel management;
— preparation and implementation of normative
acts.
The Program was to be implemented with the use of the
following means: legal acts, systems analysis, management
of change, financial resources, training of personnel, in-
forming of the society and public servants.
The principles of structural reform of public administration
were stated in the Program. The following provisions were
made for the public administration. The Cabinet of Minis-
ters exercises the political leadership of public administra-
tion and adopts secondary legislation aimed at implemen-
tation of the laws passed by the Parliament. Ministers are
members of the Cabinet and political leaders of respective
ministries. A ministry is the highest organization in the
institutional hierarchy responsible for policy making for
the sector, budget allocation within a sector, organization
of implementation of the public policies through manage-
ment of the subordinated institutional system. The institu-
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tions, which are under direct subordination and super-
vision of the ministry, are responsible for implementation
of the public policy or exercising control functions. Insti-
tutional system is based on principle of hierarchical ma-
nagement and control. For the purpose of horizontal
coordination, various mechanisms are employed: ad hoc
task groups, coordinating councils, institutionalized
system of exchange of information.
Implementation of the structural and organizational reform
started with clarifying the roles and functions of institutions
of public administration even before the official approval
of the Program of Latvian Public Administration Reform.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Program stated that
entrepreneurial activities are not an objective and part of
public administration, the use of entrepreneurial legislation
was made to establish state non-profit companies under
management of ministries to administer state programs
and deliver public services. As it will be discussed further,
not all the measures had been well substantiated by a com-
prehensive analysis of the impact, because the lack of the
experience in building new public administration, weak
theoretical knowledge of the basics of democratic gover-
nance, economic and fiscal pressures produced a mix of
circumstances, in which experimenting was an alternative
option to inaction.
The Program addresses civil service reform as an essential
element of transformation of the state to a democratic
rule of law. The objective of the civil service reform is to
establish politically neutral, professional, accountable and
regulated by the law administration, whose decisions can
be reviewed and challenged through certain stated pro-
cedures. The basic principles for civil service included:
• principle of trust—the state entrusts civil servants
with the rights to exercise public authority with a
framework of law and with a reasonable discretion;
• general applicability—a civil servant should be able
to perform his/her duties within a wider context of
public administration and can be transferred of
seconded to another post in the administration;
• principle of career—the state ensures an opportunity
for a civil servant to develop a career through a pro-
gression within the civil service ranks, linked to the
professional growth and continuous learning; the
state undertakes an obligation not to dismiss a civil
servants unless he has committed an offence as stated
in the law;
• principle of state care and social protection of civil
servants—the state provides certain social guarantees
to the civil servant in return for his loyalty and dedi-
cation to the state interests;
• Principle of ethics—avoidance of the conflict of
interest to ensure that civil servants performs his duties
in the interests of the state and the society and his
performance is not interferes by any personal interest
and wish to attain private gains through compromis-
ing his/her position.
To ensure the establishment of legal framework for the
civil service, a set of laws was to be passed and implemented:
The Civil Service Law, Law on Disciplinary Procedures,
Law on Administrative Procedures, Law on Conflict of Interest,
The Law on Access and Protection of Information together
with the Cabinet regulations on civil service. For the im-
plementation of the Civil Service Law, coordination and
development of career based civil service system the Go-
vernment established a central coordinating institution—
Civil Service Administration. The change from the old
soviet type administration working under strict control
of the Communist party to the professional civil service
required new types of knowledge, skills and attitudes. To
enable the public servants acquire such skills, a government-
funded training institution for in-service training—
Latvian School of Public Administration was established
simultaneously with the Civil Service Administration, in
December 1993.
The School has developed into a sustainable and develop-
ing training institution, which follows the reform, needs
and develops and delivers training programs to civil servants
within broad range of reform agenda. Till present, the
School resisted suggestions to change a status from public
institution financed by the Government to a more relaxed
agency status for the reason of serving primarily as a reform
tool for the public administration which should facilitate
the growth of professionalism in public administration
without focus on entrepreneurial activities aimed at
earning revenues through delivery of training for a fee.
The Program made a very general provision for manage-
ment of public administration reform by stating that the
Cabinet of Ministers ensures the implementation of public
administration reform with all the available means and
tools. Later in the paper we will see how such an uncertain
provision influenced the pace of the reform and attitudes
of politicians, administration and the society towards
reform initiatives.
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Early Transformation
of Public Administration
After the 1993 elections of the 5th Saeima,2 the Cabinet
of Ministers established a Ministry of State Reforms (with
a limited two-year mandate) to develop policy on public
administration and civil service reform and to coordinate
its implementation. Other sectors of economy and social
sphere were entrusted to twelve ministries: Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry
of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Welfare,
Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Culture,
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of
Environmental Protection and Regional Development.
The State Chancellery acts as a central administrative
institution and ensures necessary professional support for
work of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Prime Minister.
One of the critical roles that the State Chancellery plays
is to ensure the quality of the normative acts submitted
for adoption by the Cabinet. The policy advice function
at the State Chancellery has been underdeveloped till the
beginning of 2000.
In order to ensure the most comprehensive review of the
legal drafts and National Programs before adopting by
the Cabinet Members, the Cabinet of Ministers established
a Committee, which is a discussion forum for Members
of Cabinet and civil servants from all ministries and central
institutions. This forum assists government in coordination
of various sector policies and prepares the ministers for
voting on policy decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers.
For a government lead by a coalition, this is an important
instrument to express political and professional concerns
and influence the contents of the final draft submitted to
the Cabinet meeting for approval.
The structure of ministries reflects the functional approach
to the setting up of administrative system. The ministries
in Latvia are comparatively small to those in countries of
the continental Europe (France, Germany) and are com-
parable in size to the Scandinavian ministries. This reflects
the trend of de-concentrating and decentralizing the
functions of the state to avoid the concentration of power
at the center and to establish public administration bodies
under supervision and subordination to the ministry for
carrying out specific functions which fall within the remit
of the ministerial mandate. These functions are related to
implementation of policies and to exercising control and
monitoring over the implementation of law.
The legal status of the supervised and subordinated bodies
is different. The basic principle employed in establishing
the status of the public administration institution refers
to the desired degree of political influence on performance
of a certain function of public administration. If the
function requires a direct access to the political decision-
making and is closely involved with policy implementa-
tion, coordination of activities of public bodies with in
the institutional system of a ministry, the institution is
placed under the direct subordination of the ministry. This
means that the minister or other authorized top civil
servant (State Secretary of Director of Department) has a
legal right to give direct orders regarding the operation of
the subordinated institution as well as has a right to review
any administrative decision and revoke or suspend it
through exercising a superior hierarchical authority.
On the contrary, the institutions that should operate under
the provisions of the law and perform functions that should
be protected from any political influence (interference)
of the minister are placed under supervision of the ministry.
Such supervised institutions perform regulatory and
control functions under the provisions of the law. The
ministerial authority is limited to (1) proposing the director
(head) for nomination by the Cabinet of Ministers, (2)
proposing the budget for approval of the Cabinet within
a framework of the government budget, (3) exercising a
legal oversight over operation of the institution with the
right to suspend or revoke the decision contradictory to
the law. All Latvian inspectorates3  are placed under the
supervised status, which ensures their autonomy and
responsibility for carrying the functions stipulated, by the
law.
Establishment of Civil Service. Training
Civil service system was introduced in Latvia in 1994,
upon adoption by the Parliament the Law on State Civil
Service (21.04.1994). The law provided for establishment
of a career civil service in central administration and after
the transitional period in the local governments.4 The law
emphasized separation between the political and admi-
nistrative roles in public administration. The selection of
civil servants was based on a principle of open competition
and meritocracy. The selection criteria accentuated the
professional qualifications, education, loyalty to the legally
established government and absence of a record of service
within intelligence organizations of other countries and
banned organizations in Latvia after proclaiming of
independence.
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To perform a transition from the existing in1994
administration to the new system defined by the Civil
Service Law, all persons employed in administration had
to pass a qualifying test and undergo the check of com-
pliance with the obligatory requirements stated for civil
service candidates. During 1994–1996 all the employees
serving in ministries and subordinated and supervised
public bodies underwent the documentation and qualifi-
cation tests. Those who passed those tests were nominated
to a civil servant position as a candidate to the civil service
status.
To establish a unified civil service, a common general system
of civil service positions was established by the Cabinet
regulations with a remuneration system linked to the
position. However, the civil service grades and ranks have
not been introduced, thus preventing from development
of careers based on rank progression. Instead, the carriers
developed in relation to the positions. Carrier development
was a matter for individual or organization concern, with
much lesser role for the Civil Service Administration,
which failed to ensure rotation and secondments system
facilitating the allocation of civil servants with the proper
skills across the civil service in the interest of the state.
The rationale for the civil servant candidate status was
connected with the fact that it was not possible for the
people in civil service positions to meet all the high profes-
sional standards that should determine a civil servant.
Therefore, training was considered a priority measure to
allow the civil service candidates to develop their manage-
ment, policy development, legal drafting, administrative
procedure and other relevant skills. Training also was
meant to serve as a tool of changing attitudes of employees.
A comprehensive compulsory training program was deve-
loped by the School of Public Administration and deli-
vered during the 1994–1998 to all civil service candi-
dates. The basic training curriculum included tailor made
courses aimed at development of practical skills and im-
parting the most essential knowledge in modern theory
of management, office and documentation management,
basics of market economy, administrative law, psychology
and ethics, budget management, communication and IT
skills, rules on public procurement, etc. The School also
provides language training for those who work with the
EU institutions and documentation.
The approach to training of top civil service managers
(State Secretaries and Heads of civil service institutions)
and the rest civil servants was different. The 240 top civil
servants were trained separately from the rest of the civil
service through specially designed courses and delivered
by the external experts on public administration. The
major introductory training coincided with the PHARE
Public Administration Reform Program (1994–1996),
which devoted special attention to assisting in training
capacity building. To train the medium and lower level of
civil servant candidates (~12000 candidates), the School
implemented the train-the-trainer program and trained
Latvian teaching staff, developed a uniform set of training
materials and organized training in the compulsory
curriculum within 23 regional training centers.
Training served as a common basis for all civil servants,
which helped to forger common views, skills and attitudes
within civil service. With years, the training curriculum
of the School expanded to include emerging priorities of
public administration reform. This was possible due to
the fact that the School worked for the needs of raising
the professional qualifications of civil servants. The new
courses included wide range of areas: project management,
strategic management, foreign languages, personnel ma-
nagement, internal control, European Institutions and poli-
cies, management of the EU policies, presentation skills,
psychology, conflict resolution, public procurement, etc.
The priorities in training program include such topics as
EU institutions and policies; administrative procedures
(this course is aimed at improving knowledge and under-
standing of the basic principles and procedures of civil
servant work), ethics, strategic planning, project manage-
ment, client oriented service, personnel appraisal, etc.
Presently implemented training program for inspectorates
supports a program of institutional development of ins-
pectorates aimed at improving the regulatory environment
in Latvia, reducing administrative barriers to investors and
improving client orientation of the public administration.
The program contains a set of courses that support deve-
lopment of strategic thinking and client orientation of
inspectorates, attempts to develop client orientation cul-
ture, facilitates establishment of better communication
links between the inspectorates, trains in developing clear
and transparent procedures and internal control systems,
and focuses on development of interpersonal skills of
inspectors while dealing with difficult clients.
Training is an essential instrument of building administ-
rative capacities. However, one should not rely on training
only, because in isolation from the policy and legal
framework as well as accountability and monitoring
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mechanisms the skills may not be demanded by the Heads
of institutions and the civil servants will fall back on their
traditional behaviors thus leaving the things unchanged.
Therefore, there should be sustained pressure from the
central coordinating institution to implement reforms as
well as the system of incentives linking the reform efforts
with the benefits for the institution and individual.
Commercialization of the Public Sector.
State Non-Profit Companies
Even in the market society, the state remains responsible
for delivery of public services related to education, health-
care, culture, public transportation, etc. These functions
are delivered by public bodies placed under the supervision
of respective ministries or by bodies established by local
municipalities. Other publicly established and states
financed institutions deliver professional services either
to the public or to the state and enables the public admi-
nistration to perform their objectives. In Latvia such insti-
tutions are under the management of the ministry, which
exercises policy guidance, manages these institutions
according to the Cabinet regulations, oversees allocation
and usage of the state budget resources and ensures that
these bodies implement public policies properly and attain
established goals. Examples of such bodies are State infor-
mation network agency, State health insurance agency,
State assets agency, Highway agency, etc.
During 1996–1997, under the influence of the market
trends in Latvia, severe fiscal constraints within the state
budget, as well as inspired by the process of commercia-
lization of public services in OECD countries,5 Latvia
started to establish public bodies with a commercial type
of organization—non profit state stockholding companies.
The Ministry assumed the role of the shareholder on behalf
of the state and organized the management of such state
companies through the nominated proxies, who represented
the interests of the owner. The management elements for
such public bodies of a commercial type have been quite
heavy: the State proxies (the highest management authority),
reporting to the Ministry (sometimes the Minister exercised
a role of a proxy), Management Councils with an inter-
mediate management authority and Management Board
headed by the Director, which exercised operative manage-
ment of the company while not going beyond the frame-
work set up by the two higher authorities.
Such state companies were either financed from the state
budget or allowed to earn their own revenues through
the fees for services or tax levies. In case, the financial
management and accountability was the exact replica of
those in business enterprises. State non-profit shareholding
companies used accrual accounting allowing accounting
for the value of assets, while the sworn auditors reviewed
the annual reports. Such companies also were registered
in the State Registrar as any other commercial body, ope-
rating on the territory of the Republic of Latvia.
The personnel issues of such state companies were not
bound by the civil service rules and the remuneration was
set according to the private sector benchmarks. Often reve-
nues of such companies have been quite impressive and
allowed for a much faster investment growth and develop-
ment than otherwise it would have been possible to do from
the state budget appropriations. The central Treasury Control
over the financial management of such public commercial
bodies has been significantly weakened. In fact, many such
‘agencies’ have been outside of the state budget and it resulted
in a situation when more than a half of the public expendi-
ture was taken outside of the Parliamentary allocating and
controlling authority. Proliferation of the extra-budgetary
funds (special budgets made with the earmarked revenues)
used to finance the operations of state non-profit companies
significantly reduced the state control over fiscal macro-
economic situation and facilitated disproportion’s in
financing levels within public sector.
The evaluation of the impact of the commercialization
started with the involvement of the World Bank experts
during 1999. As a result the recommendations for clari-
fying the status of the state non-profit companies were
formulated and further incorporated into a draft law on
Public Agencies. Chapter two of this paper deals with the
problems identified in the new semi-commercial state
structures and recommendations for improving of transpa-
rency, accountability and management systems of autono-
mous agencies.
Administrative Territorial Reform
The administrative territorial reform started in early 1990.’
Instead of the old Soviet type municipalities that acted as
a part of a unitary state hierarchically linked to the center,
locally elected self-governments were established with their
own administration taking full care of the local matters.
The Law on Local Self-Governments stipulated the divi-
sion of responsibilities between the state and self-govern-
ments regarding implementation of the state functions.
Local self-governments assumed a managerial respons-
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ibility for implementation of such functions as general
secondary education, primary health care and social care,
etc. The law provides for the state funding of these public
functions. At the same time, local self-governments as-
sumed full responsibility for organization and management
of local matters: local infrastructure, housing, utilities,
local transportation, pre-school care, etc.
While the law grants certain authority to local governments
in performing public functions, it should be realized that
managerial, personnel and financial capacity limit the ability
for implementation of these decentralized functions. For a
country with a total population of slightly below 2.5 million
inhabitants, the number of first level municipalities around
500 is too big. This means that the small municipalities
are not able to properly organize all the necessary services
and ensure the necessary standard of service due to the
inadequate budget size, and limited property tax level.
This in turn leads to undesirable economic and social
consequences. The young people strive to leave the remote
municipalities in search for a better education and chal-
lenging employment in the capital city and other big cities,
leaving behind the elderly and the ones who are trying to
put up with the possibilities to earn by farming or employ-
ment in the local public service sector. Lack of investments,
due to the shortage of capital, conserve the unfavorable
economic and social conditions and retard the development
of the private sector in the underdeveloped infrastructure.
With years social and economic disparities among muni-
cipalities become sharper.
In 1998 the Parliament passed a Law on Administrative
Territorial Reform (ATR), providing for amalgamations
of small municipalities into bigger and economically
sustainable local governments. The Law provides for
voluntary amalgamations till end December 2003, after
which the process of merging municipalities will be the
centralized and accomplished by the central government.
As a first step to ATR, the law provides for investigation
of all Latvian territory and collecting the data on economic,
social, ethnical, cultural, geo-physical preconditions and
incentives for amalgamations and planning of new ad-
ministrative territories. By the end of the year 2000 all
Latvian municipalities have been investigated and Minister
for Public Administration Reform submitted to the Cabinet
a project of future administrative territorial division of
Latvia into 102 self administering territories—novads—
future first level municipalities. The criteria for setting
such municipalities are:
• minimum number of inhabitants—5,000;
• the territory has a development center with the
population between 2,000–25,000 inhabitants;
• the administrative center is approachable by the exist-
ing transport network;
• the center is within 30-km reach form the boundaries
of the municipality.
Latvian government set up an amalgamation support fund
within the state budget,6 which could help new municipa-
lities to establish the new structures. However in 2000
and 2001 only a small share of this fund was used, because
the amalgamation process is slow. Apart from purely
objective difficulties of amalgamation, internal open and
latent resistance from the local politicians serves as an
important impeding factor for the administrative territorial
reform. Lack of clear and persuasive information to the
local citizens leaves them indifferent and skeptical to the
Administrative Territorial reform.
Therefore, the efficiency, access and quality of the public
services remain a serious problem for the citizens. It is
not feasible to introduce civil service either in local munici-
palities, which are, still non-reformed and oppose to most
of the changes initiated from the center. Without a proper
information, incentive system and facilitation from the
center, ATR will likely to remain a problem for the years
to come. At the same time, conservation of the small
municipalities presents an efficiency problem and a barrier
to the influx of investments and EU money for economic
and social cohesion.
From the structural point of view, decentralization of the
central government is not possible if at the receiving end
we have administratively, economically and financially
weak municipalities. Such decentralization can reduce the
economic efficiency of delivery of public services and cause
decline in the quality of delivery. Today’s sharp contrast
in a standard of life in the Capital City and remote muni-
cipalities is striking. It is reflected in accessibility to public
services, employment, level of income, demographic situ-
ation, business activities, transport and mobility.
Economic and social development of Latvia depends on
the success of the Administrative Territorial Reform. The
Economic Development Report prepared by the Ministry
of Economy of Latvia [2] states that for the reduction of
social and economic disproportion’s, (among other things)
should be achieved through ‘encouraging a balanced regional
development and employment by promoting SME, improving
infrastructure, strengthening of municipalities both financially
and legally...’ (p. 130).
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EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FIRST REFORMS (1997–1998)
Fragmentation versus Centralization
Establishment and strengthening of the line ministries,
permanency of the State Secretary of a ministry granted
by the Civil Service law, respect for hierarchy, frequent
changes of the coalition governments,7 weak role of the
Prime Minister8  granted by the Constitution, weak coor-
dinating center at the State Chancellery and the lack of
the strong central body coordinating public administration
reform—all these factors have contributed to development
of strong and influential line ministries, which present a
problem for horizontal coordination in public administ-
ration.
Authority to prepare sector policies, to form sector insti-
tutional system performing public functions, to prepare
and distribute state budget for the ministerial system,
decentralized authority to hire and fire civil servants makes
ministries quite powerful. The political factor also acts as
a reinforcement for the fragmentation, since each of the
political parties represented in the government claims the
political responsibility for a particular sector of public life:
economy, welfare, education, environment, transport, etc.
This means that apart from the collegial Cabinet decision-
making on policy and legal issues, the party represented
by the minister has influence on the ministry.
The coordination system, established to ensure the co-
herence of policies and legal drafts, have been designed as
a special procedure on preparation the documents for
adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers (Cabinet Regulation
#160). This Regulation provides for coordination among
the ministries of any policy or legal issue to be submitted
to the Cabinet. Although this coordination instrument is
perceived quite efficient in balancing ministerial proposals
and improving of the quality of the documents that reach
the Cabinet level, the problem with the shared interest of
the government is still open, since reviewing the contents
of a particular draft from sector perspectives does not
ensure the observance of government priorities and
identification of conflicts with the already adopted policies.
Till recently, the State Chancellery performed only legal
quality checks of the submitted documents without
analysis of policy implications.
Since September 2000, Latvian government establishes a
central strategic planning and policy coordination capacity
in the State Chancellery—Department of Policy Co-ordi-
nation. This unit has three main functions: (1) preparation
of medium- to long-term Government plan concerning
the future policy and legislative agenda; (2) coordination
of ministries in their preparation of draft policies in accord
with the medium term policy framework and to ensuring
the coherence of the new policies with the already adopted
ones; and (3) undertaking the development of policies
on the emerging issues, which do not fall under the res-
ponsibility of any ministry.
OECD research on policy coordination also pays attention
to the capacity to evaluate the policies during their im-
plementation and formulate the necessary amendments,
as well as to carrying out a comprehensive impact analysis.
There is awareness in Latvian administration that impact
analysis of economic, social, financial, political and legal
consequences is a real need. Therefore, the Regulation of
the Cabinet procedure #160 was amended formulating
the requirement for a comprehensive impact analysis to
be done and submitted to the Cabinet together with the
policy draft or legal draft. The State Chancellery is res-
ponsible for reviewing the Annotations to the submissions
and checking whether the submitting institution did a
quality impact analysis. However, the legal need for
evaluation during the implementation of policies is not a
legal requirement, which diminishes the role of mid-
evaluation.
Implementation of policies and legal acts is linked to the
operation of public institutions and consequently to their
budgets. The allocation of budget resources in Latvia is a
combination of a top down and bottom up approaches.
Initially, early in the budget cycle, the Ministry of Finance
performs macroeconomic forecasting for the coming year
and submits to the Cabinet for approval the ceilings for
each spending ministry or central body. During this process,
the government makes an attempt to link the emerging
policy priorities (like integration to the EU, accession to
NATO, etc.) to the spending limits. However, this process
is quite strenuous and politically highly charged, therefore
the result of the process is more or less incremental budget
within the same broad targets as for the previous year.
The competition for state funds among the ministries is
based on rational, emotional and political arguments and
never ends in a complete satisfaction by all.
The link between the government agenda, ministries’
agenda and the budget is not quite obvious. Often, decla-
rations of government priorities do not reflect the budget
allocation, but the need to keep the budget deficit under
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a stringent control results in under-financing of important
areas. The World Bank in its review (1996) of public admi-
nistration in Latvia insisted, that government allocates
and reallocate capacity should be tied with the government
priorities. One of the suggestions how to cope with the
multiple priorities and reduce their number to realistically
implementable was to review what and how the government
institutions do. As a result of such reviews activities that
do not contribute to the mission and main objectives of a
ministry should be reduced, dropped or shifted to the
private sector. Another reserve for savings could be better
allocation of functions and responsibilities across the
government, carefully avoiding unnecessary duplications
and overlapping responsibilities. Latvian administration
has carried out a limited number of such reviews.9 The
ministry of Agriculture as a result of this review introduced
structural changes and allocated staff and finances to the
new priority areas without increasing the total budget lid.
Unified or Decentralized Civil Service
Latvian civil service was designed as a unified civil service
with the central management and coordination. The law
on Civil Service of 1994 has been implemented with the
exception of some provisions during 1994–1996. Impor-
tantly, that the basis for professional, merit-based, sepa-
rated from political influence and interference civil service
exists and not challenged. Civil servants establish and
develop their careers in public administration. According
to the SIGMA opinion [3], Latvia had number of prob-
lems in implementation of the Civil Service law:
• the scope of the civil servants defined in the law (1994)
was too wide and did not match the existing financial
capacity;
• the labor regulation was used as a substitute for the
civil service by many institutions to avoid financial
constraints under which civil service was operating;
• the inadequate pay structure which resulted in intro-
duction of non-transparent pay arrangements with
management contracts;
• the lack of motivation and perspectives for career
development among the candidate civil servants; and
• The weak role-played by Civil Service Administration
(CSA) in managing civil service.
The recommendations provided by the SIGMA experts
suggested restricting the applicability of the law to the
core public administration; developing a scale of ranks
for job positions; establishing new pay structure based on
legally defined pay concepts ensuring transparency and
predictability to the system. Additional general recommen-
dation was to establish strong political back up for the CSA,
so that it can fulfil its function as a horizontal instrument
for managing the civil service and ascertain a uniform legal
treatment of every civil servant across the system. The
link between CSA and the School was perceived important
in designing and implementing training pro-grams for
putting forward credible and sustainable reform policies.
Based on SIGMA recommendations, the Cabinet of Minis-
ters set up a working group that drafted a new Civil Service
Law. It defined the scope of civil service in relation to the
core functions of public administration, providing more
coherent arrangements for mobility of civil servants, setting
the norm for performance evaluation of civil servants as a
precondition for the career development. The law was
adopted by the Parliament in 2000 and entered into force
on 1 January 2001.
During the last stages of the preparation of the law the issue
of senior civil service has become quite acute. First, in his
report to the Prime Minister Sir Robin10  Mountfield identi-
fied the need for strong central coordination through the
State Secretaries. The State Secretaries11  have responsibility
for their performance to the minister and a collective res-
ponsibility to the Cabinet of Ministers as a whole for their
progress on implementation of the Government program.
Sir Robin suggests that the Chancellery needs to be the
center of strong co-ordination through the State Secre-
taries.
Establishment of senior civil service puts a new strong
responsibility on the Chancellery: to co-ordinate public
administration and to develop corporate or collective cul-
ture among the State Secretaries and other top officials
that goes beyond their loyalty to their own Ministry. State
Chancellery needs to develop a collective emphasis on
medium-term policy planning and collective lead on Public
Administration Reform matters.
It is believed that establishment of coordination mechanisms
among the State Secretaries will help to overcome the frag-
mentation and excessive decentralization trends in Latvian
public administration and improve government capacity
to develop and implement sustainable, well coordinated
and coherent policies. The culture that should develop in
time through implementing of the new coordination
mechanisms will help to ensure that the ministries are
driven by the common purpose of the state rather than by
their narrow sector priorities. This will result in strength-
ening the efficiency and effectiveness of public administ-
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ration, better budget preparation and better position of
Latvia vis a vis the European Union.
As for the civil service management, there is still need for
the central coordinating institution like the Civil Service
Administration, which should be responsible for the
developing of procedures and regulations, exercising the
monitoring of the implementation of the law in public
administration, serving as an institution for disciplinary
reviews and appeals, maintaining the statistics and facili-
tating the mobility of civil servants. Civil Service Admi-
nistration also should serve as a center of expertise and
advice on personnel management issues and a champion
of the best practice in civil service management issues.
To answer the question of whether to have a centralized
or decentralized civil service the answer is that there should
be a good balance between the two. The issues to be cent-
ralized are: setting the procedures, establishing regulations,
coordinating the work through strategic plans, managing
the reform process, monitoring of compliance with the
law and established procedures, facilitating of the mobility
of civil servants, designing and delivering training programs.
The responsibility for the public institutions will be
associated with the selecting and recruiting, developing
of civil servants, planning careers and keeping the carrier
tracks, evaluating performance, applying disciplinary
procedures, designing job descriptions, promoting ethical
behavior and administering rewards and sanctions.
Transparency, Accountability
and Steering of Public Bodies
Transparency of public administration has a legal basis in
the Law on Access and Openness of Information. The
information that is not classified as restricted or confiden-
tial is accessible by public and private entities. However,
the desired state of transparency will be achieved when
institutions design and implement public information
programs. The evidence of increasing transparency is the
growing use of Internet sites to inform on the institutional
missions, basic functions and strategies. All ministries have
their web home pages with the links to the subordinated
institutions. Institutions serving public (in health, social
sphere, and transport) also provide interactive opportu-
nities for the public. The Cabinet plans to adopt a Regula-
tion on the structure and access to the ministerial web sites.
To improve accountability of public institutions, in 1998
Cabinet of Ministers adopted an Instruction requiring
all public institutions to prepare their Public Annual Re-
ports on the performance during the year. The instruc-
tion lays out the basic items of the contents and set out
the dissemination procedure. Latvian administration
bodies have been preparing their Annual reports since
1999. Similar practice was implemented earlier for the
state non-profit companies, which produced verified by
the certified auditor’s Annual reports on performance and
financial management results. The improvements are
planned in the quality of Annual reports through linking
the performance results to the budget allocations, report-
ing on the cost-efficiency of performance, reporting on
performance within the government priority objectives,
reporting on the outputs and outcomes rather than report-
ing on the process and functions.
Transparency and accountability of public service bodies
increase significantly if institutions develop special infor-
mation for customers. Road Traffic Safety Directorate pro-
vides the best example in Latvian public sector on how
client oriented service is established and customers can
assess the performance and influence it through using the
client rights provided by the Clients’ Charter. The
Standards of service are set up for all services provided by
the Directorate. If any of the standards is not observed
(especially the standards on service time), the customer
may be relieved from paying for the service.
The assessment of reporting arrangements in public bodies
was performed during the World Bank survey of the state
non-profit companies in November 1999. The Survey
revealed that not all state companies had adequate financial
reporting documentation. Moreover, often Ministry was
not controlling the financial statements and monitoring
performance of the agency. This meant that while estab-
lishing public companies at the arm length from the center,
and creating a cumbersome management system with
Proxies, Councils and Management Boards, the Ministry
itself was isolated from the managing the agency and
supervising performance. A break in the accountability
system was quite dangerous if senior public officials
delegated the management and control responsibilities
too far and reduced their own involvement in management
of public bodies. This means that the implementation of
public policies, use of public finance, observance of the
law was effectively taken away from the administrative and
political control of the government.
Such conclusions called for re-thinking of the status of
semi-autonomous public agencies and applicability of the
private sector company model for such bodies. It was
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concluded that there is a different philosophy behind the
management, accountability and control of public bodies
and that of private companies. Therefore, Public Agencies
Law was passed in March 2001 to provide a proper legal
basis for establishment, management, operation, account-
ability and control of public agencies. The basic concept
of Public Agency allows for separation of the roles of the
ministry and agency. The ministry approves the operational
framework of and agency, which includes operational stra-
tegy, business plans and budgets (as well as levels of charges
for public services, if agency is allowed to collect fees for
its services). Preparation of such a framework is a common
responsibility of an agency and the ministry, which results
in signing of a performance agreement between the minister
and the executive director. The performance agreement
specifies the expected outcomes and outputs, resources to
be used, incentives and sanction related to performance
and targets against which the performance will be evaluated.
The agency is given the necessary managerial flexibility
in organizing its operations and is bound only by the law
and the targets set out in the performance agreement.
Steering and rowing is separated for the purpose of achieving
greater economic efficiency and quality of service delivery.
The law provides also for eliminating of a multiplier ma-
nagement structure, which proved to be inefficient. Instead
the head of the agency is directly responsible to the minister,
who in turn appoints a liaison person in a ministry. The
liaison person as part of his/her regular duties should
monitor the implementation of the business plan, state
of financial management and should timely inform the
minister if his involvement is required. At the end of the
fiscal year the liaison persons analyze the Annual report
and advise the minister on the evaluation of implemen-
tation of the annual performance agreement.
According to the transitional provisions of the Public
Agency Law, the structural reorganization will concern
some 170-state non-profit stockholding companies within
the period lasting till the beginning of 2003. The functions
of these bodies will be analyzed and one of the following
decision taken and implemented:
• creating a public agency;
• privatizing the whole ‘business’;
• returning the function to the core public administration;
• transforming into a trading company (for profit).
The implementation of Public Agencies Law will ensure
better transparency and accountability in the administra-
tion. The role of Ministry Vis a Vis the agency will be made
quite clear and a link between the political accountability
and service delivery will be established. Currently, the im-
plementing regulations are in the process of adoption by
government, concerning the criteria for establishing the
agencies, the process of transformation of non-profit stock
companies to the agency status, the template for the perfor-
mance agreement, the regulation on annual reports of the
public agencies, the pay system in agencies and the method-
ology for setting the user charges for the public services.
New Public Administration
Reform Program
The first Program of Public Administration Reform of
1995 concentrated on structures, functions, principles and
civil service. For a considerable period of time the public
administration reform agenda did not go beyond the
formal building blocks of administration: institutions,
personnel, procedures and reform management. The
difficulties to implement such a narrow reform agenda
answering the question of how to establish administration
without paying attention to what is the substance of work
of administration have been evident in the long run. It is
not enough to create abstract schemes and to subject the
administration to perfect models. It is essential to achieve
a fit between the real administrative structures and per-
sonnel policies to the tasks of administration, namely, policy
development, policy implementation, improving perfor-
mance and quality of public service delivery, improving
the efficiency of the public sector, introducing the innova-
tions in public service and establishing ethical and ac-
countable environment.
The World Bank influenced the administrative reform
policy agenda by agreeing with the Government on
measures to be implemented under the Programmatic
Structural Adjustment Loan (PSAL). Apart from traditional
reform measures, like improving structures and strength-
ening civil service, the World Bank supports such reforms
as ensuring transparency and access to information, streng-
thening the judiciary, prevention of corruption, improving
management of public service, establishing medium term
public expenditure framework, improving of state regula-
tory functions, improving the business environment and
reducing the administrative barriers to investments.
The Program of agreed measures with the World Bank
creates a new aspect of the reforms of public sector, which
goes beyond the traditional package of public administ-
ration. As a result of the measures in the agreed program,
Latvian administration is expected to streamline the struc-
tures of public administration by clarifying the mission
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and strategic objectives of ministries, to improve the frame-
work for the budget management and link the government
allocate capacity to the strategic planning. The program
also aims at improving the performance of regulatory bodies
by clarifying their missions, improving strategic planning
capacity, ensuring the stability and clearness of the ins-
pecting procedures, ensuring effective appeal mechanisms,
enhancing the client orientation of the regulatory bodies
and providing the information on the performance.
In August 2000, a World Bank consultant Mr. Denis
Ives12  conducted an analysis of public administration reform
in Latvia and suggested the following framework for a
balanced approach to public sector reform, including:
1. Overall strategy, objectives and expectations;
2. Institutional and structural reform (including devolu-
tion and decentralization);
3. Financial management an Budget management re-
form;
4. People management reform (including employment
rules, staff quality and capacity building, particularly
for senior executives);
5. Performance management (including result-based
management);
6. IT initiatives and improvement programs;
7. Service delivery improvements initiatives;
8. Accountability, ethics and anti-corruption.
To add to this list, the reform agenda should not overlook
the issue of reform management and evaluation. This
means that effective implementation of the reforms depends
on the created steering and co-ordinating capacity. This
conclusion matches the recommendations by Sir Robin
Mountfield, who emphasized in his report the strategic role
of the center of government for policy co-ordination, top
civil service management, link between the government
priorities and public budget management.
The influence of the European Commission on the course
of public administration reforms reflects:
• the assumptions of the Commission about the charac-
teristics of reliable and predictable public administ-
ration;
• the concern for the transparency and credibility of
financial management and financial control proce-
dures, explained by the requirements to ensure trans-
parent and effective use of the Phare and pre-structural
assistance;
• the structure of the European Commission, which
determines sometimes uncoordinated demands made
on various aspects of public administration;
• the EU legislation.
Latvian task is to prepare a comprehensive reform pro-
gram, which takes account of the existing problems, par-
tially recognized and illuminated by the World Bank, and
demands exerted by the EU. After the first Program of
reforms in 1995, in 1998 the Cabinet passed the second
framework document—Strategy 2000. This document
provided for reforms in policy co-ordination, budget ma-
nagement, civil service development and training, imple-
mentation of administrative territorial reform and improv-
ing accountability and appeal mechanisms. Unfortunately,
lack of political interest to public administration reforms,
inadequate allocation of financial resources to implemen-
tation of reforms significantly delayed and weakened the
implementation. As a result, the Strategy 2000 was only
partially implemented.
With the date of accession approaching, the EU attention
to the administrative capacity is growing, which requires
especially co-ordinated and result-based implementation
of reforms. To ensure effective implementation of reforms
the Government requires establishing the framework for
medium term reform agenda. During the first part of 2001
a cross-ministerial working group, established by a Decree
of the Prime Minister, had developed Strategy of Public
Administration Reform for the Years 2001–2006, which
was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on 10 July 2001.
The Strategy states five comprehensive goals:
• improving policy development and policy coordination
process,
• introducing medium terms expenditure management
linked to policy priority targets;
• improving administrative process and enhancing the role
of society in public administration;
• improving the quality of public services; and
• strengthening civil service and human resource manage-
ment in public administration.
Some of the expected outcomes of the Strategy of public
administration reform will be:
• improved government capacity to adopt strategic ob-
jectives, making framework for coherent and coordi-
nated public policies;
• improved implementation of government policies
through central strategic planning system and coordi-
nation;
• implemented program budget planning and manage-
ment linked to the politically accepted outcomes and
specified performance targets;
• improved accountability of public bodies for the deli-
very of planned performance targets;
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• improved administrative process and better respect
of the rule of law in daily work of public administ-
ration;
• improved responsiveness and quality of public services;
• better skilled, professional, ethical and accountable
personnel, who develop careers in civil service and
ensure good performance of public service.
Recent developments related to the Strategy include the
development of action plan for implementation of the
strategy with indication of timing, resources and respon-
sible institutions. The process of development of the action
plan is a coordinate by the Secretariat of Public Admi-
nistration Reform. The Cabinet of Ministers established
the Coordinating Council of Public Administration
Reform, which should coordinate implementation of the
Strategy. The coordinated action on implementation of
the Strategy has already started.
MODELS OF MANAGEMENT
OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS
Ministry of State Reforms
In 1993 the first government established by the democ-
ratically elected Parliament in the independent Latvia set
up under a sunset law13  the Ministry of State Reforms.
The mandate of the ministry was to develop state policy
of the public administration reform, to prepare a Program
of reforms and draft the basic legislation regulating civil
service, institutions of public administration, and to co-
ordinate Civil Service Administration and Latvian School
of Public Administration (LSPA) in their policy imple-
menting functions. On 25 June 1995 the Ministry of
State Reforms was liquidated. The CSA and LSPA were
subordinated to the State Chancellery, which established
a department of state reform.
Left without the political leadership, the reforms quickly
came to a halt. This was a period when Latvia received a
shock of the bank crisis (1995), involving huge losses to
the public bodies and private persons. The crisis caused the
fall in GDP and economic performance, public administ-
ration reform was deemed as a luxury, which could be
postponed or sacrificed for a while. The budget of LSPA
was cut three times during the two years 1996–1997.
Ministries quickly learned that they should experiment in
reforms by themselves since there was no central co-ordinat-
ing institution that cared about the state of play. Department
of State Reforms in State Chancellery did not have any
concrete agenda. This was the time when even European
Commission turned their back on Latvia and refused to
finance the planned Public Administration Reform project.
In retrospect, the majority of civil servants and politicians
agreed that it was a mistake to abolish the ministry, which
started reforms in a confident and effective way. After the
dissolution of the ministry, the momentum was lost and
commitment to continuation reforms considerably weak-
ened. During the period in 1996, when some core admi-
nistration services, Like State Revenue Service, left the
civil service and returned to the labor relations for the
employees. At the same time a belief in efficiency of the
private sector and fiscal constraints pushed for establishing
of the state non-profit companies outside the state budget
and with inadequate controls and accountability.
Changes in Reform Management
Model during 1995–2000
After dissolution of the Ministry of State Reform in 1995,
the model for central management of the reform changed
several times. Civil Service Administration and School of
Public Administration also changed their subordination
depending on which body was in charge of policy and co-
ordination of public administration reform. Below a short
review of the changes in PAR management structures are
described and assessed.
June 1995–November 1996. Immediately after the Ministry
was liquidated, the Department of State Reforms was
established at the State Chancellery. CSA and LSPA were
subordinated to the State Chancellery and continued to
operate within their mandate, though without having a
political support from any of the ministers. This model
seemed well from the point of view that central position
close to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister was ensured.
However, in reality the Prime Minister was too busy with
the business of running the state and could not devote
serious and adequate attention to the political leadership
of the public administration reform. One might just spe-
culate whether in a country with a stable political and
economic regime with the term of government office equal
to that of the Parliament such arrangement could be
feasible. Probably, yes provided, that the Department of
State Reform is professional and dedicated, the rest of
public administration recognizes the authority of such a
Department, and there is a respected leader who commu-
nicates the strategies and drives the reform forward.
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In practice the pre-conditions for successful implementa-
tion of reform have not been established. Gradually, the
reform initiatives have drowned under the pressures of the
economic and financial crisis following the collapse of one
of the biggest Latvian commercial banks. The reform leader-
ship could have been saved had the Head of the State
Chancellery been more committed to the reform process
and had more political backing. However, politicians were
not ready to support the reforms, since other more pressing
issues dominated and there was a belief that the reforms
are more or less completed with the establishment of civil
service and clarifying the roles and status of ministries.
Their belief also was reflected in budgetary cuts for civil
service training followed in 1996-1997.
November 1996–March 1997. The Cabinet recognized
the need for a minister politically responsible for public
sector reforms. The awareness was also pushed forward
by the need to nominate a political counterpart for nego-
tiations of conditions in the public sector reform under
the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan. The choice
of the responsible minister was dictated by the two argu-
ments: not to create a new ministerial post and personal
qualities of the minister who could be unselfish enough
to undertake a leadership of the reform that by that time
became politically quite unpopular. State minister14  of
Labor at the Ministry of Welfare was nominated as res-
ponsible for the public sector reform. He was indeed a
strong personality who undertook his responsibility with
rigor. The Department of State Reform was transferred
to the Ministry of Welfare under responsibility of the State
minister of Labor. LSPA and CSA have been subordinated
to the State Minister of Labor. However, major reshuffle
of the Cabinet in February 1997 resulted in cutting the
State ministers posts all across the Government and the
positive changes initiated by the State Minister remained
half designed and not implemented.
May 1997–April 1998. Undertaken commitments with
the World Bank required continuity in reform manage-
ment. On April 1, 1997 Deputy Prime minister was placed
in charge of the reform. He needed administrative body
to design policies and co-ordinate implementation of
public administration reform. The Department of State
Reform in the Ministry of Welfare was liquidated but a
new body—Bureau of Public Administration Reform was
established on 1 July 1997. LSPA and CSA have been re-
subordinated to the Deputy Prime minister. The Head
of the Bureau had the status equal to that of the State
Secretary, which enabled the Bureau to be represented in
the same way as all other ministries in the government
co-ordination structures. The Bureau started its difficult
path of gaining competencies and recognition from admi-
nistration, which was tired of all the manipulations of the
government with the reform management.
A political status of Deputy Prime minister—in the center
of government and close to the Prime Minister was an
excellent pre-condition to get through the reform initia-
tives. Indeed, in spite of a lack of experience of the Bureau,
the reform was again activated and a number of important
political and legal documents have been prepared and
adopted by the Cabinet within only several months.
Political Council of Public Administration Reform was
established for co-ordination and raising political aware-
ness purposes. Regular monthly meetings of the Council
served as a launching pad for many new reform initiatives,
which were critically assessed by ministers and later sup-
ported by them in the Cabinet. During this period amend-
ments to the Civil Service law have been prepared. A go-
vernment reform strategy—Strategy 2000—was adopted.
A review of state functions across the government has been
carried out and recommendations for the govern-ment
on elimination of the overlaps presented.
However, the political environment changed with the
change of the Prime Minister in August 1997, and the
Deputy Prime Minister was no longer well accepted by
the Prime Minister. The climax of differences in views
between the parties represented by Prime Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister resulted in resignation of the
Deputy Prime Minister and his party left the Government
coalition. The Bureau of Public Administration Reform
was left without firm connection to the Cabinet and policy
process. Only two months later the Prime Minister
assumed a responsibility for PAR, however his commitment
was overshadowed by the approaching parliamentary
elections, therefore his support to the draft laws on Frame-
work of Public Administration and on Public Agencies
was rather cautious. General lack of political interest for
public administration reform was even deeper during the
pre-election rush.
November 1998–May 1999. Arrival of a new government
with centrist Prime Minister produced new hopes for acti-
vation of public administration reform. The Prime Minister
did not hurry to assume the leadership of the reform, but
tried to find a reasonable solution with nominating a
responsible minister. The opportunity was created in May
1999 by introducing four new members of Cabinet, one
of which was a Minister of Special Assignment on Public
Administration and Local Government Reform. However,
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after only 6 weeks the Cabinet fell. The fears were that
the new Cabinet might not retain the post of the Minister
in charge of the administrative reforms. Evidently, the
EU loud voices about weak administrative capacity and
the need to perform reforms of public administration before
the accession served as an argument in favor of the assigning
the responsibility for the public administration reform to
a Member of the Cabinet, Minister of Special Assignment
on Public Administration and Local Government Reform.
July 1999–January 2000. Since July 1999, the following
structure of the reform management was created. The
Minister had a Secretariat to ensure him political advice
and administrative support. Subordinated to the Minister
were Bureau of Public Administration Reform, Civil Service
Administration, Latvian School of Public Administration
and Local Government Administration. The Minister
started to develop strategies for central government and
local government reform. A number of important laws and
concept issues on public administration passed the Cabinet.
Again the reforms have been recognized as a priority.
This was the time when the demands for the reform results
started to appear not only from the international organiza-
tions, but also from the Government. The Government
started to feel internal problems that required action: nega-
tive impact of the non-profit organizations on consolidates
budget management; lack of transparency and account-
ability; fragmentation of the government causing dissipa-
tion of resources and additional expenditures; over-
burdened state budget and inefficient public sector. The
Prime Minister’ s support for the reform was in place,
however, the Minister and his institutions had to count
with and overcome the resistance from the line ministries
to the proposed changes. During this period the Minister
decided to rationalize the institutional structure under his
responsibility and a decision was passed to merge the Sec-
retariat with the Bureau of Public Administration starting
with 1 January 2000.
January 2000–present. The Reform Secretariat assumed a
place in the same category as ministries, becoming one of
central institutions, but still having the ‘line ’ position. It
means that the reform agenda comes not from the center
of government, but from a line institution, which is weaker
than line ministries. The weakness is in the fact that the
object and subject of public administration reform is the
same and it is outside the direct control and management
of the Minister: it is the public administration itself. The
authority of Minister of Special Assignment on Public
Administration Reform is limited to proposing issues to
the Cabinet for approval and to implementing the Cabinet
decisions. Any proposal before adopting needs to be agreed
among all the ministries and central bodies, which
complicates and delays the process of reforms.
Another weakness of the system that existed till November
2001 was that there was no co-ordination body established
to discuss, debate and forge commitments to the reform.
Inadequate informing of ministries resulted in their avoid-
ance of implementing changes. Ministries are working
under an immense pressure created by the need to transpose
and implement EU legislation in their particular sectors.
This is a challenge, which requires considerable financial,
people and institutional resources. The co-ordinating
Council should help to bridge the positions of line
ministries and Reform Secretariat, thus facilitating broader
support for adoption and implementation of reforms.
According to the advice given by Sir Robin Mounfield,
the reform should be steered from the center of government;
therefore, Sir Robin’s model includes State Chancellery
into the managing scheme for public sector reforms. The
arguments are strong: the center exercises policy co-ordi-
nation, links policy priorities to the budget process and
ensures that the public administration structures and pro-
cedures conform to the tasks. However rational this advice
may seem, the ambition of the Reform Minister is to
strengthen his position by transforming the Reform Sec-
retariat into a Ministry, possibly adding the responsibility
for steering of the regional development reform. Whatever
the intentions are, the decision on the structural changes
yet is a privilege of a coalition government.
Optimal Reform Management Model
Lessons learned about the public administration reform
management:
• A political consensus about the importance of the
reform is key.
• Political leadership is essential to get the reform ini-
tiative through the Cabinet in order to ensure imple-
mentation.
• Apart from strong political leadership (preferably as
close to the Prime Minister as possible) there needs
to be an administrative unit staffed with the professio-
nals, capable of developing policy, legal drafting,
communicating and consulting the administration.
• A co-ordinating forum at the high political and civil
service level is essential to raise awareness, recognize
the needs and build commitments.
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• Public administration reform management placed in
a line position bears the risk of marginalizing its inf-
luence and reducing recognition of importance of
the reform initiated outside the Government center.
• Reforms require a clear strategy, which is generally
agreed on and accepted by the Cabinet.
• All major reform initiatives need receive Cabinet
approval to be effective.
• Reform cannot rely on adopting declarations, but also
needs developing and implementing procedures,
everyday monitoring and counseling. Evaluations of
reform achievements need to be organized on a regular,
annual or semi-annual basis.
• Strong and targeted communication policy should
be implemented to rally the widest possible under-
standing and support for the reforms.
FUNCTIONAL REVIEWS
Functional reviews developed into a tool of evaluating the
functioning sectors of public administration and proposing
the rationalization of the functions and improving the effec-
tiveness of allocation of public resources to attaining strategic
objectives of the sector. Below is a description of the func-
tional reviews implemented since 1999 in Latvian admi-
nistration?
Objectives of Functional Reviews
Review of functions of public bodies (ministries and
institutions under ministerial subordination, supervision
and management) were designed to review how well the
structures match the missions, strategic objectives, and
functions assigned to various public bodies. The functional
review aims to look for possible overlap and duplications
of functions, lack of co-ordination among the public
bodies and for a possibility to hive off the functions that
could be better performed by the private sector.
Latvian administration has experience only of the vertical
functional review in Agriculture, Economy and Justice.
However other governments—Slovakia, Lithuania, Re-
public of Macedonia have undertaken also wider horizon-
tal reviews assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the
allocation of competencies and responsibilities across the
public administration and rationality of structures estab-
lished to fulfil government functions.
The functional reviews start with the clarifying of the roles,
missions and objectives of the administrative bodies in a
wider context of the government work. Then analyzing the
legal documents and interviewing the heads of these structural
units review team collects information on the functions
performed by all structural units. Then information is being
analyzed against the framework of the missions and strategic
goals, using a methodology developed by the UK experts.
The recommendations based on the analysis are then pre-
sented to the management and possibilities for feasible chan-
ges are discussed. The finalized report to the ministry contains
the analysis of the functions performed and structures,
and presents final recommendations for restructuring.
If as a results of restructuring some functions are devolved
and units closed, the financial and human resources libe-
rated in this process are not taken away form the Ministry
but are reallocated to the structures whose role is growing
and is considered as government priority. Thus rationaliza-
tion helps to reallocate more efficiently the existing re-
sources and strengthen the administrative capacity of a
ministry. Positive results have been attained in the imple-
mentation of recommendations in the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. This ministry strengthened its policy development
functions, established internal audit functions, rationalized
the regional de-concentrated structures of agricultural
departments, and created from anew a Rural Development
Support Agency by shifting the staff positions from low
priority tasks to this new priority.
Management of Functional Reviews
In Latvian case, for the vertical functional review agree-
ment with the ministry in question was reached before
the functional review was planned and initiated. This
agreement was critical to ensure that the ministry is posi-
tive and is involved in the review at various stages: formu-
lation of the scope of review, developing the mission state-
ment, analysis of stakeholders and formulating strategic
objectives. Then real involvement was needed during
collection of information, discussion of the finding and
formulation the recommendations. It should be remem-
bered that the key success factor is the sense of ownership
by the ministry of the review and its results. Lack of the
ownership creates an undesired alienated position on the
part of the ministry, which tries to shift a responsibility
for action (inaction) as well as to put the blame for failures
on the external consultants. Therefore, high degree of
ministry’s participation is a pre-requisite for the successful
analysis and feasibility of the recommendations.
The functional reviews of ministries in Latvia were commis-
sioned and co-ordinated by Bureau of Public Administ-
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ration Reform. A team of external management consultants
and local management consultants were commissioned
to conduct the functional review. The Bureau ensured
that all stages of the planned review are performed accord-
ing to the terms of reference. The Bureau also undertook
a role of the trouble-shooter and facilitator when needed.
The ministry established a monitoring group, which was
closely involved in all stages of the review, especially at
those critical stages that required ministerial decision-
making on the mission, strategy, and evaluation of alterna-
tive options for restructuring. External consultants were
responsible for the design of methodology and leading of
the process of analysis. The local consultants did interviews
and performed analysis under the guidance from the ex-
ternal consultants. It proved to be highly important and
successful to include a sector specialist from other (EU
member or EU candidate) country into the functional
review team. Such expert in Agriculture or in Justice
helped ministry to define their role and place within the
administration more precisely and in accord to the EU
practice and tradition.
It may be a subjective view, but it is felt that the impartial
co-ordination of the functional review by an outside body
(The Bureau) has advantages to the ministerial manage-
ment of its functional review. The arguments for that are
the following. Ministry has or may have some acute
concerns that can overshadow the objective approach and
may be biased towards some decisions on restructuring
which are not well rooted in analysis of mission and func-
tions. Also the ministries benefit from the fact that uninte-
rested outsiders, who do not sacrifice their objectivity to
some inherent interests, perform the mapping of functions
and structures.
Lessons Learned
The horizontal functional reviews have their limitations
of effectiveness, especially if not sanctioned by the Cabinet
of Ministers. As proved in the case of Ministry of Justice,
simultaneous analysis of public expenditure management
in the ministry can also lead to more accurate picture of
the ministry and the of way it uses money for performing
functions and allocation of resources. Both reviews done
in parallel lay the foundation not only for structural chan-
ges and adjustments, but also towards strategic planning
and linking the planned outputs with the resources allo-
cated. It facilitates also result-based management approach,
which helps improve effectiveness and efficiency.
Another limitation is connected with the fact that every
ministry is linked in many ways to the rest of public ad-
ministration. Many functions one ministry is responsible
for are close to the functions done by the other ministry.
For the Ministry of Economy, such functions are in the
area of foreign trade, macroeconomic analysis, employ-
ment policy, public investment program and regional
development program. For the Ministry of Agriculture
many functions are linked to regional development policy,
economic development policy, food control functions.
Such interdependence and overlap of responsibilities re-
quire cross- ministerial review, which can be easily blocked
by a Minister, who wishes to retain his responsibility for
important public functions and expresses his explicit
disagreement with the intentions of experts to extend the
analysis beyond the ministerial boundaries.
The latter problem could be overcome with a clear authority
to perform horizontal functional analysis given by the
Cabinet or the Prime Minister. The fact that Latvia has a
coalition government accentuates the problem and
therefore careful considerations should be made before
attempting the review across the government, which may
possibly provoke a government crisis.
Coalition government is seen as a problem to initiating
and implementing of many decisions, which change the
scope of responsibility of a ministry. Therefore, again the
conclusions of Sir Robin come to mind that the reform is
not a luxury depending on coming and going governments.
To ensure sustainability for the course of the reforms,
political consensus on the reform issues should be achieved
and central government co-ordinating and steering role
should be developed. Strong ministries will tend to oppose
reforms, if there are no mechanisms how to achieve con-
sensus and in view of the frequently changing governments,
the strength and capacity of civil servants cannot be
overestimated. To raise this strategic capacity, a unified
civil service culture around the common interests of state
should be created and effective co-ordination linking
government priorities; budget process and implementation
of policies and reform initiatives should be put in place.
PROPOSED STRUCTURES FOR
MANAGING AND SEQUENCING OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS
Drawing from international experience and critically
assessing Latvian process of public administration reform
some common features can be distinguished and suggested
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for the governments that find themselves in the early stages
of public administration reform. Below the basic elements
of the reform will be listed and commented.
The successful reforms should start with critical assessment
of the existing situation and formulation of the general
but fairly clear future vision. Understanding of the desti-
nation of the reforms should be shared by the key people
in government both politicians and administrators. Since
the reform is a lengthy and complex process of change in
basic government structures, processes it requires a sustained
commitment from the top decision-makers to design support
and implement necessary changes.
Support of political leadership should be shaped around
the values that are important for the whole society. This
follows from the logics that politicians are elected officials
who should represent interests of society and serve these
interests. Therefore, definition of the reform vision should
not be purely academic or technocratic, but meaningful for
the society. That is the simple and effective way to enlist
support from the public, which will help to sustain the
commitment of politicians and help in voicing the appre-
ciation or critique of the measures implemented. Since the
reforms take time and the fruits of the reform cannot be im-
mediately seen and felt it is important to define the desired
outcomes of the reform and not to lose sight of them.
A typical mistake of many reformers is that the reform is
communicated to the public as a technical exercise that
has its impact on the bureaucracy and the structure of the
government machinery. To ensure the support needed,
the reformers should be extremely careful in spelling out
the expected results for the society and honestly indicating
the resources needed and time, when the first positive
changes are felt. It is useful to be open and frank with the
public stating what it takes to achieve the results. Usually
the communication strategy is not the key objective of
the reform teams, because they are concerned with design-
ing the new legislation, procedures, and institutions. Over-
looking the planned information and communication strategy
may fire back at the later implementation stages when
the political fatigue of reforms sets in and the political
interests are swept away by other pressing economic issues.
In order to give the reforms needed visibility and ensure
the permanent presence of the reform issues on the govern-
ment agenda, it is extremely important to have a ministerial
post in the government associated with public administra-
tion reform. Various experiences are found in European
countries depending of the historic traditions:
a) Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister is leading
public administration reform process;
b) Minister of Finance is in charge of public administra-
tion reform;
c) Minister of Interior, often combining this respons-
ibility for the management of regions and regional policy;
d) Minister of Public Administration Reform (with or
without a portfolio).
Whatever the arrangements are chosen, it is important to
ensure that the responsible minister has full support for
his agenda from the Prime Minister and the whole Cabinet
(Council) of Ministers.
It is a shared view among many OECD experts on public
administration that the experts, not so much politicians,
drive the public administration reform. This should be
understood from the point of view that the public admi-
nistration reform follows a number of principles and pro-
cesses commonly developed by various countries, which
gives little scope for independent political decision-making.
Therefore, the reform process depends on the competence
in the governance issues of the permanent professional
administrative body reporting to the Minister responsible
for reforms. The competencies of such a body should
include: preparing the issue papers for the political decision
making on vision, goals and strategies of reform; designing
the procedures and new legislation; formulating of the
training needs; coordinating of implementation of the
accepted reform measures and reporting to the government
through the responsible minister of the process of im-
plementation of the reform. This body will take the whole
volume of responsibility for managing the change process.
Therefore, such administrative body should be seen as a
legitimate part of the government system, staffed with the
professionals in governance, civil service reform, law, pub-
lic management and personnel management.
When enabling structures are established, next step is to
develop and politically agree at the government level on
the strategy of reforms for at least first 5 years, preferably
within a framework of the long-term goals. The strategy
should be based on assessment of the existing problems
and strengths, should look at the ways how to attained
the stated vision and long (medium) term strategic goals
within specified directions of the reform, and should state
the expected outcomes of the reform for the society. Latvian
tasks force for formulating the Strategy of Public Administ-
ration Reform for the Years 2001–2006 found the SWOT
analysis approach useful for identifying the gaps and
measures to achieve the desired outcomes. The strategy is
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important because it helps to communicate the values,
goals and outcomes of the reform to the politicians, admi-
nistration, and wide public. It helps to agree on the common
agenda of reform among the institutions involved into
the reform process, and it gives the basis for the sequenced
actions by many players.
It is important to realize that the reforms do not change
systems only, but leave a profound impact on the values,
norms, beliefs and attitudes of the administration, chang-
ing it culture. Therefore, cultural values of the reform
should be also clearly understood and stated in the beginn-
ing and carefully nurtured during the process of reforms.
Drafting a strategy should not be an exercise limited to the
administrative body responsible for the reform (however
this body should be a leader in the process), but should have
a broader participation base, which gives stronger legitimacy
to the final draft and represents more that one professional
view angle. The people involved in drafting should be care-
fully chosen so that they could act as champions of change
during the implementation phase. Latvian experience of
drafting a strategy during 2001 illustrates that the drafting
group has a strong sense of ownership of the strategy and
ensures necessary support at various implementation stages.
These people were drawn from various ministries, including
those playing a central role in policy development and
implementation (Ministry of Finance, State Chancellery,
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, European
Integration Bureau, Civil Service Administration, Secretariat
of Public Administration Reform, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, ministry of Justice) and represented a cross section
of departments (personnel, internal audit, policy and strategic
planning, administ-rative, financial, legal, EU-integration).
For the purpose of effective work, the group was limited to
10 people, but it was occasionally expanded when consulta-
tions with some particular policy specialists were required.
For the strategy not to remain a wishful list of nice activities,
it should cover the basic elements of operation of public ad-
ministration: systems for policy development, systems for
government financial management, systems for civil service
development, systems for public service delivery. While
developing strategies, recognition should be given to the
ways how science (including the social sciences) and infor-
mation technology change the ways that government ope-
rates, ensuring transparency, access to decision making and
simplifying the ways services can be delivered to the public.
The general logic of reforms should follow the phased
approach. The initial stage should be labeled as getting
the basics right. The second stage could be labeled as deve-
loping systems for effective and efficient policy and resources
management. The third stage, which can be overlap with
the second stage, should be about ensuring citizen partici-
pation in public governance. The rate of reforms will be a
function of such variables as political support and leader-
ship, allocation of necessary resources to the reform process,
efficient management of reform and participation of all
administration, availability of relevant outside assistance
and capacity for learning from other experience and own
mistakes. Realistically, the three stages outlined above can
take a decade of sustained development. Even if designing
reform measures can be speeded up by use of external
international advice, time is needed for a wider community
to understand and develop supporting attitude to the goals
and objectives, for learning new practices and transform-
ing of organizational changes into institutionalized norms.
Experts also emphasize that two things are important to
keep the morale up: ensure early successes in the process and
widely publicize the achievements so that people strengthened
their belief in own capability to make changes happen.
Getting the basics right. For a proper democratic system of
governance it is important to achieve proper separation
of the representative political power from the permanent,
professional, politically neutral, impartial, ethical and acting
under the rule of law administration. Countries emerging
form the command economies as a first step of democratic
governance establishes civil service system. Together with
this step institutional system of public administration is
established under the political leadership of the govern-
ment with the proper legally determined mandate for
policy development within sectors, government regulation,
resource management and public service delivery. Both
systems should be set in law and institutions responsible
for monitoring implementation of these laws should be
established.
While forming the institutional system, proper consider-
ation should be given to decentralization issues: determin-
ing and divesting the competencies to the regional and local
authorities based on the principle of subsidiary (balancing
the efficiency and closeness to the citizen/customer).
Government should be attentive to the issues of ensuring
the effective and uniform implementation of law at all levels
of government. Therefore, the delegation of functions and
responsibilities to local authorities should be accompanied
with the proper accountability and control systems over
guaranteeing the citizens rights and equal access to the
mandated statutory services irrespective of the level of the
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state administration. Within the state administration the
measures of separation of policy making from its delivery
should be envisaged to ensure more efficient operation and
avoiding the conflict of interest at the organizational level.
Simultaneously, government strives to support the deve-
lopment of the private sector, the cornerstone of the
national economy. Within this objective, government gra-
dually withdraws from productive and commercial sector,
privatizing state enterprises and changing its role to enabler
and regulator. The process of privatization should be
treated with maximum openness and transparency. It is
beneficial to involve the NGO sector in monitoring how
the legislation is observed during the transfer of govern-
ment assets into the private hands. This is an area most
sensitive to corruption and abuse of official power.
Managing privatization process well means winning the
public support for the government action as such.
The basic rules and procedures for operation of public admi-
nistration system should be legally established and enforced.
The most critical issues to pay attention to are: prevention
of corruption and conflict on interest, ensuring access to
information and establishing the administrative procedures.
To establish the rational and transparent use of public
funds, Ministry of Finance should work out the proce-
dures for preparation and management of state budget.
At the same time financial controls should be set up both
internally, within the administration, and externally
through the independent from government and reporting
to the Parliament National Audit Office.
The law on administrative procedures is seen as a key law
for the democratic governance based on the rule of law.
It establishes the principles and rules for the operation of
administration and ensures the observance of the citizens’
rights in dealings with the administration. The law sets
standards for making administrative decisions and rules
for appeal and revoking of such decisions. Administration
should also establish the internal ex post legal control
mechanisms to guarantee the observance of legality of
administrative acts.
Among the possible threats at the stage of establishing
the basics of administration, is the insufficient attention
to the creating of mechanisms of vertical and horizontal
coordination of administration. In Latvia a vertical approach
to establishing administration at the earlier stages caused
problems later in ensuring the uniformity of civil service
and ensuring efficient policy coordination among the dif-
ferent sectors based on wider government objectives. There-
fore, it is advisable to plan and design vertical and horizontal
coordination and control mechanisms, which will finally
result in a more organic and efficient organization built and
operating around the all-government strategies and programs.
Developing systems for effective and efficient policy and resources
management. Following the establishment of basics, the
government should look at the efficiency of its operation
related to the effective use of public resources in attaining
the government goals. The effectiveness issue relates to
how government sets up it medium term goals and prior-
ities, how administration gets involved in implementation
of the all-government agenda with in their area of compe-
tence and how government ensures the coherence between
the identification and prioritization of the policy issues
and attaining the desired outputs. In a vertically built
administration there is a tension between the whole govern-
ment agenda and self-advanced agenda of the sector mi-
nistries. It requires a strong central government capacity
to decide on the policy priorities and ensure that the public
resources (money, personnel, and equipment) are allocated
according to the government set of planned outcomes.
The efficient use of public resources depends on the ability
to state government policy outcomes and allocates the
resources according to the priorities within a centralized
approach. Another facet of efficiency relates to operational
efficiency of public administrative bodies, linked to their
management and internal control processes. Efficient use
of resources means ability to clearly state operation goals
within the organizational mandate that can be expressed
as a set measurable outcomes and corresponding set of
achievable operational outputs. The operational programs
should link the outputs with the resources needed to achieve
these outcomes. Efficient resource management is achieved
through turning attention from the budgeting for the
functions and activities to the budgeting for results. In
order for this approach to work effectively, a system of
information should be in place as well as accountability
for results should be established. Often-traditional
administrative rules (based on the accountability for ad-
herence to the proper procedures) fail to work in the output
based management environment. Therefore, the reformers
must think of establishing and implementing incentives
to attain high performance and achieve planned outputs.
One way to harness commitment of management to the
stated outcomes (outputs) is through the use of the perfor-
mance contract. It should be mentioned that the separa-
tion of the policy delivery from policy making, establishing
principal—agent relations based on a non-enforceable
contract (which in fact is a hierarchical contract between
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the responsible minister as a purchaser of services and the
head of agency), should be introduced cautiously so as to
avoid the abuse of the delegated authority to the agency
and prevent the capture of provider which may be in
conflict to the overall government goals.
Introduction of performance management help improve
efficiency of administration on condition that the ministries
do not lose the capacity to establish clear operational and
accountability framework (to steer the process and evaluate
the results). Ministries also should not withdraw from
responsibility of their supervised autonomous agencies,
because it lies in the heart of the democratic governance.
To be successful in improving efficiency of public administ-
ration, administrative reforms should go hand in hand with
the financial management reforms, which include at least:
strengthening of the central coordinating role in public
expenditure management of the Ministry of Finance, enforc-
ing of the fiscal discipline, introduction of the medium
term expenditure planning, output based resource planning,
accrual accounting, clear accountability rules, capacity to
monitor and assess the results. All these measures depend
on the extensive learning and coordinated implementation.
Important organizational management changes should
include: strengthening managerial capacity of planning
strategies and outputs, people management strengthening,
establishing the internal control systems (rules and
procedures to follow), information management systems,
client service orientation, etc.
Ensuring citizen participation in public governance. As
already mentioned before public participation is important
in ensuring constant support to reforms. Developed civil
society with the strong non-government sector may play
an important role in preparation of political decisions on
important issues. NGO can represent interests of the various
groups of society and they can get actively involved into
activities that improve social welfare of the society. In terms
of divesting the government functions to lower layers of
governance, NGO can be important partner of the govern-
ment in such public areas as environmental protection,
social assistance, promotion of culture and education, even
regulation.
Civil society helps to organize people of common interest
and provides the government with a partner to discuss issues
and seek involvement. Government should establish a
strategy of supporting and involving of the non-govern-
ment organization into public governance process.
Reform is an evolving process that builds on the already
achieved and is cross-fertilized by the innovations all round
the world. Therefore the reformers should be alert to the
work of international organizations, like OECD/PUMA,
UNDP, World Bank, etc. to be able to use the best practices
and apply them to the local culture, tradition and econo-
mic conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
Since proclaiming independence in May 1990, while still
being formally one of the Soviet Republics, Republic of
Latvia has dramatically changed. It has undoubtedly broke
with its past and established the basics of the democratic
state with market economy. Public administration manages
the life of the society and is improving its effectiveness and
efficiency in spite of the problems and lack of consensus.
Political culture is still forming and the results of this process
are painfully impacting on the development. The strength
of Latvia probably is explained by the dedication of its civil
servants that are loyal to the democracy and to the govern-
ment priority to integrate Latvia into European Union
and NATO.
Latvia receives assistance in its reforms from the EU, member
states, SIGMA/OECD, World Bank and is learning the
lessons of democratic governance. The process of change
is slow, it requires shift in mentality, acquisition of new skills,
adoption of new doctrines. In a word, the changes require
a massive training. Latvia has experimented with its structures
and personnel relations and now can draw lessons from own
experience. The model of public administration for Latvia
is that of Western democracies. However, we also recognized
the fact that uncritical adoption of ready-made models created
in other countries for other purposes in different environment
is a useless game. As all public administrations are uniquely
different due to national cultural and historical differences,
it is not possible to copy models. At the same time, one
should learn to apply principles of good governance and
create models that fit these principles.
The principles are based on democratic values and there
is a strong convergence among the modern democratic
states on the principles. Co-operation with EU member
states requires us to adjust our structures and procedures
to the European Administrative Space. Benchmarking,
training of skills, evaluating ones own progress and failures
we can improve public administration that serves the
interests of the society and ensures country’s competitive-
ness in the global competition.
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NOTES
1 Freedom of movement of goods, services, persons and capital, established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
2 Latvian Parliament.
3 Central administration established 23 inspectorates for enforcement of the law in various sectors. The examples of
inspectorates are: State Labour Inspectorate, State Environmental Inspectorate, State Sanitary Inspectorate, State
Education Inspectorate, State Fire and Rescue Inspectorate, etc.
4 The Civil Service System has not been implemented in the Local Governments up to date due to the inability to
overcome a resistance from the separate municipalities and Union of Local Governments.
5 Establishment of executive agencies in Sweden, Denmark, Next Step agencies in the UK and departmental agencies
in New Zealand based on a split between the purchaser and provider and separating the role of principal (minister)
and the agent (semi-autonomous public institution, which organises the internal management according to the
modern management theory developed by the private sector.
6 To provide financial incentive for amalgamation, government allocates a lump sum up to 5% of the annual budget
of the new municipality.
7 The previous last governments were in office for 7.5 and 9.5 months respectively. The changes in government have
been provoked by disagreement among the coalition partners regarding economic issues and linked with the
privatisation process. The process of privatisation of big enterprises: Latvenergo, Riga Shipyards, Ventspils Oil have
been significantly slowed down owing to the conflicting party interests.
8 Latvian Prime minister is responsible for coordination of Cabinet of Ministers work. The law does not give the
Prime Minister any specific higher legal authority. The coalition government only emphasises the situation when
the Prime Ministers needs to maintain a fine balance of political interests, which prevents him from acting with
authority.
9 Functional review of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1999, functional review of Ministry of Economy and Ministry
of Justice in 2000.
10 Sir Robin Mountfield is the former Permanent Secretary of the UK Cabinet Office, invited by EC Delegation in
Riga to evaluate the progress of public administration reform in Latvia in February 2000.
11 State Secretary is the senior civil servant in a ministry, who reports to the minister, holds the highest rank in civil
service.
12 Mr. Denis Ives is a former Public Service Commissioner of Australian public service.
13 The Ministry of State Reforms was established for two years to develop reform programme and prepare basic
legislation.
14 The State minister is a member of the Cabinet with limited voting rights. State minister of Labour reports to the
Minister of Welfare.
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PREFACE
Hungary is one of the candidate countries for the accession
to the EU, and since 1996 member country of the OECD,
therefore the Country Study wants to reflect to the comparing
experiences in CEE candidate and OECD member countries,1
Reflecting to the requirements of the EU for the accession
and recommendations of the OECD for the development
of the public sector administrative capacity the Country
Study shows the new challenges arising from the decentraliza-
tion matching the principles of  ‘good governance,’ ‘efficiency
and effectiveness,’ ‘policy coherency.’ 2
In the case of Hungary could be analyzed how the European
and a worldwide international relationship would be ‘driving
force’ for the domestic public management reform.  Hence
the Country Study, as a pattern of ‘new approach’ on the
decentralization, could share information and experience
about the ‘regional policy,’ which try to integrate the several
policies on the national level and to identify the right measures
of public management reform, especially in the decentrali-
zation process, comparing the ‘European Regional Policy’
and bench-marking the OECD ‘best practices.’
The Country Study could give an answer for the relevant
question whether the shifting of the political structure and
regulatory system from a state-led growth to a market-led
growth supports or hinders the process of decentralization.
Regarding to the economic autonomy of local self-govern-
ments could be very important to emphasize the opportunities
and threatens of local self-governments to access the global and
local capital and credit markets, including the right measures
and level of effective and efficient decentralization process
(reflecting to the new-type regional policy objectives).3
Regarding to the primary target group of this project the
Country Study try to conclude the consequences of the last
ten years reform process in Hungary and to give some recom-
mendation for the policy makers in Croatia to pave the way
to administration and government reforms.
COMPONENTS AND PROCEDURES
OF DECENTRALIZATION
Typical Reform Trajectories
The reform of public administration could not be analyzed
without considering systemic transformation as a whole
political, legal and social-economical structure. Decentrali-
zation is an essential part of the transformation of the
political systems. In the last transition period the shifting
of the former ‘soviet-system’ to a ‘local self-government-
system,’ as well as a condition of market-oriented economic
development, was a basic element of political democratization
and pluralism in Hungary. The local reform was an impor-
tant part of the general systematic transformation of political
structure; hence most of the necessary elements of change
have been realized since the late 1980s.4
Regarding the systematic transformation and the three functions
of local governments,5 the reform process of the Hungarian
system of decentralization has been continuous in the 1990s
and has occurred in two main stages. At the first stage, the
reform mainly was focusing on the democratic and autono-
mic functions of local government, when the ‘changes of
former status quo’ emerged as the basic goal and value. At
the second phase of the decentralization process, the main
objective is to ensure the capability of local governments,
when the ‘stabilization of local government’ is the basic value.
At the first stage of ‘transition period’ the regulatory and
institutional reform were the critical elements of the public
administration reform. Between 1989 and 1995, Hungary
put in place most elements of the legal and institutional
framework for a market economy and a democratic local
governance. The transition was as well as deregulatory and
re-regulatory task, and a conceptual as well as technical trans-
formation of the whole system of public administration.
Since 1989, successive governments eliminated large swathes
of laws and other regulations that changed the former
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centrally planned economy and state administered local
affairs in accordance with the principles of centrali-zation
and hierarchy through a system of councils (‘system of
soviets’) on the local level. At the same time, the Parlia-
ment passed the main legislation creating a constitutional
and legal basis for the market-led growth and local democ-
racy. Together, structural and governance reforms and
macro-economic stabilization have generated significant
economic (and social) benefits.6
The new legislation has been consisted of:
• constitutional changes (crucial modification of the
previous one);
•  acts on local self-governments (including munici-
pality and county level) focusing on the new structure
and operational rules;
• acts on free local elections, defining the different elec-
toral system and process at several level of local
governments;
• acts on civil servants and public employees;
• acts on the scope and duties (mandatory and volun-
tary tasks) of public administration at each level;
• acts on property transportation from the state to the
local governments;
• financial regulation of local governments;
• legal supervision and parallel the juridical protection
of decision-making of local governments;
• special status and rights of the capital city.
A new system of local democracy was established based
upon two pillars: the principles of Hungarian traditions
displayed in the former century before the communist
regime and the European Charter of Local Self-govern-
ments of the Council of Europe. The Constitution and
the Act on Local Self-governments recognized those rights
of local communities, including the smallest of settlements
(more than 54% of them less of 1000 habitants), to self-
government in managing local affairs. (Hence the number
of local units increased from 1500 to 3,149, all of which
elected their own representatives in the local legislative
body and executive organs (mayors).
The principles and basic rights of local government are
stipulated by the Constitution. Eligible voters of commu-
nities, cities, the capital and its districts, counties have the
right to local self-government, which means the auto-
nomous and democratic management of and decision
making on local public affairs in the interest of an elected
body of representatives and by local referendum. The rights
and duties of local authorities are determined by parlia-
mentary acts (certain required 2/3 majority in the Parlia-
ment to pass or amendment) and are afforded legal protec-
tion by the court system and the Constitutional Court too.
The general territorial division of Hungary is fixed by the
Constitution. It is partitioned into counties (at regional
level) and (at local level) cities, villages as communities
and the capital, which is distributed into districts; admi-
nistratively, local self-governments are constituted in each
of these units. Local state administrative units as well as
other organs of the state, such as the court system, are
organized on the basis of such territorial division depen-
ding on the characteristics of their particular tasks. Since
1990, Hungarian public administration consists on two
main frameworks: bureaucratic and democratic institu-
tions. The first includes central government bodies and
their organs at local and territorial level (de-concentrated
institutions) that are subordinate to the state administra-
tion. The second type of structure is the system of local
self-governments (decentralized institutions), based on
principles of autonomy and subsidiary. ‘The functions of
public administration are shared by these two frameworks,
creating competition for the fulfillment of functions at
the local level by their respective organs. This is the essence
of the conflict of interest between local self-governments
and territorial organs of the state administration.’7
Local Self-governments system in Hungary exists at two
tiers: local and regional level. There are no hierarchical
relations between the two types of local self-governments,
as declares by the Constitution, the fundamental rights
of all local entities are equal. The difference between the
two lies in the administrative tasks delegated to each.
Municipalities have had broad responsibilities in service
provision. They provide local public services to their settle-
ments, counties have a subsidiary role in that they provide
public services which settlements are not capable of perfor-
ming, as well as that have regional character. Local self-
government tasks are differentiated as mandatory and
voluntary based. Obligatory functions and responsibilities
of local self-governments could be determined by Parlia-
ment, simultaneously ensuring the financial means neces-
sary for the fulfillment of such tasks and decision power.
However the local self-governments can undertake any
local public issue not prohibited by law that does not
endanger the fulfillment of obligatory functions and local
service delivery.
Legislation on civil service is also a key element for the
transformation of public administration. Law was passed
in 1992, establishing a civil service system based on profes-
sional criteria that broke the former style of politics. It
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also ensured a clear division of functions and roles of
politicians and administrators to guarantee the political
neutrality of staff and at the same time to defend professio-
nals from political pressures and influences. Apart from
civil servants, the responsibilities of public employees
(administrators in the several institutions owned by the
local governments as like as schools, hospitals, social houses)
also have been determined. The regulation guaranteed
security to them and clarified their accountability in order
to ensure the effectiveness of local service delivery.
The timing of financial regulation was crucial to the extent
of transformation. Later than the structural and institutional
regulation, under the process of public administration and
financial reform the local self-governments have got the
most of local properties and other financial sources that
guaranteed the real power of local self-governments for eco-
nomic autonomy and liability coupled with their opportu-
nities for the independent decision making above their
own sources.
By the end of 1996 the regulatory and institutional reform
process have been guaranteed the Political, legal-administrative
and economic autonomy of local self-governments in Hungary,
created new legal and constitutional basis for implemen-
tation and protection of fundamental rights of local self-
governments. The principle of ‘checks and balances’ could
be recognized in that reform process and because of existing
of fundamental rights and institutions of local self-govern-
ments created constitutionally have been effected for a
long time. These elements were very important to the
preservation of the democratic political institutional changes
achieved by the public administrative reform at the first
stage of ‘transition period.’
In the course of the systemic change Hungary faced a historic
challenges to establish a new type of local and central public
administration and to form a government based on the
results of democratic elections.  On the whole, the new
central and local government system adequately promoted
the rapid establishment of the foundations for the inde-
pendent democratic legal state and market economy.
However, experience with the half-decade operation of
the government, central and local public administration
revealed a number of deficiencies, both old and new, which
must be solved in the short or long term. Therefore since
1996, in the second stage of public administration reform,
Hungary has been addressing longer-term difficult issues, such
as policy implementation, as well as problems arising from
the transition itself, such as too rapid decentralization in
the early days of reform process. By the end of 1999, the
transitional challenges of building up basic legal and policy
frameworks consistent with market democracy had been
largely met. After ten years of determined reform, Hungary
has entered the mainstream of OECD countries with respect
to the challenges it faces in establishing quality public
administrative regimes supporting good governance and
long-term economic growth.8
As one of the major deficiencies of the first stage of public
administrative reform, the basic framework for the new
system has in many respects been designed inaccurately
or controversially due to the absence of experience and
the shortage of time available for preparation. The full
range of central and local government responsibilities were
not reviewed within the new framework. The competence
and operation of the government in coordinating and
orchestrating the line-segmented public administration
and in preparing and implementing the decisions of Parlia-
ment, which controls central and local public administra-
tion, is inadequate. The simplification and efficiency increase
of administration has not been given enough attention;
struggle against bureaucratic procedures was not in the
foreground.  Controlling functions have been weakened
to a disapproval extent.  The quality of administrative work
has not improved; in fact, it has declined in a number of
areas, partly because qualified professionals have left public
administration in large numbers, while little attention has
been paid to the training and continuous retraining of
the remaining civil servants and new recruits.  In order to
eliminate these deficiencies and to prepare for the new
challenges of the next millennium, in 1996 the govern-
ment has designed a comprehensive, long-term reform
program setting long-term objectives and within those,
short term goals.
The long-term reform tasks, organized into 21 major topics,
extend beyond a single central or local government term,
but they make changes predictable in the perspective if
the various political powers reach a consensus.  In accor-
dance with the objectives of the current comprehensive
reform, the public administration bodies, streamlined and
rationalized in a differentiated manner, must be streng-
thened, their effectiveness and the quality of their profes-
sional work must be improved so that they can effectively
perform their public duties in the social and economic
spheres.  Considerations of effectiveness require that public
administration does not act wantonly but produce the
expected result with the least expenditure possible.  Public
administration in itself cannot be improved on the central
or local level; therefore the comprehensive reform of public
administration was closely interrelated with the transfor-
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mation of the systemic environment of central and local
governments.  The private sector must be more closely
involved in the performance of public responsibilities; closer
cooperation must be established between the public and private
sectors. Successful techniques employed by the private sector
have been used in administration as appropriate.
In the first phase of the reform, the ongoing streamlining
and differentiated scaling down of public administration
must be completed, in line with the changing public res-
ponsibilities.  Differentiated scaling down means a general
tendency to reduce the responsibilities, organization and
work force of public administration, while not precluding
the necessary growth in justified cases and areas. The pro-
cesses of organizational integration and coordination have
been expanded. Legitimate government and public admi-
nistration roles have been strengthened, controlling in parti-
cular.  Better organized training of civil servants and their
regular preparation for crisis management and European
integration have been commenced. In this second stage of
the public administrative reform administrative mechanisms
and procedures needed to be developed of public administration,
to strengthen the ability of public administration bodies to
adapt to continuous change and to reduce bureaucracy in public
administration. Therefore we could recognize that since
1999, government has been concerning on the terms of
references of further development of public administration,
especially the ‘fine-tuning’ of public management in all
level of administration.
In this second stage of public administrative reform process
the regulation on the local government affairs has been
dealing with the upgrading of local self-government system
and territorial public administrative structure. The new
regulation consisted of:
• financial activity regulation (audit);
• acts on debt and bankruptcy of local self-governments;
• amendments of system of state subsidies;
• act on the association and cooperation of local self-
governments;
• act on supervision of local self-government decision-
making;
• amendments of acts on civil servants and other public
employees;
• act on regional development and land use planning.
In the second stage of public administrative reform followed
up the former tendencies using the principle of decentrali-
zation avoiding artificial fusion of municipalities, the mainte-
nance of a settlement oriented self-governing system (that is
adjusted to the natural borderlines of viable settlements)
have been ensured. Independent local self-governments,
however, implemented a justified part of their local public
service and administration tasks was a more effective pro-
fessional and cost efficient way via the growing number
of their associations.
Management of the Reform Process
The Country Study wants to draw the different role of
policy makers in the reform process, to identify which kind
of regulation and techniques would assure the consistency of
public management reform.
Adjustment to Political Changes, Election Cycles
Elections by elections the Hungarian Central Governments’
several methods were able to ensure the coherent policy making
process in the programming and implementing decade of
the reform process between 1990–2001. These were
building the relationship between the Parliament (Political
Parties) and the Central Government (Public Administra-
tion) at national level, including the tools of horizontal
coordination, furthermore the methods of vertical coordina-
tion between the Central Government and Local Self-
governments (regarding to the role of National Associations
of Local Self-governments)
In the case of horizontal coordination between legislative
and executive power on public administrative reform or
development, the Governmental Policy Program has a
key role accepted by the Parliament together election of
the Prime Minister. The Parliamentary control mecha-
nism on the podium of assembly or several committees
could involve the MBPS to take care with the public ad-
ministrative development program implementation.
Regarding to the horizontal coordination between line mi-
nistries in the central level and their territorial organs in
local or regional level, the Minister of PMO’s has a main
task and responsibility to ensure the policy coherence at
managerial level too. Facing those implementing challenges,
the government has recognized that mechanisms to promote
reform inside the administration are needed to maintain
policy coherence and keep reform on schedule. In 1998, the
new structure of PMO’s wants to compare this requirement,
because the Referatura System and the certain Coordination
Meeting of Permanent State Secretaries was created for
these purposes. The Referatura, modeled on a German
example, is composed of experts who shadow each ministry.
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This arrangement seems to function more as an information
source than an independent oversight of proposals. It
enhances the coordination of policy implementation and
does challenge the ministries when they violate quality
standards or goals of governmental political program. The
Referatura system helps the Forum of Per-manent State
Secretaries and accounts to the Parliamentary State Sec-
retariat, which is in charge of the strategic and policy
aspects of development of public administration.9  These
administrative instruments, as well as the monthly meeting
of head of the territorial organs of ministries leaded by the
Governmental Official (ordering by PMO’s Parliamentary
State Secretariats), ensure the effective and efficient policy
implementation and compliance.
The policy implementation mainly belongs to the several
entities that to plan and organize their activities to achieve
the goals given by the TOR of Public Administrative
Development Program, and every public administration
body should make an own yearly program and action plan,
which fulfill their tasks in that field and controlled and
coordinated by the PMO.
In the case of vertical coordination in the PMO has been
existing a Local Self-government Forum, where the all
National Association of Local Self-governments and the
representatives of chief executives meet each others and
the experts of line ministries to discuss about the prepa-
ration and implementation of Governmental Program on
public administrative development. Many of National
Association have made a written agreement with the PMO
to contribute in the compliance of the parliamentary or
governmental regulation.
Reflecting to the new role of PMO in the cabinet and the
portfolios of minister a relatively new Unit for a Public
Administration and Regional Policy was established in-
stead of the former Governmental Commissioner, leaded
by a Parliamentary State Secretary (included 28 civil ser-
vants in the staff), to ensure the policy coherence in that
field. This Unit responsible for the programming and moni-
toring of the TOR of Government on public management
reform program and administrative development plan.
According to the continuos public administrative reform
process, the newest further development public administ-
ration program was compiled on the basis of three sources:
• Specific points of Government Resolution No. 1052/
1999. (V. 21.) Korm. whose implementation has still
not been completed and which contain tasks that are
still considered necessary,
• The experiences of implementation of the task plan
formulated in the above government resolution, with
special regard to the reports of the ministries, which
were prepared and submitted at the end of 1999 and
at the end of 2000,
• The general and specific ideas and proposals of the
ministries, which were collected together in two
steps—in the summer of 2000 and at the end of 2000.
The structure of the new task plan is different from the
previous one. While the previous plan mainly grouped
the tasks according to the various levels of public admi-
nistration, the plan of the new government resolution
places the specific tasks in chapters relating to legislation
on public administration and to institutional development,
and presents in a separate chapter the strategic objectives
and regulatory guidelines of public administration whose
implementation has already begun but whose full comp-
letion cannot be expected in the near future.
The goal of the new two-year task plan is:
• on the basis of the experiences of the process of public
administration modernization that has run over various
government terms, and the priorities formulated in
the government program;
• Further, with regard to the proposals of Agenda 2000
concerning the conditions and tasks of accession to
the EU and the conclusions of the Country Report
of the European Commission of November 2000,
to determine the main courses of development and
place the tasks of development of the various branches
in a uniform framework.
The fulfillment of objectives concerning the continued deve-
lopment of public administration, as well as the definition
of new goals and courses of development, may contribute
significantly to the harmonization and approximation of
state and self-government administration, and may serve
the expectations and general societal interests that are
linked to the world’s developed systems of public admi-
nistration, to the realization of a public service of a higher
standard and of service-type, and to the proper use of the
opportunities granted by information technology.
Domestic and International Professional
Capacity to Prepare Reforms
The Hungarian Study shows the internal and external driving
forces of public management reform, especially in the
decentralization process. Internally it’s very important how
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the Central Government have been using the principle of
partnership in the programming and complying of public
sector reform initiatives, including the contribution with
the representatives of local self-governments, NGO’s, and
universities or research institutions. Externally it would
be very interesting whether the international relationship
how could help the domestic reform policy implemen-
tation, as in the Hungarian Case the multinational agreement
with the European Union, or OECD, as like as the bilateral
contribution of several international institution (e.g. World
Bank SNDP or British Know How Fund Program bet-
ween 1998–2001.)10
The tasks listed in the two-year governmental task plan
for the continued development of public administration
affect primarily and directly the public administrations sphere.
Implementation of these tasks will promote the operation
of central, regional, and local state administration, improve
the efficiency of the tasks of regional development, and
above all the development of the public administration
information flow; the acceleration of the EU accession
process; the development of a staff of civil servants who
work more effectively and are paid on the basis of perfor-
mance; the closing of loopholes in current regulations.
Still, the level of development of public administration,
the organization of community services, and the level of
a citizen-friendly administration, influence significantly
the opinions of citizens and organizations about the govern-
ment.
Attending to the domestic driving forces, besides the vertical
coordination forum mentioned above, there are many
formal contribution with the several Egos (as Rural Parlia-
ment, Forum of Roma Minorities and Civil Association
of Women, Assembly of Intelligent Municipalities and
Regions etc.) and universities or scientific research institute
to evaluate the implementation of public administrative
program and to prepare the next one.11
The objectives of the plan of governmental tasks are in
harmony with international practice and with the require-
ments and points to be applied in the process of accession
to the EU; indeed, they are aimed at establishing the con-
ditions for an acceleration of the process of accession. And
while there is no EU directive for public administration
in general, it should be pointed out that the country re-
ports on countries seeking accession to the Union regularly
evaluate the level of development of public administration
of a given state.12  From the perspective of Hungary’s acces-
sion to the EU, a basic task stemming from the Copen-
hagen Criteria is, in addition to appropriate legal regula-
tion, the application of law, a condition of which is the
guaranteeing of the quality operation of the public admi-
nistration organizations in line with capacities. Recently,
this aspect has received greater emphasis in the annual
evaluation reports of the EU, given also the Community’s
own experiences. In many sub-areas of legal regulation,
the acquis communautaire states at sub-sectional depth
the expectations on the institutional structure. The
National Program for the Application of Community
Achievements expands upon these tasks of institutional
development in detail, and in this sense it is the guiding
principle for the task plan concerning public administra-
tion development for the next period.
Regarding to the other external driving force, since 1996
the OECD membership is a very important element of
international contributions. Especially the OECD PUMA
activity give Hungary an opportunity to use the ‘best
practice’ in the decentralization and modernization of public
administration correlation with the requirements of regu-
latory reform leaded by OECD.13  In the both two years
TOR explained that Hungary wants to use the recommen-
dations of OECD and follow up the regulatory and public
management development program looking at the inter-
national experiences. In that field Hungary has a relevant
connection with the non-member countries which are
involved to join the ‘modernization and decentralization
movements’ of CEE countries, hence the Hungarian ex-
periences could use for the know how transfer from the
OECD via ‘outreach policy.’
In the row of ‘external driving forces’ for the public admi-
nistration program, as well as for the further decentrali-
zation, could be mentioned the contribution with The
World Bank. The PMO has a letter of intent assigned by
The World Bank to support the implementation of
governmental public administrative development program
to finance the research in that themes and to give technical
assistance to achieve the written aims in the TOR of
Governments. It is very fruitful to assess the contribution
of The World Bank experts and institutions to help the
local self-government to access the regional and global
capital and credit market and to strength  they’re financial
capacities and creditworthiness.
There were coordinated activities of Canadian Urban Ins-
titute with Hungarian local self-governments to help them
to build their capacity in the fiscal issues. The CIDA  prog-
ram has been used as a driving force supported the Govern-
ment Public Management and Fiscal Reform Programs
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and helped the preparation of local taxation reform regu-
lation. This program will be following in the Visegrad
Region, where Hungary could use the experiences of other
CEE countries to implement a ‘new type of decentraliza-
tion’ (‘a common regional policy’), concerning on the
challenges of accession to the EU.
Hungary has many bilateral contribution with other Central
Governments of member countries in the EU, as like as United
Kingdom, France, Italy, relating to the public administra-
tion reform, especially to the decentralization. All govern-
mental activities were concentrated the regionalism an
decentralization, however in the British Know How Pro-
gram and The French Regional Program both central
administration have involved the Association of Local
Governments to take part in that programs.14 These external
sources could be used as a good experiences for the part-
nership and common sense of the ‘Common European
Administrative Space,’ where the decentralization is a very
important value.
Economic Conditions
The Country Study could give a certain answer for the
relevant question whether the shifting of the political structure
and regulatory system from a state-led growth to a market-
led growth support or hinder the process of decentraliza-
tion. In the transition period the value of decentralization
accompanying market liberalization supported the
consistent regulatory and governance reform process over
several years.15 Regarding to the economic autonomy of local
self-governments could be very important to emphasize the
opportunities and threatens of local self-governments to access
the global and local capital and credit markets, including
the right measures and level of effective and efficient de-
centralization process (reflecting to the new-type regional
policy objectives).
The public administration development objectives are in-
tegrally linked to many other priorities of the Government’s
program, that is to the establishment and strengthening
of an efficient state that serves the needs of citizens, of a
system of regional development to equal out chances, of
a staff of civil servants who are respected and fair, and to
the support of citizens’ initiatives. However, when the
macroeconomic performance through 1993 was poor,
resulting in high social costs, led to political and social
pressures to slow the pace of reform. At the same time,
implementation of policies actually adopted was often
partial or incomplete because of weakness in administ-
rative capacity at national and municipal levels, unresolved
political conflicts about policy goals, and competing
institutional interests within the government. The failure
of deficits to respond to recovery in 1994/95 signaled the
need for correction of macroeconomic imbalances. In
response, the government adopted a macroeconomic sta-
bilization program complemented by renewed commit-
ment to vigorous structural reforms, especially accelerated
privatization.16  In that program the stabilization and
privatization combined with the devolution more tasks and
responsibilities to the local level, mainly in the social and
communal sector.
The further decentralization of responsibility to local go-
vernment have been resulted a relative success in the
solving problem because of the higher social capital in
municipal than in central level—it was supported the
decentralization process. However it created real and
potential problems of regulatory duplication, overlapping
and inefficiencies because of the no precise definitions of
the mandatory functions and content of level of the
services to be provided by municipalities, or the lack of
separation of ownership and regulatory functions of muni-
cipalities. Therefore in these stage of reform process, the
regulation was focused on the standardization of local services,
and the fine-tuning of control and accountability mechanism
over local governments, including the financial audit, limi-
tation of debt measure and bankruptcy of local govern-
ments—it was evaluated as a ‘re-centralization’ of respon-
sibility of the local government. Nevertheless these events
did not mean the stopping of systematic decentralization,
mostly remaining the basic principles of local government,
but shifting the public administration reform from the poli-
tical aspects to the technical approach, where not the political
autonomy and democratization are the question, however
the capability, effectiveness, transparency and account-
ability of local governments what the regulators were
looking for.
Acceptance of the proposal does not result in additional
budgetary expenditure, because the implementation of the
task plan must be provided for primarily out of the budgets
of the ministries (a sum determined with due considera-
tion of these tasks). The chapters in question do not receive
a source for additional spending, but this must be
established by reviewing and prioritizing present tasks.
The effects of the financial and human resources spent on
the continued development of public administration may
be felt only on the macro level and in the long term. But
with this aim in mind, the new public administration task
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plan contains many efficiency improvement tasks. In the
medium term, the objectives listed here shall promote the
development of a system of institutions that are smaller,
have fewer of the tasks of the state, and are capable of
providing more efficiently, and thus facilitate the targeted
reduction of state budgetary expenditure and the extent
of redistribution by the state. Such means could be the
review of the support institutions of the ministries, cost/
benefit analysis, performance evaluation, and an increase
in the role of central public administration, a full review
of tasks and competencies from top to bottom of the system
of public administration, a strengthening of the control
of the implementation of the tasks of state administration
(supervisory control, system of financial auditing), and
the strengthening of the role of district administration.
Administrative Capacity to Manage the Reform
The Country Study wants  to draw the role and function
of the several central bodies near the Central Government
(as the Government’ Commissioner in the former time
and nowadays the Unit for Public Management and
Regional Policy in the Prime Minister’s Office) to ensure
a high-level managerial capacity for the public administra-
tion reform. The two Case Study on the TOR of Public
Administration Development Program between 1999–
2000, and 2001–2002 cover the new approach of capacity
building which is able to ensure the capacity for the
compliance of reform program at national and regional/
local level too.
Since 1989 till 1995, the decentralization process was turbu-
lent and not always coherent, because of mainly the lack
of central or governmental coordination of regulatory and
administrative reform. The characteristic domestic driving
force was inside the government the Ministry of Interior,
but it was not enough to achieve  a coordinated and coherent
activity on behalf of the line ministries and Ministry of
Finance.
At the second stage of public administration transition process,
the Central Government amalgamated his administrative
capacity near the Prime Minister. Since 1996, a Govern-
mental Commissioner was responsible for the coordination
of public administration reform inside the central govern-
ment, but this institution could achieve some consistency
of several policies in the preparation of the public admi-
nistrative reform program, but could not afford to him to
coordinate the compliance and implementation of the
governmental program, mainly because of the lack of
political support by the head of PMO, who was a senior
civil servant.
Since 1998, the new Cabinet have strengthen the role of
PMO (headed by minister, who is deputy of Prime Minister
in the Cabinet), and hence have built a stronger administ-
rative capacity in the PMO to access a better cohesion
between the several policies. Therefore inside the PMO a
new Parliamentary Secretariat is responsible for the
coordination and coherent implementation of the public
management governmental development program, to
achieve a higher efficiency and effectiveness in the
compliance of public management reform and regional
policy. Beside the new structure of central government
the new Unit has a responsibility (given by a Governmental
Resolution)17  to coordinate the other ministries activities
in this program and to order the County Governmental
Officials’ activities on the coordination of this program
in the territorial level. These tools ensured more capabili-
ties in the PMO to implement efficiently the public admi-
nistration and regional policy programs of Government.
The coherent and efficient policy implementation needed the
capacity building of civil servants at all level of public admi-
nistration. With regard to the further training and mana-
gement training of civil servants, hence the Government
Resolution determined various tasks. In its report, the
Ministry of the Interior stated the following: on the basis
of the government program, and with a view to applying
the aspects of Union integration and to developing public
service quality. Furthermore other training of civil servants
and public administration management training has been
adopted, as has also the government medium-term plan
for the period 1999–2002 and concerning the further
training of civil servants and public administration ma-
nagement training.18  As a result of the above develop-
ments, after ten years of absence, finally a worthy and
organized system of further training is operating in public
administration. In the long term, the legal regulations
and other norms adopted by the Government—in addi-
tion to ensuring the requirements of quality assurance
and tender—shall enable the efficient integration of higher
educational and academic workshops, as well as trained
market actors, into the operation of a system coordinated
by the state.
The aim of the medium-term government further edu-
cation plan is that the Government should determine the
general principles and objectives of further training for
the planned term and the government requirements relating
to management training. Moreover it should state the main
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directions of further training nationally, further education
affecting all branches and the civil servants of self-govern-
ments, the main tasks of management training, and other
tasks closely linked to further training which improve the
operation and efficiency of the system and the standards
of further training.
The strategic goal of the further training of Hungary’s
civil servants and public administration management trai-
ning is—building upon the continuous demand for self-
education and the requirements of the profession, paying
attention to the obligations of employers, and using central
budgetary and other financial resources—that the nation
should be served by trained public administration staff who
are capable of administering the affairs of citizens and other
tasks of public administration at the level of the administra-
tive systems of OECD and EU member states, efficiently,
successfully, professionally, and ethically. The Ministry of
the Interior has assisted continuously in the compilation
of the annual public administration further training plans
for the years 1999 and 2000, which the ministries also
satisfied. Within the framework of the public service career
program, a budgetary allocation has been made for the
further training of civil servants and management training,
and this allocation shall increase significantly in the 2000-
2001 budgetary year.
On the basis of Government Decree No. 199/1998. (XII.
4.) Korm. On the further training of civil servants and
public administration management training, the Public
Administration College of Further Training has been es-
tablished as a consultative and professional organ of the
Minister of the Interior for further training and management
training. The College comprises experts delegated by the
ministries, the county (and capital city) offices of public
administration, and both the self-government side and the
interest representation side of the Civil Servants’ Concilia-
tion Forum. One of the tasks of the College is to decide—
using experts—on the acceptance of further training
programs that are submitted in response to its calls for
tender. By the end of 2002, the College had accepted
237 further training programs, whose major data may be
viewed on the website of the Ministry of the Interior.
The other major task of the College is to submit proposals
to the Minister of the Interior concerning the division of
the target allocation for further training adopted in the
budgetary legislation, which in 2000 amounted to HUF
200 million.
Out of the target allocation for further training, a signifi-
cant amount of support could be given to programs that
fitted in with the general guidelines formulated as a priority
in the four year further education plan and incorporated
into the plans by organs required to prepare annual reports
(e.g. preparation for accession to the Union, ECDL train-
ing, foreign language learning). In programs supported
by the further training target allocation, the only instructors
permitted are those who met the conditions of the board
of directors of the National Public Administration Exami-
nation Committee.
The Educational and Methodological Directorate of the
Hungarian Public Administration Institute, which
functions as a center of methodology for the system of public
administration further training, received funds from the
above indicated target allocations, which it used to finance
the publication of much methodological material and
other further training auxiliary material, which assists the
functioning of the further training system.
In its report, the Hungarian Public Administration Insti-
tute indicated that 3700 civil servants had taken part in
its EU training program by the end of 2000. The program
was supported by PHARE between January and December
2000 in Hungary on the basis of an international tender.
The Union program was organized by the Union’s insti-
tute in Maastricht, the European Institute of Public Admi-
nistration, and it was participated in by German and Finnish
organizations, too. At the request of the Union, the Hunga-
rian Public Administration Institute undertook the pro-
fessional supervision of the program in Hungary. The
success of the program is indicated by the fact that the
EU is to recommend the modules applied in Hungary to other
candidate countries. The participation ratio in the modules
was over 80% and a similar proportion of participants
considered the training sessions to have been worthwhile.
720 people took part in the training sessions on central
public administration in the course of 180 days of instruc-
tion; 3014 civil servants received training in the local or
regional administration sessions in the course of 519 days
of instruction. Regional training sessions were carried out
in regional centers, covering all the counties.
The report emphasized that, uniquely in the Central Euro-
pean region, every Hungarian civil servant entering the system
of public administration must demonstrate knowledge of the
European Union when taking the basic examination. About
12,000 senior civil servants working in management posi-
tions at local and central organs took overall successful
professional examinations, an obligatory part of which is
knowledge of the European Union. Hungarian public
administration personnel and their managers thus finished
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their basic training in European affairs by taking examina-
tions in front of independent examination boards. No
other candidate country can demonstrate such an achieve-
ment. Finally, the report also indicated that training cour-
ses for specific sectors had begun, and that the special EU
training course for senior managers was continuing under
the direction of the Prime Minister’s Office.
Finally, the Government Resolution prescribed the elabo-
ration of a code of ethics for civil servants as well as factors of
evaluation pertaining to the work of civil servants. The tasks
have been implemented; the regulations will find a place
in the legal system with their integration into a comprehen-
sive amendment to the law on the legal status of civil servants.
AREAS OF REFORM POLICIES
Regarding to the main objectives of this project lead by
OSI/LGI the Country Study wants to draw an example of
decentralization under the umbrella of regional policy between
1996–2001. It could be used by the other CEE countries
as an experience to achieve a more effective and competitive
decentralized system implementing the principles of Euro-
pean Regional Policy (subsidiary, decentralization, part-
nership, solidarity, coordination and policy integration)
as like as the challenges of modernization of public administ-
ration by the principle of ‘good governance.’19
The issue has two fundamental dimensions: one of these is
the type (self-government and/or public administration)
and size (county and/or regional) of the middle level in
modern Hungary in view of the terms of EU accession;
the other is the social-political backing of modernization
plans, in particular the geographical bases of the local and
parliamentary election systems.
In the European Union regional level units have a dual
function: to help alleviate regional level differences, the
development of backwards regions and improvement of
their competitive position, and to mediate between central
and local (i.e., municipal) public administration tasks,
organize regional services and reduce differences between
local geographical units.
The reduction of local differences is set out as an objective
in the Treaty of Rome of 1987; these fundamental prin-
ciples were reiterated in the European Union Treaty conc-
luded in Maastricht in 1991, setting forth recommen-
dations for the organization of a new regional fund for
the development of transport infrastructure promoting
the cohesion of the EU and for addressing environmental
problems. In line with this, the EU has designed a uniform
regional statistical classification system, which is the most
appropriate tool for the assessment of the regional problems
and regional economic capacities of the EC. The system
designed by EUROSTAT sets up three regional (NUTS
1–3) and two local (NUTS 4–5) levels; thought there is
no direct legal basis for this, the EU Council Regulation
No. 1260/1999. EC on the responsibilities of Structural
Funds employs these for the identification of target areas,
and these also provide the basis for regional socio-economic
analyses and statistical data collection and analyses. (Pur-
suant to the EC Council regulation, the NUTS 2 level is
used for the assessment of the sauce-economic position
and development of the EU regions.)
In Hungary Act No. XXI of 1996 on regional development
and county planning and the Parliamentary Resolution
No. 35/1998. (III.20.) OGY set up the planning-statistical
units corresponding to the NUTS system, which was approved
by EUROSTAT, based on the report of the Central Statistical
Office (CSO). Accordingly, on the local level there are 3131
municipalities (NUTS 5) and 150 micro-regions (NUTS
4), and on the regional level there are the 19 counties and
the capital (NUTS 3), as well as the 7 planning-statistical
regions (NUTS 2) and the 1 national level (NUTS 1).
Thus the county and the region are regional planning-
statistical units in Hungary, and they will also become fund-
raising categories as targets for subsidies after the EU accession
(and to some extent even before accession through the
PHARE and ISPA programs). (It should be noted that
regional grants, which represented approximately 73%
of structural funds in 1999, take into consideration the
NUTS 2 level areas, while in the case of special regions
such as industrial restructuring regions and rural regions,
both geographical units (NUTS 2 and 3) can be con-
sidered for targets up to approximately 8% of the funds.)
In its country program for 1999 the PHARE supported
regional development and regional programs in 4 (NUTS
2 level) pilot regions, and this can be continued. In other
words, the EU has already accepted regions as fund raising
categories, just as in the 1995 programs, where it sup-
ported the development of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county
as an industrial restructuring area (NUTS 3 level).
As a result, in future it is justified to prioritize the regional
(NUTS 2) level as the fundamental unit of the middle
level planning/statistical system, while also retaining the
county (NUTS 3) level as a statistical/planning unit.
Furthermore, the design and implementation of the micro-
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regional level (NUTS 4) is also important, because they
can also be interpreted as important fundraising planning/
statistical geographical units. (In this respect the Parliament
decision on planning/statistical regions and the delimi-
tation of micro-regions by the CSO provide a good basis.)
However, the issue is still whether the planning/statistical
system has, or should have, an equivalent in public adminis-
tration and/or the self-government system?
In the current Hungarian constitutional system only the
municipal (NUTS 5) and the county (NUTS 3) levels
are self-governmental/governmental and public adminis-
tration units. (In this sense counties have justification in
requiring participation in the Assembly of European
Regions (AER) based on their regional status; incidentally,
each Hungarian county is a member there.) We should
notice that even in the EU governmental/public administ-
ration units have not been formed on each planning/sta-
tistical (NUTS) level. (However, it is also true that in the
case of Portugal and Greece, notable for us because acquir-
ing a large amount of subsidies, have public administration
units as well on each level, while the NUTS 3 level has
public administration units with elected self-governments
in each country, with the exception of Belgium.)
However, the NUTS 2 level macro-regions are not only
fundraising categories but often also the fields of implemen-
tation of the state responsibilities in local economic development,
innovation, employment policy, infrastructure development
and environmental protection and tools for improving
regional competitiveness. This does not necessarily require
the transformation of planning/statistical regions into self-
government/public administration type regions (examples
for this include Germany and the United Kingdom), but
this is a desirable step (as it will be done in Sweden last
autumn in a pilot project covering one region for the election
of the assemblies of three counties at the local elections,
then gradually targeting the other geographical units as well.)
Because of this, Hungary will not necessarily have to establish
self government type assemblies in the regions to be set up
either, but this can be one objective in the process of consti-
tutional amendment, and the present regional development
institutional system may provide the regional basis for
programming and the allocation of government funds (or
potentially international funds). Regions, however, must
certainly be established as public administration units. The
establishment of the monitoring system also demanded
by the EU as well as the decentralization and reasonable
administrative organization of state tasks necessitates this.
(Public administration tasks may be reviewed, under the
auspices of modern public administration, with an eye to
reallocating some of the ministerial tasks currently
executed on the county level (the tasks that are suitable
for this) to the county self-governments, and organizing
the rest on the regional level. In accordance with the con-
tents of the Government Decree No. 193/1998. (XI.11.),
these could be coordinated on the regional level by the
public administration offices operating under the super-
vision of the Prime Minister’s Office; the tasks of these
offices already include regional coordination of issues
crossing the boundaries of counties or the capital. In other
words, for the regional establishment of the geographical
competence of de-concentrated public administration
bodies and the organization of administrative regions,
Government level regulation in the form of Government
decrees is adequate; Parliament need not be involved.)
Accordingly, until the formation of self-governed regions defined
in the Constitution, which presumes a greater degree of political
and social consensus, the county may retain its self-government
function; some tasks may even be delegated to it from the
governmental de-concentrated bodies, while it can also
perform its function of regional equalization and regional
self-governance, in a reasonable division of labor with the
administrative and regional development region.
However, for the self-government function the county
would need own resources (such as local taxes it can dis-
pose of), as well as the identification of mandatory regional
self-government tasks, accompanied by normative state
subsidies. (This could be prepared in the framework of
the so-called public administration and public finance
reform, started but not yet completed with the coordina-
tion of the PMO in conjunction with the further develop-
ment of the tasks and financing of the public sector; the
decision of the Government would be adequate for this,
and the alliances of municipalities as well as international
agencies as sponsors could also be involved, such as the
World Bank, USAID, Know How Fund.)20
In regional policy an appropriate division of labor can be
designed between the county and the region, which can
be the basis for the government’s subsidy policy as well. In
the long term the county could perform the function of equal-
ization between settlements and micro-regions (this is what
the regional equalization funds and the targeted decentra-
lized fund are assigned to; the county regional development
council disposes over this, which is chaired by the chair of
the county assembly, but its members also include the re-
presentatives of cities with county rights and the self-govern-
ments of micro-regions), and of supporting local small
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and medium sized enterprises and the promotion of local
economic development and employment (this is what the
county regional development fund is designed for, which is
also under the control of the regional development councils.)
The state functions of larger-scale economic development
subsidies, major employment, economic development,
infrastructure or environmental protection projects as well
as interregional relations could be delegated to the regional
level, this can be accompanied, through the regional develop-
ment institutional system (in which the counties partici-
pate, together with government agencies and economic
chambers on the basis of partnership), by some of the
state subsidies to be decentralized as well as international
funds (naturally, to this end in the 7 planning-statistical
regions approved in the National Regional Development
Conception regional development councils and their work
organizations must be established mandatory, and on the
basis of government offices a regional monitoring system
must be implemented to assess and control their activities
and the use of the funds made available to them.)
In the context of the functional links of the county, micro-
regions, in addition to the regional level, warrant special
attention. Micro-regions on the one hand may offer excellent
terrain for the differentiated use of regional policy instruments
(88 of the 150 statistical-planning micro-regions are
targets for regional policy one way or the other, in accor-
dance with EU standards), and for performing the county
equalization functions, the reasonable (concentrated and
coordinated) allocation of state subsidies, and they can
also be the arena of provision of local government tasks
in associations and the more rational, effective and cheaper
provision of district-type public services and local public
administration tasks (this corresponds, in one of its ele-
ments, to the modern version of the “town-county” concept,
which can be embraced on the political plane.)
In this context a reasonable division of functions and tasks
can be designed between regional units; the financing, state
subsidy system and public administration structure can be
adjusted to this under the control of the Government.
Modern public administration increasingly needs more
rational financing of micro-regional (city center) administ-
ration alongside (or potentially gradually instead of) the
county, and of the performance of municipal tasks in asso-
ciations, government incentives to this, as well as the for-
mation of administrative regions (and then gradually self-
government type regions), which requires a political basis
on the local level and in Parliament as well. For this, it may
be desirable to review the elements of the election system
in future.
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Regarding to the Hungarian Case Study try to conclude
the consequences of the last ten years reform process and to give
some recommendation for the policy makers in Croatia to
pave the way to administration and government reforms.
The last ten years period history of decentralization of former
state-owned political, economical and administrative power
has been joining the democratization of the political structure
and civil society in Hungary. There were many problems
arising from the transition itself, including the too rapid
decentralization, like the lack of the knowledge and skills
for the new managerial requirements and the weakness of
civil society to use a ‘civic culture,’ as like as the disparities
of local governments and the gap between their respon-
sibilities and capabilities.
The Central Government try to response to this problems
using the ‘regional policy issue ’ as a pattern both of the further
decentralization and devolution of power from the central
level and the instead of the amalgamation of local governments
using legal and financial incentives to involve the local
governments for the associations to deliver services in a better
quality and to develop their settlements together.
In the last ten years the consistency of public management
reform process has been assured by the clarifying the different
role of policy makers in the reform process and using efficient
regulation and managerial techniques. In the case of Hungary
it would be a good lessons to understand better how should
reach that the ‘decentralization value’ would be the guaran-
tee of the consistent reform process over several years and how
could achieve the consistency of governance reform accompanying
the market liberalization (however the macro-economic
structural changes couldn’t support always the coherent
decentralization reform process.)21
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ANNEX
1057/2001. (VI. 21.) Government Resolution
On the Plan of Governmental Tasks Concerning the Continued Development
of the Public Administration System in 2001 and 2002
Deadline:
• for points a–b): on-going
c) The examination and reform of the organs of central
public administration that are not functioning in the
form of ministries must be continued.
Responsible:
• in accordance with Government Resolution No.
2396/1997. (XII. 8.) Korm. As amended by
Government Resolution No. 2013/1999. (II.
10.) Korm.
Deadline:
• in accordance with Government Resolution No.
2396/1997. (XII. 8.) Korm. As amended by
Government Resolution No. 2013/1999. (II.
10.) Korm.
In the Field of Local and Regional State Administration
a) The examination of the tasks and spheres of compe-
tence of the regional and local (settlement-level)
organs of state administration, and of their organiza-
tion and operation, must be continued. In the course
of the examination, it should be reviewed:
• where the intervention of the state is unnecessary
or where the intervention of the state can be
provided for through other, non-public means
of administration,
• where the state administration status of these may
be abolished,
• in the case of state administration tasks that re-
main necessary, an attempt should be made to
place these tasks at a level nearest to customers—
transferring them to regional or local organs of
state administration or to the clerks of local self-
governments.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: on-going
I. The Review of the Tasks and Spheres
of Competence of the System of Public
Administration and Their Regulatory
Guidelines
In the Field of the System of Central Public Administration
a) The review of the tasks and spheres of competence
performed by the ministries should be continued. With
regard to the tasks of the ministries that remain neces-
sary, the objective is that only those tasks concerning
branch strategy, regulation, analysis, and control
should remain at ministerial level. Among the tasks
of operation, tasks concerning public administration
services and information, as well as individual powers
of authority, should be entrusted to central offices with
autonomous competence and separate from the orga-
nization of ministries, regional government offices,
regional or local state administration organs directed
by ministries, organs and chambers of self-government
public administration, and organizations in the civilian
domain. In all cases, the ‘detachment’ of tasks of mi-
nistries should be accompanied by reductions in staff
numbers and financial allocations, or the transfer of
the task to an organization fulfilling an individual
sphere of legal competence and authority.
b) In line with the examination of the tasks of ministries,
the review of the structure of background institutions
assisting in the work of ministries should be conti-
nued. As a result of the examination, a proposal should
be made concerning the maintenance or abolition of
the status of background institutions as organs funded
by the central budget, or the transfer of the tasks per-
formed by the organ to central or regional organs.
The maintenance of background institutions that are
considered necessary should be supported by cost-
benefit analysis.
Responsible:
• for points a–b): ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the Prime
Minister’s Office
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b) The taking into consideration of organs fulfilling tasks
of local (settlement-level and regional) public admi-
nistration should be realized and these organs should
be officially recorded.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• with respect to the Minister of the Interior
the district notaries
and self-govern-
ment associations
• for coordination Minister Heading the
and records: Prime Minister’s Office
in cooperation with the
county and Budapest
offices of administration
Deadline: 31 December 2001
c) Based on the official records, there should be a review
of the legal status, organizational structure, and
functions of local organs fulfilling state administration
tasks and spheres of competence.
In the course of the review, an attempt should be
made to ensure that
• matters of state administration determined in Act
IV of 1957 on the general regulations of state
administration procedure should be performed
only by organs of public administration falling
under the provisions of Act XXIII of 1992 on
the legal status of civil servants,
• non-public administration organs should be able
to administer the affairs of state administration
only exceptionally and where justified for reasons
of expediency or expertise,
• During the review, organs of public administra-
tion that do not perform matters of state admi-
nistration according to Procedure of State Admi-
nistration (Áe.) but do fall under the authority
of the law on civil servants should be removed
from falling under the law on civil servants and,
where their maintenance is necessary, should be
given a different legal status that is appropriate
to their range of tasks,
• Where ministries manage several organs of local
state administration, the possibility of their mer-
ger or the joint provision of the tasks provided
should be examined.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: on-going
d) The examination of the possibility of placing (terri-
torial) regional state administration on regional bases
should be continued. In the course of this examina-
tion, the aim should be to ensure that:
• After the clerks of local self-governments based
on districts, which are the authorities of first ins-
tance, organs of state administration organized
regionally and at a higher level than the counties
should be the authorities of second instance,
• In the case of organs that do not possess autho-
rities of first instance at local level, an attempt
should be made to bring the legal spheres of com-
petence at first instance to a level that is closer to
customers (the clerks of self-governments in dist-
rict centers), while organs of second instance
should be established at regional level on the basis
of the former county organs,
• In the case of organs that are currently function-
ing at regional level (or which have territorial
competence stretching beyond the county frame-
work) an attempt should be made to harmonize
territorial competence in line with the framework
of the seven regions for planning, statistics, and
regional development,
• Of the county (capital city) offices of public ad-
ministration, a priority task of the heads of these
offices in the seven regions for planning, statistics,
and regional development should be to coordi-
nate the work of devolved organs functioning at
regional level and their control according to the
provisions of a separate law.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: on-going
e) New tasks of regional state administration should
primarily be entrusted to existing regional organs of
state administration, or, where these are lacking, to
the administrative offices functioning as government
offices. The addressee of the branch state administ-
ration tasks and spheres of competence placed with
the offices of public administration should be:
• in affairs that rarely arise or represent a small
administrative turnover, the head of the office
of public administration,
• in affairs with a high administrative turnover or
requiring special professional expertise, the in-
ternal units with there own tasks and spheres of
competence of the offices of public administra-
tion.
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Responsible: ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: on-going
With Regard to the Local Self-governments
The review of the tasks and spheres of competence of the
local self-governments should be continued. In the course
of the review, an attempt should be made to ensure that:
• in accordance with the provisions of the self-govern-
ment law, self-governments of localities with larger
populations and capacities should receive a greater
number of compulsory tasks while the smaller ones
should be relieved of compulsory tasks that exceed
their capacities,
• a review is made of the professional regulations and
system of conditions of the provision of compulsory
tasks by self-governments,
• concerning re-regulation, a proposal should be made
concerning the level of self-government at which the
tasks reviewed should be carried out from the pers-
pective of effectiveness and efficiency,
• Where justified, a proposal should be made concern-
ing the provision of tasks within associations and the
incentives for the development of such associations.
Responsible: ministers concerned
Minister of the Interior
Deadline: on-going
II. Other Tasks
a) The competence and efficiency of the provision of
tasks of public administration by the public corpo-
rations should be examined.
Responsible: Government Control Office
Deadline: 31 March 2002
Tasks Concerning the Institutional Development
of the System of Public Administration
• Tasks Concerning Organizational Modernization
II/1.
The possibility and expediency of establishing a mo-
nitoring system serving to monitor the comprehen-
sive governmental tasks, coordination, and commu-
nication concerning the Roma problem and to be
operated with the involvement of a wide range of
those affected should be examined.
Responsible: Minister of Justice
Deadline: 31 October 2001
II/2.
With regard to the integration of tasks concerning
foreign trade into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
proposals concerning the development of a system
of foreign representations that is more integrated than
the present one, should be elaborated within the
framework of the continued modernization of the
institutional system concerning foreign markets.
Responsible: Minister of Foreign Affairs
Deadline: 31 December 2001
II/3.
The development of a new organizational structure
for the treasury system should be continued.
Responsible: according to Government
Resolution No. 2064/2000.
(III. 29.) Korm.
Deadline: according to Government
Resolution No. 2064/2000.
(III. 29.) Korm.
II/4.
By providing continuous methodological assistance,
the modernization of the regulations concerning the
organization and operation of the ministries and organs
of central public administration should be continued,
ensuring the application of uniform and general
governmental regulatory reform guidelines.
Responsible: according to Point 3 of
Government Resolution
No.  2396/1997. (XII. 8.)
Korm.
Deadline: according to Point 3 of
Government Resolution
No.  2396/1997. (XII. 8.)
Korm.
II/5.
With regard to the tasks concerning the introduction
of a public service career structure, the review of the
organizational purview of the law on the legal status
of civil servants should be continued, and, subse-
quently, a program of proposals should be prepared
concerning the reform of organs that are to be removed
from the purview of the law as a result of the review.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
in cooperation with the
ministers concerned
Deadline:
• for the review: 30 September 2001
• for the preparation
of proposals: 31 December 2001
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II/6.
With regard to EU accession, the real powers of de-
cision of the regional development councils should
be expanded in the field of state subsidies for deve-
lopment, initially by transferring a certain proportion
of the target allocations for regional development into
regional spheres of competence.
Responsible: Minister of Agriculture
and Regional Development
Deadline: in accordance with the
Budget for 2001–2002
II/7.
A proposal should be prepared concerning the deve-
lopment of the legislation records of the Ministry of
Justice, as the official keeper of records of Hungarian
legislation, with a view to the management of Euro-
pean Union legislation and legal information.
Responsible: Minister of Justice
Deadline: 31 March 2002
 II/8.
The ministries should provide for the compilation
and continuous up-dating of a list of those organs
operating under their own management or super-
vision as well as of their own tasks and spheres of
competence, and for the regular publication of the
above in electronic form or on paper.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline:
• compilation
of the lists: 31 December 2001
• other: on-going
II/9.
The ministries should prepare action programs for
the development of their contacts with the civil sector.
Within this framework, they should provide for the
involvement of professional and interest represen-
tations organs as well as research establishments with
a view to substantiating professionally the tasks out-
lined in the present Government Resolution and their
implementation.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for coordination: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: on-going
• Tasks Concerning Human Resources
II/10.
Tasks related to the introduction of a public service
career structure:
a) The heads of the ministries and organs of central
public administration should elaborate annual
priorities comprising the basis of the performance
requirements to be applied within a system of
personal performance evaluation.
Responsible: ministers concerned and
the heads of the organs of
central public administration
Deadline: annually
• first deadline: 1 October 2001
b) For the fulfillment of tasks concerning the per-
sonal performance evaluation, methodological
assistance should be provided for the (coordi-
nated) harmonized determining of the annual
priorities for each sector.
Responsible: Minister of Justice
Deadline: 1 September 2001,
and then 1 June 2002
c) Within the framework of the financial manage-
ment system applying to the budgetary organs,
the introduction of a more flexible system of staff
and salary management should be established
and proposals should be prepared concerning the
possible directions of regulatory reform.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office,
with regard to the central
budgetary organs within
the cognizance of the
Government
Minister of Finance
Minister of the Interior
Deadline: 31 March 2002
d) The medium term program for 2001 and 2002
concerning European Union public administra-
tion training should be elaborated.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: 31 December 2001
e) An advanced training strategy for senior civil ser-
vants should be elaborated, as well as a specific
advanced training program necessary for imple-
mentation.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Minister of the Interior
Ministers concerned
Deadline: 31December 2001
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II/11.
By virtue of Point 2.2 of the agreement between the
Government and the cooperation Forum of the Trade
Unions, a report on the situation of employees in the
public sector should be prepared. Within this frame-
work, an evaluation of the level of training necessary
for EU accession should be made.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Minister of the Interior
with the involvement of
ministers concerned
Deadline: annually
• first deadline: 31 December 2001
• Other Tasks Concerning an Improvement in the
Operating Efficiency of the System of Public Administration
II/12.
Methodological assistance should be provided for the
sake of the continued development of cost-benefit
analysis and organizational performance evaluation
and their wider application.
Within this framework:
• the methodological coordination of activities
begun by the ministries and their organs of central
public administration should be ensured,
• the methods of cost-benefit analysis applicable
to decision-making in non-economic areas should
be elaborated,
• the possibilities of employing modern methods
of administration should be examined, methodo-
logical instructions should be prepared on the
basis of the findings and results,
• the legal foundation determining which organs
and institutions are required to perform cost-
benefit analyses and under what conditions and
circumstances they are to do so, as well as the
instances in which a given organ may determine
this issue for itself, should be elaborated,
• the current opportunities for applying cost-benefit
analysis must be examined, as well as the factors
preventing this, in addition to the current state
of information, human resources, and access to
an appropriate data base,
• An examination should determine which areas
need to be developed in order to eradicate the
factors preventing progress that were outlined
in the previous point (as well as financial and
other consequences),
• A schedule for the realization of developments
mentioned in the previous point should be ela-
borated.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
through the Hungarian
Public Administration
Institute
Deadline: on-going
II/13.
A survey of the application of procedural stamp duties
and administrative charges payable for official proce-
dures should be performed, and their use and effi-
ciency determined.
Responsible: Minister of Finance
Cooperating with the
ministers concerned
Deadline: 31 March 2002
II/14.
Employing a cost-benefit analysis, the use of amounts
flowing in on the basis of the law on support for pro-
fessional training should be examined.
Responsible: Minister of Education
Deadline: 31 March 2002
II/15.
Concerning the development of information techno-
logy:
a) A comprehensive information technology deve-
lopment program for the system of public admi-
nistration should be drawn up. Within this
framework, special attention should be paid to
the early introduction of electronic government
and to spatial aspects of information.
Responsible: Government
Commissioner for
Information Technology
Deadline: 31 December 2001
b) Within the framework of the information tech-
nology development program, an exact schedule
should be elaborated for the establishment of the
data-wealth records of public administration,
which was ordered in Government Resolution
No. 1113/2000. (XII. 27.) Korm.
Responsible: Government
Commissioner for
Information Technology
Deadline: 31 December 2001
c) Methodological assistance should be provided in
order to increase the role of information tech-
nology within the system of public administra-
tion: introduction and development of electronic
group work, the establishment of “paper-free”
offices, electronic task management, manage-
ment of separate data, electronic scheduling,
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deadline reminders, increased knowledge of in-
formation technology among clerks.
Responsible: Government
Commissioner for
Information Technology
Deadline: on-going
d) The implementation of the documentation pro-
ject begun by the Prime Minister’s Office in 1999
should be continued. Based on the newly deve-
loped Government Documentation System, uni-
form standards of documentation should be ela-
borated.
Responsible: Government
Commissioner for
Information Technology
Deadline:
• for project
completion: 30 September 2001
• for the elabo-
ration of
standards: 31 March 2002
e) An examination should be made concerning which
information technology and data protection sys-
tems are available within the whole of the national
budget, and how these may be used to gain access
to data and to establish an extensive data base, a
base forming the basis of, and necessary for, cost-
benefit analysis; and the first steps towards the
elaboration of a data base should be taken.
Responsible: Government
Commissioner for
Information Technology
Deadline: on-going
II/16.
An examination should be made of the possibility of
establishing computer records and checking systems
between the organizations of public administration,
and of the possibility of establishing a uniform natio-
nal system for the distribution of grants and assistance,
with a view to strengthening controls on the use of
European Union financial resources.
Responsible:
• for the technical Government
establishment of Commissioner for
grant records and Information Technology
control systems:
• for the tasks con-
cerning the content
and operation of
the system: Minister of Finance
Deadline: 31 December 2001
II/17.
With a view to establishing a system of public ad-
ministration that meets the requirements of disabled
people, the ministries should examine and make pro-
posals concerning:
• An increase in the number of disabled experts
employed in public administration
The possibility of establishing an administration
that is free of obstacles from an architectural and
communicational perspective.
Responsible: ministers concerned
Deadline: on-going
II/18.
Methodological assistance should be provided for the
support of the wider application within public admi-
nistration of modern quality assurance systems, and
a national program for the introduction of quality
assurance systems into organs of state administration
should be elaborated. Within this framework:
• A survey should be performed of the initiatives
of organs of state administration and self-govern-
ment in this area,
• With a view to the introduction of a uniform
system of quality assurance and development,
which may be applied throughout the system of
public administration, a domestic adaptation of
the system applied in the European Union (the
Common Assessment Framework) should be
elaborated, and its implementation should be
commenced according to a schedule established
in the national program.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Through the Hungarian
Public Administration
Institute
• for measuring
the initiatives
of the munici-
palities: Minister of the Interior
Deadline: on-going
III. Legislative Tasks Affecting
the Development of the System
of Public Administration
III/1.
With regard to the review of the law on the general
regulations of state administration procedure, and the
renewed regulation of this subject area:
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a) The draft of a new uniform law on public admi-
nistration procedure should be elaborated. This
should include a definition of the legal term of
organ of public administration and its types.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Minister of Justice
Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: the bill should be sub-
mitted to the Government
by March 31, 2002
b) In connection with the elaboration of the new
law on public administration procedure, the de-
tailed regulations concerning the new system of
supervision for the organs of state administration
should be drawn up.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Deadline: in line with the above
deadline
c) Following the adoption of the new law on public
administration procedure, the ministries should
provide for the amendment of the legal regulations
affected by the reform of the general procedure.
With a view to a rapid settlement, the ministries
should begin a review of the special procedural
regulations within their own sectors once the regula-
tory strategy/draft of the new law has been adopted.
Responsible: ministers concerned
Deadline: on-going
III/2.
With regard to regulatory reform:
a) The amendment to the law on legislation, which
is necessary owing to Hungary’s accession to the
European Union, should be elaborated.
Responsible: according to Government
Resolution No. 2319/2000.
(XII. 21.) Korm.
Deadline:
• for the sub- according to Government
mission of Resolution No. 2319/2000.
the regulatory (XII. 21.) Korm.
strategy to the
Government:
• for the sub-
mission of the
draft bill to the
Government: 28 February 2002
b) An action plan should be drawn up processing
the recommendations made by the OECD con-
cerning regulatory reform in its country report
on Hungary, as well as the annual reports of the
European Commission. An inter-departmental
committee should be established for this purpose.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Minister of Justice
Heads of ministries affected
Deadline: 1 July 2001
c) The main regulations of the organizational and pro-
cedural rules relating to the continuous deregu-
latory examination of laws should be elaborated.
Responsible: Ministry of Justice
Deadline: 31 December 2001
d) The methodology of examining the preliminary
and subsequent effects of laws and their drafts
should be prepared, and methodological assis-
tance should be provided with a view to support-
ing its introduction and propagation.
Responsible: Minister of Justice
Deadline: on-going
• elaboration of the
methodology: 31 March 2002
e) The Minister of Justice should prepare a report
annually on the results of technical and essential,
and continuous and specific instances of deregu-
lation.
Responsible: Minister of Justice
Deadline:
• first deadline: 31 December 2001
III/3.
Concerning the constitutional amendment that is
mentioned in Point 2/a. of Government Resolution
No. 2319/2000. (XII. 21.) Korm. And is necessary
owing to the accession of Hungary to the European
Union, the following should be elaborated:
a) Legislation concerning the signing of internatio-
nal treaties;
b) Legislation concerning foreign relations.
Responsible:
• for point a): Minister of Justice
Minister of Foreign Affairs
• for point b): Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Justice
Deadline:
• submission of
the regulatory
strategies to the
Government: 31 August 2001
• submission of
draft legis-
lation to the
Government: 28 February 2002
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III/4.
With regard to the regulatory guidelines of chapter I
of the Government Resolution, the regulatory strategy
for a comprehensive amendment to the law on local
self-governments should be prepared. Within this
framework, special attention should be paid to the
following issues:
• The scope, system, and legal and professional
conditions of tasks of state administration ful-
filled at the local self-governments,
• Possibilities of establishing systems of administ-
ration for areas surrounding cities (small regions),
• Modernization of the system of administration
of the capital city and the surrounding area,
• Possible solutions for a reform of the level of re-
gional self-government, and its effect on the elec-
toral system,
• Reform of the system of financing,
• Extension of the legal monitoring system of self-
governments.
In areas of special attention, various strategies and
regulatory plans of equal professional value should
be elaborated, analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages of the various solutions.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Minister of Justice
Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Minister of Finance
• with regard to
reform of the
system of
financing: Minister of Finance
Deadline: 31 December 2001
III/5.
Regulations should be drafted concerning the preli-
minary control of the use and auditing of local self-
government assistance stemming from the central
budget and from other sub-systems of the state budget.
Responsible: Minister of Finance
Deadline: 31 August 2001
III/6.
With regard to the tasks concerning the introduction
of a public service career structure:
a) A proposal should be made concerning the draft-
ing of detailed regulations relating to the priority
senior civil servants and the central civil servants.
Responsible: Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Minister of the Interior
Deadline: 1 July 2001
b) The draft of a government decree containing de-
tailed regulations on the introduction of a wealth
declaration and control system should be elabo-
rated.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Deadline: 1 July 2001
c) After the amendment to the law on the legal sta-
tus of civil servants, any necessary amendments
to the executive decrees of the law must be pre-
pared, with respect to qualifications, public service
records, the public service legal status of civil ser-
vants employed permanently abroad, the placing
of staff in reserve, and regulations concerning
the temporary posting abroad of civil servants.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Deadline: 31 December 2001
d) In connection with the comprehensive review
of the law on the legal status of civil servants, the
government decrees on professional examinations
in the public administration sphere and on the fur-
ther training of civil servants and public administ-
ration management training should be amended.
Responsible: Minister of the Interior
Minister Heading the
Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: 31 December 2001
e) Ministry agreements concerning the ministries’
civil servants employed permanently abroad should
be elaborated and the deregulation of related current
internal provisions should be implemented.
Responsible: Minister of Foreign Affairs
in agreement with the
ministers concerned
Deadline: 31 December 2001
III/7.
With a view to the uniform and district-centered pro-
vision of the tasks of state administration:
a) The harmonization of the territorial competence
of the four types of local administrative districts
should be concluded.
Responsible: according to Government
Resolution No. 2341/2000.
(XII. 27.) Korm.
• for coordi- Minister Heading the
nation: Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: according to Government
Resolution No. 2341/2000.
(XII. 27.) Korm.
b) A proposal should be made concerning the
transfer to district level of other tasks of state
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administration provided at local or regional level
and an examination should be made of the pos-
sibility of harmonizing the territorial competence
of organs providing public administration tasks
and functioning at district level. On the basis of
the result of the examination, a strategy should
be elaborated concerning the general administ-
rative category of the small region of public ad-
ministration, and, within this framework, the main
provisions concerning its tasks, organization,
management, territories of territorial competence,
and financing should be elaborated.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for the coordi- Minister Heading the
nation: Prime Minister’s Office
Deadline: on-going
III/8.
With regard to regional development:
a) The detailed regulations relating to the operation
of the county area development councils,
territorial development councils, and regional
development councils as well as their legal
supervision should be elaborated.
Responsible: according to Government
Resolution No. 2313/2000.
(XII. 20.) Korm.
Deadline: according to Government
Resolution No. 2313/2000.
(XII. 20.) Korm.
b) A proposal should be drafted concerning the ela-
boration of uniform organizational and opera-
tional regulations and procedural rules for the
monitoring committees.
Responsible: according to Government
Resolution No. 2134/1999.
(VI. 11.) Korm.
Deadline: according to Government
Resolution No. 2134/1999.
(VI. 11.) Korm.
IV. Final Provisions
IV/1.
The ministries should report annually on the imple-
mentation of their tasks outlined in the development
plan, and should send their reports to the Minister
Heading the Prime Minster’s Office.
Responsible: ministers concerned
• for the summary the Minister Heading
and processing of the Prime Minster’s
the reports: Office
Deadline: 31 December 2001 and
31 December 2002
IV/2.
This Resolution shall enter into force on the day of
its publication, at which time the following shall be
repealed simultaneously:
• Government Resolution No. 1052/1999. (V. 21.)
Korm. containing the plan of governmental tasks
concerning the continued development of the
public administration system in 1999–2000,
• Government Resolution No. 1027/1996. (IV. 3.)
Korm. on the completion of the first stage of the
reform of organs of territorial state administra-
tion and tasks to be carried out in the future,
• Government Resolution No. 1106/1995. (XI. 9.)
Korm. on the continued development of the
coordination of information technology in the
system of central public administration,
• Government Resolution No. 1033/1995. (IV. 28.)
Korm. on the creation of harmony between the
tasks and staff numbers of the various ministries
and organs of national authority and of their organs
of regional state administration, and on their
possibilities of expenditure and staff reductions,
• Government Resolution No. 2128/1997. (V. 22.)
Korm. on the abrogation of various laws and
other tasks connected with deregulation,
• Government Resolution No. 2171/1996. (VII.
10.) Korm. on the implementation of the reform
of organs of regional state administration, and
the planned relationship between the offices of
public administration and other organs of
regional state administration in the future,
• Government Resolution No. 2316/1995. (X.
18.) Korm. on the tasks connected with the abro-
gation of various laws,
• Government Resolution No. 2118/1995. (IV.
27.) Korm. on the various tasks of the continued
development of public administration records,
• Points 2-10 of Government Resolution No.
1004/1995. (I. 20.) Korm. on the review of laws
according to the requirements of deregulation,
• Points 3.1.3. 3.1.4. And 3.6.3. Of Government
Resolution No. 1023/1995. (III. 22.) Korm. on
the corrective measures of 1995 serving economic
stabilization,
• Tasks relating to Chapter IX of Annex No. 2 of
Government Resolution No. 1062/1996. (VI.
4.) Korm. on preparations for budgetary reform,
• Points III/E/2. And III/H/3. Of Government
Resolution No. 1067/1996. (VI. 19.) Korm. on
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the work program arising out of the document
entitled “Hároméves megállapodás a közalkal-
mazotti szférában” [‘Three-year agreement in the
public employee sector’],
• Government Resolution No. 2003/1995. (I. 20.)
Korm. determining the 1995 operative plan of
the government commissioner for the moderni-
zation of the public administration system.
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NOTES
1 For the comparative analysis the Hungarian Study uses the ‘Synthesis Paper 2000’ written by EC on the preparation
of the candidate countries for the accession to the EU and the OECD country reports assessing the Hungarian
experiences comparing the best practices, see: ‘OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Regulatory Reform in Hungary’,
Paris, 2000. And ‘OECD Territorial Reviews: Hungary’  Paris, 2001.
2 The Hungarian Study uses as a pattern the ‘TOR of 1999-2000, and 2001–2002 for Public Administration Development
Program’ accepting by the Central Government in 1999 and 2001. To show the response of the Hungarian Central
Government to these challenges. (See : Resolutions of Central Government of Hungary 1052/1999(V.22.) and 1057/
2001. (VI.13.) Korm. Sz.r.)
3 The Country Study based on the next main studies: Development of EU-Conform Regions in Hungary, or Financial
System of the Hungarian Local (Self) governments, World Bank- PMO’s of Hungary Common Published Studies, (Public
Administration Development Studies Series 4th and 5th Columns), Budapest, 2001.
4 Tamás M. Horváth: Directions and Differences of Local Changes. In.: Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms. OSI/
LGI, 2000. p. 27.
5 The main three purposes and/or functions of the local governments are ‘Liberty’/ ‘Autonomy’, and ‘Participation’/
‘Democracy’ and ‘Effectiveness’/ ‘Capability’. See: L.J. Sharpe: Theories and Values of Local Government. Political
Studies.1993. /2. (153-174.pp.), J.Stewart-R.Greenwood: The Purpose and Character of Local Government, INLOGOV,
and University of Birgmingham.1995.
6 OECD Report on Regulatory Reform in Hungary. Paris, 2000. pp. 15–37.
7 István Temesi: Local Government in Hungary. In. Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms. OSI/LGI.2000. (348.p.)
8 OECD, 2000. p. 11.
9 In every ministry there are divided the role of two secretariats: a Permanent State Secretariats for administrative
function, leaded by the highest ranking senior civil servant, who is considered politically neutral; and for the political
function, a Parliamentary State Secretariat, which has a political leader (mostly one of the MPs), who represents the
minister in Parliament and other interministerial committees, and is the political counselor or deputy of the minister
in the ministries. Hungary Country Profile. SIGMA, 1999. p. 10.
10 The Hungarian Study used the main studies in that field which are the following: Hungary-Subnational Modernization,
Policy Note (An Integrated Effort for Modernizing the Subnational Government System in Hungary), World Bank-
PMO’s of Hungary Common Published Study, (Public Administration Development Studies Series 1st Column, Budapest.
1999, or Davey, K.–Horváth, M., T.–Péteri, G.: Local Autonomy and Responsibility (Development of government
actions in a plural public service system) British Know How Fund-PMO’s of Hungary Common Published Study,(Public
Administration Studies Series 2nd Column), Budapest, 2000.
11 Resolution  of Government on TOR of Public Administration Development 1999–2000. V. Chapter.  And the Series of
Research Studies on Public Administration Reform and Regional Policy. Published by PMO 1999–2001. (1-5. Column.)
12 The European Commission, in its annual country report for 2000, the latter institution offered a favourable judgement
of the development of public administration, according to which “Hungary is achieving stable development in every
area in the establishment of the administrative capacity with a view to the application of the Community Achievements.
In the continued implementation of the 1999 development programme, further progress may be seen in the modernisation
of the system of public administration.”
13 The last OECD Report on Regulatory Reform evaluated the whole transition process, included the decentralization
too, and stated the followings: ‘ after ten years of determined reform... Hungary has entered the mainstream of OECD
countries with respect to the challenges it faces in establishing quality regulatory regimes supporting good government and
long-term economic growth.’
14 The British Know How program  helped, besides other issues, the training of senior civil servants and preparing the
new amendment of act on Civil Servants to match the new regulation the British practice. For instance the PMO
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has supported the regional contribution  of French INFH and Association of Hungarian Municipalities to train the
local leaders and experts for the regional and rural programming.
15 OECD, 2000. p. 11.
16 OECD, 2000, p. 22.
17 Resolution of Government 183/1988(XI.11.) Korm.sz.r. On The tasks and responsibilities of the Parliamentary Secretariat
in the PMO for the Public Administration and Regional Policy.
18 The medium-term program was adopted in Government Decree No. 1035/1999. (IV. 21.).
19 The Country Study based on the next main studies: Development of EU-Conform Regions in Hungary, or Financial
System of the Hungarian Local (Self-G, World Bank-PMO’s of Hungary Common Published Studies, (Public Administ-
ration Development Studies Series 4th and 5th Columns), Budapest, 2001.
20 The Country Study based on the next main studies: Development of EU-Conform Regions in Hungary, or Financial
System of the Hungarian Local (Self) governments, World Bank- PMO’s of Hungary Common Published Studies, (Public
Administration Development Studies Series 4th and 5th Columns), Budapest, 2001. And Davey, K-Horváth, M., T-
Péteri, G.: Local Autonomy and Responsibility (Development of government actions in a plural public service system)
British Know How Fund-PMO’s of Hungary Common Published Study, (Public Administration Studies Series 2nd
Column), Budapest, 2000.
21 OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Regulatory Reform in Hungary, Paris, 2000. p. 11.
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Decentralization of Public Administration in the
Republic of Croatia—Reform Process Management
Te o d o r  A n t i c´
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INTRODUCTION
After the multi-party elections in 1990, the enactment of
the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia on 22 Decem-
ber 1990 and the announcement of independence on 25
June 1991, Croatian administration was for the first time
fully defined through the regulations of the Croatian
Parliament.
In addition to the general problems facing all administrative
systems, the Croatian administration was, while in the
process of its shaping, confronted with special circumstances
related to its historic development: the dissolution of the
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the struggle
for the independence of the Croatian state, the transition
from a one-party to a multi-party political system, the
transition from an economy based on social ownership,
to a market economy with a mostly private ownership
structure, and finally war that brought part of the territory
under military occupation and destruction of great mag-
nitude. These circumstances indicated the need for the
shaping and strengthening of all parts of the administrative
system appropriate for an independent state.
As a consequence of that situation, the system of state
administration leant towards unity and centralization,
even after the mentioned extraordinary circumstances had
ceased to exist, while the interests emerging from regional
and local differences were neglected, thus developing the
swift expansion and extraordinary concentration of the
Croatian state administration.
In these circumstances, a system of local self-government
was enacted in 1992 through the Act on Local self-govern-
ment and Administration,1  after which in 1993 the first
local elections in accordance with the new system were held.
However, taking into account all of the above, this local self-
government system was fundamentally shaped to provide
for, and secure, a centralized management of public affairs.
Soon after the cessation of war activities and the re-integ-
ration of the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia
within its legal system, a need developed for a major reform
of the system of state administration and local self-govern-
ment:
1) firstly, in the direction of the opening up,  differentia-
tion and strengthening of the operational indepen-
dence of administration, the de-concentration of
power, and the decentralization of the political and
administrative system,
2) Secondly, in the direction of strengthening local and
regional self-government, so that it can gradually take
over responsibilities from central state authority, and
at the same time act as a counter-balance to this
authority.
The target of the whole reform is to allow for the narrow-
ing of the gap between citizens and the decision-making
process and for their greater participation in this process,
for a better identification of the problems, for the better
meeting of needs and for citizens to assume greater respons-
ibility in the management of public affairs, resulting in a
lessening of the concentration of the political power of
central state authority.
Starting Position and Guidelines for Decentralization.
Although the need for decentralization was considered from
the very beginning of the shaping of public administration
in the Republic of Croatia, and although some steps were
made in that direction early on, a more serious decision
about reform was taken only in 2000, and the first moves
were conducted in 2001.
The situation at the beginning of 2000 is as follows:
1. Central state administration is defined by the Act on
the State Administration System, the Act on the
Government of the Republic of Croatia, the Act on
the System and Competence of the Ministries and
State Administrative Organizations, the Act on State
Officials and Employees and on the Salaries of the
124 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
M A S T E R I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  P U B L I C  A D M I N I S T R AT I O N  R E F O R M S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
Bearers of Juridical Authority, and by a string of other
special laws and secondary legislation that defined
specific areas of activities of state administrative bodies.2
The state administration system includes administrative
bodies and organizations which the Government of
the Republic of Croatia, as the highest state political-
administ-rative body, directly guides and connects.
These bodies are also directly, or through the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia, connected to the
highest bearers of political authority in the state—
the Parliament and the President of the Republic.
The bodies of the state administration are ministries
(17), state administrative organizations (10), County
Offices (9–11 in each county) and the City Office of
the City of Zagreb.
State administration affairs include the direct applica-
tion of laws (the resolution of administrative cases,
managing inquest registers, issuing various certificates,
and conducting other administrative and professional
affairs), enacting regulations for the implementation
of laws, conducting administrative supervision and
other administrative and professional affairs.
From the point of view of administrative fields (portfo-
lios), state administration affairs could be classified as:
a) traditional state-authority portfolios: defense, in-
ternal affairs, foreign affairs, justice and finance,
b) economic portfolios: the economy, agriculture
and forestry, development, immigration and re-
construction, and tourism,
c) technical services: maritime affairs, transport and
communications, and science and technology,
d) communal services: environmental planning,
const-ruction and housing,
e) social services: culture, education and sport, labor
and social welfare, and health,
f ) Special portfolios: care of the veterans of the
Croatian War for Independence.
2. The local self-government system comprises 421
municipalities, 122 towns, 20 counties (which are at
the same time local administration units) and the City
of Zagreb (a special and unified territorial unit with
the status of a county).
Local self-government is defined by the Act on Local
self-government and Administration, the Act on the
Territories of Counties, Towns and Municipalities in
the Republic of Croatia, the Act on Financing the
Units of Local self-government and Administration,
and the Act on the Definition of Affairs within self-
government Competence of the Units of Local self-
government and Administration.3
Local self-government affairs include environment
planning and the arrangement of settlements, com-
munal activities, environmental protection, pre-school
education, culture, sport and social welfare.
The competence of a county involves mostly the affairs
of harmonizing the interests and positions of muni-
cipalities and towns within its territory, as well as
equal development for both.
For seven years (from 1993 to 2000), competence
for fire departments and cable registries has belonged
to the local self-government scope of affairs after having
been transferred from the state administration.
However, this transfer was not accompanied by an
appropriate increase of revenue with which local self-
government units could finance these affairs.
The general assessment of public administration in the
Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 2000 is as follows:
• The state administration system focuses on unity and
tends towards centralization, neglecting interests
stemming from regional and local differences. This
results in its rapid expansion and extreme concentra-
tion. It is a heavily centralized, huge apparatus that
cannot be flexible and has great difficulties in adapting
to the new roles and tasks set before it;
• The uneconomical and large number of local self-
government units and employees working in different
administrative bodies has an impact on the level of
public expenditure, while the centralization of many
administrative tasks limits the efficiency of local self-
government bodies. At the same time, the existing
system of financing local self-government units
hampers the development of an efficient communal
infrastructure and is not able to meet the basic needs
of citizens in terms of health care, social welfare,
employment, education, culture and protection of
the environment.
Consequently, it is clear that the state administration, in
executing its competencies, needs to transform gradually
as far as it can into an instrument for resolving the current
problems of society. It should also take over the administ-
ration of the public sector rather than become a traditional
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state administration. Its role should be to identify situa-
tions that cause problems in society, to develop programs
for the resolution of these problems, and to implement
these programs with the best possible cost-benefit ratio.
Therefore, it is becoming necessary to start as soon as
possible the process of delegating administrative duties
and transferring relevant administrative organizations and
employees from state administration to the wider subsys-
tems of the so-called public sector, which would decrease
the influence of state authority centers on organizations.
At the same time, within these organizations, the role of
hierarchical structures would be decreased, since the focus
of integration would be transferred to work methods. In
parallel to this, part of the administrative duties should
be obviously transferred to local self-government bodies,
as these bodies are the closest to citizens.
REFORM GUIDELINES,
ACTIVITIES, RESULTS
Guidelines and Initial Activities
The Government of the Republic of Croatia, formed after
the parliamentary elections of 3 January 2000, through
its action program (hereinafter: Government Program)
and within the sphere of its internal policy during the
period of its mandate, announced the reform of public
administration aimed at decentralization.
The Government Program, among other issues, includes:
• halting the expansion of state administration, avoiding
the establishment of new administrative organizations
and the employment of new officials and employees,
• horizontal decentralization, delegating certain state
administration affairs to autonomous organizations
outside the state administration system,
• a critical analysis and assessment of the cost-effective-
ness and efficiency of the state administration appara-
tus, implementing a program to reduce expenditures
and increase savings,
• initiating a process leading to the broad decentraliza-
tion and strengthening of the role of local and regional
self-government, defining the competence’s of local
self-government through a general clause, introducing
the principle of subsidiary, increasing the fiscal capacity
of local and regional units,
• A gradual transformation of the territorial system,
the establishment of a smaller number of regional
units, the coalescence of local self-government units
aimed at increasing their capacity and raising the level
of cost-effectiveness of local structures.4
In July 2000 the Government of the Republic of Croatia
established the Office for the Development Strategy of
the Republic of Croatia, as its expert service with the duty
to co-ordinate work on preparing, developing and imple-
menting the strategic guidelines of the Government
Program, to prepare strategic development documents,
and to provide the preconditions for the development and
implementation of the Project on the Development
Strategy ‘Croatia in the 21st Century.’5
The Project on the Development Strategy ‘Croatia in the
21st Century’ (hereinafter: the Strategy Project) comprises
19 different areas related to economic and social life. An
expert team was established for every area with the task to
draw up a document on the strategy of development for
that particular area (‘a separate file’), as part of the total
strategy of the development of the country. The Strategy
Project has its Central Council that is presided over by
the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia as
co-ordinator of the development of the strategy, while its
members are leaders of individual specific areas.
After the expert team has prepared the text of a proposal
of a separate file for a particular area, the text is published
on the Internet where it can be accessed by interested
institutions and all citizens.6
Various forms of public debate on the text of a separate
file are held (presentations, forums, round-tables) where
ministries competent for the area in question and interested
persons can participate.
It was envisaged that, once the final texts of all the separate
files were completed according to the mentioned procedure,
the Government would accept them all as a single document
on the total development strategy of the Republic of Croatia,
and would send the document to the Croatian Parliament
for adoption by the end of 2001. However, since the
separate files for some areas have not yet been completed,
the Government has decided to receive each of the separate
files individually as they are completed and send them in
that order to Parliament for adoption.
The texts of some separate files dealing with certain areas
contain an orientation towards the decentralization and
‘de-statization’ of certain tasks that are currently carried
out within the scope of state administration. Such an
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orientation is particularly dealt with in the separate files
dealing with public administration, social welfare, educa-
tion, and health.
In November 2000 the Government of the Republic of
Croatia and the Open Society Institute—Croatia (here-
inafter the OSI) concluded an Agreement on Co-opera-
tion, part of which deals with the decentralization of public
administration.
On the basis of this Agreement, a contract on the imple-
mentation of the project ‘Decentralization of Public Ad-
ministration’ (hereinafter: CLC Project) was concluded
between the OSI and the Croatian Law Center (herein-
after: CLC).
The CLC Project deals with issues that regard the formula-
tion of the aims of the decentralization of public administ-
ration and with the specific actions necessary for opening
up a dialogue with local self-government and the citizens
as end-users of the public administration reform.
The CLC Project covers several specific areas:
• the electoral system for local elections,
• the territorial organization of local and regional self-
government,
• the legal status and competence’s of local self-govern-
ment,
• the status of local officials,
• the decentralization of primary and secondary edu-
cation,
• the decentralization of health care,
• the decentralization of social services,
• decentralization in the field of culture and
• the financing of local and regional self-government.
A special expert team was created for each area. The expert
teams are made up of lawyers, political scientists, econo-
mists, and experts in public finances, sociologists, historians,
geographers, statisticians and experts in relevant areas of
public services. The work of the expert teams is co-
ordinated and directed by the Expert Council. About fifty
experts are involved in the work, while representatives of
government and non-government institutions, and
representatives of local and regional self-government are
involved in the implementation of the project.
For the purpose of implementing the project, a special
office was established within the CLC with three full-
time employees who are directly responsible to the CLC
management. The Supervisory Board of the Project, whose
members are representatives of the OSI, the Government
of the Republic of Croatia, and the CLC supervise the
implementation of the CLC Project.
For each individual area, the project includes: an analysis
of the situation and an identification of problems, a pre-
paration of proposals for an appropriate policy7 and al-
ternative models, a legitimization of the proposals (through
different discussions with various bodies), the adoption
of the proposals and their application, and an evaluation
of the results and success ratio.
In addition to this, starting from the beginning of 2000,
a number of other partial programs have been introduced,
consisting of individual areas where the decentralization
process should be conducted. These programs are carried
out by different domestic and foreign entities, receiving
various levels of support and co-operation from state bodies,
or are performed completely independently.
These projects are as follows:
1) Project on the Reform of Social Security—Ministry
of Labor and Social Welfare of the Republic of Croatia,
the World Bank and the DFID (UK),8
2) Fiscal Decentralization Project—Ministry of Finance
of the Republic of Croatia, US AID and Barents Group
LLC (USA),
3) Project of Technical Assistance in Formulating Frame-
works for the Conceptualization of the Regional Policy
of the Republic of Croatia (within the OBNOVA
Program)—Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction
and Building of the Republic of Croatia and the Euro-
pean Union,
4) Public Expenditures Analysis—Ministry of Finance
of the Republic of Croatia and the World Bank,
5) Local Financing and Local Budgets in the Republic
of Croatia—the Institute for Public Finances (Croatia)
6) Project on the Reform of Local self-government and
Administration—The Urban Institute (USA).
Conducted Activities
and Accomplished Results
Projects
In the autumn of 2000, activities aimed at decentralization
became more intensive. Some of the mentioned projects
began to be implemented, and at the same time, some
central state administration bodies directed their activities
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towards the same goal. Since the first results of these activi-
ties were accomplished in 2001, it can be concluded that
the process of decentralization has started.
In implementing the Strategy Project, the Office for the
Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia appointed
leaders for separate areas, who then formed their expert
teams and started working on their separate files. By the end
of November 2001 half of the separate files were completed.
Out of these, the preliminary procedure has been completed
for two of the separate files. This means that the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia has accepted the text of
the relevant proposal following a public debate and a
debate by expert bodies and forums, and sent it to the
Croatian Parliament for adoption. Six of the separate files
are currently in the process of being accepted by the
Government of the Republic of Croatia and its working
bodies. The remaining files are currently in the process of
being drawn up, or expert institutions and the respective
ministries are discussing the proposals. At the same time
the CLC Project commenced.
The execution of the program started with forums under
the title “Reform of Local self-government in the Republic
of Croatia” held in co-operation with the Union of Towns
and Municipalities of the Republic of Croatia in Nasice,
Varazdin, Karlovac, Crikvenica, Biograd and Makarska.
A total of 414 representatives of local self-government
units (mayors, municipality mayors, employees of local
self-government units) from 283 towns and municipalities
participated in the forums. The forums sought to present
the Project to the representatives of local self-government,
but also to collect information about local problems and
needs, as well as views and suggestions regarding local self-
government reform. The results of this survey and the con-
clusions from the forums which reflected the positions
and thoughts of the representatives of local self-government
units and which were debated at separate workshops are
being used in the continuing work on the Project.
The expert groups involved in local elections and in the
legal status and competencies of local self-government
were drawn into the work of the Ministry of Justice, Admi-
nistration and Local self-government in the process of
preparing the Bill on Local and Regional self-government
and the Bill on the Election of Members of Representative
Bodies of Local and Regional self-government Units.
The relevant expert group prepared a draft model on the
status of local government employees, which was debated
by a wide circle of experts and interested bodies (the Trade
Union of State and Local Officials and Employees of the
Republic of Croatia, the Union of Towns and Municipalities
of the Republic of Croatia, etc.). On the basis of the model
and in co-operation with the Ministry of Justice, Admi-
nistration and Local self-government a draft Bill on Local
Officials and Employees was prepared. Currently, dis-
cussions are being held on the Bill with the representatives
of local and regional self-government. Up to now, five
debates have been held (Osijek, Sisak, Cakovec, Opatija,
Zadar) while an additional one is planned (Dubrovnik).
By the autumn of 2001 fundamental discussions were
conducted for the preparation of the draft model of the
territorial organization of local and regional self-govern-
ment, the legal status and competence’s of local and
regional self-government, decentralization of primary and
secondary education, decentralization of social services
and financing of local and regional self-government. All
experts engaged in the Project, representatives of the
respective ministries and representatives of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia were present at the
discussions. A discussion including a wider expert circle
was held in the area related to local elections.
In June 2001, the expert group for the decentralization of
social services held a public forum named ‘Decentralization
of Social Policy and A New Role for Local Authorities.’
By the end of November 2001 draft models on the decent-
ralization of primary and secondary education, of health,
and of culture were prepared.9  The rest of the mentioned
projects are in different phases of execution.
In most of these programs, in addition to civil servants
from the respective ministries, the execution is conducted
by domestic and foreign assistants—experts who perio-
dically provide reports on their work and results to the
appropriate bodies for the supervision of projects (Super-
visory Board, Co-ordination Group, Steering Group).  For
the Government of the Republic of Croatia, respective
ministries supervise the execution of each of these projects.
Regulatory Framework
In 2001 the decentralization process was also undertaken
in the normative sphere.
The amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of
Croatia from November 2000 created the preconditions
to expand the competence of local self-government on the
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one hand, and introduced the concept of regional self-
government on the other hand.10
At the beginning of March 2001 the Government of the
Republic of Croatia decided on a ‘package’ of proposed
bills, a starting point for the process of the decentralization
of certain competencies of the state administration, which
it was proposed would be transferred to the units of local
self-government (municipalities and towns) and the units
of regional self-government (counties). By the summer
of 2001, the Croatian Parliament had enacted this ‘package.’
The new Act on Local and Regional self-government
(hereinafter: the Act)11  on the one hand brings the changes
necessary for decentralization (provisions on competence),
and on the other hand provides for straightforward
decentralization (provisions on organizational structure).
It is defined that towns and municipalities, within their self-
government competence, deal with affairs of local signifi-
cance that directly satisfy the needs of citizens, and for which
the Constitution or the law confer no competence to state
bodies. This wording is very similar to a general clause and
it is equivalent to the principle of subsidiary. The affairs
that fall within the mandatory competence relate to:
• arrangement of settlements and residential affairs,
• environmental and urban planning,
• communal activities,
• child care,
• social protection,
• primary health protection,
• pre-school and primary education,
• culture, physical culture, and sports,
• consumer protection,
• environmental protection and enhancement,
• Protection against fire and civil protection.
The affairs of regional significance are dealt with by the
counties, within their self-government competence, and
in particular relate to:
• education,
• health,
• environmental and urban planning,
• economic development,
• transport and the transport infrastructure,
• planning and development of a network of education,
health, social and cultural institutions.
However, under certain conditions, the units of local self-
government may deal with the affairs, over which the
county, in whose territory they are situated, has compe-
tence, if the unit is able to secure sufficient funds for that
purpose.
Regarding organizational structure, the Act provides for
no restraints in relation to the internal organization of
the local units; the units can freely decide whether they
will constitute a special executive body (certain categories
of units only), or whether a number of units will have
joint administrative bodies.
The Croatian Parliament also enacted amendments to
the laws that regulate areas of primary and secondary educa-
tion, health insurance and social protection. These amend-
ments partially decentralize the administration and the
financing of certain institutions in the mentioned areas.
The Law on the Amendments of the Law on Primary
Education and the Law on the Amendments of the Law
on Secondary Education transferred the right of establishing
primary and secondary schools and halls of residence to
the units of local and regional self-government. The men-
tioned laws also regulate the issue of managing schools;
and they delimit the obligations to pay for the expenditures
of schools and halls of residence.
The Law Amending the Law on Health Insurance partly
transferred to the county obligations to secure the func-
tioning of certain health institutions.
The Law Amending the Law on Social Protection partly
transferred to the counties activities in the area of social
protection; it regulated the issue of managing social protec-
tion centers; it delimited the obligations to pay for expen-
ditures, and it transferred to the counties the right of estab-
lishment of some residences of social protection.
The above-mentioned laws are being implemented as of
1 July 2001.12
At the same time the Law Amending the Law on Financ-
ing the Units of Local self-government and Administra-
tion13  was enacted. This Law regulates the financing of
the decentralized affairs.
On the basis of this Law, the Government of the Republic
of Croatia adopted the Regulation on Calculating
Clearing Assistance for the Decentralized Functions of
the Local and Regional Units for the period from 1 July
to 31 December 2001, which provides for a detailed
procedure of calculating the amount of support for the
these affairs.
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For the purposes implementing this Regulation, the
Government of the Republic of Croatia also adopted the
Decision on the Criteria to Secure Minimal Financial
Standards of Public Needs in Primary Education in 2001;
the Decision on Criteria to Secure Minimal Financial
Standards of Public Needs in Secondary Education in
2001; the Decision on Minimal Financial Standards for
Investment Maintenance of Health Institutions in 2001
in respect of the decentralized functions for the period
from 1 July to 31 December 2001; and the Decision on
Minimal Financial Standards for Current Expenditure
of Social Protection Centers and Expenditure for Heating
Assistance in 2001.14
In the area of culture, a number of laws implementing
decentralization in respect of founders’ rights were adopted.
Approval by the minister of culture is no longer required
in matters concerning the appointment and dismissal of
directors of museums, libraries, public theatres and other
public institutions in the area of culture.15
In addition to this, decentralization of the decision-making
process and of financing in the area of culture was imple-
mented by the adoption of the Law on Cultural Councils.16
Cultural councils for specific areas of culture were estab-
lished by this Law, through which employees in the area
of culture and artists could influence decisions relevant
for culture and art (proposals related to the aims of cultural
policy and measures to achieve the aims; co-decisions in
defining cultural policy; the provision of expert proposals
and opinions; opinions on annual programs for public
needs in culture).
Current Situation
When considering the current situation in the areas where
the process of decentralization has started, it is more
appropriate to speak about the consequences and effects
than about the results, and there are two reasons for this:
1) The process is still in its early stages, and the results
in terms of the realization of the proposed goals are
not yet available;
2) The adopted regulations, through which the process
of decentralization has come to life, are not the out-
come of the above-mentioned projects; the drafting
of the regulations, as well as their adoption, was not
linked to the implementation of the projects.
To summarize, the current situation is as follows:
1) Central state administration is defined by the Act on
the State Administration System, the Act on the
Government of the Republic of Croatia, the Act on
the System and Competence of the Ministries and
State Administrative Organizations, the Act on State
Officials and Employees, and by a string of special
laws and secondary legislation that define specific
areas of activities of state administrative bodies.17
The bodies of the state administration are: ministries
(19, two more than at the beginning of 2000), state
administrative organizations (8, two less than at the
beginning of 2000), County Offices (one office in
each county), and City Offices of the City of Zagreb.
2) The system of local self-government in the wider sense
of the word includes 424 municipalities (three more
than at the beginning of 2000), 122 towns, 20 counties
(as units of regional self-government), and the City
of Zagreb (which has the status of county).18
Local self-government is defined by the Act on Local
and Regional self-government, the Act on the Territory
of Counties, Towns and Municipalities in the Re-
public of Croatia, the Act on the Elections of Members
of Representative Bodies of the Units of Local and
Regional self-government, the Act on Financing the
Units of Local and Regional self-government, and
the Act on the City of Zagreb.19
3. In May 2001 local elections pursuant to the new elec-
toral law took place. Out of 546 local self-government
units; representative bodies in 541 units were consti-
tuted, as well as in each county and in the City of
Zagreb. Executive and administrative bodies were
constituted and their functioning was brought into
line with the provisions of the new law on local self-
government. In 5 units the elections were repeated
and the process of constituting the representative
bodies is still under-way.
4. On 1 July 2001 laws decentralizing certain activities
in the areas of social security, primary and secondary
education and health came into force. At the same
time, funds were transferred from the state budget
for decentralized activities to the units entrusted with
decentralized activities.
5) In the area of social security, some counties have not
yet started with the partial financing of the expendi-
tures of social security centers.
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Management councils have not yet been established
in a certain number of social security centers.
The right of establishing homes for older and disabled
persons will be transferred to the counties on 1 January
2002.
The funds for heating costs have not yet been secured
by a certain number of counties.
The regulation providing for registries of social rights
users has not yet been adopted by a certain number
of counties.
6) In the area of education, the right of establishing
primary and secondary schools, and pupils’ halls of
residence has not yet been taken over by the majority
of units.
School councils have been successfully established in
a large number of schools.
7) In the area of health, funds for the investment main-
tenance of health institutions, which are set up by
the county, have been determined in accordance with
the proposals of each individual county.
PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF DECENTRALIZATION
The decentralization measures that have been carried out
so far, contrary to some catastrophic warnings, have not
led to larger functional impediments in terms of the affairs
that have been partially decentralized.
However, some of the adopted measures are encountering
in their implementation huge problems and uncertainties
for which there is no solution at the moment. At the same
time, the decentralization process is advancing at a slow
and inefficient pace.
Putting it mildly, the first phase of decentralization can
be considered, with regard to the results achieved so far,
as being partially successful,
The reason for this lies in a string of objective but also
subjective factors, for which both the state as well as local
bodies can be blamed.
Limiting Factors in Relation to the State
A number of entities are included in the decentralization
process in terms of the state administration: the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia (as a political body),
individual ministers (as heads of the ministries), ministries
(as bodies of the state administration), civil servants from
individual ministries (as individuals), and each one of them
has a different role.
However, in the implementation of the process, each of
the entities is surrounded by a large number of objective
and subjective circumstances, which are slowing down,
limiting and making more difficult the course of events
and progress towards the desired results.
1) The Government of the Republic of Croatia rightly
started the whole process off by adopting its Program
that put the principle of decentralization in the center
of its future work in a number of areas. In the Program
itself, as well as in its subsequent conduct, the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia has constantly stressed
its unquestionable political will for the decentrali-
zation.
However, no implementing documents were adopted
in the meantime to define clear goals, provide for
elaborated methods and practical tasks, appoint bear-
ers and set deadlines and criteria to assess the results,
i.e. the goals of the decentralization process.
Decentralization is not a goal itself; it is merely a means
to achieve the goal. Therefore, the absence of any
document or documents (in relation to specific port-
folios) of a general nature leads to an unclear situation
and provokes doubts in relation to practical questions
as regards the implementation of decentralization:
where, when, how and why?
Indeed, everyone is involved in the implementation
of decentralization, but no entity is fully entrusted
with this task.
2) As a consequence of what has been mentioned above,
decentralization, on all levels of the decision-making
process, is often considered as one of many regular,
ordinary activities, and it is dealt with in this manner.
It is not rare that the tasks in relation to the decentra-
lization process are ‘dealt with’ as a matter of techni-
cality, and not as something that has strategic im-
portance. Even more frequently, tasks relating to
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decentralization are put aside because of the everyday
problems that have to be solved. Since decentraliza-
tion is considered as a long-term activity, it is thought
that it can always wait another day.
3) The pressure to fulfil public expectations in a short
period of time resulted in the fact that the decentrali-
zation process started before any development strategy
could be adopted, and before the decentralization
projects previously begun could have brought any
results. The first phase of decentralization was pre-
pared in a very short period of time. This did not allow
for a complete analysis of the current situation at that
time, and what was lacking in particular were alter-
native solutions with outcome simulations and impact
projections; the main method selected was the method
of trial and error.
4) Decentralization demands specific research and
managerial knowledge, and skills to manage the pro-
cess, and a large number of officials have no training
in this area. The majority has been trained to perform
routine tasks, and they are not prepared for such a
typical work. For this reason the assistance and advice
of foreign experts is frequently used. However, from
time to time, problems arise in the co-operation
between government officials and foreign experts;
language is perhaps the most banal problem, but
nonetheless it is often the most important.
5) Since a relatively small number of domestic administ-
rative staff has specialized knowledge and skills (ranging
from the knowledge of language to the ability to
manage certain processes), these individuals are heavily
burdened. In addition to their regular working duties,
they are involved in a constantly rising number of
projects, seminars, working groups, co-ordination
bodies and similar types of structures. On the one
hand, the advantage is that these persons greatly con-
tribute to the functioning of the above-mentioned
types of structures, since they have the opportunity
to obtain a great amount of information by partici-
pating in them. On the other hand, the activities
partly overlap, and since there is no co-ordination,
time and energy are unduly spent.
In addition, such an engagement has its objective
boundaries, which are frequently not taken into
account, influencing the quality of work and the exe-
cution of the tasks.
6) Decentralization encounters opposition from some
officials. The reasons vary: the mildest explanation is
the fear of the new. Decentralization leads to new
relationships, which change the conditions in which
the work has been done for years and to which every-
one has grown accustomed; for that reason, there is
fear of the possible difficulties to be encountered in
adapting to the new circumstances.
Another explanation might be that employees fear
that their position and importance will be lost or
reduced, and in the most extreme case, that they will
lose their job. Some state officials will lose more, and
some less, of the activities they have been performing
so far because of the transfer of competence from
state administration to local units. This will certainly
affect their position and all that it entails.
Limiting Factors
in Relation to Local Self-government
From the very beginning of the process of establishing
local self-government in the Republic of Croatia, local
units expressed their resentment to the highest-ranking
state bodies that among other things their competence
was too narrow and not sufficiently important. This was
often picturesquely presented in the statement ‘the com-
petence of local self-government is confined to cutting
the grass.’
However, when the first phase of decentralization was
about to start a large number of units were opposed to
this process. This opposition continued even after the first
measures of decentralization were implemented.
Some reasons for this opposition are of an objective, and
some of a subjective, nature:
1) A large number of municipalities and towns in the
Republic of Croatia cover a small area. On average,
municipalities have a population of about 3,600 and
a surface of 86 square kilometers, whereas towns have
a population of about 2,000 and a surface of 167 square
kilometers. According to European standards they
would be put into the category of small local units.20
A large number of local units simply have no capacity
to perform the tasks that should be executed by the
local self-government. And this relates not only to
financial capacity, but also to staff capacity.
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2) There has been some negative experience so far with
the transfer of the affairs of state administration to
local self-government, i.e. there has been no transfer
of financial funds (e.g. fire departments, cable re-
gistries) and this has intensified the fear that it would
not be possible for local self-government to carry out
the tasks entrusted to it.
3) The situation in the areas where the transfer is to take
place is sufficiently grave, and therefore there is addi-
tional fear that, besides executing the new tasks, the
responsibility for the difficult situation would be also
be transferred in the process of decentralization, a
situation for which the local units bear no respons-
ibility.
4) In a large number of units, especially in smaller units,
local officials lack sufficient knowledge, skills and
experience for the taking over of new, extremely com-
plex tasks. Most of them have been trained to perform
routine tasks, and are consequently not prepared for
the new tasks that involve high levels of responsibility.
5) Some of the high-ranking local officials have no wish
to take on more responsibility. Decentralization would
force them to manage resources differently and would
oblige them to spend the means from the state budget
in new priority areas, areas that rarely provoke public
interest and are neutral in terms of popularity. More-
over, decentralization imposes on official’s direct
responsibility with regard to citizens in the execution
of certain activities, and the opportunity to shift res-
ponsibility to the state level would no longer exist.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCESS
The decentralization process in the Republic of Croatia
has recently started. In its beginnings, it has involved
central state administration and local self-government (in
its wider sense), although not to the extent that would allow
us to say that the whole administrative system was being
decentralized.
For the process of decentralization to run more efficiently
and successfully, some recommendations for the future
implementation may be obtained from the experiences
gained in the preparation and implementation of the first
phase of decentralization.
Some of those recommendations could be the following:
1) The individual ministries responsible for the areas
where it is planned to carry out decentralization (whe-
ther it is intended to transfer tasks from the ministries
to state administrative regional units or from the state
administration to local self-government) should draft
a document to define the basic elements of decent-
ralization: its goals, methods and modalities of exe-
cution, concrete tasks with bearers and deadlines, as
well as criteria for the assessment of results, i.e. of the
achievement of the goals of decentralization. These
documents should be proposed by responsible
ministries and adopted by the Government of the
Republic of Croatia and they should be an integral
part of the development strategy of the Republic of
Croatia.
2) A special co-ordinator should be entrusted with the
task of supervising the decentralization process and
co-ordinating the activities of relevant ministries. This
person should have wide knowledge and experience
and be actively involved in the implementation of
decentralization in specific ministries, and at the same
time this person should constantly unite and co-
ordinate in operational matters the activities of various
institutions, including all projects carried out either
in co-operation with the bodies of state administration
or independently.
In order to execute the above-mentioned tasks, no new
organizational unit need be established, since the co-
ordinator could be located in the Office for Strategy
or alternatively be directly linked to the Deputy Prime
Minister (who is in charge of decentralization).
3) The additional education of public officials should
become a permanent activity as well as an obligation,
both of state institutions (which must allow it) and
of the officials themselves (who must undergo it as a
precondition for the performance of certain tasks).
4) The implementation of each decentralization measure
should be first well prepared in every available way:
organizing seminars, preparing brochures, making
available information and guidelines, etc. Several
goals should be achieved by doing this: established
solutions will be well fitted to practical needs, entities
will be pre-trained to execute their tasks, political
support for the adopted measures will be secured.
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5) In order to improve the capacity of local structures
to perform more and more tasks that are becoming
increasingly complex, it is essential to intensify co-
operation with non-governmental organizations
capable of executing these, perhaps decisive, tasks.
These organizations could be entrusted with tasks of
independent impact assessments of the implemented
decentralization measures, in order to detect and
remove difficulties and obstacles and possibly to make
modifications in the implementation.
6) Particular attention should be devoted to areas that
are not capable of executing their tasks (areas under
special state protection, islands, etc.). Special measures
should be proposed for the units in these areas, which
would build their capacity to function independently
and to implement to the largest extent possible the
tasks within their competence. If the planned goals
were not achieved within the proposed deadline, this
would certainly show that organizational changes in
the system would have to be made.
The above-mentioned recommendations are certainly not
the only ones that could be given in order to secure the
successful implementation of the decentralization process
and to achieve the awaited results.
It is therefore essential to include in the process the largest
number of entities possible (institutions and individuals),
both from the administration (in the widest sense of the
word) and from civil society, whose knowledge and expe-
rience would facilitate and accelerate this process.
The reform of any system in the direction of decentrali-
zation is politically always a highly sensitive process and
is of a very complex nature. For this reason, the aptitude
of institutions and individuals is of crucial importance.
The Croatian administration is capable of such a reform.
However, in order to carry out this task successfully it has
first to identify the limitations and obstacles that lie in
wait, and find efficient ways to overcome them. This is
the only way to bring to life any of the targets of decent-
ralization.
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‘Citizen participation is simultaneously a goal and an instrument of human development. It is
a goal because it is a part of the fabric, which provides legitimacy to governance. Citizen
participation guarantees that governance objectives and results are indeed the objectives
and results of people. At the same time, citizen participation is a part of the good governance
process because it makes governance more efficient, fair, transparent and legal. Last but
not least, citizen participation is a basic human right. It enables people to command their
own destiny and to contribute to the development of their community and society.’
Human Development Report —Bulgaria 2001,
UN Development Program
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this survey is to present the current Bulga-
rian experience in organizing the system of state gover-
nance in several basic aspects:
• The new role of the state—a conception for moder-
nization of the country;
• A model of state governance and distribution of power
between central and local authorities;
• The new model for organization of the administrative
system;
• A system for managing the process of introduction
of the new model of organization in the administrative
system;
• Results from the process of transformation of the ad-
ministrative system.
The survey of the process of modernization of the Bulga-
rian state and its governance is considered in the context
of the global challenges before the governance, as well as
in view of the specifics in the process of transition, carried
out in Bulgaria during the last 12 years, from strongly
authoritarian type of government and centralized economy
to a democratic political system and market economy.
The analytical process reflects the influence of another
matter of crucial importance for Bulgaria, namely the pre-
paration of the country for joining the European Union
and the related challenges to the government.
The time scope of this survey encompasses the last 5 years,
since in this particular period the process of reconsidering
the role of the state acquired a more systematic character
and strategic purpose.
The ambition of the present analysis is to point out the
strategic challenges, which the modernization of gover-
nance and the model of organizing of the administrative
system have to meet, the impact of these processes on the
decentralization and effective distribution of powers at
the regional and local level, as well as the necessity for
enlarging and activating the civil participation.
NEW VISION OF THE STATE
Historical Review
Bulgaria is the only country from the former socialist
block, which adopted a new democratic Constitution as
early as 1991.
With the adoption of the new Constitution in 1991 began
the process of building the new state. Officially—in legis-
lative and juridical terms—Bulgaria adopted the model
of pluralistic democracy and market economy. At the same
time the country had to face the true challenge of the im-
plementing in practice the new model of state constitution
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and the transformation of the public relationships. The
first democratic government1  of the Republic of Bulgaria
set off a process of radical transformations in the structure
of governance, in the economy and social relations, but
this process was interrupted before it could produce the
planned results.
The cabinets that governed the country between 1993
and 1996 did not perceive this challenge. Their activities
largely multiplied governance practices, characteristic of
the previous political system from the period before 1989.
The period of instability and attempts at restoring the
previous public model that followed practically drove the
development of the country to a close. What is more, the
values and principles implied in the new Constitution
were largely depreciated and the public confidence in the
change was exhausted.
The attempts at reformation of the government and the
administrative system were fragmentary, sporadic and
lacking a general national vision for the new role of the
state, which lead to a full crash in the economic, financial,
and social spheres, a total pillage of the national wealth
and dissipation of the human resource. The inability and
the reluctance of the former government to take whatever
measures to create a working system of the state bodies
and introduce the market principles strained the social
tension to the edge and eventually caused the fall of the
socialist government.2
‘The inherited institutional and administrative structures
were preserved unchanged. This caused havoc in the com-
petencies and the responsibilities of the different structures
and officials. The citizens still perceive the state as a pat-
ronizing institution, in contradiction with their new role
of users of administrative services. The paradox is that,
by virtue of its new nature, the new administration should
be based on the role of the individual as a responsible tax-
payer, willing to bear certain burdens, which is still not
the reality yet. ... The obligations of the state are still per-
ceived as something constant, taken for granted—an
element inherited from the communist period.’3  That was
precisely the reason why the transition in Bulgaria was
left behind compared with the rest of the Central European
countries.
In 1997, after the decisive victory of the United Democratic
Forces (52,5%) in the early parliamentary elections a new
reformist government of Bulgaria was established.4  The
government of the Union of Democratic Forces faced the
huge challenge of recovering the stability in the country
and giving an impetus to the process of structural economic
reform and the building of an adequate institutional system
in the country.
The new cabinet presented to the National Assembly an
ambitious government program titled ‘Bulgaria 2001.’
This program responded to the social expectations with
its all-embracing definition of the mission of the new de-
mocratic state, its role in regulating the public relationships
and setting a model for efficient distribution of government
powers between the central and the local authorities.
The main objective of this program was to build the Re-
public of Bulgaria in accordance with the European stan-
dards as a modern European state of sustained develop-
ment, clear national identity and a modern state governance;
supremacy of the law and the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the citizens; efficient market economy, capable
of meeting the challenges of the 21st century and a princi-
pally new social policy. The strategic objective of the in-
ternal and foreign policy of the Republic of Bulgaria was
full membership in the European Union, and accession
in the Euro-Atlantic structures.
At the same time the review of the condition of the admi-
nistrative system concluded that the development of the
administrative structures had stopped at the end of the 60s,
i.e. at the level of the pre-industrial production relations.
The processes of industrialization had no essential influence
on the government structures, although there were nume-
rous attempts at reforming the governmental structures
even before 1989. However, they had scarcely produced
any results; on the contrary, those frequent re-organizations
have only increased the instability of the system of gover-
nance and reduced its ability to fulfil its purposes.
In this connection, in order to implement the government
program, the task of paramount importance was formulated
as overall transformation of the governance model of the
country according to the principles of the new Bulgarian
Constitution, the needs of the Bulgarian society, the modern
democratic principles of state constitution and organization
of the administrative system. The new role of the administ-
ration was defined as an active factor in carrying out the
reform in the economy, the improvement of the state
government and the harmonization of the Bulgarian legis-
lation with that of the European Union. A clear expression
of the priority character of the policy of modernizing the
governance and the administration was the introduction
of a separate minister directly responsible for this field of
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government policy in the Council of Ministers: a minister
of public administration.
The fulfillment of this government program started with
the adoption of a Strategy for establishment of a modern
administrative system of the Republic of Bulgaria.5  The
Strategy defines all the practical measures for transformation
of the governance model and the overall scope of the
process—all the spheres of state governance, at the central
level—within the system of the legislative, the executive,
and the juridical power, as well as at the local level—
within the system of local self-government.
The Strategy enabled the overall, strategically oriented, and
sustained process of changes. This process secured the im-
plementation of the generally acknowledged democratic
principles in forming and organizing the performance of
the administration; overcoming any hierarchic discrepancies
and the imperfections in the structures; the removal of
duplicating units and the clear definition of functions;
implementation of an effective system for recruitment of
administration staff; elaboration of a system for evaluation
and control over the activity of the administration, thus
limiting the possibilities for corruption; introduction and
use of modern information technologies in the management
activities and the work of the administration. An important
element of The Strategy for establishment of a modern
administrative system was the realization of an administ-
rative-territorial reform and the strengthening of the role
and the authority of the regional governors as the basic
governing institution at the regional level.
The Strategy enabled the establishment of an adequate
institutional framework, harmonized with the European
requirements that should stimulate the business climate
for the local and foreign entrepreneurs and investors. The
new administrative-territorial arrangement of the country
and the strengthening of the role of the regional governors
secured the possibility of accomplishing another key
priority of the government policy by laying the foundation
for the application of an effective regional policy through
the national plans for regional and economical develop-
ment, adopted by the government.6
The realization of the strategy has provided a basis for
development of the policy in the field of the regional deve-
lopment. This policy aims to achieve a stable and balanced
regional development as a basis for effective decentraliza-
tion and the creation of a modern local self-government
system with clear distribution of functions and responsibi-
lities between the central and local authorities.
The legislative basis for the launching of a differentiated
and complex regional approach to the economic, social,
environmental and public works policies has also been
created. The adoption of the Regional Development Act7
provided the foundation for efficient regional policy.
During the period of enacting the law the Regional Deve-
lopment Council8  was established at the Council of
Ministers, accompanied by District councils for regional
development in the 28 districts.9 One of the principal
objectives of the law was to create the necessary prerequisites
and conditions for active participation of the districts and
municipalities in the regional development policies thus
ensuring the basis for effective decentralization of more
and more governance rights. And it is exactly in this
direction that the mechanism for achieving unity of action
between the state, the districts and municipalities was
developed. This in turn outlined the essential requirements
to the district authorities in their capacity of direct
intermediaries between the state and the municipalities.
The regional development policy was worked out on the
basis of the created legislative frame and as a result of a
sound expertise and evaluation of the challenges. An ex-
pression of this policy is the National Plan for Regional
Development (NPRD) for the period 2000–2006.10  The
process of elaboration of the plan went from bottom to
top. The district plans formed the basis for development
of the National plan, which step on the municipal plans.
It covers a period of seven years and is annually updated
so that it reflects all changes in the existing circumstances
and the availability of resources.
As a result of the successful fulfillment of The Strategy,
the process of consolidating the democratic institutions
in Bulgaria was completed. The basic institutions and
structures of the modern democracy and market economy
were set up. The strengthening of the state governance
and the effective system for collaboration between the
different levels of authority to apply a modern economic
and regional policy was achieved.
The new Bulgarian government11  of prime minister12
Simeon Sax-Cobourg-Gotha has declared continuity as
regards the further modernization of the governance and
the administrative system of the Republic of Bulgaria, and
has taken the commitment to update the strategy. The
post of the minister of the public administration was pre-
served in the new cabinet, as an indication of the impor-
tance, attributed to the modernization of state government
and the administration. At the same time at the very begin-
ning of its mandate the new Bulgarian cabinet offered
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some changes in the legislation, oriented at altering the
model and scope of the civil service.13
Policy for the Establishment
of a Modern Administrative
System in the Republic of Bulgaria
Conditions and Necessity
Until 1997 Bulgaria lacked one of the main factors for
stable democracy: broad public debate that analyses the
various ideas, projects, concepts and programs for public
prosperity. The various forms of mythologies of the public
realities were coming to life and fading away, while most
of them ignored, as a rule, the issues related to the means
of exercising the state power and its public character.
The government placed in the focus of public concern
the idea of “good governance” and gave a new dimension
of the terms of “democracy” and “the widening of the public
involvement in the policy-making process.” This perception
has essentially outlined the core meaning of the public
transformation and enlarged its scope by including in it
not only the formal institutional mechanisms, but also
the life in the public space. In this changed context the
“good governance” received a rational, non-ideological
meaning. At the same time the governance acquired a
new legitimacy, reflecting the fundamental character of
the political and public transition.
The government defined the process of transformation
of the model of governance and of the administrative
system as a process of establishment and not a reform, since
it recognized that the reformation of the old system implies
the danger of multiplying its defects. This new definition
of the process, known in most of the countries as an ad-
ministrative reform, outlines the depth and the content
of the new vision of the role of the state and its institutions,
and reflects the specific approach to achieve the desired
results.
The European dimension of the process of introduction
of modern governance and establishment of the new admi-
nistrative system of the Republic of Bulgaria is based on
the adoption of modern models for organization and
functioning of the administration in accordance with the
best practices in the countries of the European Union,
and “the requirements for comparable results” from the ac-
tivity of the administration in the fields that are subject
to the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union.
The basic criterion is the fulfillment of the requirements
for real and comparable results from the activity of the
administrative structures in their joint activities with the
respective structures of the European Union member-
states.
Within the context of these new political realities, the
government made the public commitment to initiate pur-
poseful and complex reforms for the purpose of creating
the new legitimacy of the state institutions. The adopted
Strategy for establishment of a modern administrative
system is a complex document, outlining the modern vision
of the role of the state, the distribution of government
powers and the organization of the administrative system.
The Strategy takes into consideration the modern tenden-
cies for development and modernization of the administrative
system through application of the latest achievements of
the science of governance, combined with a large-scale
application of modern information technologies in the
government process and in the work of the administration.
Concept for the Distribution
of Governmental Powers
The Strategy for establishment of a modern administrative
system defined as a key element in the vision for distribu-
tion of government power the outsourcing of certain every
day activities of the cabinet, thus creating the possibility
to concentrate on strategic matters of state policy. The
mechanisms of achieving this goal were determined to be
an optimization of the administrative-territorial structuring
of the country, de-concentration and decentralization of
government powers.
The optimization of the administrative-territorial struc-
turing of the country was connected, on the one hand, with
the necessity to overcome the discrepancies in the adminis-
trative-territorial structure, inherited by the totalitarian
state and, on the other, with the creation of real conditions
for exercising an effective regional policy based on the public
needs—a new way of government and public management,
a “good state,” providing the necessary services and means
of meeting the people’s needs—and full-value participation
of the civil society in the democratic process.
The de-concentration was defined as a system of purposeful
organizational activities for transferring certain decision-
making powers to the lower levels of hierarchy within the
framework of a single administrative structure. The ac-
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complishment of the process of de-concentration, i.e. the
real empowerment of the local branches of the different
ministries while avoiding possible breach of the operative
information flows requires the implementation of a com-
mon model of organization for the administrative structures.
A good example of effective de-concentration is the new
organization of the regional administrations, as well as
the territorial services of some of the ministries—the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and Science,
etc.
The concept for decentralization is based not only on the
traditional understanding of the process as a transfer of
power and resources from the national to the local level—
territorial decentralization, but also on the understanding
of the necessity to decentralize certain state functions—
functional decentralization—the establishment of specialized
central autonomous administrative structures to perform
supervisory, regulative or other similar functions, with
juridical, functional, and financial autonomy, independent
from the central state authorities.
The establishment of the regulatory framework of the
territorial decentralization began with the adoption of the
new Constitution, and the Local self-government and
Local Administration Act (LSLAA).14 The development
of the legal frame of the local self-government and the
enlargement of its functions, including the regulation of
the financial independence of the municipalities, were
accepted as a good perspective for further development
of the local self-government.
An example of territorial decentralization is the municipal
administration, which has juridical autonomy, its own
budget, administered independently, governance bodies
elected by the people, no hierarchic dependence on the
national government.
Examples of functional decentralization are the National
Health Insurance Fund, the National Insurance Institute,
and the National Radio and TV council, the State Com-
mission for Energy Regulation, the State Commission on
Stock exchange and marketplaces, etc. An essential element
in the formulation of the concept for the functional de-
centralization was the definition of the non-political status
of their chairs and the mandate character of this type of
positions.
The government policy treats the effective distribution of
power and the decentralization as a means of enlarging
the basis for elaboration of an adequate public policy, of
strengthening the administrative capacity to implement
this policy and to build a common national mechanism
for coordination of the common public policy implemen-
tation, while taking a maximum account of the public
interests.
Last but not least it was envisaged to differentiate organi-
zationally the activities on the formulation and elaboration
of the policy from the activities on the implementation
and the feedback from the impact of the policy implemen-
tation as a mandatory condition for de-politization of the
civil servants. Within the main administrative structures
in the system of the executive power, as defined in the
Constitution—the ministries—the establishment of poli-
tical cabinets was envisioned. The political cabinet was
defined as an organizational unit, assisting the respective
minister in carrying out the government policy in the
sphere of his powers.
A Model for Organization
of the Administrative System
A second important element of the Strategy for establish-
ment of a modern administrative system was the formula-
tion of a common model for the organization of the
administrative system. In its essence the structure of this
model determines the types of administrative structures
depending on their functions and the general principles
of organization of each administrative structure.
The analysis of the condition of the administrative system
of the Republic of Bulgaria concluded that the organiza-
tion of the administrative system does not respond to the
requirements of the modern state governance and could
not effectively assist the government in its efforts to establish
financial stability, sustained economic growth and an irre-
versibility of the democratic process. A necessity to elaborate
a unified regulatory arrangement for the organization and
performance of the administrative structures in all the
systems of the state power was established, as well as the
implementation of general rules for their internal organi-
zation. The purpose of this process was to provide the
overall improvement of the functioning of the administ-
rative structures and the operative coordination between
them, and to put an end to the practice of creating different
administrative structures (below the rank of the ministries),
with vague names and functions. The determined structure
of the administrative system is based on a functional classi-
fication of the various administrative structures within
the system of the executive power.
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The Strategy defined the basic administrative structures,
forming the administrative system, depending on their
functions. Within the system of the executive power the
administrative structures are as follows: The administration
of the Council of Ministers—strategic center for formation
and general coordination of the national policy; ministries—
strategic units for elaboration, planning, methodological
assistance and monitoring of the implementation of the
sector policies; state agencies—auxiliary administrative
structures for implementation of policies outside the com-
petencies of the ministries; state commissions—specia-
lized administrative structures for control over the imple-
mentation of certain sector policies; executive agencies—
specialized administrative structures for the performance
of administrative service.
In view of the internal organization of the administrative
structures the functional approach was applied as well.
Depending on the distribution of the functions in the
administration, performed in assisting the execution of
the competencies of the respective body of the state power,
the internal administrative units were defined as general
and specialized administration. Within the specialized
administration units were defined those departments that
assist and ensure the fulfillment of the specific competencies
of the respective body of state power. The general adminis-
tration includes the units, securing technically the activity
of the respective body of state power, the activity of the
specialized administration, as well as activities on the admi-
nistrative service of the citizens and the juridical persons.
Practically the organization of the general admi-nistration
is typified and unified for all administrative structures and
subject to identical rules. The adopted model provided
organizational identity of the internal organization and
the overcoming of hierarchic discrepancies, while at the
same time it secured conditions for improving the commu-
nications between the separate administrative structures.
The introduction of common rules for the internal organi-
zation of the administrative structures is a beneficiary
prerequisite of a further implementation of measures for
decentralization and de-concentration of the power, by
preserving the operative links and by guaranteeing equal
quality of the administrative services for the public.
The establishment of an effective administrative system was
defined as a means of executing the government policy
for the country’s accession into the European Union and
of fulfilling the National strategy for accession of the
Republic of Bulgaria into the European Union, and of
the National Program for adoption of the achievements
of the acquis communautaire.15 The fulfillment of the
European Union membership criteria by the Republic of
Bulgaria is an integrate part of the necessity for an effective
administrative system, which not only carries out the
national policy, but also provides constant cooperation
with the European administration in the elaboration and
application of the common policies of the Union as a full
member of the European administrative space.
Internally the new organization of the administrative system
aims to improve the work on the identification and analyz-
ing of the strategic information, necessary for policy for-
mulation; to ensure methodologically, and to increase the
potential for policy-making; to improve the organization
in taking political decisions; to improve the system of
policy implementation, as well as the system of monitoring
the effect of the policy implementation while guaranteeing
the political neutrality of the civil servants.
Unified Civil Service
The third basic characteristics of the policy for moderni-
zation of the administrative system, was the introduction
of a unified state service, through regulation of the status
of the civil servants.
The process of establishment of a modern administrative
system in the Republic of Bulgaria, as a natural element
of the transition, following the example of the West-
European countries, derived the necessity to adopt a legal
framework for the civil service as a preliminary condition
for the establishment of a professional civil service, based
on personal merit and capable of serving the interests of
society in a competent and effective way.
Historically, the development of irreplaceable administ-
ration, composed of officials, appointed in accordance
with their qualification established general rules instead
of political appointments or hereditary right, is a compa-
ratively new phenomenon in Europe. The irreplaceable
administration corresponds to the greatest extent to the
requirement for establishing a highly qualified, profes-
sional and neutral civil service.
The model of a civil service, based on professional and
carrier development has been adopted. This is the dominant
system in the European Union member-states and com-
bines several compulsory elements:
• Early long-term appointment, with the intention for
professional and carrier development within the
administrative system;
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• Professional development under clear conditions,
regulated by law;
• Step-by-step carrier or hierarchic promotion based
on clearly stated and well-defined rules.
The choice of this model is functionally justified by the
fact that such a system corresponds to the greatest extent to
the specific nature of the civil service in its capacity of service
for the society implying continuity and neutrality in its
performance and, at the same time, providing a high level
of professionalism and efficiency of the administrative
work.
The Strategy pays special attention to the system of deve-
lopment of the human resources in the administration by
stipulating the formulation and implementation of an
overall, integrated policy for management and development
of the human resources in the administration, a policy to
provide both the development of the potential and the
professionalism of the administrative staff, the improve-
ment of the internal communications and building a new
administrative culture and the fulfillment of the national
priorities and the preparation of the Bulgarian administ-
ration for working in the enlarged European Union.
Other Elements of the Strategy
As a complex policy document the Strategy comprises of
a number of other issues, connected with the improvement
of the administrative work, such as a new system of ser-
vicing the natural and juridical persons, implementation
of the European norms and rules for public procurement,
regulation of the access of citizens to public information,
personal data protection, as well as the large-scale intro-
duction of information technologies in the government
and in the performance of the administration.
The Strategy has also anti-corruption purposes, since the
impact of taking the envisaged measures for strengthening
the government and providing organizational stability of
the administration are, in their essence, an effective con-
finement of corruption.
The Strategy for establishment of a modern administrative
system of the Republic of Bulgaria laid down the basis for a
systematic approach to the establishment of the new effec-
tive organization of the administrative system at the start
of the 21st century and provided the conditions for the
institutional building of the administrative system in ac-
cordance with the European principles and the require-
ments to build administrative capacity for effective state
policy.
The process of establishment of the new administrative
system has a complex character—on the one hand is the
establishment of the necessary structures, rules and proce-
dures for the implementation of the internal policy of the
government and on the other, the achievement of the ne-
cessary conformity of the administration’s performance
with the European Union membership criteria. The Stra-
tegy provides the necessary conditions for institutional
capacity for effective planning, implementation and control
over the regional policy, as well as a natural mechanism
for operative coordination of the activity of the central
and the decentralized administrative structures.
Several practical steps were envisioned for the fulfillment
of this Strategy, including the complex application of legis-
lative, organizational, and logistic measures, aiming to
increase the potential and the efficiency of the government,
as well as to make the process of integration of the Re-
public of Bulgaria in the European Union more dynamic
through harmonization of the regulatory basis and building
effectively operating administrative structures. The app-
lication of an overall approach for the realization of the
Strategy for establishment of a modern administrative sys-
tem of the Republic of Bulgaria guarantees the achieve-
ment of tangible results for the improvement of the state
government, creation of favorable environment for the
development of market relations, the acceleration of the
democratic processes in the society and achieving confor-
mity of the activity of the Bulgarian administration with
those of the countries in the European Union.
REALIZATION OF THE POLICY
FOR MODERNIZATION
OF THE STATE MANAGEMENT
AND THE ADMINISTRATION
General Framework of the Process
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria defines the
general model of state government and the distribution
of the power between central and local authority.
According to the Constitution, the Republic of Bulgaria
is a unitary state with local self-governance. Autonomous
territorial formations are not allowed in it. The state power
stems from the people and is carried out by the people
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directly and through the bodies envisioned in the Consti-
tution. The state power is divided into legislative, exe-
cutive, and judicial.
The executive power in the Republic of Bulgaria is carried
out by the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers
is a central collective body with general competence that
manages and carries out the domestic and the foreign policy,
ensures the social order and the national security, and
maintains the general management of the public admi-
nistration and the armed forces of the country in accor-
dance with the Constitution and the laws.
The territory of the Republic of Bulgaria is divided into
municipalities and regions. Law can establish other admi-
nistrative-territorial units and the related self-government
bodies. The current legal regulation—the Administrative-
territorial System of the Republic of Bulgaria Act16
(ASRBA)—defines the districts and the municipalities as
constituent administrative-territorial formations.
The region is an administrative-territorial unit that carries
out the regional policy, executes the state government
locally, and ensures conformity between the national and
local interests.
The government in the region is carried out by a regional
governor, assisted by the regional administration. The
regional governors are appointed by the Council of Minis-
ters. The regional governors are representatives of the
government, whose basic functions are to implement the
state policy, to protect the national interests, the compliance
with law and the social order, and to exert administrative
control over the territory of the region.
The municipality is the basic administrative-territorial
unit, where the local self-government is carried out. The
realization of local governance is an element and a form
of organization of the state power. The local self-govern-
ment is a decentralized form of state authority and has
independent competencies.
The municipalities have their territory, borders, population,
name, and an administrative center, and include one or more
neighboring settlements.17 The borders of the municipa-
lities are determined with a plebiscite of the population.18
Constituent administrative-territorial units in the munici-
palities are the mayoralties19 and the districts,20 established
to fulfil the functions and competencies entrusted to them
by law or with a decision of the Municipal Council.21
The citizens participate in the governing of the municipa-
lities through the local self-government bodies elected by
them, as well as directly through plebiscite and the general
assembly of the population. The borders of the munici-
palities are determined with a plebiscite. The munici-
palities are juridical bodies separate from the state.
A local self-government body in the municipality is the
municipal council, elected by the population of the respec-
tive municipality for a four-year mandate, as defined by law.
An executive body in the municipality is the mayor, elected
by the population, or by the municipal council, for a four-
year mandate.22
The municipalities have the right of property, which is
used in the interest of the community. The municipalities
have an independent budget.
The Constitution affirms the model of the modern de-
mocratic state and outlines the principle of decentralization,
admitting the right of self-government to the basic admi-
nistrative-territorial units and preserves its supremacy and
its control over the defending of the common national
interests.
The central executive power, the districts and municipalities
are specifically organized government systems but the fact
that they formulate, organize and develop the government
processes at the national, district and municipal level makes
their binding and cooperation indisputable and needed.
The development of the processes of decentralization and de-
mocratization of society is impossible unless partnership
and unity of action and taking a full account of the national,
district and municipal interests support it. Both the govern-
ment and the municipal authorities have expressed their
commitment to follow this line of action.
It was this that determined the scope and the Strategy of
the new regulatory framework both on a central level,
with regard to the central administrative structures, and
on a local level, in the sphere of regional and municipal
administrations.
The realization of the policy for modernization of the
governance and of the administrative system started with
the adoption of several acts—the Public Administration
Act,23 the Civil Servant Act,24 the Administrative Services
for Natural and Legal Persons Act,25 the Access to Public
Information Act,26 etc.
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Establishment of the New Model
for Organization of the
Administrative System
General Review of the Process
In accordance with the principles of the law-governed
state the government adopted the approach of legislative
arrangement of the new model for organization of the
administrative system. The Public Administration Act was
the first of a series of legal acts, aiming to implement the
new the organization of the administrative system and
the internal organization of the administrative structures.
The Public Administration Act is a unified regulatory base
that sets the administrative system of the Republic of
Bulgaria. For the first time the Bulgarian legal system
defined the general system of the administration and its
organization principles: lawfulness, transparency, acces-
sibility, responsibility and coordination. The law regulates
the organizational forms of the administrative structures
(types of administrative structures in the system of the
executive power), as well as the general principles of the
internal organization of the administrative structures and
the way they function. This ensures identity and organiza-
tional transparency of the administrative structures and
forms a prerequisite for better horizontal and vertical com-
munications between the authorities. The principle of
regulating the internal arrangement of the administrative
structures with the help of statutes to be approved by the
Council of Ministers was introduced. These organization
statutes determine the organization, the order of activities,
the functions and staffing of the administrative units.
Alongside the organization of the administrative system
the Act elaborates the constitutional regulation of the
executive bodies, defining their basic competencies as
provided in the Constitution—the Council of Ministers,
the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, re-
gional governors and municipal mayors—and defines their
respective administrative structures—the Administration
of the Council of Ministers, ministries, regional and muni-
cipal administrations. In application of the concept for
distribution of power the Act established the order and
conditions for creating additional administrative struc-
tures—state and executive agencies and administrations
of state commissions. It also affirmed the status of their
directors as organs of the executive power, respectively
the chairs of state agencies, CEO of executive agencies
and state commissions, as collective bodies.
An important aspect is the legal regulation of these additio-
nal administrative structures and the status of their directors.
Organizationally they are subject to the general provisions
for organizing the administrative structures. At the same
time the status of their directors is dual—as directors of
autonomous administrative structures they obtain the status
of executive bodies—and, in order to ensure the indepen-
dence and professional competence of the directors of these
administrative structures, the mandate principle for taking
the office was introduced, as well as the requirement for
the candidates to be part of the permanent professional
public service.
The adoption of this legal regulation, establishing a high
level of political neutrality of the state and executive agency
directors and members of state commissions, was evaluated
as a serious step towards the decentralization in spheres
of high social importance.
The Public Administration Act introduced a normative
distinction between political and administrative functions
through the organizational form of the “political cabinet.”
The political cabinets are attached to the members of the
Council of Ministers.27 The status of the officials in the
political cabinet is clearly defined—they are not civil ser-
vants and they are subject to the regulations of the Labor
Code,28 being in practice personally linked to the respec-
tive minister, deputy minister or the prime minister. The
adopted model of differentiating between the political and
the administ-rative function limits the scope of the political
level and largely frees the administration from political
influences.
When it assumed its duties, the present government revised
the status of the directors of state and executive agencies
and of the members of state commissions on the basis of
the concept for the political character of these positions.
As a result the National Assembly adopted amendments
to the public Administration Act,29 which removed the
mandate principle and the recruitment requirements and
underlying their political character. These amendments
regulated the possibility of dismissing the persons, occu-
pying the aforesaid positions upon subjective assessment
and without whatever professional grounds, connected
with the fulfillment of their official obligations. During
the first six months of its governance the new cabinet
changed 81 organizational statutes—of all the ministries
and central administrative structures—introducing new
recruitment requirements for certain management posi-
tions.
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Administrative-territorial Reform
An important element of the strategy was the planned
optimization of the administrative and territorial division
of the country providing conditions for enlarging the rights
and obligations of the regional governors and improving
the relations between the municipalities. The aim of the
administrative territorial reform, carried out in 1998–1999,
was to create a new district division of the country. The
new 28 districts were created after the amendment to the
administrative territorial System of the Republic of Bulgaria
Act (ASRBA), and their boundaries and administrative
centers were determined by the President in Decree No. 1
of 1999. With this document the administrative territorial
reform was practically more or less concluded. It managed
to provide better coordination of the govern-ment of the
territory at the regional level. The newly created districts in
their territorial range, competence and scope are able to
practically solve the issues, raised by the Constitution and
the legislation in the country and facilitate the faster transi-
tion of the country to a market economy and to overcoming
the negative consequences of the transition period; and also
equal treatment of all kinds of ownership, opening of the
economy of the country towards Europe, and the synchro-
nization of our regional policy with that of the EU.
The major characteristics and advantages of the executed
reform are as follows:
• Shortening of the distance between the central
executive power and the municipalities and their
problems, and their better interaction;
• More efficient coordination between the state, its de-
concentrated units on the territory of the country and
the districts in the process of implementing the district
and sector development policies;
• Strengthening the capacity, both vertically and hori-
zontally, of partnership opportunities for determining
the priorities and the common interests.
The steps undertaken after the implementation of the
administratively territorial reform managed to strengthen
the contacts between the government, he National Asso-
ciation of municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria and
the municipalities for resolution of certain problems, di-
rectly connected to the functioning and development of
the local governance (primarily connected with the legis-
lative provision, financial independence and the owner-
ship). These initiatives, despite the fact that they were
limited in their scope, actually constitute the right steps,
which guarantee a possibility for integration of the efforts,
directed at the joint response to the public needs.
At the same time, the need for implementing new forms
and mechanisms for widening the interaction between
the central and local authorities is becoming much clearer.
They should be based on the principles of mutual trust,
equal treatment, and partnership. The vision for predeter-
mination of the unity of action between the state, the districts
and municipalities is also taking grounds.
Despite the fact that a number of positive steps were taken
in the process of implementing the administrative territo-
rial reform and despite the positive attitude on the part of
the local authorities and the citizens, the interaction and
contacts between the two levels of power are not efficient
enough.
Organizational, Functional and Staffing
Strengthening of the Local Self-government
The implementation of the Modern Administrative System
Strategy provided the legislative and organizational link
of the decentralization process in the overall transformation
of the governance.
The organizational, functional and personnel strengthen-
ing of the local government was directly linked to the
application of the new legislation concerning the organi-
zation of the administrative structures and the status of
the civil servants.
The coherence of the processes opened the opportunity
to coordinate the efforts for its execution, regardless of
the existence of certain problems or the lack of understand-
ing of their inter-relatedness. Special attention deserves
the process of adoption of the common model for organi-
zation of the administrative system and its implementation
at the municipal level—there were opinions of its inappli-
cability in the municipal administration, as well as a thesis
about the specific nature and “independence” of the muni-
cipal administration. The Constitutional Court finally
solved this issue30  by declaring: ‘The fact that the local self-
government and the local administration are regulated
by the separate chapter seven of the Constitution does not
mean that they are excluded from the executive power in
the meaning of Art. 8 of the Constitution.”
The development of the legislative framework of the local
self-government is based on the implementation of the
principles of the European Charter on Local Self-govern-
ment.31 Through the adoption of the Public Administration
Act and the Civil Servant Act, a new legislative framework
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for the organizational and functional restructuring and
strengthening of the local administration was created. The
practical implementation of the increased requirements
to the competent knowledge and professional qualifica-
tions and the new structuring of the administration still
face certain constraints. Much more essential is the con-
straints connected with the staffing strengthening of the
municipal administrations and the attraction of young
and highly professional employees. The implementation
of the new status of the civil servant creates the necessary
conditions for overcoming those constraints.
The system of shared competence between the state and
the municipalities with a view to a number of significant
sectors such as health care, social activities, infrastructure,
finances, etc. was imperfect due to the lack of rules and
regulations and the strong fiscal and functional centrali-
zation, which limited the municipalities’ independence.
The period 1997–1998 marks the point when two basic
laws were adopted—the Local Fees and Taxes Act32  and
the Municipal Budgets Act,33 which had the purpose of
creating optimal conditions for the functioning of the
municipalities and for the assurance of their financial
independence. Those legal acts regulated the sources for
revenues, the property management and the expenditure
opportunities. There were furthermore significant improve-
ments in the relations with the Republican Budget and
the system of targeted subsidizing of the municipalities.
Thus in practice real conditions were created for effective
participation of the municipalities in the process of re-
alizing the regional policy. The municipalities have in-
dependence in outlining their objectives for development,
their initiatives for achieving those objectives. The district
development plan includes the priorities and projects from
the municipal plans and formulates the common
objectives for regional development.
At the same time the financial independence of the local
self-government bodies is confined by the economic
situation in the country.
Introduction of Uniform Civil Service
In the Bulgarian law the legislative arrangement of the
statute of the civil servants is a traditional way to set the
rules, obligations and responsibilities of the civil servants.
Since 1951, when the previous Labor Code was adopted,
in 1998 the civil servants were subject to the general
arrangement of the labor legislation.
Article 116 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria
from 1991 introduced the requirement to legally regulate
the status of the civil servants, the conditions for their appoint-
ment and dismissal, their membership in political parties
and their right of strike. In order to fulfil this constitutional
requirement, the Civil Servant Act separated the civil servants
from the Labor Code regulations and set their legal status
in accordance with the traditional principles, underlying
the modern civil service in Bulgaria. The Civil Servant
Act was harmonized with the legislative trends in the
countries of the European Union. The act defines the
term civil servant and outlines the scope of the civil service.
The Civil Servant Act regulates a stable and professional
system of civil service, based on the principles of legi-
timacy, loyalty, responsibility, stability, political neutrality
and hierarchical subordination. The act introduced a new
type of legal relations between the state and the civil
servants—the official legal relations. This status is the
ultimate legal basis and guarantees the carrier development.
The established rights of the civil servants aim to com-
pensate the increased requirements to their performance
and the limitations imposed on them.
The continuity of the state service is ensured by certain
limitations for the civil servants concerning the right of
strike they possessed until recently and some other civil
rights. The civil servants have the right for membership
in political parties with certain confinement of their parti-
cipation in the political activities, in view of the require-
ments for loyalty to the nation and to the institution, in
which the person works.
The stimuli and the sanctions as defined in the act clarify
the honors and prizes that would encourage the good per-
formance of the civil service, as well as the responsibility
of the civil servants in cases of violation of their official
obligations. The act also sets out the specific (besides the
general regulations) disciplinary and material responsibility
of the civil servants.
The act also regulates the control over the observation of
the statute of the civil servant by envisioning the establish-
ment of respective structures for its application—the State
Administrative Commission.34
The independence of the civil service is based on the prin-
ciple of payment by merits. The principle of payment by
merits depends on the acknowledgement, directly and
indirectly, of qualification and skills.
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The independence of the civil servants is perceived as neut-
rality with regard not only to the ruling politicians, but
also to private group interests. The political neutrality—
in the absolute or relative sense—does not avoid the sub-
ordination of the administration during the performance
of its duties to the governmental bodies, neither the possi-
bility of the politically appointed persons to surround
themselves with assistants whom they trust. On the other
hand, it presumes separation of the political from the
administrative levels and avoids political influence during
the career management.
The general structure of the civil service comprises all
officials, employed by the public authorities. The Civil
Servant Act defines as civil servants those officials, whose
duties are directly connected with the fulfillment of the
competencies of the respective body of the state power,
i.e. the act introduces dependency of the status of the
civil servants on the occupied position. According to the
provisions of the Civil Servant Act, ‘The civil servant performs
the civil service upon appointment by a competent body of
the state power.’ 35
The Public Administration Act defines three categories
of administrative posts:
• management posts;
• expert posts; and
• technical posts.
The posts of the civil servants and their distribution in-
groups and ranks are defined by the government in the
Unified Classifier of posts in the administration.36 The
Classifier is a general model for distribution of the posts
in the administration. The basic principle of the Classifier
is to distinguish between a post and profession—the post
in the administration is a legally defined position, con-
nected with the fulfillment of specific activity and indepen-
dent from the profession. In this connection as far as the
administration is concerned posts, and nor professions
have been defined. The possibility is provided for, when-
ever needed, to add the name of the profession, necessary
for its fulfillment, to the respective post.
In order to acquire a post in the administration, certain
professional qualification is required, including the mini-
mum level of education, general and specific length of
service. The requirement that management posts could
only be taken by civil servants was introduced,
The government adopted an approach for gradual imple-
mentation of the status of the civil servant, as initially the
Unified Classifier of the posts in the administration only
defines those posts that require higher education to be
occupied employees with a civil servants status.37 The
adoption of this approach is justified by the general econo-
mic situation in the country and the increase in the respec-
tive budget expenses for the overall introduction of the
new status of the civil servant.
The general application of the legislation should also com-
prise officials with lower education, fulfilling expert func-
tions, since their work has an influence on the general
efficiency of the administration.
The basic rules, regulating these different groups of officials
are identical, although there are certain differences in the
conditions, connected with the recruitment, the career
development, the remunerations and the respective rights
and obligations. Certain categories of civil servants are
subject to special legislation (the police, frontier guard
and prison administration).
In May 2000 an Institute of Public Administration and
European Integration (IPAEI)38  was established, and thus
the practical implementation of an effective policy for pro-
fessional and career development of the officials in the
administration started.
A Code of Conduct for the civil servant was approved.39
It outlines the basic principles and rules for ethic conduct
of the civil servants and their relationships with the citizens
in fulfillment of their professional duties and also in their
public and private life.
During the last few months the approach, adopted by the
new government to limit the scope of the officials having
the status of civil servants, lead to the dismissal of officials,
appointed by the previous cabinet. Regardless of the five-
year mandate, set out in the Public Administration Act,
almost all-chief secretaries of the ministries were dismissed.
Although in several cases it could find justification, such
an approach does not ensure the stability of the civil service
envisioned by the law.
Publicity of the Administration
and its Activities
The purpose of the Public information access act is to
regulate the conditions and order of exercising the cons-
titutional right of nationals to seek and obtain information
about public life in the Republic of Bulgaria. The efficient
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exercising of this right allows nationals to form their own
opinion about the work of both Government authorities
and other subjects whose activity is of public character.
Information access regulation is an element of the general
organization of the information rights of nationals and
provides the normative base for regulation of a number
of relevant public relations—personal information pro-
tection, determination of the contents, scope, conditions
and order for creation and work with protected inform-
ation.
The Public information access act is a basic implemen-
tation mechanism, which ensures greater transparency in
the governance and provides conditions for increase of
civic participation in Government policy formation.
The main purpose of the act is to provide more information
to citizens since only informed citizens can take an effective
part in the public life of the country and this is a basic
condition for strengthening the civic society.
The Public information access act will enable the realiza-
tion of the basic principle of openness in administration
activity regulated in the Public Administration act.
The legal grounds for the scope and the content of the
act is contained in a number of regulatory documents40
which are basic for the Bulgarian legislation—on the one
hand these are international documents, in which the
Republic of Bulgaria is a party, and on the other hand
this is the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.
The problems of nationals’ information rights regulation
are the subject of many documents41  of the Council of
Europe—one of the oldest European structures, and the
Committee of ministers of CoE member-countries, which
at different times have taken up an attitude towards the
realization of the communication rights of citizens.
The Committee of ministers of CoE member-countries
recommends implementation in national legislation of
the following basic principle:
“CoE member-countries must consider the possible legal
measures for providing the public with access to pluralistic
and diverse information about the mass media, containing
different political and cultural views, while taking into account
the importance of ensuring editorial independence of the mass
media as well as the importance of the said measures when
adopted voluntarily by the mass media themselves.”
The process of harmonization of Bulgarian legislation to
EU legislation and practice is directly dependent on the
implementation of the principles laid down in CoE recom-
mendations, as CoE is the only institution where the Re-
public of Bulgaria is a full member.
In local aspect the basic principles of realization of nationals’
communication rights are regulated in the Constitution
of the Republic of Bulgaria.
The act is based on the regulation in article 41in the consti-
tutional right of nationals to seek obtain and disseminate
information. Paragraph 1 of the above article contains the
legal grounds for development of the act, as it is precisely
that text which gives universal regulation of the information
rights of nationals. The implemented approach corresponds
to the mentioned Recommendation No. R (81) 19 of the
Committee of ministers of CoE member-countries for
access to information held by public authorities. According
to the said recommendation “no access to information may
be denied on the grounds that the person requesting infor-
mation does not have specific inte-rest in the subject.”
The normative regulation of the order and conditions for
realization of the rights under article 41, paragraph 1 of
the Constitution evolves also from Ruling No. 7/1996 of
the Constitution court under constitution case No. 1/1996
where the court rules that the rights under article 41 belong
both to physical and juridical persons. The legislator must
regulate the scope and forms of realization of this right,
especially with regard to paragraph 1 of article 41 of the
Constitution. The Constitution court introduces the notion
“information of public significance.” The name and the
basic notion of the act—public information, as well as the
rights and obligations of the subjects covered by the act,
are determined on the basis of this interpretation.
In the context of the above stated, the ever-increasing in-
formation exchange characterizing the globalization of
modem society becomes especially topical. This, on its
part, reformulates the stratification of modem society and
the movement of information streams. The role of the
state as a source of information is decreasing, and the role
of other information sources is respectively increasing.
These calls for regulation of certain access of nationals to
the basic sources of publicly significant information in
view of balancing interests and providing adequate condi-
tions for formation of public opinion based on the actual
dimensions of information. This has its philosophic sense
with regard to the future and the development of democ-
racy as a whole.
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Basically, the texts of the act regulate the procedure for
access to information of government authorities. The im-
plementation of this procedure with regard to other subjects
whose activity is of public character is further provided.
This means particularly that there is regulation of the access
to information about the activity of public legal subjects,
which is deemed public by a law. The act applies also to
access to public information about public services carried
on by physical or juridical persons and financed through
budget or off-budget funds, which is an essential element
and provides transparency of public funds utilization. The
act covers also the information providing transparency to
the mass media, with determination of the scope of generally
accessible information about the latter.
Prior to adoption, the Public information access act was
submitted for wide public discussion, which continued
for about two months. The views of other government
authorities and non-government organizations were
received during that period. As a result of the discussion,
the principles of the act and the procedures provided for
therein were approved. The final draft of the act includes
most of the proposals made.
GOVERNANCE OF THE PROCESS
OF MODERNIZATION
OF THE ADMINISTRATION
General Governance of the Process
The Minister of public administration is responsible for
the general governance of the implementation of the strategy
for establishing a modern administrative system is a
responsibility of In planning towards its realization the
minister of public administration was aided by its political
cabinet and by external consultants, including foreign
experts working under the PHARE program. The main
governance principles of this realization were provided
for in the regulatory acts. At the same time mechanisms
were provided for operative coordination and method-
ological support of the team in the separate administrative
structures directly responsible for the application of the
new regulatory documents.
The minister of public administration is the main body
in the system of executive power in charge of the elaboration,
implementation and horizontal coordination of the policy
for modernization of the administration. In exercising his
duties the minister of public administration presents a
revised annual report on the state of the administration
to the Council of Ministers.
The process of implementation of the Public Administ-
ration Act was planned in the act itself and it lasted for a
year after its acceptance in 1998. In order to coordinate
its implementation and to ensure an overall application
of the principles implied in the Act, the government estab-
lished a joint council for restructuring of the administrative
units within the executive power system.42
The minister of public administration was appointed as
head of the council for reformation of the administrative
structures in the executive power. He was also in charge
of the overall implementation of the Public Administ-
ration Act. Deputy ministers from all the ministries
received chairs in the council. The council drafted a general
methodology of restructuring the existing administrative
structures to be used for the purposes of the practical
restructuring: definition of the main functions of the
ministries according to the new organizational model at
the background of clear distinction of their functions and
establishment of effective mechanism for coordination
between the ministries.
Thanks to the work of the Council for restructuring of
the administrative structures within the system of executive
power the model of all administrative structures within
the system was finally clearly established.  Organization
statutes for all the ministries were written and approved.
Proposals were made to close administrative structures
with duplicating or inadequate functions.
The Council for restructuring of the administrative system
functioned until November 2000.43 After that the ‘Public
Administration’ directorate at the Council of Ministers
administration took its functions of operative monitoring
on the implementation of the principles of the Public
Administration Act.
The ‘Public Administration’ directorate ensures the coor-
dination of the horizontal system for management and deve-
lopment of the administrative system and the human resource
as a central coordinating unit with the following key func-
tions:
• to analyze the organizational state of the administra-
tions in the system of the executive power, the human
resource and their qualification;
• to analyze the working methods and procedures in
the administrations and elaborate projects for optimi-
zation and improvement programs;
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• methodological provision of the policy for human re-
source management in the system of the executive power.
An important element of the system for monitoring and
managing of the process of modernization is the Internet-
based Registry of the administrative structures, which
provides continuous, up-to-date and technologically
effective information. The Registry of the administrative
structures is public and offers the constant possibility for
the citizens to get acquainted with their respective issues
of interest, connected with the structure and the functions
of the administrative structures and their units.
The act sets out a system for periodical account on the
activity of the executive administration, through reports
of the respective directors of the administrative structures
to the Council of Ministers.
According to the quoted amendments to the Public Ad-
ministration Act, offered by the current cabinet, the role
of the minister of public administration has been seriously
diminished. His powers regarding the horizontal coordina-
tion on the implementation of the measures for moderni-
zation of the administrative activity were cancelled.
The overall management of the process of introducing a
unified civil service is carried out separately by the respec-
tive managers of administrative structures. The main role
of the methodological provision of the process of introduc-
ing the status of the civil servant is attributed to the State
Administration Directorate at the Council of ministers
administration as a central coordination unit. The State
Administrative Commission is in charge of the supervision
over the compliance with the civil servant status. The Com-
mission has important powers related to the competitions
for the posts in the civil service, which it exercises through
its representatives in the evaluating committees, examina-
tion of objections from the rejected candidates and metho-
dological instructions for the competitions. The State
Administrative Commission maintains a Register of the
Civil Servants, containing information on the professional
and carrier development of everyone among them.
Methods and Techniques for
Implementation Planning and Monitoring
The scope and the specificity of the process for moderni-
zation of the governance and the organizational building
of the administrative system called for the use of a large
number of techniques and methods for analysis, planning
and monitoring, which were later introduced as current
practices in the work of the administration.
The dynamics of the process at its outset called for a parallel
development of methodological principles and their prac-
tical testing. A main tool for planning the process for moder-
nization of the administration was the implementation
of the general and specific functional reviews whose aim
was to determine the state and identify the options for change.
Thus the second half of 1997 saw the planning and im-
plementation of the first general functional review which
included practically all administrative structures in the
execute power at central and regional levels, the admi-
nistrative bodies of the legal and legislative powers, and
of the presidential establishment. The scope of the func-
tional review was based on the set goals and with a view
to the necessity of the planning of a universal purposeful
and strategically directed process of transformation of the
administrative system. The planning of the process required
a detailed knowledge of all structural units in the system,
the organizational and functional characteristics and the
legal principles in the establishment, organization and
functioning of the administrative bodies.
Aims of the review:
• Assessment of the existing condition and potential of
the administrative system of the Republic of Bulgaria
for implementation of the mission of the new democ-
ratic state and its role in the regulation of public re-
lations.
• Determining the major strategic directions and scope
of the process of institutional establishment of the
Bulgarian administration.
• Development of a universal plan for implementation
of the governmental policy with respect to administ-
ration, schedule of action, criteria for assessment of
the efficacy of the process and assessment of the
necessary resources.
The idea for the implementation of a review of all structures
of the state powers was also founded on the necessity of the
identification of the system as a whole and the communica-
tion among its elements. The formulation of a strategy
for the implementation of the ambitious governmental
policy of the establishment of a modern administrative
system required numerous factors to be taken into account—
the hierarchical place, functions and implications of each
element in the existing system. This was necessary for the
identification of the opportunities and dangers in the
planning and carrying out of the concrete actions.
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The general functional review of the administrative system
of Bulgaria was carried out from July till October 1997
on the basis of specially developed methods of study of
the organizational condition of the administrative bodies
and the organization of their activity.
On the basis of the methods of the functional review, a
detailed questionnaire was developed which was sent to
and filled in by the specified administrative bodies. Major
elements of the functional review:
• Assessment of the missions, functions and tasks of
each administrative body and its units;
• Assessment of the correspondence between the mission
and functions and the actual activities;
• Formulation of suggestions for reconstruction and
planning of the activities.
As a result of the functional review a Strategy for establishing
a modern administrative system of the Republic of Bulgaria
was prepared. The Strategy defines in detail the major aims
and actions for implementation of the governmental policy
with respect to the administrative system of the country
in three major directions:44
• conditions, related to the overall system of the state
organization;
• inner conditions in the system of the executive power;
• influence on the processes of expansion of the European
Union, and NATO, and the new tendencies in the
development of the international relations around the
globe.
The accounting of these factors, in their mutual interrela-
tion, in the implementation of the governmental strategy
guarantees the achievement of a sole national vision re-
garding the directions of development and possibilities
for achievement of actual success. The generalized result
from the General functional analysis was presented with
the help of a matrix45  of the status and possibilities for
development of the administrative system.
As a result of the established good methodological and expert
base for carrying out functional reviews in the period up
to the middle of the 2001, several functional reviews were
carried out:
• Review of the licensing, permit and registration
regimes—November 1999–April 2000
• Functional review of the systems for collecting, pro-
cessing, and storing of personal information—
November 1999–December 2000
• Functional review of the administrative service to
physical and juridical persons—June–December 2000
Along with the implementation of the functional reviews,
the team of the minister of the public administration had
also a long-term goal—to develop mechanisms and tech-
niques for continuous monitoring of the process and to
identify the indicators for its efficiency.
As it was mentioned above, the Register for the administ-
rative structures was developed as a major practical tool
for follow-up planning, for self-governance and for moni-
toring the results of the process for modernizing the admi-
nistration. It contains detailed information for the structure,
functions and the distribution of positions in each and every
administrative structure. The creation of the Register for
administrative structures was preceded by the development
of an Internet-based software product—Configuration for
organizational modeling of the administrative structures. The
main aim of this application program product was to aid
the executive power bodies in modeling the administrative
structures so as to make them fulfil the requirements of the
Administration act and the Single classificatory of the posi-
tions in the administration. At the same time, the Configu-
ration for organizational modeling of the administrative
structures was used to test the readiness of the separate
administrative structures to work together in the new for
them Internet environment. The assessment and the recom-
mendations made in the process of using this product proved
the need for a further use of similar tools. Subsequently,
three public registers were developed—for the administra-
tive structures; for the civil servants; and for public pro-
curement.
Under the present conditions in Bulgaria the major factors
for the relatively successful application of the method of
functional review is to a large extent due to the active
position of the government and the its actual willingness
to fulfil the reforms. At the same time the effective ac-
complishment of functional reviews is directly dependent
on the methodical and practical readiness of the project
teams, pressed by the time and insufficient resources to
manage to organize their work so that they can extract
the optimally necessary and objective information about
the process or the object under survey.
The Bulgarian experience in the planning of a system for
functional reviews especially in the described approach
to produce an Internet based information registers are a
felicitous and up-to-date model of creating a permanent,
actual and technologically effective informational medium
for effective planning and monitoring of the implemen-
tation of the government policy. Naturally the type and
organization of such kind of register should completely
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comply with the specificity of the administrative practice
and organizational culture.
EVALUATION OF THE REALIZATION
The new legislation practically resulted, towards the end
of the term of Ivan Kostov’s cabinet, in the restructuring
of the entire administrative system in the country.
All the regional administrations were restructured in com-
pliance with the requirements of the Public Administra-
tion Act—Organizational Statute of the regional admi-
nistrations.46 The municipal councils adopted new organi-
zational statutes for their respective local administrations.
With the restructuring of the administrations the basic
objective of the Public Administration Act was achieved:
to establish a general organizational model for the struc-
tures of the executive power. The functions, tasks and
responsibilities of the administrative units were clearly
defined in their organization statutes. The capacity of the
administration to cope with the issues, concerning the
European Union, has increased. The uniform structure
of the ministries, the agencies, the regional and the munici-
pal administrations improved the coordination between
them. The regulations of coordination of legislative
projects, set by the Organizational Statute of the Council
of Ministers and its administration, were systematically
adopted. Each bill, decree and order, presented to the
government, was obligatory accompanied by a financial
argumentation. The new practice of releasing bills and other
legislative projects in the Internet was introduced in order
to involve the public in the discussion of their consideration.
The possibility, provided for in the Public Administration
Act, to carry out coordination and fulfillment of the joint
policies by means of special structures—councils, which
are a successful formula for better internal coordination
and dialogue with the economic and social partners, receives
a large-scale application.
The established model of the Bulgarian civil service should
be considered as a complex result of the application of
two basic legal acts—the Public Administration Act and
the Civil Servant Act. The Public Administration Act
introduced the new rules of organization for the execution
of administrative activities, while the Civil Servant Act
regulates the specific official status and the employment
rules for the civil servants. In fact the two acts regulate
the implementation of the civil service concept in the
Republic of Bulgaria. Generally speaking, it can be charac-
terized as ‘the civil service, based on professional and carrier
development.’
The general structure of the civil service can be depicted
in the form of concentric circles. All categories are led by
common principles, based on the law but at the same
time they possess specific characteristics, defined by their
functions and status. Moving from the center to the pe-
riphery, the legal status of the civil servants is increasingly
subject to the common labor legislation. Nevertheless,
the boundaries between the various categories of admi-
nistrative personnel remain vague and are often the result
of subjective assessment or budget deficiencies, which do
not facilitate the clear formulation of the tasks or, in a
more general perspective, do not secure the effective per-
formance of the regulating and planning role of the admi-
nistration.
At the end of the term of office of Prime Minister Kostov’s
cabinet the civil servant status was introduced in 77% of
all structures in the central, regional and municipal admi-
nistrations.
For the period April–December 2000 13 156 positions
in 81 administrative structures of the central government
administration were defined as civil service positions. The
civil servant status in the Ministry of the interior was
introduced following the respective amendments to the
Ministry of the Interior Act in October 2000. At the end
of 2001 the civil servant status was given to approximately
22 000-state employees.
The introduction of the civil servant status in the regional
administrations began after the adoption of the Statutory
Regulation of the regional administrations. The applica-
tion of the Civil Servant Act in the municipal administra-
tions is related to the adoption of statutory regulations of
the respective municipal administrations, although slowly,
is making progress. The civil servant status was introduced
in all municipalities—some 3 to 500 positions have been
allocated to the civil servants.
In general perspective, the modernization in the field of
the regional and municipal administrations and the
enhancement of their capacity to realize the policy for
regional development is priority-set towards:
• increasing the absorbing capacity;
• providing the human resource equipped with the
necessary skills for the respective public services;
• establishing good institutional organization for work
with the EU funds;
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• establishing effective mechanism for coordination
between all stakeholders, and;
• exerting the necessary supervision.
The lack of trained and experienced human resource, the
limited knowledge and skills are problems, inherent in
administrative structures outside the central administra-
tion. This impedes the full realization of the government
powers, which the central authority delegates and transfers
to the decentralized bodies and their administrations.
As a whole, the process of organizational building of the
administrative system, regardless of some digressions from
the principles of this act, connected mostly with the prac-
tice of creating administrative structures with no ministe-
rial rank and the insufficient understanding of the func-
tional principles of organizing the internal units of the
administrative structures, could be described as successful,
especially in view of the exclusively short time of its conti-
nuation.
The last report on the administration for the year 2000
concludes that the new legislation, related to the consti-
tution, organization and functioning of the administration
is being applied ever more efficiently and the practices in
the administrative performance and the succession of the
actions are in the course of improvement. The regular
report of the European Commission for the year 2001
makes similar conclusions.47
Regardless of certain withdrawal from the establishment
of the civil service in the last few months, the commitment
to a further strengthening and modernization, declared
by the present government, as well as the challenges before
the implementation of the ambitious government program
do not envisage radical reorganization of the administrative
system and changes in the status of the public employees
in the mid-term perspective. An argument in support of
this statement is the Strategy for training of the admi-
nistrative personnel, adopted early in February, with which
the government has engaged with actual measures for the
establishment of the civil servants status and the provision
of their professional and carrier development.
At the same time, as the Strategy points out, ‘the moderniza-
tion of the governance and the administrative system is not a
single act but a continuous process, demanding expressed political
will, maintenance of constant dynamics of its development
and active civil participation.’  In this connection some of
the activities of the new government, regardless of the declared
continuity, instead of broadening and improving the process
of modernization of the administration compromised the
results that have already been achieved without offering
alternative decisions and restore models, known from the
past. Still, the promised updating of the strategy for moder-
nization of the governance and the administration48
should give a clear idea of the overall vision of the govern-
ment about the essence and ways of executing this process.
CONCLUSION
“... The main resource for strengthening the civil com-
petence through motivated, competent and practical
participation in the solution of immediate problems
of the day.”49
The Bulgarian experience in modernizing the governance
and the administrative system is indicative, regardless of
the relatively short period of implementation of this large-
scale targeted process, of how between 1999 and 2001
practically the whole administrative system was trans-
formed, the status of the civil servant was introduced and
the foundations of the new democratic state were laid. At
the same time the impact of applying the new legislation
cannot be categorically assessed yet, since the results of
in-depth reforms of this type become evident in not less
than 3 or 4 years, irrespective of their dynamism.
The development and the expansion of the local self-
government are a priority for the new government. The
implementation of this policy has at least two interrelated
directions—strengthening the administrative capacity of
the municipal administrations and the introduction of a
second level of local self-government.
The first issue stems from the lack of sufficient coordi-
nation between the municipal and the state authorities in
the area of shared competencies, the lack of a system for
preparation, qualification and methodological support of
the local administration activities, the insufficient quality
of the administrative service, which in its own turn leads
to negative public attitude towards the local authorities,
as well as the lack of tradition in the partnership on the
part of the local authorities with the citizens, the private
sector and non-government organizations for the imple-
mentation of efficient policy for development of the admi-
nistrative territorial and territorial units.
The expected intensification of the public discussion on
the introduction of a second level of local self-government
should lead to the formation of consensus vision for the
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development of the administrative territorial system in
the country and of the introduction of a second level of
local self-government. At the same time it should answer
the question on the place that this second level should
occupy given the fact that the current legislative frame-
work, regulating the administration of the territorial
management to a large extent shows a tendency for grouping
the settlements in the creation of the basic administrative
territorial units—the municipalities. The Republic of
Bulgaria has 262 municipalities with an average of 20
settlements and an average number of residents 30 000.
Such indicators are considerably higher compared with
the majority of the other European countries.
Here is the point where the major difference between the
concept of ‘municipality’ in a Bulgarian context and the
‘municipality50  understood as an autonomous territorial
formation consisting of a community of people who have
their particular interests,’ a populated center ‘which has
an organized engineering, public facilities and its own
administration’ should be outlined. The Bulgarian muni-
cipalities represent an aggregation of settlements, which
possess some of the characteristics of administrative
territorial regions within the meaning of the territory. In
this connection the Bulgarian local self-government, exe-
cuted by the municipalities, has to a large extent the cha-
racter of regional self-government or the so-called second
level of local self-government. At the same time the sepa-
rate settlements, i.e. the places that appear to be the natural
center for the development of a community and public
life,51 lack forms of local self-government.
A possible approach to the optimization of the self-govern-
ment system is the perception of the existing system of
local self-government as a second level, and thus the efforts
will be directed towards the creation of a basic level of
local self-government in the settlements (towns and villages),
i.e. closest to the people.
Such an approach will ensure the possibility for efficient
participation of the citizens in tackling issues of local signi-
ficance, and at the same time the process will not result in
the violation of the natural processes in the administrative
activities, since the present municipal councils will
gradually transfer their functions to the newly-created ones
and they will take the functions of a second level of local
self-government. This will lead to the actual creation of
conditions for the fostering of the local democracy. It is
however natural that the planning of this process will
envisage a sufficiently long period for the efficient
implementation of the two-level local self-government
system; 5 years for example, i.e. the cycle of a mandate.
The only way to achieve effectiveness of the process of
decentralization and increasing the local democracy is to
make the process an integrate part of the efforts for moder-
nization of the governance, perfecting the administrative
system and improving the administrative performance.
This process should not be considered ‘‘the necessary
reorganization” but rather be based on specific political,
economic and social values for the public.
The good governance has occupied central position in
the public sphere. At the same time the lack of clear and
well-defined mechanisms of introducing it into all spheres
of governance (economy, public order, social security,
education, environment etc.) produced certain fragmen-
tation and did not ensure the appropriate decisions in
every case in the government practices. Together with the
lack of a structured public debate on “the government
that the public wants,” one that would rationalize the
strategic ideas for the state government, this has pushed
those matters to a secondary position and eventually the
achievements of Kostov’s cabinet were diminished, at the
end of his four-year term of government, to mere success
in the foreign policy.
Thus, although the foundation was laid for understanding
of the new role of the state, the ‘good governance’ idea
failed to establish as a main criteria of the public evaluation
of the political forces in their activities.
‘... The results of the latest parliamentary elections speak
eloquently about the consequences of citizen passivity
between elections. What differentiates the votes cast for
NMS II are not authoritarian values, but the lack of citizen
practices, attitudes and knowledge ... The outcome of the
parliamentary elections reflects the isolation of many
people from governance in Bulgaria.
The enormous challenge in front of any new government
is to mobilize the participation of all citizens and to
transform them into co-authors and partners of the new
governance.’52
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ANNEX 1
Matrix of Status
Table 1
Type of the Organization
Characteristics ‘‘Reacting” ‘‘Responsive” ‘‘Active” ‘‘Highly effective”
Time orientation in the past at the present in the future in progressive motion
Degree of orientation distraction in productivity in the result in perfection
Planning of excuses of activities of strategies of development
Model of changed trough punishments trough adaptation trough planning trough programs
development
Governance finding out co-ordination maintaining of order ‘‘navigation”
of the guilty
Structure fragmentary hierarchical matrix network
Perspective personal group of the organization ‘‘corporate culture”
Motivation parrying of blows reward co-operation actuality
Development scratching a living unity harmony transformation
Communication forced relations establishment direct relations constant exchange
of feed-back relations of information
Management compulsory training determining confiding
the objectives
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ANNEX 2
Main Challenges with which the Process of Establishing
of a Modern Administrative System of the Republic of Bulgaria Faces
Factors for Success
When elaborating the strategy for establishing of a modern
administrative system of the Republic of Bulgaria an analysis
of the key factors for achieving the strategic objectives
has been done. The main factor for success of the activities
for the realization of the Government strategy is the plan-
ning and carrying out of an overall, strategic oriented, sus-
tained process of changes. The management of this process
should be directed towards achieving the desired results
through ensuring favorable, prognosticated conditions for
its flow. These conditions could be synthesized in three
main groups:
Conditions, Referred to the Whole System
of the State Administration
1. Stability of the political system—development and
stabilizing of the consensus achieved on the overall
development of the state and its concretization with
regard to the state administration and civil servant’s
status;
2. Codification of the legislation—elaboration of com-
mon rules for organizing the activity, in particular,
those of the administrative structures aimed at im-
proving their functioning;
3. Effective co-ordination and interaction among the
bodies of the state power in elaborating and carrying
out of the state policy.
Internal Conditions within the
System of the Executive Power
1. Commitment of the governmental for the sustain-
ability of the process while delimiting the activities
on formulation and elaboration of the policy of acti-
vities on the realization of the feedback for the effect
of the implementation of the policy as an obligatory
condition for the de-politization of the civil servants;
2. Adequate usage of the available human resources in
the planning and the realization of the activities while
at the same time the necessary efforts are made for
enhancing the professional qualification of the emp-
loyees within the administration and stabilizing the
internal relations within the system;
3. Stabilizing the coordination among the ministries in
elaborating the governmental policy through stimulat-
ing the horizontal links within the administration;
4. Establishing a mechanism for administrative control
and periodical assessment of the effectiveness of the
work of the administration on the implementation
of the legislation;
5. Attractiveness of the civil service by stabilizing the
civil servant status and decreasing the conditions for
corruption, by introducing the principles of competi-
tion in recruiting the civil servants, creating conditions
for professional and career promotion and an adequate
remuneration;
6. Active involvement in the process of the territorial
bodies of the executive power and the bodies of the
local self-government—increase the role and importance
of the regional governors as a transmission of the state
policy at a local level; filling with content the functions
of the mayors of the municipalities for executing their
juridical powers in carrying out the state policy;
7. Increasing the information provision of the process
of elaborating of the policy; introducing  up-to-date
information technologies in the activity of the admi-
nistration and in the administrative service of the
citizens and legal persons;
8. Effectively using the external assistance, provided to
the country by different donors and increasing the
responsibility of the institutions, which receive the
external assistance, for its effective and appropriate
use;
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9. Increasing the participation of citizens in the elabora-
tion and co-ordination of the government policy;
10. PubliCity and reporting, in the course of the process,
before the society, as well as a purposeful information
policy referred to the activity of the administration.
Impact of the Processes for Extension
of the European Union, NATO
and the new Tendencies in the Worldwide
Development of the Interstate Relations
1. The Luxembourg decisions about an equal start in
the process of accession of the countries of East and
Central Europe to the European Union—the
integration of the Republic of Bulgaria into this
process responds to the strategic goals of the country.
This possibility is a serious challenge for the Bulgarian
country. The preparation and the carrying out of the
negotiations for the accession of the Republic of
Bulgaria into the European Union require an entire
mobilization of the state structures and fortification
of their potential for the elaboration and the
implementation of the state policy. At the same time
the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria into the
European Union must be carried out in a close co-
operation with the Member States of the European
Union and as well as with the candidate Member
States.
2. World-wide globalization of: the international eco-
nomic exchange; the competition; the new transitional
means of communication; the increasing mutual de-
pendence between the nations and the cultures places
new, every time more and more complex requirements
before the processes of changes.
The adequate response of these requirements places
under doubt the effectiveness of the traditional
structures and ways of acting of the state apparatus
in managing the complexity, variety and the mutual
dependencies of the modern society.
3. Transition to the information society—increasing the
volume of the informational flows and the human
knowledge requires effective national systems for an
exchange of information, concerning the governing,
which must be open, flexible and adaptive to the
changes with the respective mutual interconnections.
Taking into consideration these factors in the imple-
mentation of the government strategy, accepted in
their mutual connection, guarantees the achievement
of a unified national vision about the directions of
development and the possibility of achieving real results.
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NOTES
1 November 1991—December 1992, Prime-minister Philip Dimitrov, formed by the Union of Democratic Forces,
after the Parliamentary elections, October 1991.
2 January 1995—February 1997, Prime-minister Jean Videnov, formed by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, after the
Parliamentary elections October 1994.
3 Human Development Report, UN Development Program, 1996.
4 May 1997–July 2001, Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, leader of the victorious coalition of the Union of Democratic
Forces.
5 Decree No. 36 of Council of Ministers from February 1998.
6 National Plan for Economical Development, and National Plan for Regional Development—adopted October
1999.
7 Regional Development Act, publ. SG, No. 26, 1999
8 The Regional Development Council at the Council of Ministers discusses and develops the NPRD and also co-ordinates
the activities of regional importance, essential for its implementation. It is within its competence to evaluate the
infrastructure projects and, as a whole, this is the most important authority in charge of the formulation and
monitoring of the regional development policy in the Republic of Bulgaria. The Regional Development Council
under the Council of Ministers consists of 11 members. The Minister of regional development and public works
presides the council and the minister of finance, the minister of the economy, the minister of transport, the minister
of commerce and tourism, the minister of agriculture and forestry, the minister of the environment, the minister of
labour and social policy, the minister of health, the minister of education and science are its standing members.
Advisory vote at the meetings of The Regional Development Council at the Council of Ministers have the district
governors and a representative of the National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria.
9 Decree No. 104 of the Council of Ministers from 1999, publ. SG, No. 53, 1999l
10 National plan for regional development for the period 2000—2006, adopted with Decree No. 208 of the Council
of Ministers from 1999, publ. SG, No. 106, 1999, amended by SG, No. 24, 2001l
11 Elected by the National Assembly, July 2001, after the regular parliamentary elections, June 2001, won (42%) by
the newly formed National Movement Simeon II, a coalition between two political formations—the Movement for
National revival ‘‘Oborishte”, and the Party of the Bulgarian Women.
12 Simeon Sax-Cobourg-Gota is the son of the last Bulgarian tsar Boris III (1918–1943).
13 The changes enacted are presented in the present survey further on.
14 Local self-government and Local Administration Act (LSLAA), publ. SG, No. 77 from September 1991, last
amended—SG, No. 1, 2001.
15 Decision No. 125 of the Council of Ministers from March 1998.
16 Administrative-territorial System of the Republic of Bulgaria Act (ASRBA), publ. SG, No. 63, 1995, last amended—
SG, No. 57, 2000.
17 The settlement is territorial unit, which is historically and functionally a differentiated territory, defined with the
existence of constantly residing population, construction borders or land and construction borders and the necessary
social and engineering infrastructure. The settlements have their territory, borders and name and are divided into
towns and villages, where the towns should have a population of over 3 500 persons and the appropriate social and
technical infrastructure.
18 Art. 136,  par. 2 of the Constitution.
19 The mayoralty is a constituent administrative-territorial unit in the municipality, which has its territory, borders
population, name and administrative centre and consists of one or more neighbouring settlements.
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20 The district is a constituent administrative-territorial unit in the municipality, which has its own territory, borders,
population, and name. Districts are obligatory established in the capital city (Sofia) and in the cities with population
of over 300 000 persons (Plovdiv, and Varna).  With a decision of the respective Municipal Council districts can
also be established in the cities with population of over 100 000 persons.
21 Art. 2, par. 2 of the Local self-government and Local Administration Act (LSGLAA)
22 The order of election of community mayors is defined by law—the Local Elections Act, publ. SG, No. 66, 1995,
last amended—SG, No. 24, 2001.
23 Public Administration Act, publ. SG, No. 130, 1998, last amended—SG, No. 99, 2000
24 Civil Servant Act, publ., SG, No. 67 1999, last amended—SG, No. 110 2001.
25 Administrative Services to Physical and Legal Entities Act, publ., SG, No. 95, 1999.
26 Access to Public Information Act, publ., SG, No. 55, 2000, last amended SG, No. 1, 2002.
27 Members of the Council of Ministers are the Prime minister, the vice prime ministers, and the ministers.
28 Labour Code, publ., SG, No. 26 1986, last amendments—SG, No. 1 2002.
29 SG, No. 99, 2001.
30 Decision No. 2 of 1999, constitution case No. 33/98 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria—SG,
No. 8, 1999.
31 Ratified with a law, publ. SG, No. 28, 1995, issued by the Ministry of regional development and public works,
publ. SG, No. 46, 2000.
32 Local fees and taxes Act, publ. SG, No. 117, 1997, last amended SG, No. 109, 2001.
33 Municipal Budgets Act, publ. SG, No. 33, 1998, amended, No. 69, 1999.
34 Decree Nos. 152 and 259 of the Council of Ministers, 2000.
36 The bodies of executive power are defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, and the Public
Administration Act.
36 Decree Nos. 4 and 35 of the Council of Ministers, 2000.
37 The lowest level of higher education, according to the High Education Act, publ., SG, No. 112, 1995, last amendments
SG No. 22, 2001, is that of a “specialist.”
38 Decree No. 82 of the Council of Ministers, 2000.
39 Order Nos.-100 from December 29, 2000 of the minister of state administration.
40 The Universal Human Rights Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, article 19
in particular and the European convention on protection of human rights and basic freedoms.
41 Recommendations of the Committee of ministers of CE member-countries No. R (81) 19 on the access to information
held by public authorities; No. R (94) 13 on ensuring transparency of the mass media; No. R (99) 1 on mass media
pluralism incentive measures.
42 Decision No. 43 of the Council of Ministers, 1999.
43 Decision No. 826 of the Council of Ministers from 2000 to close the council.
44 See Annex 1 Main challenges, which faces the process of establishing of a modern administrative system of the Republic of
Bulgaria—factors for success.
45 See Annex 2 Matrix of Status.
46 Decree No. 121 of the Council of Ministers, 2000.
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47 ‘‘Last year (2000), progress in laying the legal framework for a modern, professional and independent public
administration was reported. This has continued through the adoption of most necessary secondary legislation and
progress in implementation of the legal framework, thus making further progress towards the short–term Accession
Partnership priority of implementing the civil service law. The legal framework for the Bulgarian civil service is now
largely satisfactory but a number of issues still requires attention. There is now a need to focus on its implementation
to ensure establishment of a professional and impartial civil service.
Further steps have been taken towards the implementation of the Laws on State Administration and the Civil
Service. Statutes setting out the structures for most ministries and executive bodies have been adopted by the
Council of Ministers. Employees in the administration are gradually being covered by the new civil servant status.
By September 2001, 17 300 people had civil servant status. This represents about 30% of those employed in state
administrative structures (including national, regional and municipal administrations). These figures exclude the
Interior Ministry where about 8% of staff (5119) have been demilitarised and have Civil Servant status.  People
with this status received significant salary increases of approximately 20%, which is intended to contribute towards
recruitment and retention of high quality personnel. Civil service salary levels and pay components (e.g. allowances
and bonuses) are regulated by law.”—2001 Regular report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession.
48 The program of the government envisions the adoption of a new, updated strategy for modernisation of the state
management and the administration to be a fact by the end of March 2002.
49 Human Development Report, UN Development Program, 2001.
50 Designated as municipality, commune, municipal, Gemeinde, comune.
51 The conclusion comprises an actual practice in the country and is valid as far as the possibility, envisaged in the
LSGLAA (Art. 37b), for selection of mayoral counsellors has not yet found its practical application.
52 Human Development Report, UN Development Program, 2001.
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INTRODUCTION
The implemented up to now model of decentralization
in Bulgaria has influenced the municipalities, primarily,
since they are the only units in which local self governance
had been realized. The decentralization of power at the level
of municipalities and the establishment of a new administ-
rative system in the country are done within the framework
of two separate types of reform—the first is known as the
administrative-territorial1 reform (local self-government
reform) while the second is public administration reform.
The public administration reform has its influence on
certain components that characterize the level of decentra-
lization, such as the nature of interaction between central
and local authorities, the status of municipality servants,
public service and others. This study emphasizes on the
methods and techniques of managing local self-government
reform and transfer of power to the municipalities.
Why does Bulgaria need decentralization? The transfor-
mation of the command-administrative methods and style
of management and the establishment of new institutions
that are much closer to the citizens and provide better public
services was recognized as part of the democratization
process, as one of the most important manifestations of
the transition. The efforts and enthusiasm of the first two
years were focused on it. As in the other Central and East
European countries ‘the reforms had a strong symbolic
meaning, as they were a way to legitimize the new power
and demonstrate that things have moved on.’2
What was the result of the decentralization reform ten
years after the beginning of this process? Most importantly,
in Bulgaria now there is stable local self-government, built
in full compliance with the European charter of local self-
government. There is a comparatively comprehensive, stable
and completed normative basis, settling all institutional,
financial, legal and economic issues, related to municipa-
lities. The country has balanced and optimum territorial
division without big territorial disproportion. The Bulgarian
municipalities are large in territory and population, which
turns them and there associations (national and regional)
into serious participants in the social-political and economic
life of the country. The Ministry of Regional Development
and Public Works, that is responsible at the central level
for the coordination of a greater part of the municipalities
is established as one of the key Ministries, headed by a
Vice Prime Minister, which has now become a practice
without being stipulated in written form. At present the
greatest challenge to the finalization of decentralization
in Bulgaria are fiscal decentralization3 and establishment
of second level of self-government at regional level.
TYPICAL REFORM TRAJECTORIES
Review of the Past Decade
of Decentralization
In 1987 the then ruling Bulgarian Communist Party in
its attempts to find a solution and way out of the deepening
political and economic crisis initiated, without any public
debate, a change in the territorial division of the country.
Nine regions replaced the existing, then 28 districts. Within
the frame-work of this regime any attempt to reform the
system was bound to failure. The undertaken measures
were far from being fruitful because at a certain point in
time they eroded the backbone of the regime and contradict
to the democratic centralism.
The process of decentralization started back in 1991 with
the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Bul-
garia, The Local self-government and Local Administ-
ration Act as well as the Members of Parliament, Munici-
pality Advisors and Mayors Election Act. These were im-
portant, for the establishment of the country as a legal, social
and democratic state, normative documents provided the
basic constitutional and legislative framework of the con-
temporary administrative-territorial division of the country
and created conditions for the development of the local
self-government.
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In the period 1992–1993 the lack of expertise and infor-
mation on planning and implementing the decentralization
resulted in focusing the efforts on large scale and com-
prehensive research, studies and projects. The work was
done by expert teams comprised of Members of Parliament,
as well as experts and specialists from the administration
of the Council of Ministers, the other Ministries and the
local authorities.
During 1993 the KPMG Consultant Company made a
report on decentralization. This report served as the basis
for the preparation of a comprehensive and strategic docu-
ment called ‘Key Points of the Territorial Reform in the Re-
public of Bulgaria ’ The project was coordinated with all
the interested parties and in 1995 was adopted by an expert
council in the Ministry of Territorial Development and
Construction4 as well as by the Inter-governmental Council
on Regional Development and Local Self-government.
The ‘Key Points’ define the role of the reform in building
the new political and economic system of the country,
the goals, scope, principles, the concept and model of the
reform as well as the timetable of the decentralization.
These guidelines became the basis for the law package on
decentralization developed by the Council of Ministers.
Account is taken of the fact that the realization of the
reform takes a longer period of time, which according to
the experience and practice of leading European countries
are 5–8 years long.5 The reform is treated as a complicated,
continuous and multisided process of change and building
of effective territorial, functional and institutional orga-
nization and structure of the local and regional authorities
within the general system of management of the country.
Although the project was not approved by the Government
for various reasons, the reform continued to follow its
logic.
The period from the end of 1992 to the end of 1994 was
successfully identified by the political analysts as a ‘hold
on’ and is still used today as a synonym for bad government,
corruption, and the state refusing to realize its obligation
to protect its citizens from criminal acts, etc. This was lost
time for the reforms, a period during which no progress
in the field of decentralization was made. The same is valid
for the other reforms in the country. The reason for that
was the political situation. The Government and therefore
the parliamentary majority had a very strange structure.
This was a government of the minority elected with the
mandate of a party having only 23 Members of Parliament
out of 240 total. The Government was officially adhering
to the program of the Union of Democratic Forces, which
had to resign and was in opposition, but at the same time
it relied on the Parliamentary and public support of the
former Communist Party. In order to maintain the fragile
majority the Government did not undertake any essential
measures aimed at reforming the public and economic
sector. The lack of a foreign factor, (Bulgaria had not yet
applied for membership in the EU, and the Council of
Europe had not yet started to actively work in the country),
as well as the lack of think tanks and most importantly
the lack of municipality associations protecting the rights
of the local authorities, contributed sufficiently to that
situation. The then existing associations of municipalities
were established on a political basis each party united in
associations the local authorities elected with their support.
This situation started to change after 1995 when the Na-
tional Association of Municipalities was established.
Aims of the Reform
The goals defined in ‘The Key Points’ include:
• Restructuring and development of the territorial,
functional and institutional organization of local self-
government and improving its cooperation with the
system of state management;
• Establishment and development of democratic proce-
dures and mechanisms in the organization and func-
tioning of local self-government;
• Enhancing and widening the scope of the decentrali-
zation process;
• Integration and joining of the local and regional struc-
tures in the country to similar European structures;
Stages of the Reform
Two stages with firm goals, objectives and clear priorities
were outlined in the draft of the program document:
1. First stage (1995–1997)
—the major goal was transition to reasonable decent-
ralization in local self-government as well as stabili-
zation of the municipal level of self-government. It
comprised of preparation and approval of the basic
normative documents, limiting the reform and con-
ducting local elections; development of local self-
government through enhanced participation of the
population; designing the property and financial
framework of the local self-government; normative
background of the municipality property.
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2. Second stage (1998–1999)
—the major goal was establishment of the local democ-
racy; strengthening the fiscal and financial indepen-
dence of the municipalities; introduction of the prin-
ciples and mechanisms of the public administration
reform in the field of local self-government. This stage
included endorsement of the financial independence
of the municipalities; beginning of the public administ-
ration reform and assessment of its impact on the
administrative-territorial reform; improving the ser-
vices and reform of the regional level of government.
Within the framework of this stage was envisaged to es-
tablish a rational organization of the deconcentrated state
structures, to introduce improved model of state and local
administration, as a result of the interrelated implemen-
tation of the principles and mechanisms of the administ-
rative and administrative-territorial reform, to achieve syn-
chronization with the structural reforms, regional deve-
lopment and realize other reforms of a mainly territorial
character.
The length and scope of the different stages and sub-stages
of the reform are fully dependent on the political will and
the consensus achieved by all participants in the process.
Because of that dependence there was an option to transfer,
based on the political will, part of the goals of a given stage
to another stage. Together with it the goals and measures
could be updated based on the assessment of the course
of the reform, the newly emerged circumstances, definition
of new criteria or formation of new social attitude.
It so happened that in 1997 when the country was on the
edge of hyperinflation an agreement was signed with the
International Monetary Fund providing in this way a sup-
port for the balance of payments. Certain engagements
were taken in the field of budget, finance, and privatization.
The budget restrictions enhanced the tendency towards
centralization and delayed the already planned introduc-
tion of self-government at the at the regional level. The
fear how the redistribution of power will impact the budget
could be  seen in the whole decision-making process. The
process of centralization is coming back as was the case
with the three Central European countries Poland, The
Czech Republic and Hungary [Kimball, 2001]. The
tendency itself has different dimensions:
• The central government refuses to be engaged with
clear division of power between the central and local
authorities;
• Assigning tasks without providing funds for their rea-
lization;
• Establishing a balance between the authorities via
different centralized measures such as preliminary
authorization and preliminary supervision of decisions;
• In some cases the municipalities have the responsibi-
lities to realize certain activities but are not authorized
to allocate, plan and control the related with the im-
plementation funds
Decentralization and
Public Administration Reform
It didn’t seem to matter that from the very beginning,
that the need to interrelate and incorporate the decentra-
lization into the process of legislative changes in the
government of the country was taken into account it was
not done in practice.  In any case if such a tendency could
be observed it has to be made clear that the result was not
planned beforehand. The relation and feedback of this
reform with the other reforms, directly connected to the
division of the territory and the regional development (the
so called small scale) and to the account of all possible
relations with the reforms resulting in change and improve-
ment of the political and economic system of the country
(the so called large scale) was not defined clearly enough.
It should be reiterated that the problem of interrelation
as acknowledged by direct participation in the process6
proved to be highly complicated and comprehensive. The
lack of interrelation lead to a number of difficulties in the
realization of the reform.
The public administration reform that started a little bit
late sufficiently influenced the process of decentralization
as a result of the need to re-assess part of its goals, priorities
and mechanisms. The public administration reform clearly
defined the need to re-assess the administrative capacity
of the municipality administrations. As time went by and
after the major package of measures of the public administ-
ration reform was adopted, the institutional inbalances
and the contradiction between central and local authorities
were not overcome. It was very difficult to make the mayor
of the municipality and the municipal administration part
of one joint model of administration. The mayors claimed
that they were local administration of the local legislative
authority, which is not part of the state administration.
In other words the introduced relations of coordination,
control and accountability between the central and
municipal administration were disputed. The idea that
the municipal administration should not be subordinate
to the norms and rules valid for the state administration
was strongly supported. A group of Members of Parliament,
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supporters of the local self-government, put the issue
before the Constitutional Court, which had its own position
on the matter. Court decided that the mayors are part of
an executive authority at local level. Thus in the course of
the public administration reform a problem, that should
have already been solved by the administrative-territorial
reform, was raised and finally settled.
The preparation of the strategic document for the realiza-
tion of the public administration reform started in 1995,
in other words two years after the beginning of the terri-
torial reform. In 1996 a paper ‘The New Administration-
Strategy of the Public administration reform in the Republic
of Bulgaria’ was written but was not adopted by the Govern-
ment because of the governmental crisis that had ensued
in the country. The Governmental strategy for contem-
porary public administration reform was adopted as late
as 1998 while the reform was practically realized in 1999–
2000 (although the two are separated by 5 to 6 years).
The experience from the combination of the two reforms
showed that if the reform could be designed as the ideal
option they should develop in parallel with the decentrali-
zation starting at least one year earlier. Apart from that
their simultaneous realization is necessary so that the focus
is kept on the local state administration or to put it in a
different way to combine de-concentration with decentra-
lization. The most suitable moment both from a psycho-
logical as well as a practical point of view to reform the
de-concentrated spheres is when the local authorities are
reformed. De-concentration and decentralization are terms
not familiar to the population and the society does not
differentiate between them. After all the citizens do not
care whether the taxes are collected by a municipality unit
or a branch of the Ministry of Finance, but they really
care about the quality of the services and the amount of
taxes. There are a great number of problems, which escape
the attention of the experts while conducting both the
reforms of the administration as well as the decentralization.
In spite of the gathered experience so far, it seems to me
that the civil servants in Bulgaria still do not have com-
prehensive and strategic understanding of the interrelated
character of the relation between the reform of the state
and the decentralization policy, as well as between these
reforms of the social sector as a whole and the structural
economic reform. In spite of the existing close connection
between the two major processes of the reform—the public
administration reform of the state and the decentralization,
the activities related to those policies are not only imple-
mented independently by the Minister of Public Admi-
nistration and the Ministry of Regional Development and
Public Works respectively but there is no common frame-
work for the two policies that should result in a deeper
transformation of the social sector. The coordination
between these two Ministries is very poor, while the real
dialogue either does not exist or is highly dissatisfactory
in view of the complexity, interrelation and importance
of the respective issues. This problem is taken into account
in the consultant report on decentralization from 1998
and is still current.7
Legal and Constitutional Basis
of the Local Self-government
The Local Self-government derives its legislative back-
ground from the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.
In compliance with Article 2, paragraph 1 the Republic
of Bulgaria shall be a united state with local self-govern-
ment. No autonomous territorial formations shall exist.
The basis of local self-government is provided by Chapter
Seven ‘Local self-government and local administration’
and establishes the definitions of:
• The territorial division—The territory of the Republic
of Bulgaria shall be divided into municipalities and
regions. The territorial division and the prerogatives
of the capital city and the other major cities shall be
established by law;
• Municipalities as the basic administrative territorial
unit at the level of which self-government shall be
practiced;
• The rights of the Citizens to participate in the govern-
ment of the municipality both through their elected
bodies of local self-government and directly, through
a referendum or a general meeting of the citizens;
• The functional and institutional structure and
organization of the local self-government—municipal
council and mayor;
• The right of the municipalities to form a national
association and regional associations for protection
of the common interests thereof and for promotion
and development of local self-government;
• The role of the state in establishing conditions for
the development of the regions and for the support
to the local authorities through funding, credit and
investment policy;
• The procedure of defining the borders of a munici-
pality—shall be established following a referendum
of the populace.
• Each municipality shall be a legal entity and shall have
the right to own property and to have a self-contained
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municipal budget, which it shall use to the interest
of the territorial community;
• Regions as an administrative territorial unit entrusted
with the conduct of a regional policy, the implementa-
tion of state government on a local level, and the
ensuring of harmony of national and local interests.
A regional governor aided by a regional administ-
ration shall govern each region. A regional governor
shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers. The
regional governor shall ensure the implementation
of the state’s policy, the safeguarding of the national
interests, law and public order, and shall exercise
administrative control;
• The central government and their local representa-
tives shall exercise control over the legality of the acts
of the bodies of local government only when autho-
rized to do so by law.
The Local Self-government and local administration Act,
enacted in 1991 defines the operations, rights and autho-
rity of local self-governments and their relationship to
the state. The areas of local self-government competence
are defined and revised regularly through legislation that
conforms to the European Charter of Local Self-govern-
ment, which was ratified by Bulgaria in 1995.
After the beginning of the decentralization reform in 1995
and the public administration reform in 1997 the legislative
basis of the local self-government was sufficiently enhanced
and enriched. The basic changes in that field were done
through three major steps:
• Regulating the manner and procedures for local elec-
tions. Local Elections Act (1995); establishing the
administrative-territorial units and definition of the
conditions, manner and procedures for administrative
territorial changes Administrative-Territorial Division
of the Republic of Bulgaria Act (1995), as well as de-
fining the administrative division of the big towns.
Territorial division of capital municipality and other
major cities Act, (1995).
• Regulation of the specific relations resulting from the
participation of the citizens in the political process
on local level, Referendums Act (1996); the issues of
acquiring, management and use of municipality pro-
perty, Municipal Property Act (1996); precise formu-
lation of the amount and type of local taxes and fees,
local taxes and fees Act (1997) and regulation of the
procedure and organization of the budget process in
the municipalities, Municipality Budgets Act (1998).
• The initiation of the public administration reform
in the country and the need to sufficiently improve
the work of the central and local administration mainly
in the part related to the development of the status
of the municipal servants resulted in adopting the
Public administration Act (1999), The Civil Servants
Act (1999) and The Administrative services Act
(1999). As that work was done changes were intro-
duced to other laws, directly related to the improve-
ment of the organization and functioning of the local
self-government [See Annex, List of Acts].
Structure and Operation
of Local Self-government
A municipality generally has at least six thousand inhabi-
tants, although exceptions may be made due to geographic
location or for national, historical or economic reasons.
Bulgaria’s administrative structure is currently comprised
of 263 municipalities. In 1999 28 regions (counties) re-
placed the then existing 9 regions. In 2000 6 macro-regions
for planning were created.
The average number of inhabitants of a municipality—
34,000 is rather high in comparison to a number of Euro-
pean countries. The same is valid for the average territory
of the Bulgarian municipalities—it is 418 square kilo-
meters. The average number of populated areas comprising
one municipality is 20. The majority of the populated
areas have the status of municipalities with a directly elected
mayor. A representative body in the municipality is the
municipal council, which is directly elected by the popula-
tion with a 4-year tenure using the proportional system.
The number of members of the municipal council is defined
based on the total population and varies from 11 to 61
people. A municipality’s duties include local matters affect-
ing its inhabitants, which the municipality independently
may determine8 (See Table 1.).
The Local Self-government Act stipulates those municipal
councils, local community councils or citizens’ assemblies
must participate in decisions to change or create the terri-
torial structure of a municipality. In accordance with the
Law on Referendums, a municipality may be established
following a local referendum that ascertains public opinion
in the affected area. On the basis of initial research and
the referendum, the Council of Ministers and President
legally recognizes such new administrative units and app-
roves the demarcation of their territories.
82 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
M A S T E R I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  P U B L I C  A D M I N I S T R AT I O N  R E F O R M S  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
MANAGEMENT
OF THE REFORM PROCESS
Adjustment to Political Changes,
Election Cycles
Provided the reform is 7–8 years long achieving consensus
on its basic points was a must for its success. The consensus
though was not reached. The lack of continuity in Bulgaria
is one the most serious problems of its development. There
was partial continuity in the period 1990–1999 and it
was only on the issues of European integration. Since the
beginning of the negotiations for EU membership the
area in which there is continuity broadened and in that
aspect the accession process plays a stabilizing role in the
political life of the country.
Table 1.
Functions of Local Self-governments
1. Municipal property, municipal-owned enterprises, municipal finances, taxes and fees, municipal administ-
ration;
2. Organization and development of the municipal territory and of the population centers therein;
3. Education: pre-school, elementary, primary and secondary education;
4. Health care: outpatient, policlinic and hospital care, preventive care, community care, and municipal sanitation
and hygiene;
5. Culture: community centers, theaters, orchestras, libraries, museums and museum collections, amateur art
activities, rituals, local traditions and customs;
6. Public works and utilities: water supply, sewerage, electricity supply, central heating, telephone line installation,
streets and squares, parks, gardens, street lighting, landscaping, river-bed and gully correction, municipal
waste management, public transit, public baths, laundries, hotels, garages, and cemeteries;
7. Social assistance: social care and welfare benefits, provision of subsidized housing and other social work of
municipal importance;
8. Environmental protection and rational use of natural resources of municipal importance;
9. Maintenance and conservation of historical, cultural and architectural landmarks of municipal importance;
10. Development of sports, recreation and tourism of municipal importance.
Parliament is related to political decentralization as far as
it approves the laws.  Each Parliamentary majority does its
best to start from scratch. A characteristic feature of our po-
litical life is that the newly elected always blame the previous
government for all their problems and misfortunes. A
tradition of writing a White book of the failures of each
previous government by the newly elected is established,
although, the mistakes are repeated over and over again.
An interesting change of roles is observed when a party is
in opposition and when it is in power. Because of the clearly
established bipolar political system from 1990 till 2001
in different coalition configurations the Bulgarian Socialist
Party and the Union of Democratic Forces 9 took turns
to be in power. Both parties when in opposition supported
the local authorities and communal positions, insisted on
increasing subsidies and the percentage of municipalities
budget from the consolidated state budget, worked actively
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the most recent elections. The fact that three from four
parliamentary represented parties are in power gives a great
opportunity for decentralization. The measures taken so
far indicate that the type of party system is important for
the success of the decentralization.
The Governmental program approved in October 2001
has a special section ‘Stimulating the process of decentrali-
zation, local self-government and participation of the
citizens.’ Attention should be paid on to priority given to
the enhancement of the local democracy and the processes
of decentralization of functions, competencies and finances
from the state to the administrative territorial units. It is
envisaged to:
• Conduct a broad public debate on the further deve-
lopment of the administrative-territorial structure of
local authorities and establishing a second level of
self-government in compliance with the requirements
for our European integration;
• Discuss the distribution and differentiation of func-
tions between the central and local authorities;
• Increase the independence of the local authorities
through decentralization of the functions, allocation,
planning and spending of resources;
• Improve the horizontal coordination between the Na-
tional Assembly Committees, the Council of Ministers
and the Ministries in order to regulate the process of
decentralization of functions and resources provision;
•  Regulate the processes for training and qualification
of the personnel in the local authorities.
Domestic and International
Professional Capacity
to Prepare Reforms
USAID, FLGR, Associations of Municipalities
After the Constitution was adopted and the local self-
government was established, public pressure was signi-
ficantly reduced and it resulted in less activity in the reali-
zation of the decentralization. Since decentralization was
not a governmental priority it was the passive participation
of the whole process and gave in only in the instances when
it was not able to counteract efficiently. The rethorics of a
restricted decentralization often hides the real intentions
which in most cases are transferring responsibilities to the
municipalities without providing funding in other words
this is the tendency of delegating responsibilities but not
authorities. It seems that the topic of decentralization is
for the adoption of laws, related to local self-government
and are particularly in favor of the establishment of a second
level of self-government. The decentralization is fashion-
able, as it is fashionable to talk about democracy. Even
more than that—the decentralization became something,
which in its populist characteristic can be only compared
to the promises for pensions and salaries raise. These cha-
racteristics of our political life result in lack of any chance
to reach strategic and long-term consensus on the goals
scope and model of decentralization. No wonder when a
new Government has a different idea of the depth, the
level of decentralization and its timetable.
Anyway if we try to find any differences in the programs
of the Bulgarian left party and the right party and we
make a deeper analysis our observations will be as follows,
the left party is to a greater extent supporting decentraliza-
tion, insists on conducting decentralization at the lowest
possible level, they spend the budget by re-allocating it to
the less developed and distant regions; the right party is
much more interested in the problems at the level of the
region, the regional development issues and it strives to
concentrate the resources and to fund the bigger projects
in the already developed regions which have a greater
development potential.
It seems that the local authorities are fed up with this
game and a good example are the failed attempts to reach
consensus on amendments in an article of the Constitution
related to the right of the municipal councils to define
the amount of taxes and fees.   The article stipulates that
the local authorities can not independently define the
amount of local taxes and fees but can do so only within
the limits of the minimum and maximum values as defined
by a law. A 2/3 majority is necessary to amend the Consti-
tution and as usual when one of the parties is for the other
is against. Not a single party, when it was in opposition,
gave a chance to that amendment.
There is for the first time hope for changes because of the
current parliamentary majority, elected in June this year.
It is comprised of representatives from two parties, that
are totally different from the two main parties that have
been ruling in the country so far—the National Movement
Simeon the Second and the Movement for Rights and
Freedom. The staff of the administration still to a great
extent comprises of people appointed by the party, which
was in power (The Union of Democratic Forces). The
fourth big political power—the Bulgarian Socialist Party
is represented by two Ministers (both of them are former
mayors) and by the President of the country, elected in
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not of great importance for the public opinion in Bulgaria.
The public opinion does not consider the decent-ralization
an integral part of the efforts aimed at better government.
That is why external pressure and lobbying from the NGO
sector became the main source and engine of reforms.
The National and Regional Assembly of Municipalities,
the municipalities themselves and the NGOs and parti-
cularly the Foundation for Local Self-government Reform
took an active role. On 11 December, when the fifth anni-
versary of the establishment of the National Association
of Municipalities is celebrated, the Prime Minister and
the Chairman of the National Association signed an agree-
ment for cooperation between the Government and the
municipalities. The main goal of the agreement is to realize
the long delayed decentralization and financial indepen-
dence of the municipalities. The agreement guarantees
the joint development of normative act drafts and the
participation of representatives of the Association in meet-
ings of the Government when it discusses important issues
related to the municipalities.
Of utmost importance for the reform is the fact that the
Bulgarian mayors have a very strong lobby. What are the
factors for that? First, the population directly elects the
mayors and the majority element enhances their authority.
The mayors of big municipalities like Sofia, Plovdiv,
Varna, Burgas, Russe and others are the personalities with
a high rating in the country and the respective regions.
Second, the mayors, especially those of the big municipa-
lities, operate with substantial resources with a lot of staff,
since the Bulgarian municipalities are big in territories.
Very often they take key positions in the government of
the country. A fairly large group of former mayors and
regional governors traditionally become Members of
Parliament. In 1997 the mayor of the capital became Prime
Minister and managed to successfully deal with the crisis
in the country within the first few months of his tenure.10
The 1998 Government had a Vice Prime Minister Minister
and Minister of Regional Development and Public works
whom before being promoted was a municipality advisor.
Four Ministers in the current Government are former
mayors—one of them is a Vice Prime Minister11 and Mi-
nister of regional development and public Works, second
is Minister of Public Administration,12 the third is Minister
of Agriculture—the most important sector in Bulgarian
economy13 and the fourth is minister without portfolio.
There is an increased interest and involvement of the mayors
of the municipalities and the heads of the regions towards
the need of decentralization. So the lobby of mayors is
the link between the government, think tanks, associations
of municipalities, the elected politicians, members of
parliament and political parties.
Among the key players in Bulgaria the biggest professional
capacity have the NGOs. Apart from the above-mentioned
National Assembly of the Municipalities14 a well-laid
network of regional associations of municipalities are built
in the country, covering its territory on the geographical
principle.15 To a great extent this is due to the financial
and technical support provided by the US Agency for Inter-
national Development and other donors. The National
Assembly of the Municipalities was established with the
active role of another powerful NGO—The Foundation
for local self-government Reform.16 This organization also
helped in the structuring of the professional organizations
of those working for the municipal administrations—
municipality secretaries, lawyers of municipalities, the PR
officials, the finance experts in the public sector.
It will be very true if we say that in the course of the last
5 years almost everything that happened in the area of
decentralization has the NGOs as a background. For
example the development and approval of the Regional
Development Act, the Municipal Budgets Act, the pub-
lication of the European Charter on local self-government.
The state uses their capabilities in different ways. An
example is the provisions of some laws that envisage the
participation of municipality representatives in different
consultative councils, working groups, their active partici-
pation in the work of the National Assembly Committees,
the coordination with them of different drafts of normative
acts. The Government is less and less engaged in assigning
the development of concepts and programs as it used to
do at the beginning of the reform. This niche was success-
fully filled by the above mentioned NGOs. They take
part in the whole legislative process : do research and initial
analysis, organize campaigns on the need of a certain
decision, participate in working groups for writing laws,
take part in the work of the Parliamentary Committees,
organize workshops and other activities in order to support
the implementation of the new law.
KPMG
The Government, funded by the World Bank, engaged
in March 1993 the Group for Economic Policy of KPMG
Peat Marwick—Washington. DC to make an assessment
of all the drafts and give recommendations on the deve-
lopment of the respective legislation by outlining and
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pointing out the possible way in that direction. The analysis
and the recommendations were collected in a report ‘ The
decentralization and strengthening of local self-govern-
ment in the Republic of Bulgaria’ that was presented in
September 1993. This is the first sufficient analytical report
outlining the directions of decentralization in the country.
Furthermore it served as the background for the ‘ Key
Points of the Administrative Territorial Reform’ done in
1995. This report as well is circulated among a very limited
number of people.
The report recommends that it is not feasible to establish
a second level of self-government with fiscal autonomy
or at least the two levels should not be established simul-
taneously since this requires huge efforts and will result
in competition for political power between the levels of
sub-national government. Recommendations were given
on division of expenditure functions between the state
and the municipalities, the municipalities funding, the
necessary political reforms, the change of borders of the
municipalities, the status of the capital Sofia, the associa-
tion of the municipalities, the property of the municipa-
lities. Yet another recommendation was not to establish
regional self-government or at least to delay by something
like 10 years. Different Bulgarian Governments highly
selectively followed these recommendations. The held
within the framework of the study activities—workshops,
discussions, specific consultations provided for the
establishment of favorable conditions and formation of
political will and unanimous understanding of the need
for and the direction of the reform. The study and the
joint work with the team of experts were highly beneficial
for the future work of the Bulgarian teams directly involved
in the work on the reform.
International Monetary Fund
It might be pretty strange but since 1998 the IMF is a
key participant in the process of defining the trajectory of
the decentralization process.
UNDP
Upon the request of the Ministry of Territorial Development
and Public Works in 1998 the UNDP supported a Consul-
tancy Mission on Decentralization.17 It comprised of two
parts: report summarizing the decentralization experience
in Latin America, outlining positive conclusions for the
situation in Bulgaria and a study visit to Bulgaria with the
aim to prepare a final report, that sums up the impressions
from the decentralization process in Bulgaria as well as
making recommendations in relation to the decisions that
have to be made.
The report does the most detailed analysis of the decent-
ralization process in the country within the last three years.
Regretfully this highly beneficial report was not officially
published and is circulated among very few people
working for the Ministry of Regional Development and
Public Works.
The contribution of the UNDP is more than that. The
problems of good government and decentralization in
particular have always been the focus of the attention. In
view of development of the democratic institutional infra-
structure, the 1997 UN Development Program Report
on Human Development recommends ‘ensuring guaran-
tees for the efficient decentralization of the state administ-
ration.’18  The annual 2000 UNDP Report was entirely
devoted to regional and local development problems.
Council of Europe
After the Republic of Bulgaria became a member of the
Council of Europe in 1992 the contacts and the expert,
consultant, methodological and experimental assistance,
directly related to the problems of decentralization, was
sufficiently enhanced.  The Bulgarian Government was
engaged with the development of the basic program docu-
ments for decentralization expert teams in the different
Ministries and research units were helped out in the deve-
lopment of the specific Bulgarian projects and papers
through exchange of expertise, consultations, training and
specialization as well as through attending international
workshops.
Joining the European Charter on Local Self-government,
although its clauses were earlier included in the different
drafts of the reform, gave impetus to the decentralization.
The Congress of Local and Regional authorities in Europe
plays an important role for the decentralization. The
Congress monitored the country. The visits of delegations
from the Congress turned into a catalyst for the progress
of the process. Most beneficial were the intensive contacts
between the Congress and the Bulgarian Government in
1998–1999 when a working group from the Congress
visited Bulgaria a few times and made a Report on the
situation of local and regional self-government in the
Republic of Bulgaria.
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Bulgaria was invited to start accession negotiations at the
Helsinki Summit in 1999. Soon after that the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe stopped the super-
vision on Bulgaria and made a number of recommenda-
tions. One of the recommendations was to introduce
self-government at the level of the 28 regions.19
Accession to the EU
The European Union has no specific requirements as far
as decentralization is concerned and does not have a model
for decentralization, common theoretical frame, nor optimal
degree of decentralization to which a country should follow.
Nevertheless the membership invitation totally changed
the direction of the public debate—more attention is now
paid to regional development, regionalization and regional
self-government. This makes one think that such an attitude
to decentralization provides arguments to the supporters
of restricted decentralization by saying that a financial
centralization is necessary in order to collect resources for
co-funding of projects. Fortunately the membership invi-
tation had a positive impact on decentralization as far as
the method of work is concerned. The Bulgarian Govern-
ments learned how to develop management programs, stra-
tegies and program documents as well as how to imple-
ment them and report on the results achieved. The PHARE
Program of the European Union funded a number of
projects mainly related to the public administration reform.
Economic Conditions
Currency Board and Decentralization
Since 1998 Bulgaria is in a currency board. In summary
this means high budget restrictions, restrictions for funding
the deficit, the financial discipline and stability at macro
level. For five years now the Bulgarian national currency—
the Lev is in a 1:1 ratio with the German Mark. This is
yet another good argument used by the enemies of the
financial decentralization. In spite of our claims that
Bulgaria is not in transition any more the chances of
decentralization are not large as long as the greater part
of the budget is used for covering the external debts.
For that reason Bulgaria is a classic example for the eco-
nomization of the decentralization issue and rejection of
decentralization because of economic reasons. Instead of
decentralization for the sake of economic reasons the
decentralization in Bulgaria had stopped due to economic
reasons.
On the other hand the economic policy is under the super-
vision of the currency board is realized to a certain extend
independently from the problem related to the reform
and decentralization of the public administration.20 The
Ministry of Economy is responsible for the economic policy,
which in no way is engaged with the reforms in the public
sector. Worse than that the understanding, that first of all
an economic reform should be done and after achieving
economic stability and development there will be resources
and time to pay attention to the accommodation of the
public sector to the needs of the process of development
of democratization of the country, is getting more and
more supporters. The major and prevailing engagement
of the national authorities is the economic development.
The decentralization in the beginning of the transition
started mainly as a strive towards democratic values. That
is why it can’t be treated as a solution of the crisis.
Up to now there is no political platform, which clearly
supports the understanding that decentralization is much
more cost effective than centralization. When there is
deficit the state can easily argument the centralization of
power by pointing out that it will much better manage
the resources. Another reason for centralization could be
protection of public interest in fighting corruption and
criminality in general. In the last year or two the relation
of decentralization with cost effectiveness became more
important because of the work on improvement of the
services for citizens. Efforts are also made to reduce the
great number of permit and license regimes. It was found
out that it is much more cost effective to give the munici-
palities more authority to organize the services instead of
the citizens traveling to the capital for minor services and
permits.
One of the most serious criticisms of the Bulgarian govern-
ments in the last 7–8 years made by the Council of Europe
and the Bulgarian municipalities was related to constantly
assigning new tasks without providing funds for their
realization. This hides nothing less but the desire to avoid
the problems via focusing the public discontent towards
the municipalities and the other structures but not the
central government. Frequently social welfare is not paid
on time. The rage of the protesting people is addressed to
the municipalities.
The conclusion is that it is very difficult to decentralize in
a currency board because of the fear that the transfer of
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resources and competence to the echelons in the public
sector of a lower level can have a negative impact on the
management of the macro-economic variables and respec-
tively the economic stability in the country. An illustration
of this approach is the period 1998–2000 when the focus
of the governmental policy was on the macro-economic
stabilization without taking into account the need for
development and looking for decisions which no matter
how risky would contribute to the development.
The ruling party won the elections with a strong liberal
platform in which the decentralization played an important
role. The adopted elections leadership program is restrictive
according to some assessments. The reason is that in order
to guarantee macro economic stability, the Government,
again signed an agreement with the IMF and accepted
the conditions of the Fund. The program of the current
Government, elected in July this year, comprises of the
most radical outlines of measures for decentralization and
despite the mentioned restrictions it is doing its best to
implement them. The proposed draft budget for 2002 is
the best in view of the municipality budgets since the
beginning of the transition. The investment possibilities
for the municipalities are enhanced, impetus is given to
the realization of the envisaged incomes in the municipality
budgets. A decision how to cover the existing deficit in
the municipality budgets was found. The efforts of the
local authorities and their associations, of FLGR and LGI
to include in the Governmental agenda the issue of financial
decentralization were at last successful so as of the current
stage of the reform the efforts are directed at financial
decentralization.
Finally, I share the concerns that without fiscal decentrali-
zation the level of decentralization will remain very low.
The position of the municipalities on the goals of the
reform in summary reads as follows: ‘ The realization of
the idea for strong local authority should start and finish
with financial decentralization.’21
The mentioned report of KPMG is also of the opinion
that the financial decentralization should be categorically
used for the reduction of the state expenditures.22
Decentralization and Privatization
An analogy between the two processes and the need for
the privatization (reform and withdrawal of the state from
the economy) to develop in parallel with decentralization
(reform of the administration and withdrawal of the state
from the public sector) is being done in Bulgaria. Decent-
ralization is rather treated as a way to escape the problems
via transferring them to other levels of responsibility. The
analysis shows that privatization is undoubtedly of a higher
priority. Up to now not a single government had supported
decentralization while several governments had announced
themselves as governments of the privatization. ‘The big’
privatization is out of the control of the executive power
and is under the Privatization Agency whose work is super-
vised by the Parliament. While Parliament is constantly
dealing with privatization—electing the Board of directors,
approving the annual reports and the privatization program
it had never had a particular attitude as far as decentrali-
zation goes. Apart from the Privatization Agency almost
all Ministries have branches dealing with privatization.
The comparison between the two processes shows that
no attention is paid to decentralization.
Regionalization and Local Self-government
The current Government declared its intentions to intro-
duce a second level of self-government. Regardless that
the issue of establishing self governing sub units had been
raised periodically, the second level of self-government in
the regions became actual today, 11 years after the beginn-
ing of the transition.
Even if a second level of self-government is established its
authorities will be highly restricted because of the small
territory of the country, the Constitutional restriction on
establishing autonomous territorial formations and the
fear from federalization of the state via defining regions
in which the minorities dominate the local and regional
authorities.23
Administrative Capacity
to Manage the Reform
The decentralization issue is not taking an important place
on the list of priorities. As a result there is no structural
and united political and administrative position on the
decentralization policy issue in the country. Furthermore
all expert working on it do not believe that decentralization
is a national interest. The technical team dealing with
decentralization believes that the decentralization problem
is rather political than technical in other words the problem
is clearly defined at the technical level, but the politicians
are not clear about it.
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The most important unit, playing a key role in decentrali-
zation is the National Center for Territorial Development
to the Ministry of Regional Development and Public
Works. The Center was established back in 1960 as an
institute that provides legislative, methodological, infor-
mation, expert and constancy services in the area of regional
development, territorial division and spatial planning. The
Center developed the already mentioned draft decentrali-
zation strategy, called ‘Key Points’. Regretfully the capacity
of the center, the expertise and the highly qualified team
were gradually lost for the purposes of the territorial reform.
In 1999 the Center was transformed from a branch within
the Ministry of Regional development and Public Works
into a limited liability company, which to a certain extent
restricted its access to the government processes After that
a new body or unit dealing with the decentralization process
was not identified since there was no program documents
engaging the governments to continue the reform. The
territorial decentralization remained a responsibility of the
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works,
but the Ministry has no clearly identified team, responsible
for the reform.
After the beginning of the public administration reform,
the, Minister of Public Administration, in his capacity of
a leader of the public administration reform, gradually
undertook part of the reform functions related to the de-
centralization process, but this is only within the framework
of the public administration reform.
From 1999 to mid 2001 the functions of a Minister of
Public Administration were assigned to the Prime Minister,
which time and again demonstrates the attention paid to
the public administration reform in comparison to the
territorial reform and the development of local self-govern-
ment. Due to that all important activities in that area were
implemented under the direct supervision of the Prime
Minister including the new territorial division at the level
of regions, introduced at the beginning of 1999 and the
adoption of the Regional Development Act in the beginn-
ing of 1999. There was no special unit directly supporting
the Prime Minister in this function. The existing Regional
Coordination Directorate was supporting him without any
special authorization to implement the reform.
The central and the local authorities are very well aware
that the lack of a written document on the stages of the
reform is not a big problem if there is a will for dialogue
since the Government might have a strategy but if it does
not want to implement it everything else is fruitless. From
that aspect decentralization is treated as a continuous
process but not a single act that has to be completed by a
defined timetable. Thus the lack of a written strategy is
becoming a powerful argument of the decentralization in
Bulgaria since it provides opportunities to focus on what
is important at any particular stage at the current important
issues and not follow artificially outlined stages.
Things are totally different in the field of the public ad-
ministration reform. It also started with preliminary analysis.
A special declaration of the Government, addressed to the
citizens, was adopted. Together with this the Government
approved a Strategy for the establishment of a modern
administrative system. Making the reform a priority resulted
in the establishment of the first ever Ministry of Administ-
ration. A ‘State Administration’ Directorate to the Council
of Ministers and Public Administration and European
Integration Institute were also established. The reform is
conducted continuously by all Governments and the public
is very well aware of what has been achieved and what
still has to be done. As far as the methods and techniques
of the reform are concerned the public administration
reform is much better organized.
Since decentralization is not a high priority, it is not treated
as a unified process that needs to be developed continuously.
Because of that there is no strategy for it, there are no
structures, task forces or special commissioners for policy
design and reform implementation. The stages are not
clear, a review of the results achieved is not done. That is
why an annual report of UNDP points out that some of
the changes are done in compliance with the principles
of countries in transition—the changes are done either
spontaneously or on a case by case basis, acclimatizing to
the realities after they occur.24
Among the civil servants related in different ways and at
different levels to the problem of decentralization there is
no real and deep enough understanding, that the country
indeed needs a process of efficient decentralization—
basically one of the most often sited reasons for the need
of decentralization are the requirements of the European
Union 25 but not the real need. Another problem is that
the policy makers are conceptually perplexed regarding
the processes dealing with decentralization and those
dealing with de-concentration.
Policy Lessons
• The decentralization is part of the transition process;
• The decentralization is a comprehensive, radical pro-
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cess related simultaneously to the structural economic
reforms, the reform of the administration and the
changes in the society and its interrelation with the
state;
• A connection with the other reforms should be ensured;
• It is necessary to preliminary reach a national con-
sensus on the need of such a process and on its basic
characteristics;
• At the very beginning the best possible policy and
model should be developed, plus a clear understand-
ing among those defining the policy and the politicians
themselves;
• A Strategy for the realization of this policy and this
model should be developed with clear stages and
activities that should be realized by each of them, as
well as the time tables, the necessary mechanisms for
coordination and the critical trajectory of the process;
• The model should be flexible recognizing from the
very beginning that changes could be done at different
stages;
• An inter-governmental committee, headed by a
Minister should do the whole coordination at the
highest possible level, which personally represents the
Prime Minister.
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ANNEX
Basic Laws on Local Government
1) Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, promul-
gated State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria No.
56/13.07.1991.
2) Administrative and territorial division of the Republic
of Bulgaria Act, St. Gazette, No. 63/1995 and amend-
ments.
3) Local self-government and local administration Act,
St. Gazette, No. 77/1991 and amendments.
4) Municipal budgets Act, St. Gazette, No. 33/1998
and amendments.
5) Local taxes and fees Act, St. Gazette, No. 117/1997
and amendments.
6) Municipal property Act, St. Gazette, No. 44/1996
and amendments.
7) Local elections Act, St. Gazette, No.66/1995 and
amendments.
8) Regional development Act, St Gazette, No.26/1999.
9) Spatial planning Act, St. Gazette, No. 1/2001 and
amendments.
10) Public administration Act, St. Gazette, No. 130/1998
and amendments.
11) Territorial division of capital municipality and other
major cities Act, St. Gazette, No. 66/1995.
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NOTES
1 That is why I use the two terms as synonyms: decentralization reform, administrative-territorial reform and local
self-government reform.
2 ‘The Transfer of Power’, 1999, edited by Kimball, Jonathan. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service
Reform Initiative, p. 17.
3 Drumeva, Emilia. Local government in Bulgaria in: Stabilization of Local Government, Budapest: 2001, p. 168.
4 Today this Ministry is called Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works.
5 These were defined in this manner so that they include at least two tenures of the National Assembly.
6 Stanev, H. 2001. Local-self-government and decentralization. (unpublished paper in Bulgarian)
7 Correa, D. 1998. Decentralization in Bulgaria—overview and recommendations, p. 9.
8 Ref. Art. 11, Law on Local Self-government and Local Administration.
9 The major political forces in the country are the Union of Democratic Forces (people’s party); the Bulgarian Socia-
list Party (socialist, social democratic party); the Movement for Rights and Freedom (liberal, minority party); National
Movement Simeon the Second, which is a newly established political force that won the last Parliamentary elections.
10 He intends to form new political party, ‘mayors party.’
11 He is steel chairmen of the National Assembly of Municipalities.
12 He is former chairmen of the National Assembly of Municipalities.
13 All of them are members of Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Council of Europe.
14 The right of the municipalities to have their national assembly and the goals on which they might be in dialogue
with the Government are stipulated in a Law. This is stipulated by Art. 9 of the Local Self-government and Local
Administration Act.
15 Ten regional associations of the municipalities and three assemblies of the municipalities, which are not based on a
territorial principle, have been established. An example is the association of the municipalities with minorities ,
called ‘Tolerance.’
16 The program of the Bulgarian Government, approved October this year clearly states that a task of the Government
is to regulate the relations with the National Assembly of the Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria, the
Foundation for the Reform of Local Self-government, the Regional Associations of the municipalities and the
professional unions of those working for the local self-government in view of their practical participation in the
processes of local democracy development, which is an indication that they are reliable partners.
17 The mission was assigned to German Correa. The consultant has a very broad expertise—before mission he was on
missions in the area of public sector reform in Honduras, Mongolia and Bolivia, Nicaragua, Egypt He is a former
Minister of Transport and Telecommunications and Minister of Interior of Chile in 1990–1994.
18 Correa, D. 1998. Decentralization in Bulgaria—overview and recommendations, p. 21.
19 Art.4, vii. ‘the 28 newly established regions should be given directly elected councils in accordance with the European
Charter of Local Self-government.’
20 Correa, D. 1998. Decentralization in Bulgaria—overview and recommendations, p. 9.
21 Local budgets in Bulgaria, Sofia, 1998, FLGR.
22 Correa, D. 1998. Decentralization in Bulgaria—overview and recommendations, p. 42.
23 About 10% of municipal councils are dominated by minorities.
24 Annual report of UNDP for 1997.
25 Correa, D. 1998. The Decentralization of Bulgaria—overview and recommendations, p. 12.
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Public Administration Reform
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INTRODUCTION
The public administration reform is a long-term, never
ending process. It has been up and running since 1990 in
the Slovak Republic, 2 years  in the Czechoslovak Federate
Republic, and more than 10 years in the independent Slovak
Republic. From the start, it was understood that it was
going to be a complex task comprised of 4 reform processes:
• Change of the territorial arrangement,
• Reform of the public administration institutions.
a)  New arrangement of the state administration,
including the reform of the central state admi-
nistration bodies
b) New arrangement of the self-government (crea-
tion of its second level and reform of the local
self-government),
• Decentralization of the powers and competencies,
decentralization of the public finances and decentrali-
zation of the political power from state administration
to self-government bodies,1
• Modernization of the public administration (legislative
framework and management, control, and educa-
tion).
The process of the reform started by electing the local
self-government bodies (towns, villages), in 1990. Then,
in the years between 1991 to 2001, there were changes
provided within state administration only (disintegration
followed by integration of the offices, cancellation of the
county level and then its application at the circuit level
and then once again its cancellation...), these changes cost
several billions of Slovak crowns (the estimated cost was
about 25 billion Slovak crowns). The year of 2001created
movement in the area of decentralization and creation of
the second level of the self-government—a region.2
The study contains the process of the preparation and
realization of the public administration reform since 1989,
since the fall of communism, or from 1990, when the
šš š
new legislation was approved, till today. The study of the
development is divided into three units:
• The chronology of the development  from 1990 to 2001.
• The description of the public administration reform
management process is divided into three stages: from
1990 to 1992, 1992 to 1998, and 1998 to 2001.
• The summarization of the knowledge.
In the last twelve years, there have been 7 changes of
government in Slovakia. Each of them had its own idea
of public administration, its structure and system of work.
Some of the ideas were compatible sometimes they were
totally different. It is necessary, for better understanding,
to include in this material some short outlines of the models
of public administration, which were preferred at different
times. The management techniques and methods of the
decentralization reform are stressed in this study.
THE CHRONOLOGY
OF THE DEVELOPMENT IN 1990–2001
After the fall of communism, in 1989 the new government
headed by Mr. Milan Cic was appointed. Vladimír Meciar,
later known as a triple Prime Minister, was appointed to
the position of Minister of Interior in February 1990.
The main task of this government was to lead the country
to free elections, when after more than 40 years the parlia-
ment would be freely elected again. Some changes in the
structure of public administration were planned at that
time, mainly re-construction of the self-government,
within the preparation of democratic changes. Based on
the resolution of the government, the Minister of Interior
was charged with the preparation of this task.
The free elections were held in June 1990; the new govern-
ment was appointed. The government program, which
was about the big changes towards democratic regime,
contained also the changes in the structure of public ad-
ministration, its democratic functioning and reconstructing
š š
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of the self-government. There were no thoughts about
creating the second level of self-government. These ideas
arose for the first time in 1991.
The municipal law was adopted by the parliament in the
autumn of 1990, which reconstructed the self-government
in Slovakia and split the public administration to state
aministration and self-government. The system of national
committees was abolished. The municipal law empowered
the municipalities with some powers and competencies.
In the spring of 1991, the law on municipal property was
adopted, which transferred selected property of the state
to the towns and villages that allowed the real functioning
of the self-government.
There was also a new law adopted: law on organization of
the ministries and other state central bodies (so called ‘large
competency law’), which divided the powers and compe-
tencies among these bodies and set the basic mechanisms
of their functioning and the relations among them. In
accordance with this law, based on the government resolu-
tion, the whole process of the public administration reform
management, organization and its decentralization was
managed by the Ministry of Interior.
Some members of the government were replaced after
Prime Minister Meciar was dismissed from his position
in March 1991. The government was then headed by
Prime Minister Ján Carnogursky´. The concept of the
reform of public administration was worked out by the
Ministry of Interior and approved by the government.
This concept contained the creation of the second level
of the self-government and also the proposal of a new
territorial arrangement of Slovakia to new units—so called
‘zupy.’  The material was submitted for discussion to the
parliament. The next parliament elections were planned
to take place in June 1992, the members of the parliament
decided not to change the character and structure of the
state. They left the final decision for the new parliament,
which was created after the elections. This policy seemed
to be a big mistake, because it allowed for the possibility
of an autocratic regime in 1994 to 1998, but also the
cardinal delay of public administration reform in comparing
with other post-communist states.
In the period between 1992 to 1995, there were some
attempts to continue the preparation of the reform, but
without any real result. The following two reasons are
important:
• An independent Slovak republic was created on 1 January
1993 by the constitutional law adopted by the Federal
Assembly of the Czech and the Slovak Federative
republic. The government and the parliament were
focused mainly on creating the structures of a new
state, and its central bodies,
• The destabilization of the political scene. In the spring
of 1994, Prime Minister V. Meciar was dismissed
again, the new government was appointed for six
months and new elections of the National Council of
the Slovak Republic (parliament) were held in autumn
1994. The HZDS won the election again and Meciar
returned to the position of Prime Minister.3
The Ministry of Interior organized the work on the reform
between 1992 to 1996, aided by the special commission,
headed by the Deputy Prime Minister. This commission
was cancelled and only the Ministry of Interior organized
the works after the power changes, with the clear support
of the majority in parliament, mainly after the 1994 elections.
The law on territorial and administrative arrangement of
the Slovak Republic and the law on local state administ-
ration were approved in the first half of 1996. The presi-
dent of the Slovak Republic sent back both these laws
with comments for new discussion and approval, but they
were approved again in an unchanged form. The ruling
political parties were talking about public administration
reform and decentralization, in fact there was only the
state administration reform, because the new structure of
the local state administration was established (district and
county state administration bodies). They did not consider
the transfer of competencies and powers to the self-govern-
ment. Within the new territorial and administration
arrangement, 121 circuits and circuit offices were cancelled.
From 38 districts 79 new districts were created and also 8
new counties and county offices. At the same time, in
spite of the attempt to integrate local state administration,
23 network of the specialized local state administration
remained. The law led to the creation of the second level
of self-government within the county areas, but decent-
ralization of the competencies and finances remained
unsolved. This ‘reform’ was approved in spite of serious
reservations and disagreement not only from the experts,
but also from the citizens of Slovakia. The realization of
the reform stopped after this change of the state admi-
nistration structure in that election period. The government
prepared the draft law on the regional self-government,
but it did not contain the real decentralization of the com-
petencies and political powers. It was denied not only by
the parliamentary opposition and representatives of the
self-government (their resistance turned to open demonst-
rations), but also by the representatives of the Council of
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The basic contents are:
• Continuation and realization of ‘dual model’ of public
administration,
• The framework list of the competencies, which will
be decentralized from the state administration to the
self-government,
• The time schedule of the preparation and realization
of the reform,
• Organization of the next preparation.
In the government resolution to this document, the pleni-
potentiary was given the task to work out the Concept of
decentralization and modernization of public administration,
that   described detailed individual reform processes,
together with the tasks and time schedule their realization
by individual ministries. During the preparation of the
Concept, 24 meetings took place in the regions of Slovakia
with the participation of the representatives of the local
state administration, local self-government, NGO-s and
the citizens. The range of decentralization of the compe-
tencies, they’re financing, inter-municipal cooperation and
changes of the territorial arrangement were discussed.
These seminars were organized to keep the public informed
about the preparation of the public administration reform,
approved by the government and supported by the Cana-
dian government. Several expert teams existed during that
period, supervised by the plenipotentiary and supported
by the Phare program. They worked on the solution of
the partial reforms.  The Concept was worked out and
submitted in January 2000. The first, coalition council
dealt with it, and, in spite of the previous intentions, put
this document to the process of inter-ministerial comment
procedure and to discuss it in the government advisory
bodies. It was done by the left-parties SDL (democratic
left party) and SOP (party of citizen’s understanding).
This material was worked out and submitted to the govern-
ment in January 2000. The government approved it in
April 2000; in the government resolution to this document
concrete tasks and concrete terms for their realization were
given to the individual ministries. The government ap-
pointed the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs
to be a coordinator of the works related to the public ad-
ministration reform within the government. The mandate
of the plenipotentiary was prolonged for the period of
the next preparation and realization of the reform.6
The reform, as mentioned above, consisted of four com-
ponents:
• New territorial arrangement of the Slovak Republic.
• Decentralization of the competence, finance and poli-
tical power.
š š
Europe. After that, the coalition withdrew the proposal
from the parliament. This step had also its political back-
ground. The coalition leaned more to the centralist model
of the state and realization of the elections to the regional
bodies before parliamentary elections was raising the risk
of failure for ruling parties.
In political outlines to the coalition agreement and in the
program of the next—Dzurinda’s coalition government,
after the 1998 elections, a new obligation appeared—to
continue and bring to an end the public administration
reform. The government, due to its program would realize
the decentralization and consider a need of the new ter-
ritorial arrangement of the Slovak Republic. By the app-
roving of the government program, members of parlia-
ment obliged the government to submit the conceptual
document on the continuation of the reform measures,
till the end of June 1999. First, the Ministry of Interior
was given this task, but then the decision was changed
and the position of government plenipotentiary was
created to deal with the decentralization and public admi-
nistration reform. The past experiences showed that if
such a wide process, as public administration reform is
managed only by one government resort, it does not bring
the effective results.
The plenipotentiary (Viktor Niznansky´) was appointed for
the purpose of reaching the cross-cutting approach and
the preparation and organization of the reform process
and including the non-government institutions to the
process of preparing the reform. The main task of the
plenipotentiary was to prepare and submit conceptual
documents for necessary political decisions4  at the level
of coalition political parties, government and parliament.
The plenipotentiary was given by the government the task
to work out and submit The Strategy of Public Administra-
tion Reform. It was a complex framework document, which
outlined the basic way and mechanism of the reform pro-
cess. For the acquittal of this task, the plenipotentiary
created a team of experts, self-government representatives
and NGO representatives. Also foreign experts partici-
pated in the work within Phare support programs and
other support programs. At this stage, coalition parties
appointed their experts, who were informed about the whole
process and they had to inform their political parties. The
series of discussions about the possibilities of the reform
within individual sectors5  was part of the preparation.
This document was worked out and submitted to the coa-
lition council and government in May 1999. The govern-
ment approved it and related resolution in August 1999.
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• The reform of the institutions (bodies) of the public
administration—creation of the second level of the self-
government, cancellation of the district offices and re-
organization of the local state administration and re-
organization of the central state administration bodies.
• Modernization—there were some principles of related
concepts submitted in the Concept—education of
the employees in public administration, informatics,
management, but also the control in public administ-
ration (auditing). The Concept contained the reform
principles of the central bodies and the central govern-
ment with the aim first to realize a rationalization
within the existing structure and then, in the second
phase, the radical change of the structure of the central
bodies will be realized. The project of ‘Audit of the
central state administration bodies and their financ-
ing’ was based on this idea (‘audit’). Further, the rela-
tionships within public administration, mainly those
related to labor law, were provided individually by
the new acts on the state service and civil service.  The
project of the audit is still realized under the super-
vision of the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs Ivan Miklos. The government resolution was
the result of the audit, it contains more than 50 indi-
vidual tasks for various central state bodies, further,
there are the recommendations for the cancellation
or unification of some organizations, that are founded
by central state bodies. There are proposals for pri-
vatization of operation of some of these organizations
and proposals for a change in the way of financing
such organizations and operations. There was a bigger
problem in the preparation of new draft laws on state
service and civil service. The preparation of these drafts
was the task of the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs
and Family. This Ministry is due to a coalition agree-
ment—in the hands of the post-communistic SDL
(democratic left party), the philosophy of these drafts
was mainly about conserving the contemporary status,
or to reach a status, when to make any personal changes
would be very difficult, also  dispensing with excess
clerks. Also the possibilities for attracting young, well
educated people to public administration were not
included to these drafts, as well as the system of the
‘fast track’ for these people, ... These ministerial drafts
were refused mainly by the Deputy Minister for Eco-
nomic Affairs, who, together with his team elaborated
the alternatives to the individual provisions of the draft
laws. These basic discrepancies caused by that the
preparation and approval of these acts in the govern-
ment took too long and the process was too compli-
cated. Finally, there was a compromise reached on the
special meeting of the government in March 2001;
both of the acts were approved and then also by the
parliament, in the summer. The object of the act on
state service is the regulation of the law relations by
providing state service. There are the rights and obliga-
tions of the state and state servant related to the state
service. The civil service,  according to the law, is a perfor-
mance of the work in the public interest, related to
local self-government. Further, the law provides the
civil service and the relations related to the labor law to
those employees, which are different legal entities active
in the area of public administration. The government
individually discussed and approved the concept of
education, the new informatics system started to be
realized (mainly within state administration—Govnet
system), the concept of the control (auditing) was elabo-
rated, which still has not been discussed in the govern-
ment, but some provisions were included to several laws.
The process was significantly reduced in its speed after
the concept’s approval. Mainly the left part of the coalition
started to put up barriers, in spite of their confirmation
of the basic documents in the government. The SDL was
changing their statements to the issues of the territorial
arrangement, speed of the reform process, using its in-
fluence in the ministries, managed by the ministers nomi-
nated by SDL.
Due to ever increasing delays, the realization of the time
schedule for individual tasks became more and more un-
realistic. Finally, the discussion about the next continuation
of the reform became the discussion about the new ter-
ritorial arrangement of Slovakia, in spite of the complexity
of the concept. The government approved two resolutions
related to the proposed change and both confirmed this
proposal. The coalition political parties did not reach the
agreement, because the left parties were changing their
opinions and the SMK (Hungarian coalition party) pre-
ferred their own idea of territorial arrangement, mainly
in the second half of 2000. These caused disagreements,
the concept was not submitted to the parliament and the
political decisions were made by discussing and approving
the new laws related to starting the public administration
reform in 2001.
In the spring of 2001, the government approved several
laws, which were submitted to the parliament for the next
legislative procedure. The discussion about the new terri-
torial arrangement became really acute. The new proposed
model predicted the existence of three levels of public
administration (municipality, region and state), providing
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existing elected bodies on all three levels. The new 12-
unit arrangement of Slovakia, the so-called ‘zupy’ was
recommended. This division respected historical and
natural regions created over the centuries. The left part
of the coalition (Democratic left party and the part of the
Party of citizen understanding) changed its mind several
times and finally joined the opposition in favor of pre-
venting the 1996 model, which the SDL voted against at
that time. The post communist joined the opposition at
the voting in the parliament and outvoted the rest of coa-
lition After this voting in the parliament the plenipoten-
tiary resigned from his position7  and the Deputy Prime
Minister for Economic Affairs gave up his coordination
role.
In September and October 2001, parliament approved
laws related to decentralization, but their content does
not always correspond with the Concept as initial material
for the next reform process. After the discussion, which
took several months, the Ministry of Interior was given
the coordination role.
The bodies of the new regions will be created in the
election in 1 December 2001. They will initiate their
functions, at the start of 2002. The competencies and the
property, necessary for their activities will be transferred
in several stages between 2002 and 2004. The new system
of financing of the self-government is anticipated in
January 2002. The transferred tasks will be financed by
the subsidies until that time.
THE DESCRIPTION
OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REFORM MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Period of 1990–1992
The first changes in the state took place before the first free
elections. Based on the government resolution, the Ministry
of Interior was given the task to consider and work out a
new model and structure of the local public administration
bodies, which will replace existing national committees.
The national committees were the only bodies of public
administration. The government decided to cancel the
structure of national committees—local, district and
county in the summer of 1990. This decision was based
on analysis from the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry
of Interior proposed to abolish the system of the national
committees and divide the public administration to elected
self-government and appointed state administra-tion. There
is a need to highlight one of the basic tools of managing
the reform process, which was used later and still is.
The government, due to the Constitution, approves the
decisions as a whole body. Only this body is entitled to
give the tasks to ministries or other central state bodies
and requires the fulfillment. This can only be done accord-
ing to the approved law. The parliament approved the
law on organization of the ministries and the other central
state bodies (further ‘competency law’) in 1990. This law
regulates the activities of the ministries and the other central
state bodies as well as the relations among them. But
according to this law, no one individual ministry can give
the task to each other and require the fulfillment; the same
about the Deputy Prime Minister. So the basic and the
most used order is to approve the government resolution,
where the tasks are already given to the ministries and
also the term of the fulfillment (and sometimes the duty
to report about it to the government).
Just because the Ministry of Interior is respons-ible for
the internal state administration, due to the competency
law (central state body in the area of internal administ-
ration), the government gave (and then was giving) the
tasks related to the changes within the public administ-
ration just to this ministry. The ministry to that respons-
ible only to the government.
In relation to the public administration reform, we do
not consider this mechanism of managing as an efficient
one. The public administration reform is too wide a process
and the cross-cutting approach and coordination within
the state administration, it is also necessary externally.
After the 1990 election, the government decided in its
program to continue with the process of changes in the
public administration, its decentralization and democrati-
zation. Three expert work groups were created, which had to
consider the new territorial arrangement and the future
optimal model of the public administration in Slovakia.
The Ministry of Finance created the first one, the Ministry
of Interior created the second one. The third one was
created in the parliament by the resolution of the Slovak
National Council.8
The government appointed at the same time the Commis-
sion of the Slovak government for solving the public administ-
ration and the territorial and administration arrangement.
This commission reviewed all the three projects and chose
the most suitable. It was the one worked out by the parlia-
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mentary work group. Then the government appointed
the new members of the commission to solve the problems
public administration, besides the members of the govern-
ment the representatives of the self-governments and the
experts form the NGO-s were included. Also the chairman
of the representative association of the self-governments
(ZMOS–The Association of the Towns and Villages)
became a member. The Deputy Prime Minister was the
head of the commission, the minister of interior was his
deputy. The government resolution that created this
commission gave to the commission concrete tasks and
the time schedule for their fulfillment, to work out the
laws and their submission to the parliament.
The new element appeared during this period in
the area of managing the reform process: the
creation the cross-cutting commissions, which had
a more complex approach to the problem and
such a commission could consider the problem
from several points of view. This was not only
about the primary relation between the govern-
ment and the Ministry of Interior. The new com-
mission could review several different alterna-
tives, because the parliament was also included
in the process through its expert group. At the
time of giving the commission its tasks, the
Deputy Prime Minister was responsible to the
government, also the minister of interior who
acted on his behalf. The basic relation and com-
munication between the wide work body and
the government was preserved. The next new ele-
ment was enlisting the experts to the process.
Who did not come from the government or the
parliament? They could influence the process as
members of the government commission, in
which the representatives of the NGO-s and the
self-government were involved.
The proposals, as the results of the work of the commission,
were submitted to the parliament, which had to approve
the laws necessary for starting the reform process. That
political representation decided not to approve such prin-
ciple decisions so close to the parliamentary elections
(summer 1992); they left this decision to the parliament,
which would come from the elections. The new govern-
ment, after its formation revoked the time schedule of the
works on the public administration reform. It stopped
the process of the systematic changes, the government
forbade the recruitment of new staff into the public admi-
nistration, and ordered the lowering of budgets to the
local state administration proportionally. This was done
through the government resolution.
In that period, lots of foreign institutions helped us, also in
the area of the public administration reform. The government
created The Government Center for Coordination of the Pro-
grams of the Foreign Support in Public Administration for
better order and to use these programs effectively.  The
Ministry of Interior was responsible for setting up the center,
and the Ministry of International Relations co-operated
with this center in its foreign activities. This was the first
attempt to coordinate the foreign support for the purposes
of its effectiveness. This center did not do any meaningful
activities until after the 1992 elections and was later cancelled.
Period of 1992—1998
After the 1992 elections, the development focused on the
separation of Czechoslovakia, so the problems of public
administration reform were pushed back. Based on the
constitutional law approved by the federal parliament,
the Czech Republic and the Slovak republic became two
independent states from January 1, 1993. Then the state
and its representatives focused on building the structures
of a new state, which were necessary to act, because the ma-
jority of the (mainly federal) bodies had its seats in Prague.
The government started to deal with the reform again in
August 1993. The head of the government commission for
solving the public administration and territorial arrangement
had to work out and submit to the government the report on
the progress of the work on the concept of the local public
administration. The head of the commission was at the
same time the Deputy Prime Minister; he was given by
the government resolution the task to submit the proposal
of the concept of the local and regional self-government.
This concept was approved in October 1993 by the
government; together with the time schedule for the pre-
paration and the realization of the concept was approved.
Within this government resolution the Deputy Prime
Minister—the head of the commission and the other
members of the government were given the concrete tasks
to work out the draft laws, which would be submitted
due to the time schedule to the government and parlia-
ment. It was quite complex document, which would bring,
as a result, the creation of regional level of the self-govern-
ment and start the process of the decentralization from
the state administration bodies to the self-governments.
The concept was submitted to the parliament, to make
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the members of the parliament familiar with this document,
which was the starting point of the reform.
At that time, the mechanism of the work of the
govern-ment commission still functioned. There
was a possibility to comment and change deve-
loping materials. Through this commission, the
external experts could comment and influence
the documents that were developed at that time.
The next managing procedure was as follows:
also the legislative intents, which would be sub-
mitted by the indi-vidual ministers to the govern-
ment, were first submitted to the Deputy Prime
Minister as head of the commission. This allowed
the previously mentioned external experts to
comment on the ‘pure government’ materials.
It was at that time, substantial element in the
process of manage-ment and coordination of the
works necessary to start the public administration
reform.
The problems arose within the government at the end of
1993 and they culminated in the political crisis within
the ruling party (HZDS). Roman Kováè, Deputy Prime
Minister and the head of the commission for public
administration reform was one of Meèiar’s critics.
Based on the government resolution, the concept of the
public administration reform was withdrawn from parlia-
ment in January 1994. In March 1994, some of the tasks
were removed from the deputy Prime Minister and were
given to the minister of interior. This was, in fact, the end
of the work of the commission, which provided the cross-
cutting approach. The next work would be done under
the leadership of the minister of interior. Nothing concrete
was realized, because the crisis ended by the removal of
Meèiar and his government. Then the president appointed
the new government with Jozef Moravèík as Prime
Minister. The next parliamentary elections were declared
to be held in September 1994.
The new government renewed the activity of the government
commission for public administration reform and re-appointed
the Deputy Prime Minister as its head. The Deputy Prime
Minister (head of the commission) was given the task of
submitting to the government a complex concept of orga-
nization and working of the public administration and a
proposal for the fulfillment of the remaining related tasks
in May 1994.
The head of the commission submitted to the government
the report on the state of the tasks related to public admi-
nistration reform in June 1994. The ministries and the
other central state bodies were given the duty to cooperate
with the government commission. The materials, which
had to be worked out, would be first submitted to the head
of the commission. The mechanism of managing the
reform process was renewed again, other state structures
also cooperated on the work of the reform. The third sector
experts actively took part in this work. The opinions (com-
ments) of these experts made there way to the commission
through its members, also materials submitted by its head
to the government.
Also the new element appeared in the managing
of the reform process. The Deputy Prime Minis-
ter was given the task to inform the government
on the works related to decentralization every
three months in the year’s between1995 to 1996.
The parliamentary elections were held in September 1994.
The winner the HZDS formed a new government coa-
lition together with SNS (Slovak national party) and the
ZRS (Association of the workers of Slovakia) in December
1994. The personnel changes were held at all levels of the
state administration. Only after this ‘cleaning process,’
did the government parties start to deal with the administ-
ration reform process.
In February 1995, the government abolished the Govern-
ment commission for solving the public administration and
territorial arrangement of the Slovak Republic. Several go-
vernment resolutions of the previous governments were
cancelled, those related to the public administration reform
and the time schedule of the realization of individual tasks.
Also the reports of the government commission, comp-
leted with its information (also the result of the coope-
ration with external experts) were cancelled. The Ministry
of Interior was the only body coordinating the public
administration reform works, responsible only to the
government. The new element appeared in the managing
process. The government created a new advisory body
the Council of the government for the public administ-
ration. The representatives of the ministries were ap-
pointed as the members together with only one represen-
tative of the local self-government.
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The Council of the government for public admi-
nistration is the advisory body of the government.
The members were appointed mainly from the
representatives of the central state administration
bodies. The head of the Council is the minister
of interior. Its activity does not relate only to ad-
ministration reform, but the public administ-
ration as a whole. This body does not approve
the decisions it approves only the recommenda-
tions, which have only the advisory character.
In comparison to the previous commission, the
council does not work out its own documents, it
only comments on worked out documents, which
would be inserted for the meetings of the govern-
ment. It is a’ harmless’ body, dealing with the
technical details, not the conceptual aspect of
the documents.
In October 1995, the government took into consideration
the report of the minister of interior on the works on
public administration reform and the statement of the
Council of the government for public administration to
the proposal of the works on the reform. The individual
ministries and central state bodies were charged with
working out a concrete analysis, which will review the
brand new public administration model, which was not
compatible with the previous works. After these analyses
working out the ministry of Interior would elaborate the
process of the works on the local public administration
reform, completed with these analyses. The government
resolution contained also the time schedule for the
individual tasks.
In the area of the management, a substantive change
appeared. The wider expert team did not elabo-
rate on the future model of the public administ-
ration to submit to the government for approval.
The government approved the model and then
the ministries and central state bodies were given
the concrete tasks for its realization. It was the
movement from the mechanism of the expert
discussions and consensus to directive mecha-
nisms based on the previous political decision.
Based on the works realized in the autumn of 1995, the
parliament approved two laws elaborated by the Ministry
of Interior, which were discussed by the advisory body
(Council of the government for public administration),
in the first half of 1996. These 2 laws were:
• First, the law on territorial and administration arrange-
ment of the Slovak Republic.
• Second, the law on the organization of the local state
administration in the Slovak Republic. At the same
time the laws presently in place were cancelled. The
government introduced this innovation, as the de-
centralization of the public administration, in fact
there was only partial de-concentration of the decision
procedures from the central state bodies to the local state
administration bodies. But no second level of the elected
self-government was created and no strengthening of
the local self-government was done. Related to the tech-
niques of the reform management, nothing changed.
The Ministry of Interior also elaborated on the draft law
on regional self-government. Strong resistance arose against
its creation within the 8 states, not just from the experts,
but also from among self-government representatives. The
government was afraid of losing its position and support
in the next election, this draft was withdrawn and was
not submitted again until the end of the election period
(autumn 1998). In the area of the public administration
reform nothing relevant was done until the formation of
Mikulás Dzurinda’s government. There was nothing to
manage, when no reform was realized.
Period of 1998–2001
One of the priorities of the new government was to con-
tinue the process of public administration reform, realize
the real decentralization and consider the necessity of change
of the territorial arrangement. The National Council of
the Slovak Republic gave the task to the government—to
submit to the parliament the strategy of the next prepara-
tion and realization of the reform. The Ministry of Interior
was given this task first. But then, in February 1999, the
government changed its previous decision and appointed the
government plenipotentiary for public administration reform
and approved his status. Due to his status, the Prime
Minister controlled the activity of the plenipotentiary.
From the management’s point of view, the next
new element appeared—the government plenipo-
tentiary was appointed just for this purpose.
With his appointment, the cross-cutting app-
roach was reached, which is necessary for such a
wide reform. The plenipotentiary was not em-
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powered by any powers to influence the work of
individual ministries. His task was to prepare the
conceptual documents, provide the cooperation
with non-government sector and submit the
documents to the government advisory bodies.
His position was more political than executive.
The plenipotentiary submitted the strategy of the next
reform process in May 1999; the government approved
the resolution to that in August 1999. In total there were
12 strategy discussions, which were held in Bratislava and
organized by M.E.S.A.10. Approximately 600 experts
participated, including ministers, state secretaries, repre-
sentatives of the parliament, state administration, self-
government etc. Following that, the government gave
another task to the plenipotentiary, to work out the Concept
of the decentralization and modernization of the public
administration.9 There were 32 discussions held across
Slovakian regions, with representatives of the local state
administration, local self-government and also the citizens.
The Concept also contained the concrete tasks, concrete
procedures, which would be done, in cooperation with
the plenipotentiary, and also the time schedule. The works
were planned to continue to this time schedule. After long
discussions within the inter-ministerial commenting
procedure, the government approved this document in
April 2000. The concrete tasks with the time schedule
were given to individual ministries by the government
resolution. The coordination of these tasks was given to
the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and
the status of the plenipotentiary was changed, too. The
above-mentioned Deputy Prime Minister took over his
functions from there on. The documents, elaborated by
the plenipotentiary, were submitted to the government
through the Deputy Prime Minister.
From the initial approval of the strategy every
decision tended to weaken the cross-cutting app-
roach. The position of the plenipotentiary was
also reduced by the fact, that he was not given
any concrete tasks, (he just participated on the
tasks of the Deputy Prime Minister) and the posi-
tion of the Deputy Prime Minister was not
strengthened towards individual central state ad-
ministration bodies. He could only coordinate
their activities and use the government meetings
to correct those proposals, which were submitted
by individual ministries and were in contradic-
tion to the Concept.
In the summer of 2000, the plenipotentiary elaborated
the initiative document, submitted by the Deputy Prime
Minister to the government. The reason was the lack of
respect for the government resolution related to the
Concept of the decentralization. The ministries were given
the tasks to elaborate the projects of the decentralization
of the competencies to the self-government within indi-
vidual resorts, due to the Concept and to the resort reforms
(of education, health-care, social affairs etc). These projects
were not efficiently elaborated on, they were (1) overdue
and (2) not in line with the concept as it was stated in the
government resolution. At that time (autumn 2000), the
unwillingness of the state bodies to realize the reform and
give up the competencies in favor of the self-government
started to appear more and more often. The individual
ministries started to fulfill their tasks related to the reform
only ‘pro-forma.’
The aim of the initiative material was to create the condi-
tions for quicker and more effective coordination of the
reform process. Contents of the material came out from
the government resolution related to the Concept of the
decentralization. By this resolution, the Deputy Prime
Minister was given the coordination role at the reform
process. Due to the Concept, some of the institutions,
providing the reform process were proposed:
• The coordination and expert unit within the Office
of the Government;
• The coordination group;
• The deputy Prime Minister for Legislative;
• The council of the government for public administ-
ration;
• The central state administration bodies;
• Contact persons in the state administration bodies.
The coordination and expert unit within the Office
of the Government
Would provide for the Deputy Prime Minister
for Economic Affairs following   activities:
• Coordination of the works on the prepara-
tion and realization of the reform (consulta-
tions, discussions, time coordination);
• Considering the materials elaborated by in-
dividual central state administration bodies
from the Concept point of view;
• Expertise reviews, preparation of the alterna-
tive solutions;
• Coordination of the foreign support, part-
nership in the support programs;
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• Propagation of the reform, information of
the state and course of the reform.
The unit had two employees: project manager
the head of the unit and the coordinator of the
foreign support, mass-media policy.
The external experts cooperated with the unit in
the area of the legislative agenda, economy, finance,
regionalizing and mass media policy.
The sources of the financing of the unit:
• Two employees: salaries paid by the Office
of the Government;
• External experts: from the support programs;
• Space and technical equipment: office of the
Government.
Coordination group
had the following tasks:
• Discussing the materials submitted to the
government;
• The recommendations and suggestions to
the expert unit;
• Reviewing the political, economic and social
suitability of the proposed solutions.
The members of the coordination group were:
• The chairman: Deputy Prime Minister for
Economic Affairs Ivan Miklos
• Members: state secretaries from: Ministry
of Interior, Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Education, Ministry of Labor, Social
Affairs and Family, Ministry of Construc-
tion and Regional Development, the repre-
sentative of ZMOS (Association of towns
and villages of Slovakia), government pleni-
potentiary for public administration reform.
Deputy Prime Minister for Legislation
Due to government resolution coordinates the
legislative works on the preparation of public
administration reform with the works on the pre-
paration of the amendment to the Constitution,
election laws and the proposal of the constitu-
tional act on the security, due to the Concept of
the decentralization and modernization of the
public administration.
Council of the government for public administration
The tasks due to its statute.
Central state administration bodies
Due to government resolution Nr. 230/2000
(related to the Concept):
• Implementation of the decentralization and
modernization;
• Elaborating the projects of transferring the
competencies due to the Concept and resort
reforms;
• The preparation of the legislative intentions
and laws;
• The preparation of the list of laws touched
by the process of decentralization.
The contact persons (the office) on the central state
administration bodies
Will provide: implementation of the reform of
the relevant ministry, information about the
impact of the proposed solutions of decentraliza-
tion, contact and cooperation with the coordi-
nation and expert unit, with the representatives
of the support programs.
This government resolution was cancelled in November
2001, when the ministry of Interior was given the coor-
dination role again. The change of the organization and
realization of the reform was caused by the voting of the
parliament on the first two laws related to the public admi-
nistration reform in July 2001. This voting was followed
by the resignation of the plenipotentiary and the Deputy
Prime Minister giving up the coordination role. During
this period, the following documents were elaborated and
approved by the government:
• The starting points of the public administration reform
financing due to the Concept,
• The general outlook of the expenses related to the
public administration reform,
• The list of articles of the Constitution and the laws
touched by the process of the decentralization,
• The proposal for solving the status of the ombuds-
man,
• The alternative proposal for arrangement of the local
state administration,
• The proposal for inter-municipal cooperation,
• The projects for transferring of competencies from
state administration to the self-government,
• The project for finding solutions and time schedule
for the realization of public administration.
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Figure 1
The Scheme of the Reform Management Valid Since June 2000 until October 2001
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During the preparation of the laws related to public ad-
ministration reform, no special techniques of management
or coordination were used. The relevant ministries worked
out the documents, based on the government resolution.
The Ministry of Interior elaborated the amendment to
the municipal law, the Ministry of Finance elaborated
the laws related to the property and financing.
There was also an important role for the foreign partners
and donors within the process. There are several projects
completed and other on-going projects aided by foreign
support. The first group is connected to pre-accession
support, related to the preparation of Slovakia for EU
accession, and the second group of donors is concerned
with supporting bilateral agreements. Their support is not
only aimed at the central level, but also local public
administration. This support is focused on the govern-
mental (state) institutions and the first group supports
independent NGO-s also.
Several projects have been financed within pre-accession
support from the EU Phare fund. During the Mikulás
Dzurinda period of government there was: Assistance for
the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic,
which contained specifications of the strategy of decent-
ralization and modernization of public administration due
to the strategy formulated by the government plenipoten-
tiary for decentralization and modernization of public ad-
ministration, elaboration and proposal of optimal struc-
ture of public administration, professional attitude of civil
servants, improvement of services delivery; the other was
a support project to the National program of decentrali-
zation and modernization of public administration in the
Slovak Republic—implementation of the project Audit.
The project contained the whole coordination of the audit
implementation, monitoring of the audit process, general
advisory to the ministries in the area of audit, preparation
of the conceptual materials related to transparency of
relations among central state bodies and subordinated
organizations (annual reports, public bills, contracts, etc)
the preparation of the conceptual materials to the transfor-
mation of such organizations (concept, law), draft to the
law on public procurement, realization of the concept in
the form of pilot projects and other works; the other larger
project is the Twinning project, which is running right
now, realized by the consortium of the states of Spain,
Great Britain and France and it is focused on the support
of the process of reform, legislative area, control (auditing)
area, education in public administration, improvement
of the management of services delivery.
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The other projects, which have to be mentioned, are: project
supported by the British Department for International
Development (government agency), which is realized
together with the British organization Public Administ-
ration International and is focused on various aspects of
modernization in public administration, for example: fast
tracks, public procurement, education, quality of the
services, ... And there are also some other foreign donors,
which have to be mentioned, too, because of their support
the programs within public administration: USAID,
UNDP, CIDA—Canadian Urban Institute, Dutch Royal
Embassy, British know-how Fund, and many more.
In September 2001, the National Council of the Slovak
Republic approved one of the most important decentra-
lization laws, the law on the transfer of some competencies
from the state bodies to municipalities and upper-tier
territorial units, so called ‘little competency law.’ Its pre-
paration was quite complicated and from the coordination
point of view quite nonstandard. The relevant ministries
were given the task to elaborate the proposals of the com-
petency decentralization within their resorts. These pro-
posals would be submitted to the Ministry of Interior;
this ministry had to summarize these proposals and submit
it to the government as one united law. The first proposals
were really poor; the content of the competencies was not
in line with the Concept. Then the Prime Minister himself
took the initiative. The work group was duly appointed,
it is made up of state secretaries from the relevant ministries
concerned. This work group had to work out brand new
proposal, which would correspond with the Concept as
much as possible. The Prime Minister personally super-
vised the work of this group and the result of this work
was submitted to the government after he had expressed
his satisfaction. From the coordination and management
technique’s point of view, such a procedure is not unusual,
but even non-standard (the Prime Minister can not super-
vise the preparation of every law).
After approving the organization law on the regional self-
government, election law and ‘little competency law’, the
new additional laws were approved by the parliament in
October 2001: the law on regional property, the amend-
ment to the law on municipal property, the amendment
to the municipal law and the amendment to the law on
budgetary rules.
The approval of these laws could be considered as a start
of the public administration decentralization process.
However, it does not mean, that the principles approved
by the government within the strategy and Concept were
involved. The laws (maybe except election laws) have
several deficiencies, the competencies between the state
administration and self-government is too divided, creat-
ing space for the state administration to intervene in the
functioning of the self-government (breaking the principle
of subsidiary). Some of the problems are for example the
new arrangement of the state administration on all levels
is still not definitely decided (breaking of the principles
of effectiveness, rationality and transparency). Also the
fiscal decentralization was not realized, the funds for public
administration would be divided still through the state
budget. The state bodies, in several cases, restrict the self-
government bodies in their ownership rights (based on
the law, but non-constitutionally).
Related to the management of the reform process today,
we cannot talk about the cross-cutting management and
coordination of this process. The legislative proposals are
being prepared separately by the relevant Related Ministry,
approved by the government, and passed to the parliament
where, within the coalition, some space for the possible
changes will be agreed. It is the result of processing the
quick and strength reform that had not been done, and
have the political decision about the phased process of
the decentralization. The process of decentralization will
proceed over several years, phase by phase.
THE SUMMARY
The reasons for the proposed complex changes in public
administration:
a) Request for more efficient public administration,
b) Necessity of the increase of the economy of state and
its lower self-governed units,
c) Need for the reform of functioning of state administ-
ration,
d) Tendencies of the Slovak Republic to enter into united
economic and safety area.
The analysis of the state of public administration showed
its real deficiencies:
a) The model of public administration and centralist
managing of the state remains unfinished,
b) Absence of quality control system in public administ-
ration,
c) Increase of ineffective costs in public administration
caused by its structure,
d) Lack of diligence in the process of managing on all levels,
e) Ignoring generally accepted principles of financing
of local self-government (the Slovak Republic did not
229
ratify article No. 9 of the European Charter of local
self-government),
f ) Local self-government could not participate in re-
gional development because of inefficient distribution
of competencies,
g) There was no suitable educational system for the civil
servants,
h) Existing territorial arrangement had a negative in-
fluence on social and territorial organization of the
Slovak society,
i) Not only did citizens have little or no knowledge, but
also representatives of public administration, its status
and tasks in new conditions.
The real success of this government coalition is the moving
up of the decentralization and public administration reform
process. The government had achieved what no other
government or parliament had done since 1990. The Slovak
Republic will have elected self-government bodies on the
second level, for the first time for several decades. At the
same time, Slovakia progressed within the pre-accession
process towards NATO and European Union.
But looking at the circumstances and expert potential, which
this coalition disposed of, we have to state its failing in
some intentions, some of them were only half-successful.
The aim of the coalition was to realize four reforms. The
form and technique of the management would be modified
to that. Mainly the cross-cutting approach would be
strengthened and the agenda of the Prime Minister, or
appointed Deputy Prime Minister (or alternatively, creat-
ing the minister ‘without chair’ responsible for the reforms
and taking out the relevant competencies from the
individual ministries at the same time). During the eleven-
year reform preparation, almost all the governments begun
this way, but after some time, the preparation was returned
back to the Ministry of Interior.10
The necessary decisions, which were to be performed, had
its political and expert-political character, but the political
decisions must be done before the expert-political ones.
The disagreements among the coalition parties in the
political part of the reform (the agreement on the territorial
re-arrangement, speed of the reform, election system) caused
the prolonging of the preparation stage and complications
in the effective management process. Later, when there
was a danger of coalition splitting, the decisions were
approved very quickly without any chance to influence
their quality, it was impossible to manage it suitably. The
original intention composed over 2 years, will take consi-
derably longer, and if the next government does not take
measures to speed up the process. The seed and timing of
the reform steps are very important elements for the suc-
cessful project.
In spite of the partial progress, there are several areas in
public administration reform, which remained unfulfilled
due to the concept and they are still waiting to be solved:
• Replace centralized, segmental, scattered and bureau-
cratic system by decentralized, territorially integrated
system, set on political responsibility of elected re-
presentative system. To change the system, its charac-
ter from centralized to decentralize.
• Spreading the decentralized competencies and
elimination of divided competencies between state
administration and self-government,
• Decentralization of the public finance by the streng-
thening of the original revenues of the self-govern-
ment,
• New system of finance balancing,
• Continuing in the privatization of the property and
activities,
• Reconstruction of the local state administration
(cancellation of the district offices),
• Reconstruction of the central state administration
bodies,
• Change of territorial arrangement,
• Local self-government reform,
• Creating changes in the election system for the
National Council of the Slovak Republic.
The preparation and realization of the Public administ-
ration reform is insufficient, mainly in the decentralization
process, which has its own political background. And the
permanent dispute about the character of the state, bet-
ween the followers of the HZDS (right) and party followers
from the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union,
Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Party,
the Hungary Coalition Party and the flexible policy of
the (left) parties, Democratic left party and party of Citizen
Understanding expressed in the regular changes of the
government and ruling groups. From this point of view,
the first move of the decentralization process since 1990,
as well as in the modernization of public administration
(the change of the legal environment, the laws on state
service and civil service, educational process, etc.), is the
success in such a political surroundings.
Another issue, which arose, was the difficulty of realizing
the reforms within a wider coalition that consists of the
members from the whole political spectrum. Coalition
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parties created a ‘coalition council,’ for considering staunch
decisions. This body adopted political decisions before
discussing important materials in government; every one
in the party had a right of veto. This process led to many
positive compromises, but on the other hand it caused
delays regarding substantial changes and in many cases
large deformations of original proposals. In the case of
public administration reform, many issues, already
approved by the government were reviewed again in the
coalition council. It was also caused by the composition
of the coalition council, where the ‘decisive voice’ belonged
to the heads of political parties and heads of political clubs
in the parliament. These people were not bound by the
government resolutions. A Very good example is a dispute
about the change of the territorial arrangement. In spite
of dual approval by the government, SDL, SOP, but for
the some time also SMK (Hungary coalition party) were
blocking the possibility of the change in the parliament.
Following that, the special commission consisting of
experts and politicians of the government coalition was
created. This commission had to reach the compromise
proposal of the changes, commission failed, because of
lack of respect for the (SDL and SOP) the changes
supported by SMK and vice-versa. Finally, the proposal
was submitted to the government without agreement of
the coalition council, supported by SDKÚ (Slovak Chris-
tian and Democratic Union), KDH (Christian Democ-
ratic Union) and SMK. These parties have a majority in
the government, so the proposal was approved. As it turned
out the situation in parliament changed, where coalition
parties SDL and SOP joined the opposition and refused
governmental proposals of laws. Finally, the parliament
approved an opposition proposal, it means no change of
the territorial arrangement. It shows that there is one
coalition in the government and the other in the
parliament. In spite of the fact, that this breaks the
coalition agreement, the effort of Slovakia to join the EU
and NATO holds this coalition together. The sensitivity
of common progress of left and right parties is rising with
the closing end of election period. The approving of
unpopular measures shows that it is necessary to do it im-
mediately after the election period. The meaning of such
a step is much more important in the case of wide political
coalition.
The case study on the process of the public administration
reform can be used for the instruction mainly in the uni-
tary states, with the coalition governments consisted of
the right and left parties.
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NOTES
1 There is so called “dual model” of public administration created in Slovakia since 1990, so there are independent
bodies of the state administration and the self-government.
2 The second level of the self-government is called region in Slovakia. In fact, related to its powers, it has the character
of the second level of the self-government, as for example powiat (Poland), department (France), province (Spain),
but it is not like a länder (Germany, Austria), region (France, Italy), wojewodztwo (Poland).
3 Also in this time the political mistake was made, related to possible change of the character of state. After the fall of
Meciar’s government, the new one declared the election to be held in six months from the beginning of its functioning
without any reason. It was made on the impulse of Democratic left party (SDL), which believed in its election
success. The return of the previous power was allowed.
4 As the political decisions we can consider the change of the territorial arrangement and the fastness of the reform
steps.
5 Under the supervision of M.E.S.A.10 (NGO), 12 conferences took place in Bratislava, with the participation of
(approximately) 600 state administration representatives (ministers, state secretaries…), representatives of the
parliament, self-government, NGO-s and foreign experts. The results of these discussions were transferred to the
draft of the strategy and later the concept.
6 The Prime Minister coordinated the work of the government plenipotentiary at the preparation of the Strategy; in
the government resolution approved with the Concept, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs became a
coordinator since that time. Several models of the decentralization management were considered during preparation
of the Concept, but the composition of the coalition and coalition agreement did not allow the plenipotentiary to
have a stronger position.
7 The reasons for resigning were as follows: it was impossible to cooperate with non-solid coalition, leaving the
principles approved by the government in the concept and change the government draft laws by the parliament in
all reform proposals (territorial arrangement, the scope of decentralization, new structure of the local state
administration,).
8 Slovak National Council existed within Czechoslovakia, since January 1, 1993 it is National Council of Slovak
Republic.
9 The detailed related concepts (of education in public administration, of informatics, of the control (auditing), of the
financing), as well as the draft laws would have to be worked out by the individual central state bodies, following the
approved Concept.
10 The reasons: inability realize the reform right after the forming of the new government with the necessity of building
the wide coalitions with different ideas, differently oriented political parties of the coalition preferred their own
policy through their ministries, devaluing the meaning of the decentralization and public administration reform.
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